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KMG046 0002.Commentary on Engaging in Bodhisattva Activity, The Ocean of Eloquence and Logic.g2.0f

English

How can a body exist if it is not connected to limbs? It cannot. Secondly, because the body is not real, due to ignorance, the thought of mistaking the hand, etc., which has no body, for a body will arise. But what that thought holds is not true. For example, just as a puppet made in a special way resembling a human form will cause the thought of it being a human. As long as the causes and conditions for mistaking that puppet for a human gather, that puppet will appear like a person. Similarly, as long as the causes for mistaking limbs, etc., for a body exist, those limbs, etc., will appear as a body. Secondly, just as the entire body is not truly established, because fingers are gathered together, how can a hand be truly established? A finger is also a collection of joints, so a joint is not real. Those joints also do not exist individually because their respective components are separated. The components are also broken down into minute particles, and those minute particles also become multiple due to the distinction of directional parts, so it is not truly one. If each of its directions is separated, because it is separated from the real part, it is empty like space, therefore the minute particle itself is not real. Thirdly, the point of summarizing is: since it appears like that but is not real, who would be attached to a dream-like body with discernment? One should not be attached. When the body does not exist, how can its distinctions, whether it is a male body or a female body, exist? Secondly, regarding the mindfulness of feelings and memories, there are four points: the nature of feelings, the cause of contact, the object, and the non-establishment of grasping. The first point has two aspects: the way in which feelings are not established in ultimate reality, and cultivating the antidote to this. There are two points in the first point, first is the reasoning of refutation: As stated in the Root Wisdom: "If it has its own nature, then it should not be non-existent. If the nature is different, then it is other, this is never reasonable." Just as if the feeling of suffering truly exists, then it will never be abandoned, then how can it not harm the extreme joy and happiness that are opposite to it? Because it will cause harm, they will never arise, but in reality they do arise, which is clear. If happiness itself truly exists, then sorrow and severe suffering such as illness

Chinese

等等,为什么不用美味的食物等等来让自己快乐和舒适呢?很明显,他们会这样做,而不是不这样做。第二,驳斥对这个问题的回答:如果痛苦确实存在,但当强大的快乐产生时,由于它压倒了痛苦,所以不会体验到痛苦,如果这样说,那么,如果某事物不是被体验的自性,它怎么会是感觉呢?因为它没有那种特征。即使体验到微小的痛苦,它也是一种感觉,但这种粗大的痛苦不是被强大的快乐消除了吗?确实如此。如果那个微小的本质只不过是比粗大的快乐稍微弱一点的喜悦和快乐,那么,即使体验到微小的快乐,它也不会变成痛苦,因为它属于快乐的范畴。如果由于相反的快乐产生,痛苦没有在那个相续中产生,那么认为没有产生的东西是感觉,这难道不是颠倒的执着吗?确实如此。第二点是:因为认为是感觉是错误的,所以为了对抗这种错误,应该修习这种智慧,即分析所有事物都没有自性。因为这种智慧所分析的领域所产生的果实——禅定,是瑜伽士增长对实相的理解的食物。第二,触:因为他们认为境、根、识三者是相遇的,所以为了驳斥这一点,有三点:驳斥根与境的相遇,驳斥与识的相遇,以及总结要点。第一点分为两部分:一般驳斥相遇:如果眼睛等根和色等境是有间隔的,那么它们会在哪里相遇呢?就像东西方的山一样。如果在中间没有任何间隔的部分,那么它们会变成一体,那么它们中的哪一个会与哪一个相遇呢?因为没有相遇者和被相遇者。第二,驳斥微粒的相遇:根和境的微粒不会在所有方面相遇,因为微粒不会进入微粒,即不会溶解在一个微粒中。原因是微粒没有空隙,并且只有相同的大小。因此,没有进入的东西不会混合,没有混合的东西不会在所有方面相遇。

