Chinese
如果仅仅因为异生者安立为生灭法就成立的话，那么众生怎么能从痛苦中解脱呢？肯定不能解脱。如果有些人已经从痛苦中解脱，但其他人却安立为生灭法，这就会变成世俗谛了，是这样吗？对此的回答是：实际上，虽然在胜义谛上是无生的，但因为没有证悟到这一点，所以才会执着为生灭法，并且以心作为对境，依赖于此而安立为世俗谛，因此它不会消失。但这并不会导致涅槃的消失，因为他人的错觉不会使他人变成世俗谛。这种错觉是涅槃之外的心识分别。因此，它不是涅槃自身的世俗谛，而是错觉。如果后来确定涅槃时存在错觉，那么那里也存在世俗谛。如果不存在错觉，那么世俗谛就不存在。《释论》中说：诸法从诸法中产生，是后来产生的，并非本来就存在。因此，如果后来确定的法存在，那么那时世俗谛就存在。因此，也可以这样说，在涅槃时，如果存在后来确定一个产生的这种情况。第二，遮破不合理的观察，分为两部分。第一，辩论：能分别的智慧和所观察的对境二者是相互依赖的，如果对境不存在，那么智慧也不存在，因此观察是不合理的。第二，分为三部分。第一，观察者不需要是真实的：因为对境不是真实的，所以智慧也不是真实的，但观察不会变得不合理。因为所有的一切观察都是依赖于世俗谛的知识，依赖于世间人所共知的道理而说的。第二，如果需要真实，那么就会出现无穷的过失：如果在分别时，需要用真实成立的观察来进行观察，那么这个观察也需要用其他的观察来进行观察，因此会变成无穷无尽，从而导致根本的观察对象无法确定。第三，即使不观察，也成立为空性：如果观察的对境被分别观察为空性，那么对于观察的智慧来说，即使不观察，也没有所依赖的对境。因为没有所依赖的对境，所以它不会产生，对境和智慧二者都会在无生中寂灭。
English
If it is established merely by others designating it as having birth and cessation, then how can sentient beings be liberated from suffering? They certainly cannot be liberated. If some have been liberated from suffering, but others designate it as having birth and cessation, then it would become conventional truth, is that so? The answer to that is: In reality, although it is unborn in the ultimate sense, because it is not realized, it is apprehended as having birth and cessation, and relying on that which is made an object by the mind, it is established as conventional truth, therefore it will not disappear. But that will not cause nirvana to disappear, because the delusion of others does not make others conventional truth. This delusion is a mental conceptualization other than nirvana. Therefore, it is not the conventional truth of nirvana itself, but a delusion. If it is later determined that there is delusion at the time of nirvana, then there is also conventional truth there. If there is no delusion, then there is no conventional truth. The commentary says: The arising of phenomena from phenomena is something that arises later and does not exist originally. Therefore, if the dharma that is determined later exists, then at that time conventional truth exists. Therefore, it can also be said that at the time of nirvana, if there is a situation where one later determines that one arises. Second, refuting unreasonable analysis, divided into two parts. First, the debate: The discriminating mind and the object to be examined are mutually dependent. If the object does not exist, then the mind also does not exist, therefore analysis is unreasonable. Second, divided into three parts. First, the analyzer does not need to be true: Because the object is not true, the mind is also not true, but analysis will not become unreasonable. Because all analysis is based on the knowledge of conventional truth, based on the reasoning known to worldly people. Second, if truth is required, then there will be extreme consequences: If, when analyzing, it is necessary to analyze with an analysis that is established as true, then that analysis also needs to be analyzed with another analysis, therefore it will become endless, resulting in the fundamental object of analysis being uncertain. Third, even if not analyzed, emptiness is established: If the object of analysis is analyzed and established as empty, then for the mind of analysis, even if not analyzed, there is no object to rely on. Because there is no object to rely on, it will not arise, both the object and the mind will be pacified in the unborn.
