English
Recognizing it, refuting arguments against it, and the three benefits of realizing it in this way. First, showing that things do not exist in the ultimate sense, and showing that they exist in the conventional sense. First, establishing the root reason, and the way to prove it. First: These things spoken of by self and others, if true, then because they are devoid of the nature of one and many, they have no nature, like an image. It is said, thus, like this, I, my own school, the Buddhist, and other outsiders, the heretics, all the things that are claimed to be truly established, in the true sense, when examined well with reason, because they are devoid of both the nature of one and many, these things have no self-established nature at all, for example, like an image that appears but is not true. If expressed in words, then the inner and outer things spoken of as true by self and other schools are the subject. There is no self-nature in truth, because it is separated from the true one and many. Like the image in the mirror. Among them, what is said by one's own school is the aggregates, etc., and what is said by other schools is the principle, etc. If there is truth, then it must exist in the form of one or many. Because one and many exist in mutual exclusion, it is impossible for a third true dharma to exist in the knowable other than these two, so this sign is not an observed pervader of truth. Here, let me explain a little digression, examining the subject, examining the reason, and explaining the way of example, there are three. First, some people think, here, the things spoken of by the tenets are refuted, so how can it harm the innate self-grasping that has been practiced since beginningless time? In this treatise, what is accepted by self and other schools, permanent entities, unconditioned things, persons, pervasive, coarse, subtle, consciousness, etc. are regarded as the subject. Among these things, permanent and impermanent, inner and outer, object and object-possessor, pervasive and non-pervasive, coarse and subtle, knowable and consciousness, etc., all conditioned and unconditioned dharmas are included, if these are proven to be without self-nature by reason, then it can uproot the two innate self-grasps from the root. In general, due to the power of innate ignorance in the minds of beings, for things like vases, etc.
Chinese
执著于事物已成立，也凭借事物来施设非事物的名称，对事物和非事物执著于其本身，并且由于自己的五蕴而未经考察辨析就执著于“我”的俱生我见也产生。像这样，对法和补特伽罗执著为实有的体性，其安立的基础是蕴等。此外，在名言中本不存在，却抓住颠倒的理由，以自己的分别念强行安立的常实之我等，各种各样的概念生起，并以执著的线索束缚着孩童们。其中，这些通过遮止一个而遮止另一个，以及不遮止的方式是：即使以遮止常实所执著的对境的理性能够遮止它，但由于它不是俱生我执的所依，所以仍然不能遮止俱生我执。然而，如果知道俱生我执所执著的对境我并不存在，那么，认为我是常法和作者等的一切遍计都将被遮止，就像知道石女没有儿子，那么也能断定她儿子没有颜色一样。像这样，在这里，如果人以及有为法、无为法的一切法，通过与真实的单多体性相离而成立为无自性，那么二我执著又怎么会产生呢？因为一切所知都已确定成立为无自性之故。因此，将遍计和俱生的所执境全部归纳起来作为有法，这不仅是为了包括在世间无害的意识中所显现的事物，也是为了包括外道所遍计的等等。 第二，推理是应成还是自续？是意义成立还是名称成立？是有遮止还是非遮止？进行辨析。 首先，这个推理应该安立为应成，还是安立为自续？如果像第一种情况那样，需要以对方已承认的理由来成立，但在这里，对方并不承认单多体性相离。如果安立为自续，那么需要以三相圆满的理由通过量来成立，但在这里，常我、常自在、极微和无分识等并不成立，因此有法不成立。如果它不成立，那么周遍也不可能成立，因此三相不圆满。如果这样想，那么印度和西藏的智者
English
