Chinese
如果现和识二者在体验中以明觉的体性结合为一，那么识就会转变为对境的认知。然而，对于那些被对外境的执着之毒所败坏的思想者来说，这种情况是不可能的，因为他们认为境和识是不同的。因此，在没有单一主体的关联之前，体验对境是不合理的，因为在识的面前，所有显现的显现和所有体验的体验都必须仅仅是识的明觉自性。仅仅是同时发生的关系并不能成就对境的体验，因为那样一来，同时存在的眼睛等也会变成体验者。对于无相者来说，如果境所产生的果没有相，那么它又产生了什么呢？那是不可能的。那些外道不仅认为境的相上没有觉知，而且也认为没有自证，如果是那样的话，境和识二者的名称也会消失，因为识必须是明晰的。如果它不明晰，那么就像他人眼前的对境没有成为自己的体验对象一样，自己面前的境也不会被直接体验到，因为境和识之间没有关联的理由。因此，即使像瓶子这样的境被直接看到，如果自己的心没有对自己隐藏，那么如果这不是自证的体性，那么心对境的认知或体验都是不可能的，因此自证非常合理。第三，揭示无相之理不合理之处：揭示有相者仅仅适合对境体验的名称；揭示无相者甚至连对境体验的名称都不适合，因此揭示无相之理最为低劣。第一，对于有相识的宗派来说：实际上，境和识二者虽然不同，但由于它和影像相似，所以仅仅通过假立就可以感知。也就是说，对于那些虽然认为外境存在，但却认为识具有相的宗派来说，实际上，境和识二者虽然被认为是不同的，但是由于外境和它的相二者与物体和影像相似，所以仅仅通过假立，识就可以认知那个境，或者说可以被体验到。即使没有真正地体验到境，也可以通过体验相似之处而说“看到了瓶子”，“听到了声音”等等。第二，具有境之相的转变的识
English
If the present and consciousness are connected as one in the nature of clarity and awareness in experience, then consciousness will transform into the cognition of objects. However, for those thinkers who are corrupted by the poison of attachment to external objects, such a situation is impossible because they believe that objects and consciousness are different. Therefore, it is unreasonable to experience objects without the connection of a single subject, because in the presence of consciousness, all appearances that appear and all experiences that are experienced must be solely the nature of clarity and awareness of consciousness. Merely a relationship of simultaneous occurrence does not accomplish the experience of objects, because then the eyes, etc., which exist simultaneously, would also become experiencers. For those without form, if the result produced by the object has no form, then what does it produce? That is impossible. Those outsiders not only believe that there is no awareness in the aspect of objects, but also believe that there is no self-awareness. If that is the case, then the names of both object and consciousness will disappear, because consciousness must be clear. If it is not clear, then just as the object in front of another person's eyes does not become one's own object of experience, the object in front of oneself will also not be directly experienced, because there is no reason for connection between object and consciousness. Therefore, even if an object like a vase is directly seen, if one's own mind is not hidden from oneself, then if this is not the nature of self-awareness, then all cognition or experience of objects by the mind is impossible, therefore self-awareness is very reasonable. Third, revealing the unreasonableness of the doctrine of no-form: revealing that those with form are only suitable for the name of object experience; revealing that those without form are not even suitable for the name of object experience, therefore revealing that the doctrine of no-form is the most inferior. First, for the school of thought with form consciousness: Actually, although the object and consciousness are different, because it is similar to an image, it can be perceived only through imputation. That is, for those who believe in external objects, but believe that consciousness has form, in reality, although the object and consciousness are considered different, because the external object and its form are similar to an object and an image, only through imputation can consciousness recognize that object, or it can be experienced. Even if the object is not truly experienced, one can say "saw the vase", "heard the sound", etc. by experiencing the similarity. Second, the consciousness with the transformation of the object's form
Chinese