Chinese
此外，关于涅槃，是无所缘而完全寂灭。如是先前已述。第三，破斥执著所舍弃之事物为实有，有三：总的指示，破斥能成立之理，以及陈述能损害之理。第一，就任何实事论者而言，认为境与识二者是真实的，这实在是非常困难的，因为没有能成立之理，却有能损害之理。第二有二，第一，互相依赖而不能成立：如果说从真实的识的根源，事物才能真实地成立，那么识真实存在本身依赖于什么或有什么能成立之理？或者说从所识才能成立识，那么所识存在依赖于什么？如果互相以一方的力量而存在，那么，在这种情况下，一方不成立则另一方不成立，因此两者都会不存在。例如，如果没有儿子，父亲就不能成立，即使父母成立，儿子又从何而来呢？像这样，没有父亲就没有儿子，没有儿子就没有父亲，因此两者都不存在，境与识二者也是如此，根本不存在。第二，破斥对过失的辩解：如果说依赖也能成立，这并不矛盾。例如，幼芽从种子中生长，依赖于种子，幼芽本身就能了知种子存在。同样，从所识产生的识，为什么不能了知所识存在呢？这并不相同，幼芽是由不同于它的识所见，从而了知种子存在。因为，要了知所识真实存在的识，其真实存在本身又从何了知呢？因为没有能了知者。第三有三：从因的角度和从果的角度成立空性，以及总结已成立之义。第一有二：成立非真实产生，以及名言中从因产生是空性的。第一有三：破斥无因，从常因产生，以及总结意义。第一：顺世外道和行者说：太阳升起，河流向下流淌，豌豆是圆的，荆棘是尖锐而长的，孔雀的羽毛美丽等等一切事物，谁也没有造作，而是自性产生的。如是破斥认为事物是从无因而产生的观点。首先，即使是世间的现量
English
Furthermore, regarding Nirvana, it is utterly pacified without any object of focus. As previously stated. Third, refuting the grasping of objects to be abandoned as real, there are three: a general indication, refuting the means of proof, and stating the means of harm. First, according to any proponent of realism, it is extremely difficult to assert that both object and consciousness are true, because there is no means of proof and there is a means of harm. Second, there are two aspects to this. First, they do not establish each other due to mutual dependence: If it is said that a true object is established from a true sense consciousness, then what does the existence of true consciousness itself rely on, or what is the means of establishing it? Or if it is said that consciousness is established from the object of consciousness, then what does the existence of the object of consciousness rely on? If they exist by virtue of each other, then in that case, if one is not established, the other is not established, and therefore both will cease to exist. For example, if there is no son, the father cannot be established, and even if the parents are established, from where does the son arise? Just as there is no father without a son and no son without a father, so both are non-existent, similarly, the object and consciousness are also non-existent. Second, refuting the response to objections: If it is said that it is not contradictory to establish something through dependence, for example, a sprout grows from a seed, and although it depends on the seed, the sprout itself realizes that the seed exists. Similarly, why can't the consciousness that arises from the object of consciousness realize that the object of consciousness exists? This is not analogous, because the sprout is seen by a consciousness other than itself, and thus it is realized that the seed exists. Because, from what does the consciousness that realizes the true existence of the object of consciousness realize its own true existence? Because there is no means of realization. Third, there are three aspects: establishing emptiness from the perspective of the cause and from the perspective of the result, and summarizing the established meaning. First, there are two aspects: establishing that there is no true origination, and that origination from causes in conventional terms is empty. First, there are three aspects: refuting causelessness, origination from a permanent cause, and summarizing the meaning. First: The Lokayatas and the wanderers say: The sun rises, the rivers flow downwards, the peas are round, the thorns are sharp and long, the peacock's feathers are beautiful, and so on, all things are not made by anyone, but arise from their own nature. Thus, refuting the view that things arise from no cause. First of all, even by worldly direct perception,
Chinese
