English
Therefore, precisely because there is neither one nor many, it is established without needing to be fabricated, like a sky flower and so on. Even in conventional terms, if something exists, it must necessarily be either one or many in relation to a basis. If I do not have this characteristic, yet vow that I exist, this is acknowledging the pervaded without the pervading cause, which is extremely foolish, like acknowledging that there is no tree but wanting to have leaves. Therefore, the Bhagavan said: 'Just as, when the limbs are assembled, the designation "chariot" is applied, so too, having taken the aggregates as a basis, sentient beings are spoken of conventionally.' Thus, the so-called "person" is devoid of the nature of one and many, so there is no truth in the ultimate sense. But in conventional terms, the five aggregates are taken as the cause, and there is clinging to a self. Merely grasping the undivided five aggregates as one is what is designated as a person. The continuum of moments of the five aggregates is grasped as one and called a continuum. The phenomena belonging to that continuum, without dividing direction and time, are designated as one, just as it is permissible to say, 'This person previously transmigrated from here and will later be born here.' In this regard, the co-emergent ego-grasping only clings to the 'I' that is designated in dependence on the five aggregates, and does not clearly cling to the five aggregates after dividing them, because it is merely the force of habit that engages without distinguishing the modes of clinging separately. However, since the basis of designation for the designated phenomenon, the person, is the five aggregates, it must be established in this way if the modes of clinging are distinguished and analyzed: the person is designated merely by the five aggregates, just as the consciousness grasping a pot, its object of clinging is merely the designated pot, but the basis of designation, such as the characteristics of form and so on, are also established as objects of clinging. Therefore, if we analyze what the 'I' is that serves as the basis for actions and their results, some consider it to be the continuum of mental consciousness, and some consider it to be the continuum of aggregates, and so on. But in reality, the result matures on the one who performs the action, and it is impossible for it to mature on another. And the so-called 'actor' is merely a designation for a collection of many phenomena as 'actor.' In the ultimate sense, the actor and the results of actions, etc., are not truly established. Precisely because of the absence of these, the cause and effect of actions are not wasted, and one does not encounter actions that have not been done; this is merely a designation.
Chinese
如果存在一个非永恒的作者，如果它是永恒的，那就不适合作为作者，即使果实成熟也是不合理的。如果它不是永恒的，那么作者和体验者是不同的，体验异熟果也是不合理的。因此，将多种法聚合为一个“我”就既可以作为作者，也可以合理地作为体验异熟果者。例如，过去我做了这个，现在我种下这个种子，明天秋天我会吃掉它。像这样，不区分时间的部分，执着于未经考察和分析的“我”，并按照它的方式将业视为自己的。但实际上，据说现在的这个“我”也是不存在的。因此，业果的所依，不需要通过推理来寻找。例如，我过去体验过这种痛苦，现在我很快乐。像这样，不区分过去的五蕴和现在的五蕴，将它们聚合为一个整体，并在无始无终的轮回中执着地认为“我”。在这种情况下，对于没有分别考察和分析地点和时间等部分的“我”来说，作为业果的所依是合理的。如果进行分别，那么因和果不可能同时存在，因此无法证明异熟果会发生在作者身上。因此，将过去的作者、现在的体验者和未来将要体验者聚合为“我”，这个“我”是将多种事物聚合为一个。如果仔细分析，过去、现在和未来的所有蕴，除了连续的刹那之外，不可能是一个。因此，在分析的层面上，将作者和体验者视为一个连续体，即使只保留连续体本身，在同一种衡量标准下也没有矛盾。然而，如果分析所谓的连续体，它也只是一个假名。最终，找不到一个没有被聚合的真实存在。总之，不承认存在一个真实的补特伽罗，而应该通过将多种事物聚合为一个补特伽罗的方式来理解业果的安立等关键意义。这里所说的业果的所依，是指对业的异熟果成熟在积累业者自身上的“我”进行识别和分析，而不是理解为习气的分配基础等所依。第二，破斥遍在的单一实有总相：不同
