English
Those who believe that the basis of what appears as color and shape is the external object, which is a collection of subtle particles different from consciousness, therefore believe that it is not the sense faculties that apprehend the object, but consciousness that apprehends it. To this, some say, if external objects do not appear at all, then why do we not apprehend the forms of meat-eaters, etc.? Because there is no difference between a pot and a meat-eater in being hidden. If you say that external objects appear in the first moment and are hidden thereafter, then you have not understood the tenets of the Sautrāntika school at all. If you directly perceive the object in the first moment, then why not in the second, etc.? Even if it is hidden, it is only possible to apprehend the form to which it is directed, and it is impossible to apprehend any other form. Just as it is never possible for a real object to appear in a mirror, but whatever faces the mirror will appear, and it is impossible for anything else to appear. In this case, the example of an image is used here only to make it easier to understand. Thus, although the Mind-Only school and this school are similar in saying that consciousness has aspects, the only difference is whether or not they believe that external objects exist separately. In this regard, for those who have aspects, there are three possibilities when analyzing the apprehended aspect and the consciousness that apprehends it, which will be discussed below. So, in this treatise, which of these three do you think is the case in terms of convention? The Gelug scholars say that the Pramāṇa and this school all agree that multiple phenomena are non-dual. But in general, if we consider only the stream of consciousness from the point of view of looking inward at self-awareness, then we can say that the appearance of multiple phenomena is non-dual in the mind, and there is a time when it is permissible to use this term. However, in the case of these three possibilities, it is not just that, but it must be understood as the way of apprehending the form through the power of the moon, so it is very unreasonable. Therefore, in this system, I believe that only the equality of the number of apprehender and apprehended is established by conventional valid cognition and is without harm, and I speak only in that way, and I think that is also the intention of the treatise. In this regard, in the context of the Mind-Only school refuting the equality of the number of apprehender and apprehended, some former teachers believed that many completely identical types of minds that apprehend blue, etc., arise simultaneously. If that were the case, then the Bhagavan said: "It is not possible, there is no opportunity, for two minds to arise without before and after." And again, "All sentient beings are of one stream of consciousness." This contradicts the scriptures.
Chinese
需要注意的是，例如，如果不混淆瓶子的自相，就必须不混淆地抓住它们在地点、时间和形态上的不同，因此，要像对待瓶子的口、腹、底等各个部分一样，分别对待它们。不可能将它们混合在一起。抓住口部的意识和抓住底部的意识，两者不是同一类，因此会得到多个意识的名称，怎么会得到一个的名称呢？然而，将所有这些加起来抓住的，除了瓶子的意识这一类之外，没有其他的了。具体来说，抓住口部也与抓住口部在意义上一致，与其他不一致。即使是口部，抓住上部和下部的各个部分，内部类别也不一致，但可以作为口部意识的唯一基础。如果将这些应用到所有事物上，那么两个同类的意识永远不会同时产生。如果专注于像瓶子这样的一个对象，那么瓶子的意识，无论是无分别的同类，还是有分别的两者，如果同时产生，就会变成两个对象，因此必须变成不同的相续。即使产生许多不同类的意识，也不会变成不同的相续和不同的识。要相信这一点。如果认为抓住口部也是一个瓶子的意识，抓住腹部也是同一个意识，那就大错特错了。因此，将口部意识和腹部意识等所见之处完全集合起来，作为瓶子的意识，这样意识就不会变成不同的。例如，当车轮、轮毂、轮辐、轮辋等被命名为车辆时，这些部件彼此之间不是同一个，但因此，具有这些部件的车辆也不会变成两个。因此，当意识到“这是瓶子”时，如果不区分所有非瓶子的事物，就无法成立，因此除了这一个之外，不可能与其他分别念同时存在。同样，仅仅是抓住杂色，以及杂色的分支，抓住绿色，以及绿色的分支，中心的绿色等等，只要心能区分，就应该这样理解。因此，安立意识是同一相续和同一体性的方式就是这样。如果安立为没有许多内部组成部分，除非承认对象是无分，识也是无分的一个实有，否则如何成立呢？其他
English
It is necessary to note that, for example, if the self-characteristics of a vase are not confused, then one must grasp them without confusing their place, time, and form. Therefore, one must grasp the mouth, belly, bottom, etc., of the vase as if addressing each part separately. It is impossible to mix them together. The consciousness that grasps the mouth and the consciousness that grasps the bottom are not of the same kind, so they receive the name of multiple consciousnesses; how could they receive the name of one? However, grasping all of these together, there is nothing other than the consciousness of grasping the vase. Specifically, grasping the mouth is also consistent in meaning with grasping the mouth, and inconsistent with others. Even within the mouth, the parts that grasp the upper and lower parts are internally inconsistent, but they can serve as the sole basis for the consciousness of the mouth. If these are applied to all things, then two consciousnesses of the same kind will never arise simultaneously. If one focuses on a single object like a vase, then the consciousness of grasping the vase, whether it is non-conceptual of the same kind or conceptual, if both arise simultaneously, it will become two objects, and therefore must become different continuums. Even if many different kinds of consciousness arise, they will not become different continuums and different consciousnesses. One