Chinese
我们虽然从名言的角度安立为所取相和能取相，但实际上，任何一种识，与车和墙等无情物的自性，即与离明离觉的事物相反，会极大地生起为具有明和觉的体性。因此，任何不是无情物的自性，就像这样，就是所谓的自知或自明自显。第二，对于它安立为自知的道理： 无分一体自性故， 三之自性不应理， 彼之自识即自体， 非为能作所作事。 是故此乃识自体， 是故自知理应成。 如是说。如此，所谓的自识本身，是断除了其他事物而成为一体的，并且必须是与自身不同的无分自性。实际上，作为产生者的能立因，作为应被认识的对境，以及由它所产生的所生，能认识对境者，以及所生之果，即认识，这三者的自性是不应理的。因此，所谓的识自己认识自己，就像用斧头砍树一样，实际上是产生与自己相异的自执识，或者识所要认识的对境，以及将对境作为能认识的事物来承许是不对的，因为这个缘故，这才是识的自性，所以安立自知的名言是合理且可以成立的。如果实际上将自知作为具有对境、所生、能生之自性来承许，那是不应理的。如果事物自己产生自己，那么要么是未生，要么是已生。如果是前者，那是不应理的，因为在生起之前它不存在，所以没有产生的能力。如果已经生起，在具有能力的时候，所生也已经成立，并且自己对自己作用是相违的，就像剑不能砍自己一样。因此，对境瓶子等是无情物，所以在它们那里不可能有明和觉，因此，认识它们的体性需要依赖于与自己相异的明和觉的智慧。但是，这个识的体性不是像无情物那样，所以认识自己的体性不需要依赖于其他条件，因此，安立为自知这个名言是非常合理的，因为它自己
English
Although we establish the terms "apprehended aspect" and "apprehending aspect" from the perspective of expression, in reality, any consciousness that is the opposite of inanimate objects such as carts and walls—that is, things devoid of clarity and awareness—arises greatly as having the nature of clarity and awareness. Therefore, whatever is not the nature of an inanimate object, like this, is what is called self-knowing or self-illuminating. Second, the reason for designating it as self-knowing: Because of the indivisible single nature, The nature of three is not reasonable, Its own knowing is itself, Not as an agent and object. Therefore, this is the nature of consciousness, Therefore, self-knowing is reasonable. As it is said. Thus, the so-called self-consciousness itself is something that has become one by cutting off other things, and it must be an indivisible nature that is different from itself. In reality, it is not reasonable to have the nature of the cause that produces, the object to be known, and the effect produced by it, the knower of the object, and the result produced, that is, knowledge—the nature of these three, agent, action, and object. Therefore, what is said to be consciousness knowing itself is not like driving an axe into a tree, actually producing a self-grasping consciousness that is different from itself, or considering the object to be known by consciousness, and considering that object as something that can know, because of this, this is the nature of consciousness, so establishing the term self-knowing is reasonable and can be established. If, in reality, self-knowing is accepted as having the nature of an object, a product, and a producer, that is not reasonable. If a thing produces itself, then it either produces what is unproduced or what is already produced. If it is the former, that is not reasonable, because it does not exist before it arises, so it has no power to produce. If it has already arisen, when it has the power, the product is also established as being of the same essence, and it is contradictory for oneself to act on oneself, just as a sword cannot cut itself. Therefore, objects such as vases are inanimate, so it is impossible for them to have clarity and awareness, and therefore, knowing their essence requires relying on a mind of clarity and awareness that is different from oneself. However, the nature of this consciousness is not like that of an inanimate object, so knowing its own essence does not require relying on other conditions, therefore, establishing the term self-knowing is very reasonable, because it itself
Chinese
