English
If that "being" has no beginning, then how can its fruits, such as happiness, have a beginning? It would become nonexistent. Similarly, if there is no end, then why would happiness and suffering, etc., always exist? They would continue to exist. These occur intermittently, which is clear. Second, to dispel confusion about pervasiveness: If the Lord is eternal, but the production of effects depends on some other conditions, then the Lord cannot always produce effects, which is not pervasive. If someone says that the Lord does not depend on other conditions, that is incorrect, because without the Lord's action, there would be no other things. So, what would the Lord depend on to produce effects? If it depends on the collection of conditions, then that collection itself becomes the cause, and the Lord is not the cause. Because when the cause and conditions gather, the Lord has no power not to produce the effect, and without that collection, it has no power to produce the effect. If the Lord produces the effect unwillingly, then it would be controlled by other things. If it produces the effect willingly, then producing the effect depends on the will. If producing the effect depends on the will, then what is the Lord? Because the will is impermanent, it is controlled by other things. The second view is that those who believe that eternal atoms produce all containers and contents are also unreasonable. Because the eternity of atoms has already been refuted, namely, "The atom is also differentiated by directional parts." The third part is divided into two points: stating the view and refuting the view. The first point is that the Samkhya school believes that all knowledge is contained in self-awareness and primordial matter. The self, as before, has five attributes, neither cause nor effect. Primordial matter is eternal, the only substance, which no one can see, it is the creator of all things, has five attributes, and is the cause of samsara. Its essence is the names called courage, particles, and darkness, the three attributes, namely happiness, suffering, and neutrality, are in a state of equilibrium. Its nature is called the nature of the cause. When these are unbalanced, changes occur. First, something called "great" appears, which is as clear as crystal. From within, the person (purusha) appears, and from the outside, the image of the object appears, and when these two are mixed, there is the saying that the person enjoys the object. Then comes the conceited
Chinese
并且，从那之中，眼等五种意识的感官，以及口、脚、手和大小便道这五种行为的感官，以及共同的意，这十一种感官，以及声、触、味、色、香这五种“彼量”，总共十六种聚合产生。从那五种“彼量”中，依次产生空、风、火、水、土这五种生起之物。这二十二者被称为是趋向果的。从自性产生大，从那产生我慢，从那产生十六种相。十六种相也从那些之中，从五“彼量”产生五种生起之物。如此说。第二有四点：自性是一，乐等是意义，事物是常，以及对先前存在的生起的驳斥。第一点是：主物唯一真实，但它本身具有三种自性，这不合逻辑，因此主物不存在。同样，功德也不是三种真实的，因为这三者也会各自变成三种形态。据说，这三个标志证明了凡是单一的主体或真实的物质，都必然具有三种功德的自性。大疏中对后一点有清楚的说明。如果没有三种功德的因，那么声音等现象的果也必然非常遥远，以至于不可能存在。第二点是：布等五“彼量”作为所立，在其中，乐等不可能以单一的本质存在，因为它们没有心识。如果说布等事物的本质是乐等之因的自性，因此其中存在乐等，那么布等事物也与身体相同，因此对身体的驳斥已经通过分析驳斥过了，不是吗？确实如此。此外，按照你的观点，布等的因也被认为是乐等三种功德。然而，从乐等之中不会产生布等，只是在世俗层面，人们看到从布等中产生乐等。如果进行分析，布等之因并不真实，因此它的果，乐等，也不真实。第三点是：乐等作为所立，永远不可能被认为是常恒的，因为它们是无常的。
English
And, from that, the five sensory faculties of consciousness such as the eye, and the five action faculties of mouth, feet, hands, and the two paths of excretion, and the mind in common, these eleven faculties, and with the five "that-much" of sound, touch, taste, form, and smell, sixteen aggregates arise. From those five "that-much", in order, the five arisen elements of space, wind, fire, water, and earth arise. These twenty-two are said to be those that go to fruition. From nature arises the great, from that arises ego, from that arise sixteen aspects. The sixteen aspects also from those, from the five "that-much" arise the five arisen elements. Thus it is said. The second has four points: nature is one, pleasure etc. are meaning, things are permanent, and the refutation of prior existing arising. The first point is: the chief is true as one, but it itself has three natures, which is not logical, therefore the chief does not exist. Likewise, qualities are also not true as three, because those three will also each become three forms. It is said that these three signs prove that whatever is a single subject or a true substance, it is necessarily possessed of the nature of three qualities. The latter is clearly explained in the Great Commentary. If there is no cause of three qualities, then the result of sound etc. phenomena is also very far away, so that it becomes impossible to exist. The second point is: cloth etc., the five "that-much" as the subject, in that, it is not possible for pleasure etc. to exist as a single essence, because they are without mind. If it is said that the essence of things like cloth is the nature of the cause of pleasure etc., therefore pleasure etc. exist in it, then things like cloth are also the same as the body, therefore the refutation of the body has already been refuted by analysis, hasn't it? Indeed it has. Furthermore, according to your view, the cause of cloth etc. is also considered to be the three qualities of pleasure etc. However, from pleasure etc. cloth etc. do not arise, but only on the conventional level, people see pleasure etc. arising from cloth etc. If analyzed, the cause of cloth etc. is not true, therefore its result, pleasure etc., is also not true. The third point is: pleasure etc. as the subject, it is never possible to be regarded as permanent, because they are impermanent.
