Chinese
于无二之理，立宗，说有法等，立宗、立因、立喻三者中，初者为：此色等显现为有法，非为真实，以离真实之一与多之任何一故，如影像。第二者，有法之义，所立法之义，所破之义，因之义。初者为：中观师与实事师二者皆共许显现之色等显现唯为有法而执持，不执持以真实成立所区分者与以真实不成立所区分之显现为有法，以若欲知有法，则须于敌我双方皆共许成立故。第二者，有许为如真实不具之幻化，与唯破真实之无遮二者，初者不应理，以于究竟观察之理智前，无有成为遣除之法故，是故唯后者。第三者，有说：不待于心而由境自性成立为真实之义，彼为所破，然中观自续派虽不实许真实，然以自之体性成立之法承许故，以承许真实事物之故，彼非为真正之中观师。若尔，以体性成立者，为堪忍理智观察耶？为安立耶？若如后者，则月称亦将承许以自之体性成立之法，以彼承许色乃至一切种智间之法皆以体性成立故。若如前者，则自续派未曾承许堪忍理智观察成立之法，因论师圣狮子云：轮回与清净不相符且相敌，以唯如影像之自性故。论师智藏云：若以理智力，于名言中亦不生。彼为真实，是故于彼，如其所显现且如是而说。故。自宗为：中观师之所破有真实之所破与特意之所破二者，初者为：四边之戏论，后者为：执持四边之常执心之所破为第一边，且于彼有习气。
English
Regarding the reasoning of non-duality, there are three aspects: establishing the sign, explaining the subject of the argument (chos can), and establishing the mode (tshul): the first is: This appearance of forms, etc., is the subject of the argument. It is not truly existent because it is devoid of either a true one or a true many. For example, like a reflection. The second concerns the meaning of the subject of the argument, the meaning of what is to be proven, the meaning of what is to be refuted, and the meaning of the reason. The first is: Madhyamikas and Realists both hold that the mere appearance of forms, etc., that appears to both, is the subject of the argument. They do not hold that appearances qualified by true existence or qualified by the absence of true existence are the subject of the argument, because if it is to be a knowable subject of the argument, it must be established as appearing to both the proponent and the opponent. The second is: There are those who hold it to be like an illusion without true existence, and those who hold it to be a mere negation of truth. The former is not reasonable, because there is no phenomenon that is completely excluded in the face of ultimate analytical wisdom. Therefore, only the latter is correct. Thirdly, some say that the meaning of truth is that which is established from the object's own side, independent of the mind, and that is what is to be refuted. However, the Svatantrika Madhyamikas do not explicitly accept truth, but because they accept phenomena established by their own characteristics, they accept true entities, and therefore they are not true Madhyamikas. If that is the case, is that which is established by its own characteristics able to withstand rational analysis, or is it merely a designation? According to the latter, Chandrakirti would also be accepting phenomena established by their own characteristics, because he accepts that all phenomena from form to omniscience are established by their own characteristics. According to the former, the Svatantrikas have not accepted phenomena established as able to withstand rational analysis, because the teacher Aryasimha said, "Samsara and liberation are incompatible and antagonistic, by their very nature as mere images." And the teacher Jñanagarbha said, "If by the power of reason, it does not arise even conventionally. That is true, therefore, in that, it is said to be as it appears and as it is." Therefore, according to our own system, the Madhyamika's object of negation has two aspects: the actual object of negation and the intentional object of negation. The first is the proliferation of the four extremes, and the latter is the object of negation for the mind that clings to the four extremes, which is the first extreme, and there is a habitual tendency towards it.
