English
Those pure and mindless principal things also become one, because they are the same only in terms of being knowable. Second, because the particulars are false, the general truth is unreasonable. When the particulars of knowledge, such as grasping form, grasping sound, etc., are all inverted and untrue, then what is that general, one truth that is the basis of similarity in terms of just being knowledge? It does not exist. Second, some proponents claim that the permanent, single person belongs to the continuum of the individual, possessing different material forms and consciousness, and therefore is the agent who enjoys objects. To refute this, there are three points. First, establishing the sign: Even for mindless objects, there is no agent who enjoys objects, because they lack the nature of consciousness, just like a pot, etc. Second, dispelling confusion about pervasion: If it is said that even if it does not have the nature of consciousness itself, it is the enjoyer of objects because it possesses different consciousness, that is unreasonable. If the nature of the self is one that does not know objects, and by being associated with consciousness it becomes one that knows objects, then the self that does not know objects will be destroyed and become impermanent. If the self does not change, then even if it is associated with consciousness, what difference does it make that the self does not know objects and then becomes one that knows objects? It cannot be established. Third, summarizing the meaning: In this way, because it is material form, it does not know objects, and because it is permanent, it is devoid of the function of producing results. If you consider such a thing to be the self, then it is like making space the self, it will become the self. Third, to refute the debate against selflessness, there are two points: refuting the unreasonableness of karma and result, and refuting the unreasonableness of compassion. The first point has two points. First, the opponent says: If the self is not permanent, then the relationship of karma and result, that is, the agent himself experiencing the result, is unreasonable. Because after the karma is done, the agent has ceased, and when the result is experienced, he does not exist, so whose karma will it be? Second, the answer has three points. First, the debate is the same: The basis of action is the aggregates of this life, and the basis of the result, the ripening, is the aggregates of the next life, and the two are different. And in both cases, the self does not accumulate karma and experience ripening, and you assert permanence and materiality, while we assert selflessness, which is established for both of us, so it is meaningless for us to argue about it here.
Chinese
是这样的。 第二，驳斥辩论的答复是：如果认为在可见的、感受果报的业中，业和果二者本体没有差别，那么，对于此，具有能作之因的蕴的刹那本身，连同感受其果报，见到此是不可能的，就像父子不同时出生一样。 第三，消除与经文的矛盾是：如果有人说，经文中说“由此所作之业，如何由他人感受？诸比丘，已作和已积之业，不会在外面的地界等上成熟，而只会在已取的蕴等上成熟”，这与果报由能作者本身感受相矛盾。那么，这是有密意的，因为考虑到密意是同一相续，为了驳斥将果报归于业的必要，所以显示能作者本身是果报的享受者，但实际上并非如此，因为常恒的“我”没有成立。那是什么呢？过去和未来的心不是“我”，因为它们已经灭尽和未生，所以不存在。如果说，已生且未灭的现在的心是“我”，那么，它在第二刹那坏灭时，就会变成无我。以此理，五蕴全部都破除了“我”，例如，如果将树木的树干分成各个部分，就没有什么精华，同样，如果用理智进行分析寻找，那么“我”也不是真实存在的。 第二部分有三点：没有对境，没有果报，以及因为是应舍弃的，所以不适合修习，对此进行驳斥。 第一点是：如果众生不存在，那么应该对谁修慈悲呢？虽然对境众生不是真实存在的，但在世俗中，对于那些为了获得解脱果报而承诺修行的人，以愚痴所认定的目标，也就是在错觉中显现的那些，修慈悲并不矛盾。 第二点是：如果众生不存在，那么修慈悲的果报由谁获得呢？虽然在胜义中是那样真实，但在世俗中，在对法愚痴的错觉心中，众生只是显现存在，因此修习只是显现的慈悲，也认为果报只是显现存在。 第三点是：慈悲也是虚假显现的对境
English
That is how it is. Second, refuting the response to the debate: If it is thought that in the karma of visible, experienceable results, the two, karma and result, have no different basis, then, regarding this, it is not possible that the aggregates of the moment itself, possessing the ability to act as a cause, along with experiencing its result, are seen, just as father and son are not born at the same time. Third, eliminating contradictions with scripture: If someone says, "How can karma done by this one be experienced by another? Monks, karma that has been done and accumulated will not ripen on external elements such as the earth element, but will only ripen on the aggregates that have been taken," which contradicts the statement that the result is experienced by the doer himself. Then, that is intentional, because considering that the intention is the same continuum, in order to refute the imputation of the result to the necessity of karma, it is shown that the doer himself is the enjoyer of the result, but in reality it is not so, because the permanent "self" is not established. What is that? The past and future minds are not "self," because they have ceased and are unborn, so they do not exist. If it is said that the present mind, which is born and has not ceased, is "self," then, when it is destroyed in the second moment, it will become selfless. By this reasoning, all five aggregates also refute the "self." For example, if the trunks of trees are divided into parts, there is no essence, similarly, if one searches by analyzing with