果实被看到是从其自身的所有因缘聚合而生起的。通过比量等也成立，因此，就像莲花的茎等，果实不同的差别是由因不同的差别所产生的。那么，因的差别是由什么造成的呢？是由先前的因的差别造成的。为什么不同的因能够产生不同的果实呢？这是由于先前因的力量而如此产生的。第二部分有三个方面：驳斥从自在天、微尘和自性中产生。第一部分有三个方面，首先是不成立自在天：顺世外道和胜论外道认为，自在天是指属于神，清净且值得供养，常恒唯一，是万物的作者。如果他们认为具有这五种功德的事物是万物的因，那么首先请说自在天是什么？如果他们说是大种，那么，虽然这些是大种生起的因，但如果将这些称为自在天，即使只是名言上的称谓，也不会争论。然而，你所认为的定义是不存在的。因为地等大种是多样的、无常的、没有运动的心识、不是神而是应该被践踏的、不清净的。因此，那不是自在天。虚空也不是自在天，因为它没有运动。我（补特伽罗）也不是，因为我先前已经被驳斥了。如果作者自在天不是能够思考的，那么说一个不能思考的事物是作者有什么用呢？这是没有意义的。第二，它没有产生任何东西：如果被问到自在天所产生的果是什么？如果他们回答说是我和地等的微尘以及自在天自身的后来的种姓，那么，这些事物的自性不是被认为是常恒的吗？如果是常恒的，那么就与被产生相矛盾。识也是从具有事物相状的所知而生，仅仅是觉性，没有初始的觉性是从先前的觉性中产生。乐和苦是从善业和恶业中产生的，那么请说自在天产生了什么果？第三，它不能成为产生者，有两个方面，首先是陈述结论：因自在天，果产生者，常
English
It is seen that the fruit arises from the collection of all its own causes and conditions. It is also established by inference and so on. Thus, like the lotus stem and so on, the difference of different fruits is produced by the difference of different causes. Then, what causes the difference of causes? It is from the difference of the previous causes themselves. Why are different causes able to produce different fruits? It is because of the power of the previous causes that it arises in that way. The second has three parts: refuting arising from Īśvara, atoms, and pradhāna. The first has three parts, the first is that Īśvara is not established: The Lokāyata and Vaiśeṣika say that Īśvara is a god, pure and worthy of worship, eternal and one, the maker of all. If they think that something with these five qualities is the cause of all beings, then first tell me what is Īśvara? If they say that it is the great elements, then, although these are the cause of arising, if these are called Īśvara, even if it is just a name, there is no argument. However, the definition that you think of does not exist. Because the great elements such as earth are many, impermanent, without moving consciousness, not gods but should be trampled, and impure. Therefore, that is not Īśvara. Space is not Īśvara, because it does not move. The self (pudgala) is not that either, because the self has already been refuted. If the agent Īśvara is not able to think, then what is the use of saying that something that cannot think is the agent? It is meaningless. Second, it does not produce anything: If asked what is the fruit that Īśvara is supposed to produce? If they answer that it is the self and the atoms of earth and so on, and the later lineage of Īśvara itself, then, is not the nature of these things considered to be eternal? If it is eternal, then it contradicts being produced. Consciousness also arises from the knowable, which has the aspect of things, and mere awareness, the beginningless awareness arises from the previous awareness. Happiness and suffering arise from virtuous and non-virtuous actions, so tell me what fruit does Īśvara produce? Third, it cannot be a producer, there are two aspects, first is stating the conclusion: cause Īśvara, fruit producer, eternal.
Chinese
如果那个“有”没有开始，那么它的果，如快乐等，又怎么会有开始呢？那就会变成没有。同样，如果没有结束，那么快乐和痛苦等为什么会永远存在呢？它们会一直存在。这些有时会间断地发生，这很明显。第二，为了消除对普遍性的误解：如果自在天是永恒的，但产生果需要依赖其他一些条件，那么自在天就不能永远产生果，这种说法并不普遍。如果有人说自在天不依赖其他条件，那是不对的，因为如果没有自在天的作用，就不会有其他事物存在。那么，自在天产生果会依赖什么呢？如果依赖于条件的集合，那么这个集合本身就成了原因，而自在天就不是原因了。因为当原因和条件聚集时，自在天没有不产生果的权力，而没有这个集合，它也没有产生果的权力。如果自在天不情愿地产生果，那么它就会受到其他事物的控制。如果它有意愿地产生果，那么产生果就依赖于意愿。如果依赖于意愿而产生果，那么自在天又是什么呢？因为意愿是无常的，它受到其他事物的控制。第二种观点是，那些认为永恒的微尘产生一切容器和内容的人也是不合理的。因为之前已经驳斥了微尘的永恒性，即“微尘也因方向部分的差异”。第三部分分为两点：陈述观点和驳斥观点。第一点是，数论派认为所有知识都包含在自我意识和自性物质中。自我像以前一样具有五种属性，既不是原因也不是结果。自性是永恒的，唯一的物质，没有人能看到，它是万物的创造者，具有五种属性，是轮回的原因。它的本质是被称为勇气、微粒和黑暗的名称，三种属性，即快乐、痛苦和中立，处于平衡状态。它的自性被称为原因的自性。这些不平衡时会发生变化。首先，会出现被称为“大”的像水晶一样透明的东西。从内部会显现出补特伽罗，从外部会显现出对境的影像，这两者混合在一起，就有了补特伽罗享受对境的说法。然后是慢