Holding onto things as established, and also using the term "non-thing" based on things, clinging to things and non-things as they are, and also the innate view of self arising from clinging to "I" based on one's own five aggregates without examination or analysis. Thus, the nature of clinging to phenomena and individuals as if they were established entities has the aggregates, etc., as its basis. Furthermore, various concepts arise and children are bound by the thread of clinging to the self of permanence and reality, etc., which are forcibly imputed by one's own mind, seizing upon false reasons that do not exist in name. Among these, the way in which one is negated by negating another, and the way in which it is not negated, is as follows: Even if the objects clung to as permanent and real are negated by the reasoning that negates them, the innate self-grasping is still not negated because it is not the basis of the innate self-grasping. However, if one knows that the object of the innate self-grasping, the self, does not exist, then all the imputations that consider the self to be permanent and an agent, etc., will be negated, just as knowing that a barren woman has no son, one can also determine that her son has no color. Likewise, here, if all phenomena, including persons and conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, are established as being without inherent existence by being separate from a true single or multiple nature, then how could the grasping of the two selves arise? Because all knowable objects have been definitively established as being without inherent existence. Therefore, the objects of grasping of both imputation and innate grasping are all combined and made into the subject, not only to include the objects that appear to the harmless consciousness of the world, but also to include what is imputed by outsiders, etc. Second, is the reasoning a consequence or an autonomous syllogism? Is it establishing meaning or establishing name? Is it an implicative negation or a non-implicative negation? This is to be analyzed. First, should this reasoning be established as a consequence or as an autonomous syllogism? If it is like the first case, it needs to be established by a reason that the opponent has accepted, but here, the opponent does not accept being separate from one or many. If it is established as an autonomous syllogism, then it needs to be established by a valid cognition with the three aspects complete, but here, the subject, the permanent self, the permanent lord, atoms, and partless consciousness are not established, so the subject is not established. If it is not established, then the pervasion cannot be established, so the three aspects are not complete. If one thinks like this, then the Indian and Tibetan scholars
Chinese
有些人说，对于其他学派没有认定的事物，可以进行反证；对于已经认定的事物的性质，可以采取两种方式中的任何一种。然而，正如《中观光明论》等所说，不需要区分，无论使用归谬论还是自续论都可以。如果使用归谬论，即使对方没有直接承认“一”或“异”，但如果他直接承认了遍及的事物，那么通过将此承认置于归谬论中进行论证，除了承认“一”或“异”之外别无选择，因为不需要依赖其他事物。例如，如果承认自在天是常恒的，但同时也承认其结果是多样的，那么仅仅通过承认多样的结果，就可以否定自在天是一体的。如果一体被否定，那么多样性也会被否定。实际上，论辩者是通过自己承认的理由来论证“一”或“异”的，通过承认多样性，就成立了“一”或“异”。同样，适用于所有情况。也可以使用自续论，例如，虽然“法”——自在天是常恒的——在事实上是不可能的，但在意识中，仅仅通过与自在天非常恒的相违，就可以成立他者排除。因此，可以成立无自性的名相。对外境中存在常恒的自在天的执着也会被否定。将常恒的声音作为“法”等等，也与此类似，对各自的意识如何安立的，仅仅对那一点进行否定是非常合理的。因为在自己的意识中，仅仅通过他者排除来把握，以及将外境的显现与二取执着混合在一起，所有的否定和成立的名相都适用，这是量论总体的殊胜传统。因此，对于事实上不可能存在的“法”，即使没有可观察的事实上的自相，但由于执着于似乎存在的事物的显现对象，因此可以成立无自性的名相，从而能够知道它在事实上是不存在的。第二，关于辨别什么是意义的成立和名相的成立。如果这是一个成立意义的理证，那么无自性的意义仅仅是否定所要否定的自性，因为在否定之后不会引入其他法，如果仅仅通过这个来成立，那么所要成立的基础——“法”将无法找到，就像虚空中的花朵一样。这样一来，“法”和“法性”将变得没有差别。如果说这是成立名相，那么无自性的名相是事物的
English
