English
If, when proving things upon phenomena, can the basis endowed with selflessness be established, like a place without a pot? Although this is proving the meaning, the bases to be proven will not disappear. Due to the power of beginningless clinging to reality, the things that appear as real are only proven to be selfless. Although there is no proof that other phenomena are specifically existent in their own essence, even to the extent of a mote of dust, in the face of those in the world who are famously attached to reality, relying on these appearances, the terms "subject of selflessness" and "thesis to be proven" are reasonable. If the appearances of outer and inner things, like illusions, are taken as subjects in accordance with their appearance and fame, then the term "sound cognition of selflessness" is proven by means of valid signs, just as the term "cow" is applied to a collection of humps, etc. What is certain should be repeatedly remembered, and what is uncertain should be inferred from signs. But phenomena and subjects do not become different, and although selfless, appearance is not contradictory, as it is the nature of things. The example of the former and the latter is like the reflection of the moon in water. In all other texts, it seems that only one side or another is held, but if it is understood in this way, then the general and the particular are very important to understand well in this case. Third, are both the sign and the object to be negated non-affirming negations, or affirming negations? If it is like the first, then since the object to be negated is merely a cutting off, and there is no connection with a mere non-entity that has no own essence, it is not suitable as something to be understood as the object to be proven, or as something to be understood as the reason. If it is an affirming negation, then why not accept a real entity as the established phenomenon after the object to be negated has been negated? On this, scholars have distinguished and made many separate proofs. Both the reason "absence of many in one" and the thesis to be proven "absence of truth" are non-affirming negations. Although the object to be negated is merely a cutting off, the reason and the object to be proven do not become unrelated, because both the cutting off and the exclusion of the object to be negated are the same in the nature of selflessness, so the connection of the same essence is established. Therefore, although those various views involve much labor of refutation and establishment, if appearance and negation are well distinguished, the darkness of doubt will be cleared. Otherwise, no matter how much one analyzes, there will be no certainty as it is.
Chinese
难以寻觅啊！一般来说，这种理证方式，区分其他情况、具备三相、以及对破立的论述详尽透彻非常重要，但此处担心文字过多而未书写，应从量论的论典中详细了解。第三个，显现却无有真实的例子是影像等。正如《父子相会经》中所说： 犹如清澈无垢的镜中， 显现无有自性的影像， 如是了知世间诸法。 如是说。影像等这些，显现却不真实，世间人也承认，以此为例，以理证了知一切法也与之相同。那也是镜子和脸相互成为缘起，脸的形态如何，影像就如何显现。物体所具有的颜色和形状等，不混杂地显现。如果不对其进行观察分析，仅仅停留在所见所显现的层面，虽然看起来和真实的物体没有差别，但如果进行分析，在其中连脸等真实物体的微尘也找不到。不仅如此，虽然无可避免地亲身经历显现，但如果进行分析，影像在何处显现的位置，无论是镜子的外、内、中间，还是意识和对境之间的空隙，还是内在意识本身，都不存在，那又怎么会在其他地方存在呢？明明找不到却执着认为存在也是不合道理的。如果找不到也认为存在就可以的话，那为何不执着认为石女的儿子也存在呢？因此，应当如显现却无有真实的例子那样去理解。同样，《三摩地王经》中说： 如是夜晚水中月， 清澈无垢水中现。 水中月空无不可取， 一切诸法如是知。 如是说。对此，略微驳斥对例子的错误理解。国王占卜者等人说：如此见到影像，是因为镜子的表面反射了自己眼睛的光芒，从而能够看到自己的脸等，因此才安立了影像的名称。按照他们的观点，影像这个名称只是根据所见的方式而安立的，除此之外
English
It is difficult to find! In general, this type of reasoning, distinguishing other cases, possessing the three modes, and thoroughly discussing refutation and establishment are very important. However, here, fearing too many words, I have not written them, but they should be learned in detail from the treatises on valid cognition. The third example, which appears but has no truth, is reflections and so on. As it is said in the Sutra of the Meeting of Father and Son: Just as in a perfectly clear mirror, A reflection appears without inherent existence, Likewise, understand all phenomena as a tree. As it is said. These reflections and so on, although they appear, are not true, and worldly people also acknowledge this. Taking this as an example, one understands through reasoning that all phenomena are similar to it. That is, when a mirror and a face become interdependent, a reflection of the face's appearance arises. The colors and shapes that the object possesses appear distinctly without being mixed. If one does not examine or analyze it, but simply leaves it as it is seen and appears, it