English
Yes. What the Consequentialists refute as the object of refutation of the Autonomists is the coarse object of refutation. The subtle one is: when searching for the meaning of imputation, if something is found, that is the measure of being established as true. That itself is the subtle object of refutation. Because the Autonomists do not consider this as the object of refutation, this is the uncommon key point of the Consequentialist system. Such a truth, when searched for by the reasoning explained in the Madhyamaka scriptures, the emptiness that is merely the negation of the truth that is not found, that non-affirming negation itself is the ultimate view of Madhyamaka. It is also the nature of ultimate truth, and it is also the ultimate reality of all phenomena. Having negated truth in that way, to be manifestly attached to the emptiness that is the emptiness of having negated truth is not something to be refuted. Because that is the wisdom that realizes the reality of the object, and the object of refutation of Madhyamaka is only truth, and because it does not grasp it as true. Then, 'Not existent, not non-existent, not both existent and non-existent, nor not the nature of both,' etc., what is said is that the reality of the object is free from all four extremes of elaboration, and if it seems contradictory to say that wisdom cannot grasp any of the four extremes. That is because, it is not existent in the ultimate sense, and it is not non-existent in the conventional sense. Wisdom should not grasp it in that way either, that is the meaning. It is not that one should accept 'not existent, not non-existent' as it is literally. Because understanding the true meaning of the two negations, if it is not existent, then it must be non-existent; if it is not non-existent, then it must be existent. If one thinks that wisdom not grasping any extreme is the view of Madhyamaka, that is the same as the view of the Chinese monk Heshang. Therefore, having negated truth, merely grasping the emptiness that is empty of truth is the wisdom that realizes reality. In that way, if one recognizes self-grasping well, one will know that there are many conceptual thoughts that are not self-grasping. Therefore, for everything that conceptual thought grasps as an object, all the wrong conceptual thoughts that one wants to refute with the reasoning that investigates that very nature will be dispelled. Second, the establishment of conventional appearance is: the Autonomist Madhyamikas accept phenomena established by their own nature in name, but here it is not accepted, therefore, the way of establishing the names of persons and phenomena is: 'This is Devadatta.' 'This is Devadatta.'