Back to the library

KMG047 0002.Commentary on the Ornament of the Middle Way, the Delightful Words of Lama Manjushri.·Commentary on the Ornament of the Middle Way, the Delightful Words of Lama Manjushri..g2.0f

English

It is possible to refute the one true. Thus, the so-called "pervasive general characteristic" is merely the elimination of others, and there is no establishment in meaning. For example, when one sees something with branches and leaves, one names it "tree" by excluding others, and this is giving it the name of a general characteristic. It also follows the distinctions of different places and times. Grasping at the general characteristic as its own characteristic, mixing appearance and imputation together, through negation and affirmation, the general characteristic is negated, thereby freeing oneself from the faults of the distinction being negated and the two being one or different, and so on. Among these, the single reversal that appears as a reversal from others is the general characteristic. The double collection of reversals that reverses from all others and one's own similar kinds falls into the distinction of self-characteristics. These two are also merely the imputation of one to many dharmas, so a single truth is impossible. The way in which space is not established as a real entity will also be explained below. Second, refuting the non-pervasive one truth: refuting the one truth of external objects; refuting the one truth of consciousness. The first part includes two: refuting the gross one truth and refuting the atomic one truth. First, the sutra says, "Because of objects that are obscured and not obscured, etc., gross things are also not one." Here, the term "gross" refers to a part composed of many extremely small particles. Whether it is the internal body, etc., or the external appearance of pots, felt, houses, mountains, islands, Mount Sumeru, or even the places of the great thousand worlds, any of these can be taken as an example. Because these things have distinctions such as objects that are obscured and not obscured by clothes, etc., gross things are also not truly one. For example, taking the body as an example, there are parts that are obscured by clothes and parts that are not obscured. Similarly, the "etc." includes: moving and not moving, changed by color and not changed, burned and not burned, etc. Since there are many dissimilar dharmas, how could they be of a single nature? If it is said that obscuring and not obscuring, etc., are for limbs, legs, etc., and not for those with limbs, then is the so-called possessor of limbs one with or different from the limbs? If they are one, then it is established as residing in many different dharmas. If they are different, then they must be able to appear, but since they are not observed, they are negated, and the two will also become unrelated like a vase. These two

Chinese

如果说因为地聚合的性质而不需要单独执著于一个部分,那么脚的聚合是什么关系呢?如果手和聚合二者不相同,那么粗大的事物就不能单独存在;如果相同,那么因为执著于多种性质,矛盾就更加存在于此。因此,所谓的“有肢分”只是对于聚集的多个肢分执著为一的虚构,并不能成立真实的“一”,所以名称是合理的。否则,如果“有肢分”真实存在,那么肢分和一是否相同或不同等考察就不可能进行了。第二,阐述破斥极微的理证,并通过破斥极微来阐述破斥多种事物。第一部分包括:陈述对方的观点和破斥对方的观点。第一点:经中说“粘合或者围绕,或者无间隔地存在也可以”。这里,无论是五境还是五根,即这十种有色界,任何一种粗大的显现都可以分解成多个部分,并且互相占据对方的空间,被视为具有积累多种阻碍的性质,因此它们可以被分解到极微的程度。例如,陶罐变成碎片,碎片变成粉末,粉末也被分成粗细不同的颗粒。以这种方式,有色事物可以被分割成碎片,因此可以被命名为“色”。实际上,因为具有阻碍和接触的性质,所以可以被认知,不像识那样,可以被执著,可以被损害,所以被称为“色”,就像说刀的形状一样。如果认为极微不存在,那么粗大的事物存在就没有问题。按照不承认识的色法存在的方式,因为可以对所依造成损害,所以可以这样称呼。一般来说,声音有表达和包含两种含义,或者只有其中一种,共有三种情况。因此,可以成为色的东西也可以称为色的性质。而比色更粗大的,在眼睛的对境中特别称为色。这些物体从粗到细被分解,最终分解到无法再分的极细微的程度,这被称为极微。也就是说,无法再分割成更小的东西,是极微的极致,七个极微构成一个微尘。