English

Etc., why not make oneself happy and comfortable with delicious food, etc.? It is clear that they will do so, rather than not do so. Second, refuting the answer to that: If suffering truly exists, but when a powerful pleasure arises, since it overwhelms the suffering, that suffering is not experienced, if it is said, then, how can something that is not of the nature of being experienced be a feeling? Because it does not have that characteristic. Even if a subtle suffering is experienced, it is a feeling, but is not this gross suffering eliminated by the powerful pleasure? Indeed it is. If that subtle essence is nothing other than a slightly weaker joy and pleasure than the gross pleasure, then, even that subtle experience will not become suffering, because it belongs to the category of pleasure. If, because the opposing pleasure has arisen, suffering has not arisen in that continuum, then is it not a perverse clinging to conceive of what has not arisen as a feeling? Indeed it is. The second point is: Because it is a mistake to conceive of it as a feeling, therefore, as an antidote to this mistake, one should meditate on this wisdom that analyzes all phenomena as being without inherent existence. Because the fruit arising from the field analyzed by that wisdom—meditation—is the food that nourishes the yogi's body, which understands the nature of reality. Second, contact: Because they believe that the three—object, faculty, and consciousness—meet, there are three points to refute this: refuting the meeting of faculty and object, refuting the meeting with consciousness, and summarizing the point. The first point has two parts: Generally refuting meeting: If the faculties such as the eye and the objects such as forms are with intervals, then where will they meet? Like mountains in the east and west. If there is no intervening part at all, then they will become one, so which of them will meet with which? Because there is no one who meets and no one who is met. Second, refuting the meeting of particles: The particles of faculty and object do not meet in all aspects, because particles do not enter into particles, i.e., they do not dissolve into one another. The reason is that the particles have no space and are only of the same size. Therefore, what has not entered does not mix, and what has not mixed does not meet in all aspects.

Chinese

被称为遍一切处。对于认为极微是无分之物,又怎么能说与一方相合是合理的呢?如果那样,就会变成相合与不相合的两种部分了。如果真能见到相合且无分的状态,就请指出来,但这是不可能的。第二,对于识,立为有法,相合是不合理的,因为它是无身,即无色的缘故。对此,如果说即使没有与有色物的相合,但为了产生果,仅仅是聚合也是可以的,这是不合理的。因为聚合也不是真实的实有,如前文“相续与聚合”中所分析的那样。第三,如果这样,如果没有触的因,那么感受的果又从何产生呢?因此,为了获得快乐的感受而努力,这又有什么意义呢?痛苦的感受又会对哪个相续造成损害呢?因为没有可获得者和可损害者。当见到没有任何感受者的我,并且感受本身也不存在的状态时,为什么不对获得和摆脱苦乐的贪执产生厌离呢?一定会厌离的。第三,所见或所触的五种对境,虽然显现,但并不真实,如同梦境和幻术一样,因此,以它们为对境的感受也不是真实的。第四,感受不是由与自身同时产生的那个心所见,因为与那个心同时产生,所以没有关联。由感受之前和之后产生的心,也只会忆念和希求它,而不是体验它,因为在那些时候,感受尚未产生或已经止灭。由于没有能体验者和所体验者,因此自己体验自己是不可能的。如果在三时中进行观察,其他人也不可能体验,因此没有任何感受者存在。因此,感受本身也不存在。这样,对于这个无我的蕴的集合,快乐的感受能带来什么利益,痛苦的感受又能造成什么损害呢?因为利益者和损害者都未成立。第三,心念住分为两种:意念住和五根识未成立。

English

It is called all-pervading. How can it be reasonable to say that something that is considered to be an indivisible atom can be in contact with one side? If so, it would become two parts, contacting and not contacting. If such a state of being in contact and indivisible can be seen, please point it out, but it is impossible to point it out. Second, for consciousness, it is established as a subject of debate that contact is not reasonable, because it is bodiless, i.e., without form. To this, if it is said that even without contact with a colored object, mere aggregation is sufficient to produce a result, it is unreasonable. Because aggregation is also not a real entity, as analyzed earlier in "Continuum and Aggregation." Third, if this is the case, if there is no cause of touch, from where will the result of feeling arise? Therefore, what is the point of striving to obtain pleasant feelings, and what continuum will painful feelings harm, since there is no one to be gained or harmed? When one sees the state where there is no self of the feeler and the feeling itself does not exist, why does attachment to gaining and separating from pleasure and pain not turn into aversion? It will certainly turn into aversion. Third, the five objects of sight or touch, although they appear, are not real, being of the nature of dreams and illusions, and therefore the feelings that have them as objects are not real. Fourth, feeling is not seen by the mind that arises simultaneously with itself, because it arises simultaneously with that mind, so there is no connection. The mind that arises before and after feeling will only remember and desire it, but not experience it, because at those times, feeling has not yet arisen or has already ceased. Since there is no experiencer and nothing to be experienced, it is impossible for oneself to experience oneself. If one observes in the three times, it is impossible for others to experience it either, so there is no feeler at all. Therefore, feeling itself does not exist either. Thus, for this collection of aggregates without self, what benefit can pleasant feelings bring, and what harm can painful feelings cause, since the benefactor and the harmer are not established? Third, mindfulness of mind is divided into two: mindfulness of mind and the non-establishment of the five sense consciousnesses.

