Chinese
从境上证悟的自性，是境自相所决定的行相。自证现量了知，从自相自性的角度证悟的自性，即是识自相本身。以比量从自相他性的角度证悟的他性，即是对比量所显现的境之行相本身执着为境自相。之所以安立为他性，是因为并非境从自身角度决定，而是由其他习气所显现的缘故。第四，现量和比量，是如瓶和氆氇般体性各异呢？还是如事物和非事物般，是遮遣一体的各异呢？还是如所作和无常般，是本体相同而反体相异呢？还是如月亮和清凉光芒般，是名称的各异呢？回答是：智足尊者说，是遮遣一体的各异。因为现量是经历体验的部分的意识，是事物；而比量是分别念垢染的部分，由于所取境不存在于事物中，因此以此衡量的比量也不存在于事物中。这种说法不合理，因为两者都是事物。并且，比量的所取境从不存在于事物的角度来说是错觉，而错觉本身就是事物。有些人认为，相对于同一境而言，两者是一体的，这种观点也不合理，因为分别念和无分别念两者并非同一境。有些人认为，相对于不同境而言，本体是各异的，这种观点也不合理。如果一般比量与现量本体各异，并且特殊自证现量与本体各异，那么它就成了不是意识的过失。因此，现量和比量在心的本体上是一体的，因为比量本身就具备现量本体一体的缘故。相对于境而言，安立为现量和比量。例如，证悟山上有火的比量，相对于山和火的集合意义而言是比量，而相对于其自身本体而言是现量。如果那个比量相对于境而言就成了不是比量，因为相对于境而言是现量。又，如果特殊自证现量与本体是一体的，那么就必须与现量本体是一体的。这个有法，成了与现量本体各异，因为与根现量本体各异。
English
The self-nature realized from the object is the aspect determined by the object's own characteristic. Self-cognizant direct perception knows that the self-nature realized from the perspective of its own characteristic is the very self-characteristic of consciousness. The otherness realized by inference from the perspective of the otherness of its own characteristic is the very appearance of the object appearing to inference, which is clung to as the object's own characteristic. The reason for establishing it as otherness is that it is not determined by the object from its own side, but appears due to the power of other habitual tendencies. Fourth, are direct perception and inference different entities like a vase and a woolen cloth? Or are they different by negating oneness, like a thing and a non-thing? Or are they different in terms of aspects while the essence is the same, like 'made' and 'impermanent'? Or are they different in name only, like the moon and the cool rays? In response, Jñānaśrī says that they are different by negating oneness, because direct perception is the knowing part of experience, so it is a thing; and inference is the part of the defilement of conceptual thought, so since the object of apprehension does not exist as a thing, the inference that measures it also does not exist as a thing. This is not reasonable, because both are things. Moreover, the object of apprehension of inference is a delusion from the perspective of not existing as a thing, and that delusion itself is a thing. Some people think that they are one in relation to one object, which is also not reasonable, because conceptual thought and non-conceptual thought are not the same object. Some people think that the essence is different in relation to different objects, which is also not reasonable. If inference in general is different in essence from direct perception, and the specific self-cognizant direct perception is different in essence, then it would follow that it is not consciousness. Therefore, direct perception and inference are one in the essence of mind, because inference itself possesses the essence of direct perception as one. They are established as direct perception and inference in relation to the object. For example, the inference that realizes that there is fire on the mountain is inference in relation to the collection of the mountain and fire, but it is direct perception in relation to its own essence. If that inference were not inference in relation to the object, it would follow that it is direct perception in relation to the object. Furthermore, if the specific self-cognizant direct perception is one in essence, then it must be one in essence with direct perception. That subject, it follows that it is different in essence from direct perception, because it is different in essence from sense direct perception.