English
If there is an agent who is not permanent, if it is permanent, then it is not suitable as an agent, and it is unreasonable for the fruit to ripen. If it is impermanent, then the agent and the experiencer are different, and it is unreasonable to experience the ripening result. Therefore, the mere "I" that is imputed as one to many dharmas is both suitable as an agent and reasonable as an experiencer of ripening results. For example, in the past I did this, now I plant this seed, and tomorrow in the fall I will eat it. Like this, without distinguishing the parts of time, clinging to the unexamined and unanalyzed mere "I", and according to its way, the action is said to be one's own. But in reality, it is said that even this mere "I" of the present does not exist. Therefore, the basis of karma and its result does not need to be found by reasoning. For example, thinking that I experienced this suffering in the past, and now I am happy, like this, without distinguishing the five aggregates of the past and the five aggregates of the present, imputing them as one, and clinging to "I" as a whole between beginningless and endless existence. In this case, for the mere "I" that has not been separately examined and analyzed in terms of place and time, etc., it is reasonable as the basis of karma and its result. If the parts are separated, then it is impossible for the cause and the result to be simultaneous, so it is impossible to prove that the ripening will occur in the agent himself. Therefore, the past agent, the present experiencer, and those who will experience in the future are all imputed as "I", so that "I" is imputed as one to many. If analyzed carefully, all the aggregates of the past, present, and future cannot be one except for successive moments. Therefore, in terms of analysis, even if the agent and the experiencer are imputed to one continuum, and only the continuum itself is retained, there is no contradiction in the same measurement. However, if the so-called continuum is analyzed, it is also just an imputation. In the end, a single truth that is not imputed to many cannot be found. In short, one should not admit that a single true person exists, but one should understand the key meanings such as the establishment of karma and its result through the way of a mere person imputed as one to many. In this case, the basis of karma and its result refers to the identification and analysis of the "I" to whom the ripening of karma matures in the one who accumulated the karma, and should not be understood as the basis for the distribution of habitual imprints, etc. Second, refuting the single true universal that pervades: different
Chinese
因为与具有方位的法相关联的缘故，周遍如何能成为唯一呢？如是说。对此，一般而言，所谓的周遍，是指在诸多法中，以一个本体的方式随顺其自性而周遍，如总和别；以及在任何法的尽头之间，以不同本体的方式存在而周遍，如颜色覆盖在布上。这有两种。其中，对于一切事物普遍存在的虚空、时间和方位等，由于执着于伟大和无限的观念，而执着于事物，并宣说时间流逝等，产生了外道的主张。此外，胜论派等则认为，自己所显现的或者随顺诸多差别的总，是周遍、常恒、不可见的自性，它像用一根绳子拴住许多牛一样，连接并存在着所显现的事物。而且，总有像普遍存在于一切事物中的大总，以及像牛的总这样的局部总两种，并且认为总和显现是不同的实体。数论派则认为总和显现是一个实体。无论如何，任何周遍者都可以用这种理证来驳斥，即因为与具有不同方位的法，或者方位不同的法，也就是与所周遍的不同事物，如树木等相关联的缘故，那些被认为是周遍的事物又怎么能是唯一的真实呢？如果虚空和总等周遍的事物与被周遍的、被方位和时间所包含的事物不相关联，那就不能被认为是周遍；如果相关联，那么遍及东方树木的部分与遍及西方树木的部分是相同还是不同？如果相同，那么作为周遍者的事物是唯一的，同样，与它混合且不可分割地相关联的被周遍的显现和树木等也将没有差别，成为一个本体。此外，如果像树木这样的被周遍的差别之一生长，那么在不同地点和时间生长的树木也必须同时生长等，这会造成损害。如果各个部分不相同，那么周遍又怎么能是唯一的呢？它会像被周遍的事物和显现的差别数量一样变成多个。因此，对于总和显现等有多种主张，但实际上，如果这两者不相关联，就不能成为周遍者和被周遍者；如果相关联，那么仅凭这一理证就足以周遍一切了。