seems as if there is no difference from the real object. However, if one analyzes it, one cannot find even a tiny particle of the real object, such as the face, in it. Moreover, although one inevitably experiences the appearance, if one analyzes where the reflection is seen, it is not in the outer, inner, or middle of the mirror, nor in the space between consciousness and the object, nor in the nature of the inner consciousness itself. Then where else could it be? It is unreasonable to hold that it exists even though it cannot be found. If it were acceptable to hold that something exists even when it cannot be found, why not hold that the son of a barren woman also exists? Therefore, one should understand it as an example of something that appears but has no truth. Similarly, in the Samadhiraja Sutra, it says: Just as the moon in the water at night, Appears in clear and unpolluted water, The moon in the water is empty and cannot be grasped, Know all phenomena to be like that. As it is said. In this case, let us briefly refute some misconceptions about the example. The royal astrologers and others say: Seeing a reflection is like this: the rays of one's own eyes strike the surface of the mirror and are reflected back, so that one can see one's own face and so on. Therefore, the term "reflection" is applied. According to their view, the term "reflection" is applied based on the way it is seen, but other than that
Chinese
认为其自性与实际的色法事物是同一联系的。但这是不合理的，因为如果按照那种方式，观察镜子的表面时，不会看到影像朝向南方，因此色法和影像二者是方向相反的；镜子的表面很小，却显现出自己巨大的脸庞的影像很小，因此尺寸不同；影像显现为进入镜子内部，因此位置不同；还有，清澈湖边的山和树的树枝和顶端向上看的许多影像，被观察到树枝和顶端向下，因此情况不一致，因此，执持影像的意识和执持色法的意识二者的对境不同。例如，就像声识和色识一样，是使用对象不同的。应当了知，执持影像的意识并非执持自己的脸庞等实际的色法事物。此外，分别说者说：影像是镜子等内部产生的一种非常清澈的其他色法。这种说法是不对的，因为色法是微尘的自性，有身体的事物不可能互相妨碍在一个位置上出现，因此是互相避开而存在的。如果不是这样，而是进入同一个位置，那么就必须认为互相没有差别而混合，成为一个自性的本体。在此，影像是镜子等表面的那个方向上被观察到的，如果影像也是色法，那么两个色法如何存在于同一个位置呢？就像两个瓶子不可能存在于一个瓶子的位置一样。这个理由也不是风和太阳等不确定的，因为风和太阳等的微尘就像灰尘和糌粑一样是混合的，但却是互相避开而存在的，并非融为一体。这样，由于胜论者和分别说者二者都执着于影像为色法，如果不遮止这一点，那么具备所要成立的法和能成立的法二者的例子——影像的陈述就不会成立，因此遮止了。此外，想要了知影像的经部师等人说：由于事物不可思议的力量，镜子等的缘
English
They believe that its nature is related to actual form objects as one entity. But this is unreasonable, because if it were according to that way, when looking at the surface of a mirror, the image is not seen facing south, therefore the form and the image are opposite in direction; the surface of the mirror is small, but the image of one's own large face appears small, therefore the size is different; the image appears to enter the inside of the mirror, therefore the position is different; also, the images of many mountains and tree branches and tops looking upwards by the clear lake shore, are observed with the branches and tops pointing downwards, therefore the situation is inconsistent, therefore, the object of the consciousness holding the image and the consciousness holding the form are different. For example, just like sound consciousness and form consciousness, the objects of use are different. It should be known that the consciousness holding the image does not hold the actual form objects such as one's own face. Furthermore, the Vaibhashikas say: The image is another very clear form that arises inside mirrors and so on. This statement is incorrect, because form is the nature of particles, and it is impossible for embodied things to not obstruct each other from appearing in the same place, therefore they exist avoiding each other. If it were not so, but entered the same place, then it must be assumed that there is no difference between them and they are mixed, becoming one entity of the same nature. Here, the image is observed in the direction of the surface of the mirror and so on, and if the image is also a form, then how can two forms exist in the same place? Just as two vases cannot exist in the place of one vase. This reason is also not uncertain due to wind and sun and so on, because the particles of wind and sun and so on are mixed like dust and tsampa, but they exist avoiding each other, not becoming one. Thus, since both the Vaisheshikas and the Vaibhashikas are attached to the image as a form, if this is not refuted, then the example of the statement of the image, which possesses both the property to be proven and the property to prove, will not be established, therefore it is refuted. Furthermore, the Sutrantikas and others who want to know the image say: Due to the inconceivable power of things, the conditions of mirrors etc.