should believe in this. If one understands that grasping the mouth is also one vase consciousness, and grasping the belly is also the same consciousness, then one is completely mistaken. Therefore, when the objects of sight, such as the consciousness of the mouth and the consciousness of the belly, are completely gathered together and established as the consciousness of grasping the vase, the consciousness does not become different. For example, when the wheel, hub, spokes, rim, etc., are named as a vehicle, these parts are not the same as each other, but therefore, the vehicle with these parts does not become two. Therefore, when one realizes "This is a vase," it cannot be established unless all non-vase things are distinguished, so it is impossible for other conceptualizations to exist simultaneously with this one. Similarly, just grasping the variegated, and the divisions of the variegated, grasping the green, and the divisions of the green, the green in the center, etc., should be understood in this way, as far as the mind can distinguish. Therefore, the way to establish consciousness as being of the same continuum and the same essence is like this. If one establishes it as not having many internal components, unless one admits that the object is partless and the consciousness is a single, truly existent entity, how can it be established? Others
Chinese
如果说瓶子的口、腹部等是不同的境，因此作为有境的识不是异类，那么执瓶识和执水识也会变成一个。最终，由于仅仅在有境识上相同，听觉识、视觉识等所有识都会变成一个。这样一来，由于不同类的识的基础没有成立，导师将识分为同类和异类就没有必要了。因此，对于这个宗派来说，或许有可能同时缘取花蝴蝶等各种颜色。否则，那是不可能的，如果次第缘取，就会被说成是煮半个鸡蛋时发出的“chug”的声音等的道理所损害。即使同时缘取，如果没有对各个相的执著，识和相就会变成无关联等过失，因此多种无二也极不合理。最终，即使是像蓝色显现境那样的一个境，也有中间、边缘等的差别。因此，如实执持它的有境不可能没有不同的相。如果可能，那么将有分的相执持为无分，怎么能是量呢？对于这个主张多个识的宗派来说，名言上，执持所量之量会变得不合理。因为主张瓶子是众多微尘自性的人们不承认无分的瓶子，并且像安立显现在识面前的具有分的理由一样。在那个宗派中，所取相和能取相的同类识不会同时产生。因为将二者在假立的名言上分开，实际上没有差别。像这样，即使在其他地方没有见到，也只有这个道理在名言上被承认，所以独自一人无所畏惧地说。吉祥法称的究竟见解也已确定在那里。如果如理地阅读汉藏的论典，有智慧的人们就会发现。这个有很多需要说，但暂时只是略微地指出了。其中，无相派的宗派必须展示为完全没有关联。首先，必须成立自证是合理的。也就是说，显现为所取部分的相也是识。执持它的也是识，如果二者本体是一个，那么自己对自己作用是相违的，因此那是不合理的。如果这样认为，那么像这样，显现为各种所量之境，以及执持它的有境各自存在那样的
English
If it is said that the mouth, abdomen, etc., of a pot are different objects, and therefore the consciousness that is the subject of those objects is not of a different kind, then the consciousness that grasps a pot and the consciousness that grasps water would also become one. Ultimately, since they are similar only in terms of the object-possessing consciousness, all consciousnesses such as auditory consciousness and visual consciousness would become one. In that case, since the basis of consciousnesses of different kinds is not established, it would be unnecessary for the teacher to divide consciousness into similar and dissimilar kinds. Therefore, for this system, it might be possible to simultaneously perceive the various colors of a butterfly, etc. Otherwise, that is not possible; if one perceives them sequentially, it would be harmed by the reasoning of the sound "chug" made when boiling half an egg. Even while perceiving simultaneously, if there is no grasping of the individual aspects, the consciousness and the aspect would become unrelated, etc., so the non-duality of multiplicity is also extremely unreasonable. Ultimately, even in a single object of appearance such as blue, there are distinctions such as center and edge. Therefore, it is impossible for the object-possessing consciousness that grasps it as it is to be without different aspects. If it were possible, how could it be valid to grasp a partless aspect as having parts? For this system that asserts multiple consciousnesses, in terms of convention, the valid cognition that grasps the object to be measured would become unreasonable. Because those who assert that a pot is the nature of many particles do not accept a partless pot, and the reason for that is established as appearing to the consciousness as having parts. In that system, the consciousness of the same kind as the grasped aspect and the grasping aspect would not arise simultaneously. Because the two are separated in imputed convention, but in reality there is no difference. Like this, even if it is not seen elsewhere, only this reasoning is accepted in convention, so I speak fearlessly alone. The ultimate view of Glorious Dharmakirti is also determined to be there. If those with intelligence read the treatises of India and Tibet properly, they will discover it. There is much to be said about this, but for now, only a brief indication has been given. Among these, the system of aspectlessness must be shown to be completely unrelated. First, it must be established that self-awareness is reasonable. That is to say, the aspect that appears as the object to be grasped is also consciousness. The one that grasps it is also consciousness, and if the two are the same entity, then it is contradictory for oneself to act on oneself, so that is unreasonable. If one thinks like that, then like this, the object that appears as various objects to be measured, and the object-possessing consciousness that grasps it exist separately