谁不想要呢？对于他来说，外道（指不信佛法的学派）的这种形态也是不存在的。如经部宗等不承认外境的宗派，谁不想要具有瓶子等外境形态的变异识呢？因为无相部（指不承认心识具有外境形象的学派，如说一切有部）等的观点不承认境与识之间的关联，所以他们认为外境是青色、黄色等，并且认为这种认识和觉知的显现形态也不是一直存在的。例如，如果水晶球不能被颜色所改变，那么无论在它上面显示出什么青色、黄色等颜色，它都只会保持自己原本的颜色不变。按照这些宗派的观点，外境是无情之物，没有觉知能力。而心识是有觉知能力的，因此境与识两者之间存在着遥远的差异，不仅无法直接体验到，而且也不承认两者之间存在如影像般的关联，甚至连名言上也无法成立见闻等现象。因此，如果仔细研究有相部的观点，就会发现那些认为外境存在的人非常不相关联，而这种观点则更为低劣，因为它是在否定现量。即使他们认为没有外境的形态，但现量显现仍然存在，但如果没有形态，那么通过理证就可以证明无法现量体验到外境。这样，在说明了无相的心识是不可能存在之后，对于具有各种形态、与心识的形态相应的心识，则会根据各自宗派的观点，以理证来确定遮破一性的方式。第二，驳斥经部宗的观点，分为：驳斥多种非二元论、驳斥半卵论、驳斥识的数量相等论三种。第一种又分为：如同心识一样，最终会变成一种形态的过失；如同形态一样，最终会变成多种心识的过失；如果不是这样，心识和形态最终会变成不同的过失这三种驳斥。第一种：因为一个心识不是不同的，所以不会变成多种形态。因此，不可能通过它的力量来安立境识发生改变。如是说。对于有相部的观点，也有承许所取相为一和承许为多的两种。在承许为多之中，又有承许与形态的数量相同的心识为多和不承许，而承许心识为一的三种情况，除此之外不可能有其他的思考方式。在这三种情况中，第一种是虽然有多种形态，但心识
English
Who would not want it? For him, this form of externalist (referring to schools that do not believe in Buddhism) also does not exist. Like the Sautrāntika school and others who do not acknowledge external objects, who would not want the consciousness that transforms with the form of external objects such as a vase? Because the view of the Nirākāra-vādins (those who do not acknowledge that consciousness has the image of external objects, such as the Sarvāstivāda school) and others does not accept the connection between the object and consciousness, they believe that external objects are blue, yellow, etc., and that this manifest form of cognition and awareness is not always present. For example, if a crystal ball cannot be changed by color, then no matter what blue, yellow, etc. colors are shown on it, it will only maintain its original color without changing. According to the views of these schools, external objects are inanimate and have no awareness. Consciousness is awareness, so there is a distant difference between the object and consciousness, and not only can they not be directly experienced, but they also do not acknowledge the connection between them as an image, and even in name, phenomena such as seeing and hearing cannot be established. Therefore, if the Sākāra-vāda view is carefully examined, it will be found that those who believe in the existence of external objects are very unrelated, and this view is even more inferior because it is denying direct perception. Even if they think that there is no form of external objects, but direct perception still exists, but if there is no form, then it can be proved by reasoning that external objects cannot be directly experienced. Thus, after explaining that formless consciousness cannot exist, for the consciousness that has various forms and corresponds to the form of consciousness, the way to refute oneness will be determined by reasoning according to the views of each school. Second, refuting the view of the Sautrāntika school, divided into: refuting the theory of multiple non-duality, refuting the half-egg theory, and refuting the theory of equal number of consciousnesses. The first is further divided into: like consciousness, the fault of eventually becoming one form; like form, the fault of eventually becoming multiple consciousnesses; if not, the fault of consciousness and form eventually becoming different, these three refutations. The first: Because one consciousness is not different, it will not become multiple forms. Therefore, it is impossible to establish that the object-consciousness changes through its power. It is said. For the view of the Sākāra-vāda, there are also two types: accepting the apprehended aspect as one and accepting it as many. Among those who accept it as many, there are three situations: accepting that the number of consciousnesses is the same as the number of forms, and not accepting it, but accepting that consciousness is one, and there can be no other way of thinking besides these three situations. Among these three situations, the first is that although there are many forms, the consciousness