English

If it is said that because of the nature of earth aggregation, there is no need to separately fixate on one part, then what is the relationship of the aggregation of the foot? If the hand and the aggregation are not the same, then coarse things cannot exist alone; if they are the same, then because of fixating on multiple qualities, the contradiction is even more present there. Therefore, the so-called "having limbs" is merely a conceptual imputation of clinging to the collection of many limbs as one, and a true "one" cannot be established, so the names are reasonable. Otherwise, if "having limbs" truly existed as one, then investigations such as whether the limbs and the one are the same or different would be impossible. Second, to explain the reasoning that refutes atoms, and by refuting them, to explain that many things are refuted. The first part includes: stating the opponent's view and refuting it. First point: It is said, "Adhering or surrounding, or existing without interval is also acceptable." Here, whether it is the five objects or the five senses, that is, these ten realms of form, any coarse appearance can be broken down into multiple parts, and they mutually occupy each other's space, being seen as having the nature of accumulating multiple obstructions, therefore they can be broken down to the extent of atoms. For example, a pottery jar becomes shards, shards become powder, and the powder is also divided into coarse and fine particles. In this way, form-possessing things can be divided into fragments, so it can be named "form." In reality, because it has the nature of obstruction and contact, it can be cognized, unlike consciousness, it can be grasped, it can be harmed, so it is called "form," like saying the shape of a knife. If it is thought that atoms do not exist, then there is no problem because coarse things exist. According to the way of asserting form that is not consciousness, because it can cause harm to the basis, it can be called that. Generally, sound has both expressing and including meanings, or only one of them, there are three possibilities. Therefore, what can become form can also be called the nature of form. And what is coarser than form, in the object of the eye, is specifically called form. These objects are broken down from coarse to fine, and finally broken down to the extremely fine extent that cannot be further divided, this is called an atom. That is, what cannot be divided into smaller things, is the ultimate of atoms, seven atoms constitute a dust particle.

Chinese

等等变化。逐渐地,从铁、水、兔、羊、牛、阳光微尘,以及虱子、虫子到指节的尺寸,都以七倍递增计算。在欲界中,对于有情识者来说,最小的可见微尘,至少也包含了八个有情识和无声的极微尘。如果存在有情识等,就应该通过它们来理解。因此,最终的无分微尘,是指能够区分并单独把握的构成要素和衍生的微尘,它们没有各自的部分。而粗大的事物,则根据大小的不同,包含相应数量的极微尘。有些藏人认为微尘是无穷无尽的,但这样一来,粗大的事物无法形成等过失,因此不合理。总而言之,粗大的事物是可以分割的,所以会越来越细微。如果最终变成无基,就会认为粗大的事物完全消失,因此认为存在一种比极微尘更小的、无法再分割的东西,这是普遍的极微尘理论。其他宗派认为这种微尘是常恒的,而我们自己的宗派则认为它是刹那生灭的,这就是区别。当极微尘构成粗大的事物时,这些微尘之间必须以有间隙或无间隙的某种方式组合。对此,出现了三种观点。胜论派说:必须接触才能形成集合体,如果不接触,就无法成为一个粗大的事物,所以微尘之间必须互相粘连。如果无分微尘通过不同的侧面粘连,那么就会有粘连和未粘连的部分,因此不能成为无分微尘。如果完全没有未粘连的部分,那么两者之间又怎么会有差异的空间呢?它们会变成一体,最终山王须弥山也会变成一个无分微尘,这是不合理的。此外,多数毗婆沙师等认为,微尘之间依靠力量互相 удерживают,不会散开,但像上面所说的那样,粘连在一起是不合理的,所以只是一个微尘被其他微尘包围,像牦牛尾巴和蜂巢一样存在,彼此之间有间隙。这也是不合理的,因为如果有间隙,就会有光明和黑暗的极微尘进入的空间,而且由于它们之间也无法互相接触,所以它们之间也必须有其他的微尘存在,等等,最终两个极微尘结合