仅仅因为它是明智的本质。如果他知道别人，如果没有其他人知道他，那他就不是不认识自己。正如所说船夫自己将自己从水中救起，蜡烛自己照亮自己一样。即使蜡烛照亮了黑暗房间里的花瓶等物，蜡烛自己照亮自己也不需要其他原因，所以才被贴上“自明”的标签，但这就像蜡烛不是自己作为自己的对象而照亮自己一样。因此，体验产生为明智的本质，就被称为自识，一般来说，如果是知识，那么就本质而言，它普遍是自己认识自己。但是，从将能取和所取分为二的取相被设定为自识的对立面来看，它似乎并不普遍，等等，应该理解。因此，如果仅仅知道如何建立“自识”这个术语，那么在世俗中就不会有任何损害自识合理性的问题。如果知识自己显现，就像眼睛自己看到自己，或者有技巧的人骑在自己的肩膀上一样，诸如此类的不合理之处。以及如果蜡烛自己显现，黑暗就会遮蔽自己等等的所有论证，只有在承认自识是真实的情况下才会成立。如果是自己，那么是对象就是矛盾的。如果是对象，那么是自己就是矛盾的。如果不是矛盾的，那么黑暗就必须遮蔽自己等等，不可避免地会产生损害。然而，从体验对象的现象来看，即使像能取和所取一样被贴上标签，但实际上在没有差异的层面上设定的仅仅是术语的设定方式，没有任何错误。例如，在梦境的心中，对象马和牛似乎存在于外部，在那里，能取的感官意识似乎存在于内部。但实际上，知识只是在那里显现的清晰部分，因此，显现为能取部分和所取部分的那些，并非与知识本身不同，并且也有清晰的体验，因此，“自识”这个术语是合理的。虽然自我本身不可能与自身相关，但就像将哪些不同的方面在哪个事物的本质上是相同的，就称为单一自我相关一样。因此，所有体验到的所知事物的方面，都产生为体验明智的本质。因此，在术语上，知识体验所有对象是合理的，并且仅仅因为依赖而贴上对象和有对象者的标签，就非常合理地成为了自识。这也是后比量成立的最后边界。
English
Just because it is of the nature of clarity and awareness. If he knows others, but if there is no other knower for him, then he is not not knowing himself. It is like saying that the boatman himself saves himself from the water, and the candle itself illuminates itself. Even though the candle illuminates vases and other things in a dark room, the candle itself does not need another cause to illuminate itself, so it is labeled as "self-illuminating," but this is like the candle not illuminating itself by making itself its own object. Therefore, experience arising as the essence of clarity and awareness is labeled as self-awareness. In general, if it is knowledge, then in terms of essence, it is universally the case that it knows itself. However, from the perspective of the apprehending aspect, which is divided into the apprehended and the apprehender, being posited as self-awareness, it seems that it is not universally the case, and so on, should be understood. Therefore, if one knows how to establish the mere term "self-awareness" in this way, then in conventional truth, there will be no harm to the validity of self-awareness. If knowledge illuminates itself, it is said to be like the eye seeing itself, or a skilled person riding on his own shoulders, which are unacceptable. And all the arguments, such as if the candle illuminates itself, then darkness would obscure itself, and so on, only apply if self-awareness is accepted as true. If it is self, then it is contradictory to be an object. If it is an object, then it is contradictory to be self. If it is not contradictory, then darkness must obscure itself, and so on, and harm will inevitably occur. However, from the phenomenon of experiencing objects, even if it is labeled as the apprehender and the apprehended, there is no fault in this way of positing a mere term, which is established from the aspect of no difference in reality. For example, in the mind of a dream, objects like horses and cows appear to exist outside, and there, the apprehending sense consciousness appears to exist inside. But in reality, knowledge is only the clear part of what appears there, so those that appear as the apprehending part and the apprehended part are not different from knowledge itself, and there is also a clear experience, so the term "self-awareness" is valid. Although it is impossible for the self to be related to itself for its own sake, it is like calling those different aspects that are the same in the essence of a certain thing a single self-relation. Therefore, all aspects of knowable things that are experienced arise as the essence of experiencing clarity and awareness. Therefore, in terms of terminology, it is reasonable for knowledge to experience all objects, and it is very reasonable to label them as objects and object-possessors merely in dependence, and thus it is very reasonable to be self-aware. That is also the final boundary of inferential valid cognition.