Some say that for what is not known to be examined by other schools, one can establish it through reductio ad absurdum; and for the nature of what is known, one can use either of the two methods. However, as explained in texts like the *Madhyamaka-aloka*, there is no need to differentiate, and one can use either consequence or autonomous syllogism. If one uses consequence, even if the opponent does not explicitly accept that things are either one or different, if they explicitly accept the pervader, then by stating that acceptance in a consequence, there is no choice but to accept that things are either one or different, as there is no need to rely on anything else. For example, if one accepts that Ishvara is permanent, but also accepts that its effects are multiple, then by the very fact of accepting multiple effects, one can negate that Ishvara is one. And if being one is negated, then being multiple is also negated. In essence, the proponent establishes being either one or different through the reason that the opponent themselves has accepted, and by accepting multiplicity, being either one or different is established. Similarly, this applies to all cases. Alternatively, one can apply it as an autonomous syllogism. Although it is impossible in reality for the subject, Ishvara, to be permanent, in the mind, merely by being the opposite of Ishvara being non-permanent, exclusion of others is accomplished. And because the term 'lack of inherent existence' is established in relation to that, the clinging to the existence of a truly permanent Ishvara externally is also refuted. Similarly, placing the sound of 'permanent' as the subject, and so forth, is very reasonable in that the negation applies only to how one's own mind has posited it. This is because the entire system of valid cognition holds that all terms of negation and affirmation apply to the grasping by exclusion of others in one's own mind, and the mixing of external appearances with dualistic clinging. Therefore, for subjects that are impossible in reality, even though there is no factually existing self-characteristic to be examined, the term 'lack of inherent existence' is established in relation to the object of appearance that is clung to as if it exists, and thus one can know that it does not exist in reality. Secondly, regarding the analysis of whether it is the establishment of meaning or the establishment of a term: If this is a reason for establishing meaning, then the meaning of 'lack of inherent existence' is merely the negation of the inherent existence to be negated, because no other phenomenon is introduced after the negation. If one establishes only that much, then the basis to be established, the subjects, will not be found, like a flower in the sky. In that case, phenomenon and subject will become non-different. If one says that this establishes a term, then the term 'lack of inherent existence' is of things
Chinese
如果在诸法之上进行论证时，就像没有瓶子的处所一样，具有无自性的基础就能成立吗？虽然这是在论证意义，但所论证的基础不会消失。由于无始以来的实执习气，对于所显现的一切执着为真实的实有，仅仅是论证这些事物是无自性的。虽然没有论证其他法在本体上是可明确存在的微尘，但在世间极负盛名的对实有执着者的面前，依赖于这些显现，无自性的有法和所立宗的名称是合理的。如果将内外诸法如幻象般的显现，按照显现和名声来作为有法，通过正确的理证来论证无自性的名言概念，就像将诺等聚集起来安立为牛的名称一样。对于已经确定的，要反复忆念；对于不确定的，也要通过理证来进行推断。但法和有法不会变成他体，虽然无自性，但显现并不相违，这是事物的法性。前后二者的比喻就像水中的月亮倒影一样。在其他所有论典中，似乎都只执着于任何一个方面，但如果像这样理解，那么总相和差别在此处就显得非常重要。第三，作为理由和所破二者都是无遮，还是非遮？如果像第一种情况那样，由于仅仅是破除所破，而没有自己的体性的单单是无实有，因此不可能存在关联。所以，不能成为所立需要理解的，以及作为理由需要理解的。如果是非遮，那么为什么在破除所破之后，不承认作为成立法的实有呢？对于此，智者们进行了区分，并分别进行了许多论证。理由“一中无多”和所立“无谛实”二者都是无遮。虽然所破仅仅是破除，但理由和所立不会变成无关联，因为所破的破除和遣余二者在无我的体性上是相同的，因此成立了本体相同的关联。因此，虽然那些各种各样的观点进行了许多破立的辛劳，但如果能够很好地区分显现和遮遣，那么疑惑的黑暗就会消除。否则，无论如何分析，也不会有如实的定解。