Chinese
以树和非树的两种他者排除作为基础，来确定之前的所有区分。在执持树的分别念中，显现为树的假立，是所立宗。称为“遍断”，因为依赖于对非树的遍断。某些注释家认为“遣返”和“他者排除的自性”是“无遮”，这似乎是造成混淆的根源。我进入法称论师的宗规之中，不禁发笑。再说，它是所立宗。称为“他者排除”和“排除”，因为它依赖于对反体（事物）的排除。称为“遣返”，因为它显现为从反体（事物）中遣返。称为“总”和“总相”，因为它显现为对所有显现为树的事物共同随行。称为“混合”和“关联”，因为所有显现为树的事物都显现为一个树的意义。称为“有的他者排除”和“事物（有）的他者排除”，因为它通过断除不能实现树的作用的事物，而显现为树的事物。称为“声音的他者排除”和“意识的他者排除”，因为它既是被称为“树”的声音的直接表达对象，又是执持树的分别念的直接对境。如果该分别念是由执持树的现量所引导，那么该他者排除就是确定为现前的他者排除；否则，就是确定为隐蔽的他者排除。对于此，当从夏巴（ཤ་པ།）的标志中，认识到具有夏巴的基础中有树时，之前的那种他者排除就是进入真实的后比量（ અનુમાન，Anumāṇa，推论）的他者排除；当执持无树为有时，就是进入非真实的颠倒的他者排除；当对树的有无犹豫不定时，就变成对两者都怀疑的犹豫的他者排除。再说，它是所立宗。称为“非是遮止的他者排除”，因为那个自性。在执持非树的分别念中，显现为非树的假立，是所立宗。称为“遍断”，因为它依赖于对所破的树的遍断。同样，也应知道将他者排除、排除和遣返这三者结合起来。对于总等四者，也应通过对所有非树随行等方式来了解。再说，它是所立宗。称为“无的他者排除”和“非事物（无）的他者排除”，因为树的
English
Based on the two other-exclusions of tree and non-tree, all previous distinctions should be determined. In the conceptualization that grasps a tree, the imputation that appears as a tree is the subject of the thesis. It is called "complete severance" because it relies on the complete severance of non-tree. Some commentators who consider "reversal" and "the nature of other-exclusion" to be "non-affirming negation" seem to have made this the basis of confusion. I enter into the midst of the tenets of Dharmakirti and burst into laughter. Furthermore, it is the subject of the thesis. It is called "other-exclusion" and "exclusion" because it relies on the exclusion of opposites. It is called "reversal" because it appears to reverse from opposites. It is called "universal" and "universal characteristic" because it appears to be commonly followed by all that appear as trees. It is called "mixture" and "connection" because all that appear as trees appear as one meaning of tree. It is called "other-exclusion of existence" and "other-exclusion of entity" because it appears as the entity of a tree by cutting off what cannot perform the function of a tree. It is called "other-exclusion of sound" and "other-exclusion of mind" because it is both the direct object of expression of the sound called "tree" and the direct object of the conceptualization that grasps a tree. If that conceptualization is led by the direct perception that grasps a tree, then that other-exclusion is the other-exclusion that is determined to be manifest; otherwise, it is the other-exclusion that is determined to be hidden. In this case, when from the sign of Shapa (ཤ་པ།), it is recognized that there is a tree in the basis that possesses Shapa, then that previous other-exclusion is the other-exclusion of subsequent inference that enters into truth; when grasping non-tree as existent, it is the inverted other-exclusion that enters into non-truth; when doubting whether a tree exists or not, it becomes the other-exclusion of doubt that doubts both. Furthermore, it is the subject of the thesis. It is called "other-exclusion of non-affirming negation" because of that nature. In the conceptualization that grasps non-tree, the imputation that appears as non-tree is the subject of the thesis. It is called "complete severance" because it relies on the complete severance of the object to be negated, the tree. Similarly, it should be understood that the three, other-exclusion, exclusion, and reversal, are also combined. For the four, universal, etc., it should also be understood through the way of following all non-trees, etc. Furthermore, it is the subject of the thesis. It is called "other-exclusion of non-existence" and "other-exclusion of non-entity" because the tree's
Chinese