Chinese
若非如此。如果安乐等显现是恒常存在之体性，那么在痛苦产生之时，为何不会执持安乐的感受呢？应该会执持才对。如果说痛苦产生之时，安乐变得微细而无法感受，那么恒常之物怎么会时而粗大时而微细呢？因此，舍弃粗大而变为微细，安乐等的粗细就成了无常。同样，变异等一切事物也为何不认为是无常呢？因为道理相同。如果说安乐的粗细状态是无常，但安乐的自性是恒常的，那么安乐的粗大与安乐并非他体，因此，粗大无常，安乐也明显地变成无常了。 第四品分四部分。第一，自宗的确定：如果认为一无所有就不会产生任何事物，因为是无有，就像从沙子中榨不出油一样。那么，显现先前没有而产生，虽然你不承认，但在你的宗派中也是成立的，因为你承认先前不显现的后来会显现。第二，太过分：如果因上存在果，那么吃糌粑就变成吃不净之物了。用布的价钱买棉花的种子，然后穿上它吧！第三，驳斥其回答：如果事物是那样存在，但世间愚昧，因为在种子中没有看到布而不穿。并非如此，即使是想要了解此理的比丘等，也不会穿种子，而是穿布。你自己的宗派的果，知道此理的世间人也有，那么为何在种子中看不到布呢？应该能看到才对。即使世间人也有，但在因的状态，世间人的所有心识都不是量，所以无法了知。如果这样认为，那么心识清楚地见到果也不是真实的，因为心识是错乱的对境。第四，避免对自己的损害：如果中观宗的量，即衡量对境的量也不是量，而是错乱，那么由此衡量的空性不也变成虚假的了吗？会变成虚假的。因此，修习空性也不合理，如果这样认为，对于由心识假立的事物，并非是
English
If it is not so. If happiness and other manifestations are of a permanently existing nature, then why, when suffering arises, is there no apprehension of experiencing happiness? There should be apprehension. If it is said that when suffering arises, that happiness becomes subtle and cannot be experienced, then how can something permanent be sometimes coarse and sometimes subtle? Therefore, by abandoning the coarse and becoming subtle, the coarseness and subtlety of happiness and so on are established as impermanent. Similarly, why are all phenomena such as transformations not considered impermanent, since the reasoning is the same? If it is said that the states of coarseness and subtlety of happiness are impermanent, but the nature of happiness is permanent, then the coarseness of happiness is not other than happiness, therefore, since it is impermanent, happiness also clearly becomes impermanent. The fourth chapter has four parts. First, the ascertainment of one's own system: If it is thought that nothing whatsoever can arise because it is non-existent, like trying to extract sesame oil from sand, then the arising of manifestation, which was previously non-existent, is something you do not accept, but it is established in your own system, because you accept that what was previously unmanifest arises later as manifest. Second, the extreme consequence: If the effect exists in the cause, then eating tsampa would become eating impure things. Buy cotton seeds with the price of cloth and then wear them! Third, refuting the answer to that: If things exist in that way, but the world is ignorant because they do not see cloth in the seeds and do not wear them, that is not so, because even monks and others who want to understand this do not wear seeds but wear cloth. The result of your own system, the worldly person who knows this also has it, so why is cloth not seen in the seeds? It should be seen. Even if worldly people have it, in the state of the cause, all the minds of worldly people are not valid cognitions, so they cannot understand it. If you think so, then the mind's clear seeing of the effect itself is also not true, because the mind is the object of delusion. Fourth, avoiding harm to oneself: If, in the Madhyamaka system, the valid cognitions that measure objects are also not valid cognitions but are deluded, then does the emptiness measured by them not also become false? It would become false. Therefore, it is also unreasonable to meditate on emptiness itself, if you think so, for things imputed by the mind, it is not
