English
The five consciousnesses, such as eye consciousness, which arise from the five faculties such as the eye faculty as the empowering condition and the five objects such as form as the objective condition, are also not established as real. If these are not established, then the mind consciousness manifested by the immediately preceding condition of these five consciousnesses is also not established as real. Thus, if the six consciousnesses are not established, then the immediately past mind of these six consciousnesses is also not real. When the mind is not established as real, then the mental factors such as perception, feeling, and volition, which are of the same entity and easy to establish as the mind, can also be easily understood as without inherent existence. Non-associated compositional factors are also related to form and so on, either directly or indirectly, and these are also established as unreal. These non-associated factors are merely imputed by conceptualization and do not exist in reality, just as wise people do not need to stab a corpse with weapons after repeatedly dissecting it. Non-cognitive forms are also said to be produced from the elements as causes; if the elements do not exist, then non-cognitive forms also do not exist. Uncompounded phenomena such as space have already been refuted. Therefore, since the eighteen elements are also clearly shown to be without inherent existence, many things asserted by our own school are established as unreal in this way. The way in which many things asserted by other schools are established as unreal is also as follows: When multiple particles and so on are aggregated, they are imputed as having parts; if the fundamental particles do not exist, then the parts do not exist. Sound is a quality of space; if the four elements, which are asserted to be the qualities of form and so on, are not established as real, then sound is not established. Actions such as lifting depend on embodied beings, and the basis of the body's composition is particles, so actions such as lifting also do not exist. The great universal exists, and the universal of a cow, for example, is also related to form and so on, and is the universal of form. All the individual particulars, such as trees and earth, belong to form, depend on particles, and are the relationship of the dependent and the depended upon. The aggregates that are mutually asserted also mostly depend on particles, so the views of those outsiders will also be destroyed. In short, if one examines well, due to the key point that the knower and the known are mutually interdependent, since particles are not established, matter is not established. From this, it is known that the mind is also not established as real, and ultimately, attachment to reality can be destroyed for all phenomena. For example, if any one of a bundle of thin branches is pulled out, the others...
Chinese
就像稳固然后逐渐消散一样。第二，关于破斥一个识为真，在外境存在宗派中破斥一个识为真，以及在外境不存在宗派中破斥一个识为真。第一，遮破各自不同的观点，并通过共同证明一个真识是不可能的来结束，分为两个部分。第一，遮破自宗说实事部的两种观点，以及遮破外道宗派的观点，分为两个部分。第一，遮破无相说一切有部宗派的观点，以及遮破有相经部宗派的观点，分为两个部分。第一，确立自证是合理的，确立对境之识是不合理的，因此，揭示无相宗派是不合理的，分为三个部分。第一，确定自证的体性，揭示它是自证的理由，分为两个部分。第一，（月官）说：“与识的物质自性，相违背而产生的，任何非物质的自性，那就是自性识。”也就是说，总的来说，外境有和外境无两种观点。在有外境的观点中，又有识为无相和有相两种。首先，说识为无相的说一切有部的人认为，外境是存在的，但它是被根识所见的。而识就像水晶球一样，不执持对境的相状。像这样，色等是由具有所依的根识直接、赤裸地执取的。在对境和有境之间，哪里需要连接的相状呢？比如，看到瓶子时，直接、赤裸地看到位于对境位置的瓶子的自相。他们认为这仅仅是这样。这与世俗之人的想法一致。他们认为，我用眼睛看到了瓶子，执着于能见之眼和所见之瓶，认为显现的景象就是对境本身的赤裸裸的体性。因此，如果一百个人看一个瓶子，他们都认为所见之物只是那个唯一的瓶子。对此，经部等宗派进行分析后认为，一切对境都显现在自己的识面前而被执取，如果识不执取，那它怎么能成为识呢？因为物质不可能了知对境。因此，不是眼根所见，因为它本身是物质，不能作为能见者，而水晶
English
Just as it is stable and then gradually dissipates. Second, regarding the refutation of one consciousness as true, there is the refutation of one consciousness as true in the system that asserts external objects exist, and the refutation of one consciousness as true in the system that does not assert external objects. The first involves refuting the unique assertions of each, and concluding by demonstrating that a single true consciousness is impossible, divided into two parts. The first involves refuting the views of the two Realist schools within our own tradition, and refuting the views of externalists, divided into two parts. The first involves refuting the view of the Non-Representational Vaibhashika school, and refuting the view of the Representational Sautrantika school, divided into two parts. The first involves establishing that self-awareness is reasonable, establishing that object-awareness is unreasonable, and thus, revealing that the Non-Representational system is unreasonable, divided into three parts. The first involves identifying the nature of self-awareness, and demonstrating the reason why it is self-awareness, divided into two parts. First, （月官） said: "What arises as the opposite of the nature of material consciousness, whatever is the non-material nature, that itself is consciousness." That is to say, in general, there are two views: external objects exist and external objects do not exist. Among those who assert external objects, there are