Chinese
总的来说，由于显现和意识二者都成立为无自性，因此无法成立“因是真实的”。即使暂时假定因，即色和识等是真实的，也不能因此使作为对境的虚假成为真实。例如，即使魔术欺骗了眼睛，对于知道那是魔术的人来说，虽然有魔术的显现，但丝毫不会产生认为那里有马、牛等的想法。同样，因为这里有泥土块、眼识和魔术师等因，所以也不会认为这是真实的。因此，对境本身直接在自己的位置上显现为真实存在，但通过与知道显现并非真实存在的事例进行比较，并不能否定这个事例的成立。这些都是从自释中清晰地解释出来的。第二，确立根本的理证方式，包括确立宗法和确立周遍。首先是确立真实的一异性，包括确立周遍的单一定和确立非周遍的单一定。首先是遮破周遍的单一定，包括遮破周遍的特殊单一定和遮破虚空等周遍的普遍单一定。首先是遮破常有实体的单一定，包括遮破补特伽罗的单一定。首先是遮破他宗所假立的常有实体，遮破自宗所假立的常有实体，以及对这样遮破的结论进行总结。第一，由于次第相连的果的并置，常有不是唯一的自性。如果每个果都是不同的，那么它们就会从常有中消失。如是说。总的来说，如上所述的一异性之理证，在自他宗派所说的所知事物法性上成立，这被称为第一种方式，即宗法。如果存在一异性之理证，那么必须存在所要证明的无自性，这是第二种方式，即随行。如果不存在所要证明的无自性，那么一异性之理证也会消失，这是第三种方式，即还灭。这样，由于所要证明和理证二者之间存在随行和还灭的特殊关系，因此理证必然具有成立所要证明之法的周遍性，这被称为周遍。如果成立周遍性的理证在所知事物法性的任何法上成立，那么它就不会欺骗所要证明的成立。
English
Generally, since both appearance and consciousness are established as being without inherent existence, it is not possible to prove that "the cause is true." Even if we temporarily assume that the cause, such as form and consciousness, is true, it cannot make the falsity of the object of perception true. For example, even if a magic trick deceives the eyes, those who know it is a magic trick will have the appearance of magic, but they will not have the slightest thought that there are horses, cows, etc. there. Similarly, because there are causes such as lumps of clay, eye consciousness, and magicians here, one would not think that this is also true. Therefore, the object of perception itself appears to be real in its own place, but by comparing it with the example of knowing that the appearance is not real, the example is not invalidated. These are all clearly explained from the auto-commentary. Secondly, establishing the way of establishing the root reason, including establishing the property of the subject and establishing pervasion. First, establishing the one-ness or many-ness of truth, including establishing the single exclusion of pervasion and establishing the single exclusion of non-pervasion. First, refuting the single exclusion of pervasion, including refuting the specific single truth of the pervader and refuting the general single truth of the pervader such as space. First, refuting the single truth of permanence and substance, including refuting the single truth of the person. First, refuting the permanent substance posited by other schools, refuting the permanent substance posited by one's own school, and summarizing the conclusions of such refutation. First, due to the juxtaposition of sequentially connected fruits, the permanent is not the nature of the one. If each fruit is different, then they will disappear from the permanent. It is said. In general, the reason of one-ness or many-ness as mentioned above is established on the objects of knowledge spoken by one's own and other schools, which is called the first way, namely the property of the subject. If there is a reason of one-ness or many-ness, then there must be the absence of inherent existence to be proven, which is the second way, namely the subsequent. If there is no absence of inherent existence to be proven, then the reason of one-ness or many-ness will also disappear, which is the third way, namely the reversal. In this way, since there is a special relationship of following and reversing between the object to be proven and the reason, the reason must have the pervasiveness of establishing the object to be proven, which is called pervasion. If the reason for establishing pervasion is established on any dharma of the object of knowledge, then it will not deceive the establishment of the object to be proven.
