English
Second, to establish its pervasiveness, it shows that seeing and remembering objects are contradictory. Therefore, if combined, it shows that clear appearance is not reasonable. First, thus combining the boundaries is: remembering is the act, not seeing, because it does not hold onto the past object. If asked, are clear appearance and combination contradictory? Answer: They are contradictory. Thus, combining the boundaries of before and after is remembering the past that has passed, and if not remembered, it cannot be combined. Therefore, remembering is the agent of combination. Now, seeing is not the agent of combination, because seeing enters the present object, because it does not hold onto the past object. Second, whatever is in its object, that is not clear because it is destroyed. Therefore, this appearance of a wheel is not clear, but of the nature of change. Thus, the appearance of a wheel on a torch, as you wish, if many moments of before and after are combined and appear as one, then it must be combined with remembrance. Whatever is the object of remembrance, that is already destroyed, so it can only be remembered and cannot be clearly experienced. Therefore, remembrance is only of the past object, so it does not clearly recognize even the object in front of it, because it is not the present object. For that reason, if it is necessary to combine, then the present appearance of the wheel will also become an unclear object of remembrance, and will become something that does not appear like direct perception. For example, knowing how to pierce a hundred lotus petals is not as clear as seeing a torch wheel, etc., because it is impossible to pierce them all at once, so the wise will surely determine it to be gradual. For example, like holes in copper plates, etc., many stacked on top of each other, if one person pierces them, then the holes pierced at once are harmed by measurement, so piercing the lotus is also inferred to be done by one person. Third, refuting the equality of the number of consciousnesses, stating the assertion, and refuting it. First, when seeing a stretched drawing, in that way, many minds, if in the manner of one part, how would it occur if desired? Thus it is said, in that, the number of apprehended aspects, thus knowing
Chinese
在也认为有众多的宗派中，对于蓝色事物和乐成，认为本体相同的事物，如所作、无常等有多少，就对境有多少种相，识也产生多少种相。对于杂色事物，也认为在能取眼识中，对于蓝色、黄色等事物有多少种相，就对境有多少种相。例如，在看到拉长的图画时，事物上有多少蓝色、黄色等，同样，如果认为许多心识如何能同时或以部分的方式产生，那么这就是在陈述前者的观点。对此，在此处仔细研究，虽然会产生与显现对境之物的各个部分数量相同的识，但是，对于与事物和自性没有差别的反体部分，由于事物的自性显现本身没有在反体方面添加虚构，因此，对于它的有境来说，也只是因为以具有它的相的方式而区分开来而已。对此，能取和所取数量相等，或者说识的数量相等，这些大多是识的同类，但即使像不同类一样，也不会妨碍产生众多，虽然这样想，但同类众多不会同时产生，因为已经陈述了具有众多执取相，但没有众多同类的自宗。第二，驳斥它，确立一切心识都具有众多的相，揭示了无分之一个真实是不可能的。第一，如果那样，白色等，一个相的识，最初、中间、末尾不同，就会变成各种各样的对境。如是宣说，如果未遮止的宗派是那样，那么在见到杂色的基础上，就像有蓝色、黄色等众多相一样，对于它的支分，白色等事物，即使是一个相的识，也有最初，即上方，同样有下方、彼岸、此岸、中间和末尾的部分不同，因此会变成各种各样的对境，不可能存在一个真实。第二，如果观察所缘的物质，就没有唯一对境的方式，如果观察能缘的识，就没有这种情况。第一，原子自性的白色等，唯一自性的无分，对于显现的任何识，我都没有完全感觉到。这样说，如此相
English
In the system that also asserts there are many, for blue objects and Sukhavati, it is asserted that as many forms as there are of things that are the same entity, such as created and impermanent things, the consciousness also arises possessing that many forms in relation to the object. For variegated objects as well, it is asserted that in the apprehending eye consciousness, as many forms as there are of blue, yellow, etc., in the object, the consciousness also arises possessing that many forms in relation to the object. For example, when seeing a stretched-out drawing, just as there are blue, yellow, etc., in that object, similarly, if it is thought how many minds could arise simultaneously or in a partial manner, then this is stating the previous position. Moreover, if one examines well in this context, although consciousnesses arise according to the number of parts that can appear separately as aspects of the object-entity, the aspects of exclusion that are not different in entity and nature are merely differentiated because, from the aspect where the appearance of the object's nature itself does not fabricate elaborations in the direction of exclusion, it also reverts to being of that form for its object-possessor. In this regard, whether the number of apprehended and apprehender are equal, or the number of consciousnesses are equal, these are mostly consciousnesses of the same class, but even like