English
It will not remain in the middle and be attained. Secondly, if one does not realize such emptiness, but merely meditates on the impermanence of the aggregates and the selflessness of the person, and abandons afflictions, will one be liberated from suffering? If so, then the Arhat who has attained the remainder of existence will immediately become free from suffering, because of having abandoned afflictions. If you assert this, then although those Arhats are without afflictions, some, such as Maudgalyāyana's son, are said to experience suffering due to the power of past karma, which is clear in the scriptures. If you say that although one is not immediately liberated from suffering upon abandoning afflictions, one will be liberated when the aggregates of life are relinquished, because it is certain that they do not have craving for the aggregates, which is the cause of taking rebirth. If so, then just as they have non-afflictive ignorance that is universally ignorant of knowable objects, why can't there be this non-afflictive craving for the aggregates? Because craving necessarily arises from feeling accompanied by apprehension of reality. And feeling is also present in those Arhats. Thirdly, any mind that is separate from the realization of emptiness is a mind that has an object, and therefore it will abide in some object and become attached. Even if that manifestation temporarily ceases, it will arise again, just as in the state of unconscious absorption, the mind temporarily ceases, but then arises again. Therefore, those who wish to exhaust all suffering should meditate on emptiness. The second part has two points. The first point is the accomplishment of two goals: When one realizes emptiness oneself, compassion arises for those who suffer from not understanding emptiness, and for their benefit, by not clinging to the happiness of samsara and not fearing the extremes of suffering, one accomplishes immeasurable benefit to others by abiding in samsara. This is the result of meditating on emptiness. The second point is the abandonment of the two obscurations: The obstacle to omniscience is the afflictive obscuration, and the antidote to the darkness of the obscuration of knowledge is meditating on emptiness. Therefore, those who wish to quickly attain omniscience, why should they not meditate on emptiness? They must meditate. The third point is: Because there are such faults and virtues depending on whether or not one realizes emptiness, emptiness
Chinese
既然驳斥其他宗派的观点是不合理的，那么就不要怀疑这是否是佛陀的道路，而应修习空性。第三，总结共同的意义：如果有人因为害怕空性而不修习它，那么应该害怕的是执着于实有，因为执着于实有会产生一切痛苦。修习空性可以平息一切痛苦，那么怎么会害怕空性呢？不应该害怕。第二，进入无我之境分为两种：人无我和法无我。第一种分为两种：首先，连接并简要地说明：如果存在一个恐惧者的“我”，那么从任何事物中产生恐惧都是合理的。但是，既然根本不存在“我”，那么谁会产生恐惧呢？第二，详细解释分为三个部分：通过分析五蕴来普遍地驳斥，具体地驳斥所主张的“我”，以及消除对无我的争论。第一部分：牙齿、头发、指甲不是“我”，“我”也不是骨头、血液。鼻涕不是，痰也不是，脓水和脓液也不是。“我”不是脂肪和汗水，肺和肝也不是“我”。其他的内脏也不是“我”，“我”也不是粪便和尿液。肉和皮肤不是“我”，体温和呼吸也不是“我”。所有的孔都不是“我”，六种识也不是“我”。这六种界是不恒常、众多且不自主的。第二部分分为两种：驳斥数论派和胜论派所假设的“我”。第一种分为两种：陈述驳斥和驳斥避免过失的回答。第一部分：如果执持声音的觉识是常恒的，那么在所有没有声音的时候，应该存在执持声音的觉识。如果承认这一点，那么声音的觉识依赖于声音，如果没有所知之声，那么觉识会认知什么，又有什么理由称之为执持声音的觉识呢？如果即使没有声音的觉识，仍然是执持声音的觉识，那么树木也应该成为执持声音的觉识。因此，如果没有所知之境存在，那么就一定没有执持它的觉识。第二部分分为两种：第一，回答：没有声音的时候，不会没有执持声音的觉识，因为之前已经有了声音的觉识。
English
Since refuting the views of other schools is not reasonable, one should not doubt whether this is the path of the Buddha, but should practice emptiness. Third, summarizing the common meaning: If one fears emptiness and does not practice it, then one should fear clinging to reality, because clinging to reality gives rise to all suffering. Practicing emptiness pacifies all suffering, so how can one fear emptiness? One should not fear it. Second, entering the realm of selflessness is divided into two: the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena. The first is divided into two: First, connecting and briefly stating: If there were a self of the one who fears, then it would be reasonable to fear anything. However, since there is no self at all, who would experience fear? Second, the detailed explanation is divided into three parts: generally refuting by analyzing the aggregates, specifically refuting the asserted self, and eliminating disputes about selflessness. The first part: Teeth, hair, and nails are not the self, and the self is not bones and blood. Snot is not, phlegm is not, pus and pus-like fluid are not. The self is not fat and sweat, and the lungs and liver are not the self. Other internal organs are not the self, and the self is not feces and urine. Flesh and skin are not the self, and heat and breath are not the self. All the holes are not the self, and the six consciousnesses are not the self. These six elements are impermanent, multiple, and without autonomy. The second part is divided into two: refuting the self posited by the Samkhya and Vaisheshika schools. The first is divided into two: stating the refutation and refuting the answer that avoids faults. First part: If the consciousness that grasps sound were permanent, then at all times when there is no sound, there should be a consciousness that grasps sound. If this is asserted, then the consciousness of sound depends on sound, and if there is no knowable sound, then what would the consciousness cognize, and for what reason would it be called the consciousness that grasps sound? If even without the consciousness of sound, it is still the consciousness that grasps sound, then trees should also become the consciousness that grasps sound. Therefore, it is certain that without a knowable object present, there is no consciousness that grasps it. The second part is divided into two: First, answering: When there is no sound, there will not be no consciousness that grasps sound, because there was a previous consciousness of sound.