Chinese
因此，两种和六种等的多与少的边际也得以避免，因此，从三相推理中可以见到意义。如“周遍法即是彼所周遍”所说的那样。因此，在确立根本的推理时，所说的“一多相离”，是为了阐述自他宗派所说的诸法之上成立之理的次第，不要认为此处的先前注释中没有成立这个理由。如是说。如果想知道如何成立，首先要成立真实的“一相离”，因为如果一不成立，多就不可能成立，而且多的基础是一，所以首先要成立一。对此，一般来说，如果在所知范畴内，有一个最终成立为真实的，那么就不能区分显现和不显现等部分，而必须以唯一的自性存在于一切方时中。如果那样，最终被方时所包含的一切所知都不会各自显现，而必须像一个整体，像虚空一样。如果不是那样，而是方时的各种显现无限量地非常明显地显现，那么这些显现仅仅是因为没有一者是真实的。因此，凡是显现的，凡是被有寂轮涅所包含的所知，都不可能不适用一多相离的道理。因此，在此处，为了按次第显示自他所说的诸法之上成立推理的方式，如果按科判的划分，可以是常与无常二者，或者外境所取和内境能取二者，或者所知境和能知识二者来归纳。但在此处的《难解释》中，如“周遍是神我和虚空等，无常则被归纳为非周遍的蕴”所说的那样，是以二者来归纳的。对于主张常法和有我的人来说，如果那些境是不同的，就不能完全确定地将其划分为不同的类别，而是将其归纳为周遍的范畴。在《自释》中，仅在“异方分”等偈颂的范围内提到周遍与非周遍，这清楚地表明是以周遍的定义来解释的。因此，周遍差别法中的第一种，是常法论者外道们所说的法上真实的“一相离”。
English
Therefore, the extremes of many and few, such as two and six, are also avoided. Thus, meaning is seen from the three-aspect reason. As it is said, "The property of the পক্ষ ধর্ম (pakṣa dharma) is that which is pervaded by the হেতু (hetu)." Therefore, when establishing the fundamental reason, the statement of "one and many being separate" is intended to explain the order in which the reason is established upon the objects spoken of by one's own and others' schools. Do not think that this reason is not established in the previous commentaries on this point. As it is said. If you wonder how it is established, first, the separation of one truth is to be established, because if one is not established, many cannot be established, and the basis of many is one, so it is established first. In general, if there is something that is ultimately established as true within the realm of knowable objects, then there is no way to distinguish between appearance and non-appearance, and it must exist in all directions and times as a single entity. If that were the case, then ultimately all knowable objects included in directions and times would not appear separately, but would have to become like a single whole, like the sky alone. If that were not the case, but the various appearances of directions and times were immeasurably and very clearly apparent, then these appearances are only appearances because there is no one that is true. Therefore, it is impossible that the reasoning of one and many being separate does not apply to whatever appears, to whatever is knowable included in existence, peace, cyclic existence, and nirvana. Therefore, here, in order to show in order the way in which the reason is established upon the objects spoken of by oneself and others, if according to the division of topics, it can be the two of permanent and impermanent, or the two of external objects of apprehension and internal minds of apprehension, or the two of objects of knowledge and minds of knowing. But here, in the Difficult Explanation, as it is said, "Pervasion is self and sky, etc., and impermanent things are collected into non-pervasive aggregates," it is summarized by those two. For those who assert permanent entities and persons, if those objects are different, they cannot be definitively divided into different categories, but are collected into the category of pervasion. In the Self-Commentary, it is clear that the mention of pervasion and non-pervasion only in the context of the verses such as "different directions" is done from the perspective of the definition of pervasion. Therefore, the first of the specific pervasions is the true "separation of one" on the objects spoken of by the permanent entity proponents, the non-Buddhists.