Chinese
由于俱生我执的力量，从一开始就执著于真实的俱生我执，当寻找其境，即真实存在的论证时，各宗派的立宗者虽然提出了许多论证，但都一致认为一切都可以通过理智来审查。因此，认为可以通过理智审查的事物是真实存在的这种心识，是遍计所执的真实执著，所以有两种真实执著。破斥的理路也有两种，即应成和自续。前者破斥遍计所执的真实，后者破斥俱生我执的真实。因为必须通过论证显示理智审查对所立宗的真实存在的妨害，从而破斥所立宗的真实存在。那么，遍计所执的真实一旦破灭，俱生我执的真实又如何破灭呢？因为除了遍计所执的真实的论证之外，没有其他俱生我执的真实存在的论证。而且，由于没有见到论证，所以不承认所立宗，这是所有讲理者的方式。那么，是否认为在应成论证之下不需要安立自续论证呢？这没有错，因为这仅仅是建立名言的理路。第四，远离真实的单一和多重中的任何一种是论证的意义，因为这里是破斥真实存在的场合。远离名言的单一和多重中的任何一种不是论证的意义，因为如果是那样，则周遍不成。第三，建立宗义方面，有建立法称和建立周遍两种。第一，极微，是法，不是真实的单一，因为它具有方分。承许此为理由，因为凡是承许极微能造粗大之物者，若不具方分则不能造粗大之物。由于遮止了极微，所以也遮止了粗大之物，因为若无集合者，则必须无集合。由于遮止了极微和粗大之物两者，所以也遮止了有色界的十界，因为这十界是由极微所造的粗大之物。遮止了这些，也遮止了五种识蕴，因为没有了它们的所缘和增上缘。遮止了这些，也遮止了意识，因为没有了它的等无间缘。遮止了六种入识，也遮止了阿赖耶识，因为它的习气积聚。
English
Due to the power of innate ego-grasping, from the beginning there is an innate ego-grasping that grasps at truth, and when searching for the proof that its object, truth, exists, although the proponents of various tenets have put forth many proofs, they all agree that everything can be examined by reason. Therefore, the mind that holds that something that can be examined by reason is truly existent is a conceptual ego-grasping, so there are two types of true grasping. There are also two types of reasoning for refutation, namely consequentialism and autonomy. The former refutes the truth of conceptual imputation, and the latter refutes the truth of innate ego-grasping. Because it is necessary to refute the truth of the proposition by showing how rational examination harms the truth of the proposition. So, how does the truth of innate ego-grasping perish when the truth of conceptual imputation perishes? Because there is no proof for the existence of innate truth other than the proof for the truth of conceptual imputation. Moreover, since the proof is not seen, the proposition is not accepted, which is the way of all reasoners. So, is it thought that it is not necessary to establish autonomous reasoning under consequential reasoning? This is not wrong, because this is merely the reasoning for establishing conventions. Fourth, being free from either the one or the many of truth is the meaning of the reason, because this is the occasion for refuting truth. Being free from either the one or the many of conventions is not the meaning of the reason, because if it were, then the pervasion would not be established. Third, in establishing the mode, there are two types: establishing the subject-property and establishing the pervasion. First, the atom, is the subject, is not a true one, because it has directional parts. The sign is accepted, because whoever accepts that atoms can compose gross matter cannot compose gross matter without directional parts. Since atoms are blocked, gross matter is also blocked, because if there is no aggregate, there must be no aggregate. Since both atoms and gross matter are blocked, the ten realms of the material realm are also blocked, because these ten realms are gross matter produced from atoms. Blocking these also blocks the five consciousness aggregates, because there is no object and dominant condition for them. Blocking these also blocks the mind consciousness, because there is no immediately preceding condition for it. Blocking the six entering consciousnesses also blocks the alaya consciousness, because its habitual imprints accumulate.
Tibetan
་པ་པོ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་ཁེགས་པས་ཉོན་ཡིད་ཁེགས་ཏེ། དེའི་དམིགས་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་བཀག་པས་སེམས་བྱུང་ཁེགས་ཏེ། གཙོ་བོ་མེད་པས་འཁོར་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་ལྟར་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་བཀག་པས་དེའི་དུ་མ་ཁེགས་ཏེ། དུ་མ་ནི་གཅིག་བསགས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཅན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་ཤིང་མེད་ན་ནགས་ཚལ་མེད་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ་རྗེས་ཁྱབ་སྒྲུབ་པ་དང་། ལྡོག་ཁྱབ་སྒྲུབ་པ་གཉིས། དང་པོ་ནི། མཐུན་དཔེ་གཟུགས་བརྙན་བདེན་མེད་དུ་གང་གིས་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། གངས་པ་ཤེའུ་ན་རེ། གཟུགས་བརྙན་བདེན་མེད་དུ་མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པ་གང་ཞིག