different classes, there is no contradiction in many arising. Although one might think this, many of the same class do not arise simultaneously, because the self-system of how there are many apprehending forms but not many of the same class has already been stated in sequence. Secondly, in refuting that, establishing that all minds have many forms, and showing that an indivisible single truth is impossible, there are two. Firstly, if that is so, white, etc., even a consciousness of a single form, because the beginning, middle, and end are different, will become diverse objects. As it is said, if the unprevented system is like that, then just as there are many forms such as blue, yellow, etc., on the basis of seeing variegation, for its divisions, white objects, etc., even a consciousness of a single form, there is a beginning, i.e., above, and similarly there are different parts of below, the far shore, this shore, the middle, and the end, therefore it will become diverse objects, and it is impossible for there to be a single truth. Secondly, if one examines the object to be cognized, there is no way to cognize it as one, and if one examines the cognizing mind, there is no such case. Firstly, atomic self-nature, white, etc., the indivisible of a single self-nature, for whatever consciousness it appears to, I do not fully perceive it. Thus saying, so form
Chinese
如果一个事物可以被区分为多种形态，那么什么是唯一的呢？那就是种族。如果存在无法分割的极微小的粒子，并且认为它具有唯一的形态，那么，无论我如何努力专注地观察，也无法发现极微粒子的本质，例如白色等，它与其它事物不混合，具有唯一的自性，并且无法在方向上进行分割。对于所有显现的知识，我无法明确地感知到“这就是它”。简而言之，不可能直接体验到不可分割的极微粒子。因此，如果那些有概念的人承认存在的事物是可以通过量来认知的，那么在无法认知的情况下，他们声称事物存在，这难道不是自欺欺人吗？因此，正如人造的彩色布料和天然的彩色蝴蝶一样，各种各样的知识也不可能是唯一的真理。 第二，五种意识的界限是： 以积聚为目标的形态。 心和心所的目标是： 被认为是第六种。 正如有境的心，眼等感官的五种识蕴，是以各自的对境，即极微粒子的积聚为目标的形态，因此会变成多种形态。意识也与此相似，因为它与它们具有相同的存在方式。法界，即非意识和非造作的事物，仅仅是被命名的，不能被认为是独立存在的，而是通过区分来进行命名。感受、想法和意志的三个蕴仅仅是其本质。专注于此的意识不仅仅抓住心所，而是专注于心和心所的集合。因此，心和心所共同聚集的目标被认为是意识，或者说是第六意识，或者说是它的目标。这只是按照我们自己的宗派的观点来表达的。因此，不可能存在专注于单一事物的知识。 第二，驳斥外道观点，包括对有知者等的普遍驳斥，以及对各个宗派具体观点的驳斥。首先，即使在外道典籍中，意识也不会显现为单一的，因为它专注于具有属性等的物质等。
English
If a thing can be divided into many forms, what is the one that is unique? That is the race. If there is only an extremely small particle that cannot be divided into parts, and it is thought to have only one form, then, no matter how hard I try to concentrate and look, I cannot find the essence of the extremely small particle, such as white, etc., which is not mixed with other things, has its own unique nature, and cannot be divided in direction. For all the knowledge that appears, I have no clear perception to say "This is it." In short, it is impossible to directly experience an indivisible extremely small particle. Therefore, if those who have concepts admit that what exists can be cognized by valid cognition, then how can they deceive themselves by claiming that things exist even when they are not cognized? Therefore, just as artificial colored cloth and natural colored butterflies are, various kinds of knowledge cannot be the only truth. Second, The five realms of consciousness Are forms aimed at accumulation. The object of mind and mental factors Is considered the sixth. Just as the mind with an object, the five aggregates of consciousness of the senses such as the eye, are forms that aim at the accumulation of extremely small particles of their respective objects, so they will become many forms. Consciousness is also similar to this, because it has the same mode of existence as them. The Dharma realm, that is, non-consciousness and the unconditioned, is merely named and cannot be considered to exist separately, but is named through distinction. The three aggregates of feeling, thought, and volition are merely its essence. The mind that focuses on this does not only grasp mental factors, but focuses on the collection of mind and mental factors. Therefore, the object of the mind and mental factors gathered together is considered to be consciousness, or the sixth consciousness, or its object. This is only expressed according to the views of our own school. Therefore, it is impossible for knowledge to focus on a single thing. Second, refuting the views of outsiders, including a general refutation of those with knowledge, etc., and a refutation of the specific views of each school. First, even in the scriptures of outsiders, consciousness does not appear as one, because it focuses on matter, etc., which have attributes, etc.