Chinese
上述已说明的偈颂已阐明。其中，一些外道承认自在天等本体是常恒的，但并非像虚空等一样不起作用，而是承认其为能起作用的事物。作为原因的自在天等，由于在三时中都不会改变，所以像陶师制作陶罐一样，恒常地创造了这些器情世间的事物。然而，器情世间的事物不可能同时产生，所以不得不承认其如所显现般具有次第性。因此，您所认为的常恒之因，并非同时产生这些果，而是相续不断地依次结合或产生，所以，所承认的自在天等常恒之物，并非是唯一的自性。如是说。如果常恒的唯一、无分、整体的因产生所有这些果，那么在这个因之上，必须具备产生所有果的能力，包括苦乐舍等，那为何不能同时产生呢？如果原因不完备，就不会产生结果；如果原因的能力没有阻碍，那么怎么可能出现遗漏呢？如果出现遗漏，那就不会随原因而变化，因此也不能被认为是它的结果。对此，有人说，果不能同时产生，是因为各自的俱生缘所致。如果是这样，那么恒常之物不可能从一种状态改变，因此不应依赖俱生缘，因为它是不能被条件改变的。例如，就像在虚空中涂色一样。如果可以依赖和改变，那么常恒性就会丧失。如果允许依赖，那么与俱生缘相关的常恒之物和脱离俱生缘的常恒之物，它们之间有差别吗？如果有差别，那么常恒性就会丧失；如果没有差别，那么就像最初的状态一样，后来的状态也无法摆脱俱生缘，就像脖子上被绳子拴住一样。
English
The verses mentioned above have clarified this. Among them, some non-Buddhists assert that the essence of Ishvara and others is permanent, but not like space and others that do not function; rather, they acknowledge it as something that does function. The cause, Ishvara and others, does not change in the three times, so they assume that it constantly creates these container and content phenomena, just as a potter makes a clay pot. However, it is never possible for the container and content phenomena to arise simultaneously, so there is no way to avoid acknowledging that they appear sequentially. Therefore, since the cause that you consider permanent does not produce these effects simultaneously, but rather connects or produces them one after another in a sequential manner, the permanent entities such as Ishvara that are acknowledged are not truly of a single nature. Thus it is said. If a single, indivisible, whole cause produces all these effects, then that cause must possess the complete ability to produce all the effects, including happiness, suffering, equanimity, and so on. Why then do they not all occur simultaneously? If the cause is incomplete, the effect will not arise; and if the power of the cause is unimpeded, how could there be any omissions? If there are omissions, then it does not follow the cause, and therefore cannot be considered its effect. To this, someone might say: The reason why the effects do not arise simultaneously is due to the influence of the respective co-operative conditions. If that is the case, then whatever is permanent cannot change from one state, so it is not appropriate to rely on co-operative causes, because it cannot be altered by conditions, just like painting color on space. If it can be relied upon and altered, then its permanence is lost. If it is allowed to rely, then is there a difference between the permanent entity when it is associated with co-operative conditions and the permanent entity when it is separated from co-operative conditions? If there is a difference, then permanence is lost; if there is no difference, then just like the initial state, the later state also cannot be free from the co-operative conditions, as if tied by a rope around the neck.
Chinese
就像以力量牵引一样，从（因）位产生的先前之果，因为因没有不齐全，所以永远不会改变。 以这种方式，将共同作用的条件命名为因、自在等的力量，并说它们依次产生了果，这也是被驳斥的。如果它自己的自性和力量是不同的，那么共同作用的因仅仅是被赋予了力量之名；如果不是不同的，那么正如刚才所说，它会被恒常的果不改变等所损害。因此，一旦承诺产生有顺序的果，就应该知道，作为恒常之因的唯一真实存在是不可能的。先前和之后如果不是唯一的真实，那么就一定是无常的。 此外，他们看到正如刚才所说的那些过失是无法避免的，如果认为因是恒常的，但不是唯一的，而是对于每一个果，那些因的自性也以其他和其他的顺序不同的方式存在，那么，自在等的那些事物为什么不会从恒常中衰退呢？因为它们在不同的状态中会改变。如是说。 对此，对方可能会想：即使不是一个整体，但只要自性或相续等是一个，那么即使状态不同，恒常又有什么矛盾呢？例如，世间上，即使参加各种舞蹈，也认为早上的舞者和下午的是同一个。 对此进行分析，如果不是唯一的、无分的部分，那么恒常是不合理的，因此，偈颂的前半部分否定了认为恒常的唯一真实。后半部分否定了不是唯一的恒常。 对此，有各种各样的解释，但只有这个没有弄错经文的意义。其中，自性和相续等只是将相似之处命名为一，但永远无法成立真实的唯一。如果是真实的唯一，那么就无法避免之前的过失。而仅仅是假立的唯一，这里并没有否定，而且因为它在实际上不存在，所以也无法被设定为恒常。因此，一旦状态不同，就不是唯一的真实，因此，将它分开并单独设定为恒常的唯一是不可能的。 第二，驳斥自宗所假立的常有实法，首先简要地说明破斥的理路：