Chinese
说是为了遣除，释迦智说，说是为了遣除境之不欺成为量之过失。这后一种说法稍有不妥，因为境之不欺不是此时的不欺。否则，患眼翳者的眼识，应成此时的不欺，因为是境之不欺，因为是能起作用的。不能许，因为是无知之倒识。遍故，因为是欺骗之故。彼义亦如是，说为现量似与现量二者。如是说之故。自宗方面，从遣除错觉和遣除异品两种角度来说，第一种是，由于有部宗认为根是实体的量，有此错觉，故是为了遣除它，因为说心是量之故。第二种是为了遣除补特伽罗量和圣教量二者不是量，因为彼二者也具有那三种不欺之故。彼时，作者谁不欺是断尽过失的补特伽罗，以及彼所说之语。先前所说是从知识量之角度说的。总之，量这个词所指的对象，有知识量、补特伽罗量和圣教量三种。三者都具备不欺的三种法，因此被立为量。首先确定知识量，然后从其意义圆满的角度来成立补特伽罗量，因为说具彼者薄伽梵即是量之故。成立补特伽罗量之后，再成立圣教量，因为说可信之语是从不欺之总相中推知的缘故。若说，不欺、无知、义明二者，若与自相分别之义相符，则有不周遍于衡量无实之量上的过失，答曰无过失，因为彼衡量无自相之境，故不能起作用，因此是不欺的缘故。患白螺执为黄色之眼识，以及树木显现为行走之眼识，应成是量，因为是不欺之识之故，若如是说则不成，因为彼执白螺为黄色，以及树木显现为行走，哪有如此成立的缘故。第二，彼遣除增益之
English
It is said that it is for the sake of elimination, and Shakya Wisdom says that it is said to eliminate the fault of the object's non-deception becoming a measure. This latter statement is slightly inappropriate, because the object's non-deception is not the non-deception at this time. Otherwise, the eye consciousness of a person with cataracts should be non-deceptive at this time, because it is the non-deception of the object, because it is capable of functioning. It cannot be accepted, because it is an ignorant and erroneous consciousness. It is pervasive because it is deceptive. The meaning is also the same, it is said to be both apparent and non-apparent. Therefore, from the perspective of one's own system, from the two perspectives of eliminating misconceptions and eliminating dissimilarities, the first is that because the Vaibhashika school believes that the senses are substantial measures, there is this misconception, so it is for the purpose of eliminating it, because it is said that the mind is a measure. The second is to eliminate the fact that the individual measure and the scriptural measure are not measures, because both of them also have those three non-deceptive qualities. At that time, the agent who does not deceive is the individual who has exhausted faults, and the words spoken by him. What was said earlier was from the perspective of the measure of knowledge. In short, the objects to which the word "measure" applies are the measure of knowledge, the measure of the individual, and the measure of scripture. All three are established as measures because they possess the three qualities of non-deception. First, the measure of knowledge is determined, and then the measure of the individual is established from the perspective of its complete meaning, because it is said that the Bhagavan who possesses it is the measure. After establishing the measure of the individual, the measure of scripture is established, because it is said that trustworthy words are inferred from the general characteristic of non-deception. If it is said that if non-deception, ignorance, and clarity of meaning are consistent with the meaning of self-characteristic distinction, then there is the fault of not being pervasive on the measure of measuring non-existence, the answer is that there is no fault, because it measures the object without self-characteristics, so it cannot function, therefore it is non-deceptive. The eye consciousness of perceiving a white conch as yellow, and the eye consciousness of a tree appearing to move, should be measures, because they are non-deceptive consciousnesses, but if it is said that it is not established, because it perceives a white conch as yellow, and a tree appearing to move, how can it be established in this way? Second, it eliminates the superimposition of
Chinese
有三种遮遣：所遮遣的增益自性，能遮遣的决定的自性，以及它如何决定的方式。第一种的定义是：对实相之义产生其他边际的执着心。
English
There are three kinds of refutation: the nature of what is to be refuted, which is superimposition; the nature of what refutes, which is ascertainment; and the way in which it ascertains. The definition of the first is: a mind of attachment that imagines other extremes to the meaning of reality. Classification: There are two types: conceptual wrong knowledge and doubt, but non-conceptual wrong knowledge is not included, because both superimposition and ascertainment do not arise simultaneously in the continuum of one person. For example, the eye consciousness of the appearance of two moons and the ascertainment that ascertains the absence of two moons arise simultaneously in the continuum of one person. The definition of the second is: a conceptualization that apprehends its own object as being in accordance with reality and as being unique. It is impossible to apprehend it as something else without the function of apprehending it diminishing. Classifying from the perspective of not distinguishing between real and imputed: There are two types: correct ascertainment and incorrect ascertainment. The first is: for example, the ascertainment that ascertains that sound is impermanent. The second is: for example, the wrong conception that grasps sound as permanent. The latter is the superimposition that is eliminated by the ascertainment, so it is an imputed ascertainment. Classifying from the perspective of essence: There are two types: ascertainment that has become a valid cognition and ascertainment that is not a valid cognition. The first