two types of consciousness: non-representational and representational. First, the Vaibhashikas, who assert non-representation, believe that external objects exist, but they are seen by the sense faculties. Consciousness is like a crystal ball, not holding the appearance of the object. Like this, forms and so on are directly and nakedly apprehended by the sense faculties that have a basis. Between the object and the subject, where is there a need for a connecting appearance? For example, when seeing a vase, one directly and nakedly sees the self-characteristic of the vase located in the place of the object. They think that this is just so. This is in accordance with the thinking of worldly people. They think, "I saw the vase with my eyes," clinging only to the seeing eye and the seen vase, thinking that the appearing phenomenon is the naked essence of the object itself. Therefore, if a hundred people look at one vase, they all think that what is seen is only that one vase. In response to this, the Sautrantikas and other schools analyze and say that all objects appear in the face of one's own consciousness and are apprehended. If consciousness does not apprehend it, how can it be consciousness? Because it is impossible for matter to know objects. Therefore, it is not seen by the eye sense, because it is matter and cannot be the seer, while the crystal
Chinese
等等，即使被清澈的形体阻隔也能看见。因此，要知道无论是什么样的境，都是通过了知来见和知的，离开了知是不可能了知的。因此，眼识是进入境的唯一因缘，是执持境的能力，这是通过随后的行止确定的。因此，例如镜子中显现的影像，就像镜子里显现的影像一样，是与生俱来的影像，哪里是真实的形体呢？同样，显现在意识中的一切都只是意识显现为该事物的形象。如果一百个人看一个瓶子，每个人自己的意识都会显现为瓶子的形象，就像一百面镜子里分别显现一个瓶子的影像一样。如果不是这样，那么那一百个人，如果他们各自的相续中没有了知瓶子的显现或了知的部分，那么也不可能了知瓶子。如果存在，那么各自心识中显现的部分不可能显现给另一个人，因为相续是不同的。因此，无论显现什么，都无可辩驳地是自显现。然而，这样的显现形象不会无因产生，因此存在创造形象的外境。从外境产生形象，就像从印度产生印度的凸起，或者从形体产生影像一样。例如，如果在镜子里显现形体的形象，真实的形体永远不可能显现在镜子里，但就像形体所具有的那样显现。同样，显现在自心的一切，必然是外境的形象，但外境也必须完全具备该形象所具有的一切。因此，会将自己心识中显现的形象和创造形象的外境二者混淆为一，实际上，显现的只是形象，而不是真实的事物。因此，真实的外境就像躲在幕后一样，以隐藏在形象背后的方式而无法看见。只要承认外境存在，就不得不这样承认，这非常合理。这些就像用颜色改变的玻璃被直接抓住时，玻璃直接抓住颜色的影像一样。直接显现只是意识，颜色
English
Etc., even if obstructed by a clear form, it can still be seen. Therefore, it is through knowing that one sees and knows all places and things. How could one know without knowing? It is impossible to know. Therefore, the sense faculty of eye consciousness is merely a condition for entering into an object; it is a capacity for grasping objects, which is established by the certainty of subsequent coming and going. Therefore, for example, the image that appears in a mirror is like an image born to appear in the mirror; it is not the actual form. Similarly, everything that appears to consciousness is merely consciousness appearing in the form of that thing. If a hundred people look at a single vase, each person's consciousness will appear in the form of the vase, just as the image of a single vase appears separately in a hundred mirrors. If it were not so, then if those hundred people did not each have an appearance or part of knowing the vase in their own minds, then it would not be possible to know the vase. If it exists, then that part appearing to each person's mind could not appear to another, because their minds are different. Therefore, whatever appears is undeniably one's own appearance. However, such an appearance does not arise without a cause, so there is an external object that creates the appearance. The appearance arising from that is like the bulge of India from India, or like an image from a form. For example, if the form of an object appears in a mirror, the actual object can never appear in the mirror, but it appears as it is in the object. Similarly, whatever appears to one's own mind must be the appearance of an external object, but the external object must also have everything that the appearance has, without excess or deficiency. Therefore, one confuses the appearance that appears to one's own mind with the external object that creates the appearance, but in reality, what appears is only the appearance, not the actual thing. Therefore, the actual external object is like being behind a curtain, hidden behind the appearance and not seen. As long as one believes that external objects exist, one must accept this, which is very reasonable. These are like when a glass changed by color is directly grasped, the glass directly grasps the image of the color. Direct appearance is only consciousness, and color
Chinese
认为显现为颜色和形状的基础是与识不同的微尘集合的外部事物，因此认为不是根识取对境，而是识取对境。对此，有些人说，如果外部事物完全不显现，那么为何不取食肉者等的形象呢？因为瓶子和食肉者二者都是隐蔽的，没有差别。如果说第一刹那外部事物显现，此后就是隐蔽的，那也是完全不了解经部宗的观点。如果第一刹那真实地认识对境，那么第二刹那等为何不认识呢？即使是隐蔽的，也只能取其所对应的形象，不可能取其他的形象。就像镜子中永远不可能显现真实的物体，但是哪个朝向镜子，哪个就会显现，不可能显现其他任何东西一样。对此，此处用影像来作比喻，仅仅是为了容易理解而已。这样，对于说识具有形象的观点，心识唯识宗和此宗二者相似，仅仅是有没有单独存在外部事物的差别而已。对此，对于具有形象者，对所取形象和取它的识二者进行分析，有三种情况，这将在下面讲述。那么，本论中，在名言上，您认为这三种情况中的哪一种呢？格鲁派的学者们说，正量和此宗都一致认为多种事物无二。但总的来说，如果从向内看自证的角度，仅仅考虑识流，那么可以说显现多种事物在心中无二，有可以使用这种说法的场合。但是，在这三种情况的场合，不仅仅是这样，而是必须理解为通过月的力量来取形象的方式，因此非常不合理。因此，在本宗中，我认为通过名言的量成立且没有损害的，只有能取和所取数量相等，我就是这样说的，而且我认为本论的观点也是如此。对此，在心识唯识宗遮破能取和所取数量相等的场合，以前的一些论师认为，同时产生多个完全相同的取蓝色等的心的种类。如果是这样，那么世尊说：没有先后，两个心生起，这是不可能的，没有机会。并且，又说一切有情都是一个识的相续。这与经文相违背。