Chinese
说“返回！”。那些从这个教法之外，追随食余者和僧侣等的人被称为外道或异端。由于众生的邪见是无限的，宗派的恶见也有那么多的差别，但从总体类别来看，不可能超越常断二见，而且常论者也有多种形式。有三百六十种见、六十二种见、十一个部类等多种区分方式。但总的来说，可以归纳为五种因明学派。一般来说，异端这个词，从词源学的角度来说，也适用于内外两者的实有论者。但通常被称为外道或异端。在衡量声音等时，特指常论者。顺世论也是如此，既指一般的外道，也指特指的断见论者。同样，数论派等各自的名称，也根据其通用和特殊的用法，在不同的论典中，有时看起来相同，有时看起来不同，这些大多是从总体上的相似之处，到细微的观点差异的区分，以及依赖于词源解释的原因等来理解，如果在没有获得恰当理解的情况下，对一个名称感到困惑，那么讲解论典就会变得混乱，以至于无法确定任何内容，因此必须加以区分。其中，将食余者视为导师的派别，被称为胜论派或猫头鹰派、理智派等，他们认为词有六种意义：地等九种物质、色等二十四种性质、伸展收缩等五种行为，以及这三者所具有的遍在的大和小，以及这种普遍性的区别或子类是明确的，不同的集合如头上的角，以及非不同的集合如海螺的白色圆形。他们认为一切都包含在这六种词义中。据说，食余者通过苦行来成就自在天，因此当一只猫头鹰落在石制林伽的阳具上时，他们认为那是自在天，并问它是否有物质等六种东西，猫头鹰每次都点头，最后飞走了，他们认为只有这六种东西。
English
He said, "Return!" Those who are outside of this teaching, following the remnants-eaters and the Samkhyas, etc., are called outsiders or heretics. Since the wrong views of beings are limitless, there are so many differences in the evil views of philosophical schools, but from a general category, it is impossible to go beyond permanence and annihilation, and there are many forms of permanence-believers. There are three hundred and sixty views, sixty-two views, eleven categories, etc., with many distinctions. But in summary, they can be compared to the five Hetuvidya schools. In general, the term "heretic," from an etymological point of view, also applies to realists both inside and outside. But it is mostly known as outsiders or heretics in general. When measuring sounds, etc., it specifically refers to permanence-believers. The Charvakas are also the same, referring to both general outsiders and specifically annihilationist. Similarly, the names of the Samkhya school, etc., also depend on their general and specific usages, so that in different treatises, sometimes they seem the same and sometimes they seem different. These are mostly distinctions from general similarities to subtle differences in views, and understanding based on the reasons for etymological explanations, etc. If one is confused by a single name without obtaining a proper understanding, then explaining the treatise will become confused, so that nothing can be determined, so it must be distinguished. Among them, the school that considers the remnants-eaters as teachers, known as the Vaisheshika or Owl school, the Rationalists, etc., believe that words have six meanings: nine substances such as earth, twenty-four qualities such as form, five actions such as stretching and contracting, and the pervasive large and small that these three have, and the distinction or subclass of this generality is clear, different collections such as horns on the head, and non-different collections such as the white roundness of a conch shell. They believe that everything is included in these six meanings of words. It is said that the remnants-eaters accomplished Ishvara through asceticism, so when an owl landed on the phallus of a stone lingam, they considered it to be Ishvara, and asked it if it had six things such as substance, etc., and the owl nodded each time, and finally flew away, and they thought that there were only these six things.