Chinese
他们说，仅仅是从缘起产生的知识，才显现为影像的形态。如果认为这个影像是无境的知识那样显现的，那么为什么不认为真实存在的色等也是像无境一样显现的呢？因为色和影像两者的显现都被认为是仅仅是形态而已。如果认为影像不可能是创造形态的境，因为影像本身无法成立，所以仅仅是无境的知识，那么，像那样认为创造形态的境存在于外境的色等，也因为微尘本身也无法成立等阻碍执取的理证，对境有损害，所以与影像无差别就太过分了。同样，幻术、梦境、阳焰、乾闼婆城和火轮等例子，也以同样的方式被解释为成立。对此，童授等说：幻术等不真实并非如此，例如，泥块被称为幻术吗？或者说，是称呼那样显现的知识？如果是前者，则是色，如果是后者，则是知识，无论如何，幻术的马、象等都无法在不存在的情况下成立。同样，对于所有的梦境等，作为其因的色或知识中的任何一个都是真实存在的，因此，所有这些都不能作为非真实的例子。这是他们说的。这不合理，因为幻术等的显现，无论是认为是有相的知识的形态显现，还是认为无相的境是真实被认识，无论属于哪种情况，都应安立在心识中所显现的目标本身上。而不是仅仅将它的因称为幻术等的显现，如果仅仅将因称为幻术等，那么眼睛等也是因，因此它们也会变成幻术等。因此，因为因和目标是不同的，所以，即使幻术等的因是色和知识，也不能用它们来作比喻。例如，即使泥块存在，如果它没有被视为马、象等，那么它就不会被称为幻术的显现，也不会被用作比喻。但是，当泥块本身被视为马、象等时，它就被称为幻术，并被用作比喻。对此，
English
They say that it is only the knowledge arising from conditions that appears as the form of an image. If it is asserted that this image appears as knowledge without an object, then why not assert that things like form, which are considered real, also appear as if without an object? Because the appearance of both form and image is considered to be merely an aspect. If it is thought that an image cannot be the object that creates an aspect because the image itself does not exist, and it is merely knowledge without an object, then, in that case, the assertion that the object that creates an aspect exists externally, such as form, etc., also fails because even the subtle particles themselves are not established, and so on. Since the reasoning that prevents grasping harms the object, it would be absurd to be no different from an image. Similarly, examples such as illusion, dreams, mirages, cities of gandharvas, and fire wheels are also explained as being established in that way. To this, Kumāralabdha and others say: It is not the case that illusions and so on are untrue. For example, is a lump of clay called an illusion? Or is it what is called the knowledge that appears as such? If it is the former, it is form; if it is the latter, it is knowledge. In any case, the horses, elephants, etc., of illusion cannot be established without existing. Similarly, since either form or knowledge, which is the cause of all dreams and so on, exists truthfully, none of them can serve as examples of untruth. That is what they say. That is not reasonable, because the appearance of illusions and so on, whether one considers the appearance of knowledge with aspects or considers the object without aspects to be truly perceived, in either case, it should be placed on the object that appears to the mind. It is not merely the cause that is designated as the appearance of illusions and so on. If only the cause were designated, then the eyes and so on are also causes, so they would also become illusions and so on. Therefore, since cause and object are different, even if the causes of illusions and so on are form and knowledge, they are not used as examples. For example, even if a lump of clay exists, if it is not perceived as horses, elephants, etc., then it is not called the appearance of illusion, nor is it used as an example. However, when the lump of clay itself is perceived as horses, elephants, etc., then it is called illusion and used as an example. To that,