Chinese
如果对方说，因为之后没有声音，所以在认识色等时，这两个（声音和色）是一体的。那么，为了驳斥第二种观点，有三点：反驳的方式是通过前一个过失仍然存在，相违的相状，以及互相不观察到的征相。第一点是：如果那样，在认识色的同时，为什么不听到声音呢？应该会听到声音。如果说，因为声音不靠近，所以听不到。那么，这就证明了执持声音的识也不存在。第二点分为两部分。第一，立宗：声音的自性怎么会变成执持色呢？因为相状相违。第二，例子不成立：相状相违，以前后两个对境来说，一体并不矛盾，就像同一个人，相对于父亲和儿子来说，可以被认为是儿子和父亲一样。如果对方说：在你的宗派里，父亲和儿子也只是被认为是同体，而不是真实存在的。因为，你们认为真实的物质是一种心力、微尘和黑暗三者平衡且不可见的物质，而那既不是儿子也不是父亲。第三点分为两部分：立宗和排除不成立。第一，立宗：执持色者具有执持声音，但不是存在于执持声音之中，因为如果存在于它的自性中，就应该能够显现，但实际上并没有在那里看到。第二点分为两部分。第一，正文：例如，一个舞者，显现出不同的姿态，就像以前的执持声音者，后来以另一种方式，以执持色的方式被看到。那么，识就不是常恒的，因为它会变成其他不同的方式。第二，为了排除对此的不确定性，分为两部分。第一，反驳者说：即使变成其他方式，但自性仍然是以前的那个，是常恒的。第二，为了驳斥这一点，分为两部分：因为相状相违，所以自性相同是不合理的。像那样的一体性，是一种前所未有的统一方式。如果对方说：即使显现为其他方式，但不是真实的，所以是一体的。那么，请说出真实一体的自性是什么？如果说仅仅是识的层面是一体的。那么，这样一来，不同相续的众生，他们的心在识的层面上也是相同的，因此会推论为一体，有情众
English
If the opponent says that since there is no sound afterward, when cognizing forms, etc., these two (sound and form) are one. Then, to refute the second view, there are three points: refuting by the fault of the former remaining, contradictory aspects, and the sign of not observing each other. The first point is: If that is the case, at the time of cognizing form, why wouldn't one also hear sound? One should hear sound. If it is said that one does not hear it because the sound is not near and is absent, then it is established that the consciousness that apprehends sound is also absent. The second point has two parts. First, stating the sign: How can the nature of apprehending sound become apprehending form? Because the aspects are contradictory. Second, the example is not established: Contradictory aspects, in relation to the two objects of before and after, being one is not contradictory, just as the same person, in relation to father and son, can be considered son and father. If the opponent says: In your system, father and son are also considered to be the same entity, but not truly existent. Because you consider true matter to be an invisible substance in which the three qualities of energy, particles, and darkness are equally balanced, and that is neither son nor father. The third point has two parts: stating the sign and refuting the unestablished. First, stating the sign: The apprehender of form possesses the apprehender of sound, but it is not present in the apprehender of sound, because if it were present in its nature, it should be able to appear, but it is not seen there. The second point has two parts. First, the actual point: For example, just as a single dancer appears with different postures, so the former apprehender of sound is later seen in another way, in the way of the apprehender of form. Then, consciousness is not permanent, because it changes into other different ways. Second, to refute the uncertainty about this, there are two parts. First, the opponent says: Even if it changes into other ways, the nature remains the same as before, it is permanent. Second, to refute this, there are two parts: Because the aspects are contradictory, it is unreasonable for the nature to be the same. Such oneness is a kind of unity that has never existed before. If the opponent says: Even if it appears in other ways, it is not real, so it is one. Then, please state what is the nature of that truly one? If it is said that it is one only in terms of consciousness. Then, in that case, all beings of different continuums, their minds are also the same in terms of consciousness, therefore it would follow that they are one, sentient be
Chinese
那些清净和无心识的主要事物也变成一体，因为仅仅在所知方面是相同的。第二，由于差别是虚假的，所以总的真实不合理。当知识的差别，如执取色、执取声等一切都是颠倒不真实的，那时，在仅仅是知识方面相同的，作为依据的总的、一体的真实是什么呢？是没有的。第二是，有宗派认为，常一的补特伽罗属于士夫的相续，具有异体的色法和心识，因此是享受对境的作者。为了破斥它，有三点。第一，立宗：对于无心识的事物来说，也不是享受对境的作者，因为没有心识的自性，就像瓶子等一样。第二，遣除对周遍的错解：如果说，即使它本身没有心识的自性，但因为它具有异体的心识，所以是享受对境者，那是不合理的。如果自性的作者是不知对境者，与心识相应就会变成知对境者，那么不知对境的作者就会坏灭，成为无常。如果作者没有变化，那么即使与心识相应，作者不知对境，又有什么差别使它变成知对境呢？是不能成立的。第三，总结意义：像这样，因为是色法所以没有知对境，因为是常法所以远离产生果的作用，如果把这样的东西当作作者，那就是把虚空当作作者，会变成作者。第三，对于无我论的辩论进行驳斥，有两点：驳斥业果不合理和驳斥悲心不合理。第一点有两点。第一，反驳者说：如果作者不是常有的，那么业果的关系，也就是作者自己感受果报是不合理的。因为造业之后，作者已经坏灭，感受果报的时候已经不存在，所以会变成是谁的业呢？第二，回答有三点。第一，辩论是相同的：行为的所依是今世的蕴，果报异熟的所依是后世的蕴，二者是不同的。并且在这两种情况下，作者都没有积累业和感受异熟，你们承许常有和色法，而我们承许无我，对双方来说都是成立的，所以我们双方在这里争论是没有意义的。