因为是断除了能有的作用，显现为没有树木实事的增益。那也有两种，其中，所破的对境是有存在的，他者遮遣，因为此处的所破是有树木的缘故。也说成是否定词的他者遮遣，因为是断除了所破的成立，显现为否定的样态的增益的缘故。如果那样做了，当分别念进入对境的时候，就能轻易地了知以他者遮遣的安立遍及一切所知的方式。具有成立与他者遮遣明晰智慧的，论师对于所知的实相，如同一切智者般，如此所说的授记，现在这个时代我能得到吗？这是中间的偈颂。第三，遣除诤论方面，有五种，即遣除没有总相则不可能约定俗成，遣除如果是他者遮遣则有互相依赖的过失，遣除没有遮除的对象则他者遮遣不成立，如果考察遮遣是否成立实事则不合理，以及遣除遮遣没有总相则不可能有共同基础的诤论。这些都要通过《释量论》和《理智宝藏论》的论典本身来理解。第二，顺便考察遮遣进入和成立进入的安立方面，在否定和成立两种中，首先，有些人说，遮遣进入和成立进入的定义依次是，在自己的对境上分开部分而进入，以及不分开而进入。对此，其他人说，分别念是法，具有彼定义，因为是遮遣进入的缘故。如果承认，那么，那个法，具有一个不是你的对境的对境。因为是承认的缘故。如果承认，那么，那个不存在。如果是对境，则必须是你的对境的缘故。另外，执持瓶子的分别念是法，具有彼定义，因为是遮遣进入的缘故。如果承认，则不应理，因为进入自己的所有对境的缘故。如果这样，那么，执持瓶子的作用的分别念是法，具有彼定义，因为那个缘故，立宗和周遍都承认。如果承认，那么，那不应理，因为执持瓶子的作用的那个不执持它的无常的缘故。然而，之前的宗派不合理，因为，虽然认为是“有多少部分增益”的意义，但是，那个论典只是表示在一个上区分不同之声分别念的进入方式，而不是遮遣进入总体的进入方式。
English
Because it is an imputation that appears without the reality of a tree by completely cutting off the ability to function. There are also two types of that. Among them, the object to be negated is a knowable that exists, which is other-exclusion, because the object to be negated here is the existence of a tree. It is also called negative exclusion of negation, because it is an imputation that appears in the form of negation by cutting off the establishment of the object to be negated. If that is done, when conceptualization enters the object, it will be easy to realize how the establishment of other-exclusion pervades all knowables. The logician who possesses clear wisdom of establishment and other-exclusion, regarding the reality of knowables, is like an omniscient one, as stated in the prophecy. I wonder if I will attain that in this day and age. This is an intermediate verse. Third, in terms of refuting arguments, there are five: refuting that agreement is impossible without generality, refuting that if it is other-exclusion, it entails mutual dependence, refuting that other-exclusion does not apply to what has no object to be excluded, refuting that it is unreasonable to examine whether exclusion is established as a real entity, and refuting the argument that a common basis is impossible if exclusion lacks generality. These should be understood through the treatises of the Commentary on Valid Cognition and the Treasury of Reasoning themselves. Second, incidentally examining the establishment of exclusion-entry and establishment-entry, among the two, negation and establishment, first, some say that the definitions of exclusion-entry and establishment-entry are, respectively, entering by dividing into parts in one's own object, and entering without dividing it. To this, others say, conceptualization is a dharma, possessing that definition, because it is exclusion-entry. If you accept, then, that dharma, has an object that is not your object. Because it is accepted. If you accept, then, that does not exist. If it is an object, then it must be your object. Furthermore, the conceptualization that grasps a pot is a dharma, possessing that definition, because it is exclusion-entry. If you accept, then it is unreasonable, because it enters all of its own objects. If so, then, the conceptualization that grasps the action of a pot is a dharma, possessing that definition, because of that, the sign and pervasion are accepted. If you accept, then that is unreasonable, because that which grasps the action of a pot does not grasp its impermanence. However, the previous system is unreasonable, because, although it is thought to be the meaning of "how many part imputations there are," that treatise only shows the way of entering of sound conceptualizations that distinguish differences in one, not the way of entering of exclusion-entry in general.