Chinese
那些想要一个（识）产生的，即使显现了青色境和成办安乐一体的无常等各种各样的相，有境的识也只是产生具有青色相的，以及对于抓取杂色的眼识，杂色境以青黄等多种相来施加影响，眼识也不会产生与那些数量相符的多个，而是想要产生仅仅抓取杂色的一个眼识。如果多种相变成有境识的一个自性，那么，那种宗派也被命名为多种无二。对此，按照那些宗派的观点，那个唯一的识和相二者不是异体，所以，相也不会从一个变成青黄白红等多个，而必须变成一个。因为相不会变成多个，所以凭借各个多种相的力量，在外境中存在青黄等各个多种的对境，认为能够了知，那种安立也会消失。对此，在见到拉长的图画时，如果不跟随图画中存在的青黄等各个（颜色），心意就会与对境不符。如果那样，那么“这是青色”，“这是黄色”等安立多种相的因，也没有安立了。第二，因为与相不分离，所以不会变成唯一的识。这样说，如果承认没有多种相，那么就与现量相违，最终一切名言都会毁灭，所以那是必须承认的，这样想。如果那样，那么因为不与具有多种自性的相分离，所以识也不会变成唯一，而是会变成与相的数量相同之多个。第三，如果不是那样，那么对于这二者，要如何说是一个呢？这样说，总之，如果承认识相是一个，并且认为识是一个而相是多个，要么放弃认为相是多个，要么必须接受认为识是一个，通过刚刚所说的道理可以成立。如果不是必须变成刚刚所说的那样，那么你对于识相这二者，要如何说是一个自性呢？如果识是一个而相是多个，一个和多个存在于相违的法中，如果自性是一个是可能的，那么在你的宗派中不
English
Those who wish for a single (consciousness) to arise, even though various aspects such as the impermanence of blue objects and the accomplishment of bliss, which are of one substance, may appear, the consciousness with an object only arises with the aspect of blue. And for the eye consciousness that grasps variegated colors, even though the variegated object impresses various aspects such as blue and yellow, the eye consciousness does not arise with as many instances as those, but rather wishes to produce a single eye consciousness that merely grasps the variegated. If various aspects become the nature of a single consciousness with an object, then that system is also named 'manifold non-duality.' According to the tenets of those systems, that single consciousness and the aspects are not different entities. Therefore, the aspects also cannot change from one into many such as blue, yellow, white, and red, but must become one. Since the aspects do not become many, the postulation that one can know that there are various separate objects such as blue and yellow in the external world by the power of the various separate aspects also disappears. Therefore, when seeing a stretched-out drawing, if the mind does not follow each of the blue, yellow, etc., that exist in the drawing, the mind will be inconsistent with the object. If that is the case, then the basis for designating various aspects, such as 'this is blue' and 'this is yellow,' is also not established. Second, because it is not separate from the aspects, it will not become a single consciousness. It is said that if one asserts that there are no various aspects, it contradicts direct perception, and ultimately all conventions will be destroyed, so it must be asserted. If that is the case, then because it is not separate from the aspects that possess the nature of various multiplicities, that consciousness also will not become a single one, but will become as many as the number of aspects. Third, if it is not like that, then how can one say that these two are one? It is said that, in short, if one asserts that consciousness and aspect are one, and believes that consciousness is one and aspects are many, then either one must abandon the belief that aspects are many, or one must accept the belief that consciousness is one, which can be established by the reasoning just explained. If it is not necessary to become as just explained, then how can you say that these two, consciousness and aspect, are of one nature? If consciousness is one and aspects are many, and one and many exist in contradictory qualities, if it is possible that the nature is one, then in your system it is not.