English
Because of being related to things with directions, how can the pervader be singular? Thus it is said. In general, 'pervader' refers to two types: one that pervades many things by following their nature with a single entity, like the general and the particular; and one that exists between the ends of any dharma with different entities, like color covering cloth. From this, the outsiders' views arose, clinging to things with the notion of greatness and infinity in the sky, time, and directions that pervade everything, and asserting the flow of time, etc. Furthermore, the Vaisheshikas and others believe that the general, which manifests itself or follows many particulars, is a pervasive, permanent, and invisible nature, and it connects and exists with the manifested things as if many cows were tied with one rope. Moreover, there are two types of general: the great general that pervades everything, like the existence of a great general, and the limited general, like the general of cows. They believe that the general and the manifest are different substances. The Samkhyas believe that the general and the manifest are one substance. Whatever the pervaders may be, they can be refuted by this reasoning: because they are related to things with different directions, or things with different directions, that is, to the different things to be pervaded, such as trees, how can those things considered to be pervaders be truly singular? If the pervading things such as space and the general are not related to the things to be pervaded, which are contained by direction and time, then they cannot be considered pervasive. If they are related, is the part that pervades the tree in the east the same as or different from the part that pervades the tree in the west? If they are the same, then the thing that is the pervader is one, and likewise, the manifest and the trees that are mixed with it and inseparably related to it will also be without difference and become one entity. Furthermore, if one of the particulars to be pervaded, such as a tree, grows, then the trees growing in different places and times must also grow simultaneously, which is harmful. If the individual parts are not the same, then how can the pervader be singular? It will become many, like the number of differences between the things to be pervaded and the manifest. Therefore, although there are many views on the general, the manifest, etc., in reality, if these two are not related, they cannot be the pervader and the pervaded. If they are related, then this single reasoning is sufficient to pervade everything.
Chinese
能够遮止唯一的真实。像这样，所谓的“周遍总相”仅仅是他者的断除，在意义上没有成立。例如，当看到具有树枝树叶时，通过断除其他而命名为“树”，这就是赋予了总相的名称。它也随顺于处时各异的差别。执着于总相为自相，将显现和假立混为一谈，通过否定和肯定，总相被否定，从而摆脱了差别被否定以及二者是一是异等过失。其中，从他者反观而显现的反体单一是总相。从其他和自己的同类一切反观的反体双重集合是落入自相的差别。二者也仅仅是对多种法假立为一，因此不可能存在唯一的真实。虚空不成立为实有的道理将在下文阐述。第二，遮止不周遍的唯一真实：遮止外境的唯一真实；遮止识的唯一真实。第一部分包括遮止粗大的唯一真实和遮止微尘的唯一真实两种。第一，经中说：“由于有遮蔽和未遮蔽的物体等，粗大的事物也不是唯一的。”这里所说的粗大，是指众多极微聚集的部分。无论是内部的身体等，还是外部的瓶子、毡子、房屋、山脉、岛屿、须弥山，乃至大千世界的处所等显现，任何一个都可以。由于这些事物存在被衣服等遮蔽和未遮蔽的物体等差别，所以粗大的事物也不是真实的唯一。例如，以身体为例，有被衣服遮蔽的部分和未被遮蔽的部分。同样，在“等”字中包括：运动的和不运动的，被颜色改变的和未被改变的，燃烧的和未被燃烧的等等，存在诸多不相同的法，怎么会是唯一的自性呢？如果说遮蔽和未遮蔽等是针对肢体、腿等而言的，而不是针对具有肢体者而言的。那么，所谓的具有肢体者与肢体们是一还是异？如果是一，那么就如同安住于诸多不同之法一样成立。如果是异，那么必须能够显现，但因为没有观察到而否定，而且二者也会像瓶子一样变得毫无关联。这二者