reason, then the "self" is also not truly existent. The second part has three points: the absence of an object, the absence of a result, and the rejection of the idea that it is not appropriate to meditate because it should be abandoned. The first point is: If sentient beings do not exist, then on whom should compassion be meditated? Although the object, sentient beings, is not truly existent, in the conventional sense, for those who have vowed to practice for the sake of attaining the result of liberation, it is not contradictory to meditate on compassion for those who appear in delusion, the object determined by ignorance. The second point is: If sentient beings do not exist, then who obtains the result of meditating on compassion? Although it is truly so in the ultimate sense, in the conventional sense, in the mind of delusion ignorant of the Dharma, sentient beings merely appear to exist, therefore, by meditating on merely apparent compassion, it is also believed that the result merely appears to exist. The third point is: Compassion is also an object of false appearance
Chinese
如果因为对法理愚昧而认为对自我的愚昧和对治是相同的，那么，因为（对法理的愚昧）会变成平息痛苦的因缘，所以不需要对治，也不能对治，因此，对果的愚昧仅仅是显现，是不需要对治的，而对自我的愚昧是需要对治的。因为它会增长成为痛苦之因的傲慢等等，所以需要对治。如果说除此之外也没有对治的方法，那么是有的，修习无我是对治它的殊胜对治法。第二，进入法无我的方式是：在所宣说的诸法皆无生之中，如《宝积经》云：“文殊，若见身如虚空，是为于身观身念住。”同样地，如果感觉不可得，如果了知心唯是名，如果善与非善之法不可得，是为于法观法念住。如是宣说四念住。其中，第一，身念住有三种：有支分的身不成立，支分本身不成立，以及总结要义。第一种又分两种：所观之身不成立，以及执身是错乱。第一种又分两种：与支分相关联，以及不相关联的身的破斥。第一种又分三种，首先破斥各个支分是身：身不是脚，不是胫，大腿和腰不是身，肚子和背也不是身，胸和肩膀不是身，肋骨侧面和手不是身，腋窝和肩胛不是身，内脏等也不是身，头和脖子也不是身。在这些支分中，哪里有真实成立的身呢？什么也没有。第二，破斥安住在各个部分：如果这个身以各个部分安住在所有的支分上，那么身的各个部分就安住在支分的各个部分上。然而，无分而真实的身它自己安住在哪里呢？如果每个完整的自身都分别安住在手等上面，那么就会有和它们一样多的众多身。第三，总结要义：如果内外任何地方都没有身，那么手等怎么会有真实的身呢？没有的。第二：因为手等之外不可得，所以没有整体的
English
If, due to ignorance of the Dharma, one considers ignorance of self and antidote to be the same, then, because (ignorance of the Dharma) becomes the cause of pacifying suffering, there is no need to counteract it, and it cannot be counteracted. Therefore, ignorance of the result is merely an appearance and does not need to be counteracted, while ignorance of self needs to be counteracted. Because it increases pride, etc., which become the cause of suffering, it needs to be counteracted. If it is said that there is no other way to counteract it, then there is; meditating on selflessness is the supreme antidote to it. Second, the way to enter into the selflessness of phenomena is: among the teachings that all phenomena are without arising, as stated in the *Ratnakuta Sutra*: "Manjushri, if one sees the body as like space, that is the mindfulness of observing the body in the body." Similarly, if feeling is not found, if the mind is known to be merely a name, if virtuous and non-virtuous dharmas are not found, that is the mindfulness of observing dharmas in dharmas. Thus, the four mindfulnesses are taught. Among them, first, body mindfulness has three aspects: the body with limbs is not established, the limbs themselves are not established, and summarizing the meaning. The first is divided into two: the object, the body, is not established, and the perception of the body is mistaken. The first is divided into two: refuting the body that is related to the limbs and the body that is not related. The first is divided into three, first refuting that each limb is the body: the body is not the foot, not the shin, the thigh and waist are not the body, the stomach and back are not the body, the chest and shoulders are not the body, the ribs and hands are not the body, the armpits and shoulder blades are not the body, the internal organs are not the body, the head and neck are not the body. Among these limbs, where is the truly established body? There is nothing. Second, refuting that it abides in each part: if this body abides in all the limbs with each part, then the parts of the body would abide in the parts of the limbs. However, where does the partless and truly existing body itself abide? If each complete self separately abides in the hands, etc., then there would be as many bodies as there are of them. Third, summarizing the meaning: if there is no body anywhere inside or outside, then how can there be a truly existing body in the hands, etc.? There is not. Second: Because nothing other than the hands, etc., can be found, there is no whole.
Chinese
身体如果和肢体没有关联，又怎么会存在呢？不会存在的。第二点是，因为身体不是真实的，所以对于没有身体的手等等，由于愚昧，会产生误认为身体的念头。但那个念头所执持的并非真实，例如，就像用类似于人的形状的特殊方式制作的木偶，会让人产生认为是人的念头一样。只要对那个木偶产生误认为人的因缘聚合，那个木偶就会像人一样显现，同样，只要对肢体等产生误认为身体的因缘存在，那些肢体等就会显现为身体。第二点是，正如整个身体没有真实成立一样，因为手指是聚集在一起的，所以手又怎么会真实成立呢？手指也是关节的集合，所以关节也不是真实的。那些关节也因为各自的组成部分被分开而各自不存在。组成部分也被分解成极微尘，极微尘也因为方向部分的区分而变成多个，所以不是真实的一个。如果将它的每个方向都分开，因为与真实的部分分离，所以像虚空一样是空性的，因此极微尘本身也不是真实的。第三点是总结要点，像那样显现却不真实，谁会对如梦一般的色身产生执着呢？不应该执着。当身体不存在时，它的差别，无论是男性的身体还是女性的身体，又怎么会存在呢？第二，关于感受和忆念的近取，有四点：感受的自性，因缘触，对境，以及执持不成立。第一点有两方面：感受在胜义中不成立的方式，以及对此修习对治。第一点中有两点，首先是遮止的理路：如《中观根本慧论》所说：“若自有性者，是则不应无，性异则为他，是事终不然。”就像如果痛苦的感受真实存在，那么它永远不会被舍弃，那么它和与之相反的极度快乐和安乐又怎么不会造成损害呢？因为会造成损害，所以它们永远不会产生，但实际上它们是会产生的，这很明显。如果安乐本身真实存在，那么悲伤和疾病等剧烈的痛苦