Chinese
如果不对它进行观察，就不会认为它的事物不存在。例如，如果没有抓住寡妇的儿子，就不会认为他已经死了。因为无事物依赖于事物，所以被否定的虚假事物，通过否定，虚无会清晰地显现出来。然而，修习空性是合理的，因为它能对治实执。因此，例如，梦见儿子死了，认为儿子不存在的分别念，是障碍于认为儿子存在的分别念。虽然认为不存在也是虚假的，但它能够舍弃认为存在的执着。第三，因此，如果像这样用理智进行分析，没有任何事物是无因而存在的，也不是从一开始就存在于各个或聚集的因缘中，也不是从其他地方新出现的，所以一开始就没有产生。因此，它不会在中间停留，最终也不会停止并转移到其他地方。如果分析后发现它没有成立，并且因为愚昧而执着为真实，那么这个显现但不真实的事物与幻术有什么区别呢？没有区别。第二，幻术所变现的马、牛等，以及因缘所变现的色等，最初是从哪里来的，中间住在哪里，最终又到哪里去，请仔细观察。如果观察，就会发现它们没有来去，是相同的。经中说：“色从任何地方都不来，到任何地方都不去，也没有任何地方可以停留。”等等。无论什么样的结果，什么样的因是可以通过近距离观察到的。如果那个因不存在，那就是不是通过观察而见到的因缘的造作，所以和影像一样，哪里会有真实性呢？经中说：“凡是因缘所生的，就是不生的。它没有生的自性。凡是依赖于因缘的，就是空性。谁了解空性，谁就不是放逸的。”第二，从果的角度来成立空性，有三种：否定两种极端的生，否定灭，因此成立空性。第一种又分为两种，第一种是否定已存在的生：对于已经存在的事物，还需要什么原因呢？因为它已经成立了。第二种是否定不存在
English
If it is not observed, one will not conceive of its non-existence. For example, if one does not grasp the son of a widow, one will not conceive that he is dead. Because non-things depend on things, the false thing that is to be negated, through negation, the non-existence clearly appears as false. However, it is reasonable to meditate on emptiness, because it counteracts the clinging to reality. Therefore, for example, dreaming that one's son has died, the thought that the son does not exist is an obstacle to the thought that the son exists. Although the conception of non-existence is also false, it can abandon the clinging to existence. Third, therefore, if one analyzes in this way with reason, no thing exists without a cause, nor does it exist from the beginning in the separate or assembled causes and conditions, nor does it newly come from elsewhere, so it is not born in the beginning. Therefore, it does not remain in the middle, nor does it ultimately cease and go elsewhere. If, after analysis, it is found to be unestablished and is grasped as true due to ignorance, what difference is there between this appearing but untrue thing and an illusion? There is no difference. Second, the horses, cattle, etc., that are conjured by illusion, and the forms, etc., that are conjured by causes and conditions, from where did they come in the beginning, where do they dwell in the middle, and where do they go in the end? Examine them carefully. If you examine them, you will find that they have no coming or going, they are the same. The sutra says: "Form does not come from anywhere, does not go anywhere, and there is nowhere for it to abide." And so on. Whatever result, whatever cause is seen by proximity. If that cause does not exist, then it is a fabrication of causes and conditions that is not seen by observation, so like an image, where is there truth? The sutra says: "Whatever is born from conditions is unborn. It does not have the nature of birth. Whatever depends on conditions is emptiness. Whoever knows emptiness is not negligent." Second, establishing emptiness from the perspective of the result has three aspects: negating the birth of the two extremes, negating cessation, and therefore establishing emptiness. The first has two parts. The first is negating the birth of what exists: What need is there for a cause for something that already exists? Because it is already established. The second is negating the non-existence