རྟགས་ལ་མི་ལྟོས་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་འགྱུར་ཚུལ་ནི། གཟུགས་བརྙན་སྣང་ཡང་དེ་མི་བདེན་པ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ། གཟུགས་སུ་སྣང་ཡང་དེར་མི་བདེན་པ་ཡིན་ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །ཞི་བ་འཚོ་ན་རེ། དེ་རྗེས་དཔག་གིས་འགྲུབ་སྟེ་འདི་ལྟར། གཟུགས་བརྙན་ཆོས་ཅན། བདེན་པར་མེད་དེ། འདུས་བྱས་སུའང་མི་བདེན། འདུས་མ་བྱས་སུའང་མི་བདེན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཕྱི་མ་དེར་ཐལ། དབང་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་དམིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། སྔ་མ་དེར་ཐལ། ཤེས་པར་ཡང་མི་བདེན། ཕྱི་རོལ་དོན་དུའང་མི་བདེན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དང་པོ་དེར་ཐལ། ཕྱི་དོན་དུ་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཕྱི་མ་དེར་ཐལ། མེ་ལོང་ནང་དུའང་མི་བདེན། དེ་ལས་གཞན་དུའང་མི་བདེན་པའི་ཕྱིར། སྔ་མ་དེར་ཐལ། གཟུགས་བརྙན་གཡོ་ཡང་མེ་ལོང་མི་གཡོ་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཕྱི་མ་དེར་ཐལ། གོ་ས་གཅིག་ཏུ་ཐོགས་བཅས་ཀྱི་གཟུགས་གཉིས་མི་རུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལྡོག་ཁྱབ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ནི། མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་དང་གཏན་ཚིགས་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པ་ལ། གནོད་པ་ཅན་གྱི་ཚད་མ་སྟོན་པར་བྱེད་པ་སྟེ། བདེན་པར་གྲུབ་ན་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་གང་རུང་དང་བྲལ་བ་མིན་དགོས་ཏེ། བདེན་པར་མེད་ན་བདེན་པའི་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་གང་རུང་དང་བྲལ་བ་ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །འོ་ན་གཏན་ཚིགས་འདི་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་དབུ་མ་པའི་ལྟ་བ་དུས་ནམ་ཙམ་རྒྱུད་ལ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ངེས་པའི་དུས་དུ་སྐྱེས་པར་འདོད་པ་དང་། ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་ངེས་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པར་འདོད་པ་གཉིས་ལས། དོན་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་ན་དང་པོ་འཐད་ཀྱང་། འདི་ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་པས་ཕྱི་མ་འཐད་དེ། བདེན་པའི་དུ་བྲལ་དུ་རྟོགས་པའི་ཚེ་བདེན་མེད་ཀྱི་དོན་རྟོགས་ཟིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སློབ་དཔོན་དཔལ་སྦས་ཀྱིས་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ལ་འཇུག་པ་ལས། རང་བཞིན་མེད་དེ་ཐ་
Chinese
因为没有作者的缘故。它被遮止，烦恼意也被遮止，因为没有它的对境的缘故。识被遮止，心生也被遮止，因为没有主，眷属不可能存在的缘故。这样，遮止了真实的“一”，它的“多”也被遮止，因为“多”是积聚“一”的自性。譬如没有树就没有森林一样。第二，有建立后遍和建立反遍两种。第一是：顺例，影像由什么成立为非真实呢？岗巴协吾说：影像由现量成立为非真实，因为它是量成立的，不依赖于因相的缘故。譬如转变的方式是：影像显现却不真实那样，显现为色却在那里不真实，这样说的。寂护说：它由比量成立，如下：影像法，不是真实的，也不是有为，也不是无为的缘故。后者，因为是根识所缘的缘故。前者，因为识也不是真实的，外境也不是真实的缘故。前者，因为显现为外境的缘故。后者，因为镜子里也不是真实的，从那以外也不是真实的缘故。前者，因为影像动摇，镜子却不动的缘故。后者，因为一个地方不可能有两个有碍的色的缘故，这样说的。第二，建立反遍是：在不相似品和因的所依相同的情况下，显示有害的量，如果成立为真实，则必须不离真实的“一”和“多”中的任何一个，如果不是真实的，则必须离开真实的“一”和“多”中的任何一个的缘故。那么，依靠这个因，中观派的见解在什么时候在相续中生起的呢？有认为在所立确定的时间生起的，也有认为在法相确定的时间生起的两种。如果是成办意义的因，则前者合理，但这是仅仅成办名言的因，因此后者合理，因为在证悟了远离真实的“多”的时候，已经证悟了非真实的意义的缘故。导师吉祥隐密在《入真实性论》中说：无自性，是
English
Because there is no author. It is obstructed, and afflictive mind is also obstructed, because there is no object for it. Consciousness is obstructed, and mental factors are also obstructed, because without a master, retinue cannot exist. Thus, by obstructing the true "one," its "many" are also obstructed, because "many" are characterized by accumulating "one." For example, just as without trees, there is no forest. Secondly, there are two types: establishing subsequent pervasion and establishing reverse pervasion. The first is: In a similar example, how is an image established as unreal? Gangpa She'u said: An image is established as unreal by direct perception, because it is established by valid cognition, not relying on signs. For example, the way of transformation is: Just as an image appears but is not real, so too, it appears as form but is not real there, so it is said. Shantarakshita said: It is established by inference, as follows: An image, subject, is not real, because it is neither conditioned nor unconditioned. The latter, because it is the object of sense consciousness. The former, because consciousness is also not real, and external objects are also not real. The former, because it appears as an external object. The latter, because it is not real even in a mirror, and it is not real apart from that. The former, because the image moves, but the mirror does not move. The latter, because two obstructive forms are not possible in one place, so it is said. Secondly, establishing reverse pervasion is: When the dissimilar side and the basis of the reason are the same, it shows a harmful valid cognition, that is, if it is established as real, then it must not be separate from either the real "one" or the "many," and if it is not real, then it must be separate from either the real "one" or the "many." So, relying on this reason, when did the Madhyamaka view arise in the mindstream? There are two views: one that it arises at the time of certainty of the probandum, and the other that it arises at the time of certainty of the property of the subject. If it is a reason for accomplishing meaning, then the former is reasonable, but this is a reason for accomplishing mere convention, so the latter is reasonable, because when one realizes the separation from the real "many," one has already realized the meaning of the unreal. Acharya Shri Guhyapati says in the Tattvavatara: Without self-nature, it is