English

etc., change. Gradually, from iron, water, rabbit, sheep, cow, sunlight dust, and lice, insects to the size of a finger joint, they are calculated to increase sevenfold. In the desire realm, for sentient beings, the smallest visible dust contains at least eight sentient and silent ultimate particles. If there are sentient beings, etc., they should be understood through them. Therefore, the ultimate indivisible particle refers to the elements and derived particles that can be distinguished and grasped individually; they do not have separate parts. Coarse objects, on the other hand, are believed to contain a corresponding number of ultimate particles depending on their size. Some Tibetans believe that particles are infinite, but this is not reasonable because it would be impossible to form coarse objects, etc. In short, coarse objects are divisible, so they become finer and finer. If they eventually become baseless, it is thought that coarse objects will disappear completely. Therefore, the belief that there is something smaller than the ultimate particle that cannot be further divided is the general theory of ultimate particles. Other schools believe that these particles are permanent, while our own school believes that they are momentary, which is the difference. When ultimate particles form coarse objects, these particles must be combined in some way, either with or without gaps. There are three views on this. The Vaisheshika school says: Contact is necessary to form a collection; if there is no contact, it cannot become a single coarse object, so the particles must adhere to each other. If an indivisible particle adheres through different sides, then there will be parts that adhere and parts that do not adhere, so it cannot be an indivisible particle. If there is absolutely no part that does not adhere, then how can there be room for difference between the two? They will become one, and eventually Mount Meru, the king of mountains, will also become one indivisible particle, which is unreasonable. Furthermore, most Vaibhashikas, etc., believe that particles hold each other together by force so that they do not scatter, but as mentioned above, adhering together is unreasonable, so it is only that one particle is surrounded by other particles, existing like a yak's tail and a honeycomb, with gaps between them. This is also unreasonable, because if there are gaps, there will be space for light and dark ultimate particles to enter, and since they cannot contact each other, there must be other particles between them, etc., until finally two ultimate particles combine

Chinese

因为其中也能容纳三有。其中,数论师等认为不接触,如上所述,接触与不接触二者皆不合理,所以说众多微尘实际上彼此没有接触或粘连,但因为没有间隔,所以认为是接触。然而,如果彼此接触且没有间隔,则与粘连意义相同,不可能有丝毫差别。因为在没有成为一体之前,不可能没有间隔。因此,相遇和粘连实际上是一回事,这已被大车论师们证实。因此,如果接触或没有间隔,则不可能不粘连;如果不粘连,则不可能接触或没有间隔,这也已被上述关于接触与不接触的考察所驳斥。其中,对于构成粗大的基础——极微之尘,有认为它们彼此粘连的宗派,也有认为它们不粘连,而是有间隔地环绕,或者认为它们不粘连且没有间隔地存在的宗派,无论这三种情况中的哪一种,都可以用这种考察方分的理证来驳斥。第二,驳斥认为极微是真实存在的观点,即说明如果没有方分,则无法形成粗大;如果有方分,则无法成立极微。第一,(颂曰:)“中心安住微尘一,所视自性为何者,观视其他微尘亦,若谓彼性即如是,如是地水等诸物,如何增长非应理?”意思是说,从考察方分的角度来看,在形成粗大时,必须有众多微尘聚集到位于中心的微尘上。例如,对于像房屋这样的事物,有朝向东面的部分,同样,对于朝向其他方向的部分,可以指定这是朝向这个方向的部分。同样,在众多微尘聚集形成粗大时,对于位于中心的微尘,如果说朝向东方微尘的自性与朝向其他方向的微尘的自性相同,没有其他方分,那么,如果说朝向其他方向的微尘也与朝向东方的部分或方分相同,那么,按照你所承认的观点,难道不是承认了地、水等事物不可能增长吗?