Chinese

识的自性不住于眼等诸根,也不住于色等诸境。因为即使有根境,识也不会相续产生。识也不存在于其他地方,因为无法找到。心不在身体内,也不在身体外。除此之外,也无法找到心。因为心既不是身体本身,也不是与身体不同的真实存在,不与身体混合,也不与身体分离,这样的心丝毫也不真实存在。《宝积经》中说:“光护,心不在内,不在外,不在二者之间,不可见。光护,心无色,不可指示,无碍,非所依,无显现,无分别,无住处。光护,一切佛皆不见心,不见,亦不可见。”如是说。因此,众生从本以来就已涅槃。二是,如果这样,意识是否真实地作为五根识的五境执持者存在呢?那么,考察一下这五境是先于、同时于还是后于五根识而存在。如果说五根识先于所知五境而存在,那么识缘何而生呢?因为那时境未生故不存在。如果识与所知同时,那么识又缘何而生呢?因为未生时境也未生,已生时境不需要产生识。如果识后于所知而存在,那么那时识又从何而生呢?因为境已灭故不存在。第四,于法念住有二,第一,一切法成立为无生之理:如是,以无论从先后同时都不能产生的道理,并不能真实地了知一切法的生。第二,遣除对此的辩论有二,第一,遣除不承认世俗的过失有二,辩论是:如果一切法无生,则没有生灭的世俗,那么中观宗的观点中哪里有二谛呢?将变成没有。如果一切法无生灭,那么世俗是他人的错乱之识

English

The nature of consciousness does not reside in the sense faculties such as the eye, nor does it reside in the objects such as forms. Because even if there are sense faculties and objects, consciousness does not arise continuously. Consciousness also does not exist elsewhere, because it cannot be found. The mind is not inside the body, nor is it outside the body. Apart from that, the mind cannot be found. Because the mind is neither the body itself, nor a real existence different from the body, not mixed with the body, nor separated from the body, such a mind does not truly exist at all. The Ratnakuta Sutra says: "Light-protector, the mind is not inside, not outside, not in between, and is invisible. Light-protector, the mind is formless, cannot be indicated, is unimpeded, is not a support, has no appearance, has no discrimination, and has no dwelling place. Light-protector, all Buddhas do not see the mind, do not see, and will not see." Thus it is said. Therefore, sentient beings have been in nirvana from the beginning. Secondly, if that is the case, does mental consciousness truly exist as the holder of the five objects of the five sense consciousnesses? Then, examine whether these five objects exist before, simultaneously with, or after the five sense consciousnesses. If it is said that the five sense consciousnesses exist before the knowable five objects, then on what does consciousness rely to arise? Because at that time the object has not arisen and therefore does not exist. If consciousness and the knowable are simultaneous, then on what does consciousness rely to arise? Because when it has not arisen, the object has also not arisen, and when it has arisen, the object does not need to generate consciousness. If consciousness exists after the knowable, then from what does consciousness arise at that time? Because the object has ceased and therefore does not exist. Fourth, in the mindfulness of the Dharma, there are two aspects. First, the way in which all dharmas are established as unborn: Thus, with the reasoning that they cannot arise from before, after, or simultaneously, it is not possible to truly realize the birth of all dharmas. Second, refuting the debate on this has two aspects. First, refuting the fault of not admitting the conventional has two aspects. The debate is: If all dharmas are unborn, then there is no conventional truth of arising and ceasing, so where are the two truths in the view of the Madhyamikas? It will become non-existent. If all dharmas are without arising and ceasing, then the conventional is the deluded mind of others.