Chinese
最终归于现量，并且现量义理也最终通过明晰体验的自证而完成，因此如果想要建立现见量，就不能没有自证。所以要驳斥不承认自证的观点，并且那些正确成立的部分，应当从理自在的论著中了解。第二，显示义理不合理。事物自性与他者异，彼如何能知晓？彼之自性他者无，何者知彼亦知他。识与所识之意义，是因汝欲立异故。如是说，因为如此明晰且是觉性，所以可以成为自识。对于非明觉的事物自性，与识之外的其他事物，识如何能知晓？因为没有关联。如果这样，识的自性，体验明觉的特征，在其他事物上没有，那么以什么理由，识如同自己能认识自己一样，也能直接体验并认识其他事物呢？因为主张义理的你，认为识与所识的二者，本体是不同的。所谓完全断除对境，是识的不共之处，如同体验安乐等一样，因此不应存在于事物上。凡是通过识来体验或者在识的层面显现，都必须通过明晰和觉性来认识，如果脱离了明觉，怎么能认识呢？因此，在执持瓶子的识的层面，瓶子清晰显现，如果那不是识本身，而是独立存在于外境的事物，那么，外境的法在识中没有，识的法在外境中没有，因此二者因为是否明觉而互相排斥，处于不同的位置，不同的位置怎么能直接体验呢？因为会像光明和黑暗一样变得没有关联。因此，识总是不会超出其自身的特征，即明觉。那么，脱离了明觉的外境，何时才能获得体验的机会呢？因此，在执持瓶子的识的层面，显现的如瓶子般的形象，也不可能脱离明觉识的自性。因此，如果识与对境没有关联，那么体验对境是不合理的，完全断除对
English
Ultimately, it culminates in direct perception, and the meaning of direct perception is also ultimately completed through self-awareness that is experienced clearly. Therefore, if one wants to establish manifest valid cognition, self-awareness is indispensable. Therefore, one should refute the view that does not accept self-awareness, and those parts that are correctly established should be understood from the treatises of the Lord of Reasoning. Second, showing that the understanding of objects is unreasonable: How can it know other natures of things? Its nature is not in others, who knows it also knows others. The meaning of knowledge and the object of knowledge is because you want to establish difference. Thus it is said, because it is so clear and cognitive, it can be self-knowing. How can that consciousness know the nature of things that are not clear and cognitive and are different from consciousness, because there is no connection. If so, if the nature of that consciousness, the characteristic of experiencing clarity and cognition, is not in other objects, then for what reason can that consciousness directly experience and know other objects in the same way that it can know itself? Because you, who advocate the understanding of objects, believe that the essence of consciousness and the object to be known are different. The so-called complete cutting off of the object is the uncommon aspect of consciousness, like experiencing happiness and so on, so it should not exist in things. Whatever is experienced by consciousness or appears on the level of consciousness must be known through clarity and cognition. How can one know if one is separated from clarity and cognition? Therefore, on the level of the consciousness that holds the pot, the pot appears clearly. If that is not consciousness itself, but exists independently as an external object, then the dharma of the external object is not in consciousness, and the dharma of consciousness is not in the external object. Therefore, the two are mutually exclusive because of whether they are clear and cognitive, and they are in different positions. How can different positions ever be directly experienced? Because it will become unrelated like light and darkness. Therefore, consciousness always does not go beyond its own characteristic, which is clarity and cognition. Then, when will the external object, which is separated from clarity and cognition, have the opportunity to be experienced? Therefore, on the level of the consciousness that holds the pot, the appearance of the pot-like image cannot be separated from the nature of clear and cognitive consciousness. Therefore, if there is no connection between consciousness and the object, then experiencing the object is unreasonable, completely cutting off the