is: all inferences. The second is: for example, the ascertainment that arises from being led by direct perception and inference. Direct perceptions are not the nature of ascertainment that refutes, because the action is completed by merely appearing to its own object, so it is impossible to ascertain its own object. Thirdly, the valid cognition of universal convention is what engages in accepting and rejecting self-characterized existence and non-existence, because it does not have the result of ascertaining existence and non-existence. Therefore, valid cognition itself does not change. So, does it generate ascertainment by its own power? Some valid cognitions generate ascertainment by their own power, and some generate ascertainment by the power of other valid cognitions that arise later than themselves. The meaning of ascertainment refuting superimposition is: ascertainment does not have the power to cut off the seed of superimposition. The manifestation of superimposition does not arise even when the mind is distracted to other objects, so after ascertainment arises, it is impossible for superimposition to arise before its function diminishes, and this is called ascertainment refuting superimposition. 3. Representing by definition
Chinese
确立宗义有四点：所诠的分类，对基的错解进行驳斥，说明基的自相成立的量，以及它如何进行破立的方式。第一点有六个方面：分类的所依，所分的体性，进行分类的理由，如何分类的意义，分类的数量确定，以及各个分类的词义。第一点中，有些藏人说，量是分类的所依，而正确的知识不是分类的所依，因为决断识和意念也是正确的知识，所以存在分类所依过于宽泛的过失。这种说法不合理，因为对不是量的法已经遮止了正确的知识。静命论师的现为义利之量和能为义利之量两种，前者如火能进行煮烧一样，是成为士夫成办义利的真实的因，后者如火和水等仅仅是显现，是成为士夫成办义利的间接的因。其中前者不是分类的所依，因为不会被欺骗，自己已经确定，所以不是论典中观察的对象，并且仅仅由现量确定，所以没有现量和比量两种。因此，说只有后者是分类的所依是不合理的，如果总的不能作为分类的所依，必须分开差别才能作为分类的所依，那么现量等所有的分类也都需要这样，因此太过分了。自宗认为，量和正确的知识二者意义相同，是名称的不同，所以二者都可以作为分类的所依，因为这里说，由于所量是二，所以量也是二。并且在《释量论》中说，正确的知识有两种，即现量和比量，所以已经说了正确的知识是分类的所依。第二点是，现量和比量两种。第三点是，由于在认识所量的方式上，有依靠经验而认识的方式，以及依靠理证而认识的方式两种，或者有从自己的体性方面认识的方式，以及从他者的体性方面认识的方式两种。现量的自相是从自己的体性方面认识的意义，因此义知现量从自己的体性方面认识义自相的
English
There are four points to establishing the tenets: the classification of what is to be expressed, refuting misconceptions about the basis, explaining the valid cognition that establishes the defining characteristic of the basis, and how it performs refutation and establishment. The first point has six aspects: the basis for classification, the nature of what is classified, the reason for classifying, the meaning of how it is classified, the determination of the number of classifications, and the meaning of the terms for each classification. In the first point, some Tibetans say that valid cognition is the basis for classification, but correct knowledge is not the basis for classification, because decisive knowledge and mental cognition are also correct knowledge, so there is the fault of the basis for classification being too broad. This statement is unreasonable, because correct knowledge has already been excluded from what is not valid cognition. Of the two types of valid cognition, the one that appears to perform a function according to Acharya Dharmottara and the one that is capable of performing a function, the former, like fire that appears to perform the function of cooking and burning, is the actual cause of accomplishing the purpose of a person, while the latter, like fire and water, etc., which are merely appearances, is the indirect cause of accomplishing the purpose of a person. The former is not the basis for classification, because it is not deceptive, it has already been determined by oneself, so it is not an object of investigation in treatises, and it is determined only by direct perception, so there are not both direct perception and inference. Therefore, it is unreasonable to say that only the latter is the basis for classification, if the general cannot be the basis for classification, and it is necessary to separate the particulars in order to be the basis for classification, then all classifications such as direct perception also need to be like that, so it is too extreme. The self-system considers that valid cognition and correct knowledge are the same in meaning and different in name, so both can be the basis for classification, because here it says, since there are two objects to be measured, there are two valid cognitions. And in the Pramāṇavārttika, it says that there are two types of correct knowledge, namely direct perception and inference, so it has been said that correct knowledge is the basis for classification. The second point is the two types, direct perception and inference. The third point is that, because in the way of understanding the object to be measured, there are two ways: the way of understanding based on experience, and the way of understanding based on reasoning, or there are two ways: the way of understanding from the aspect of one's own nature, and the way of understanding from the aspect of another's nature. The self-characteristic of direct perception is the meaning of understanding from the aspect of one's own nature, therefore sense direct perception understands the self-characteristic of objects from the aspect of one's own nature.