English
It is the dependent self-awareness. Secondly, the apprehended aspect, the apprehending aspect, and the knowledge that is empty of both apprehended and apprehending, etc., the very part of the nature of all knowledge that arises as merely experiencing itself. Thirdly, if it is knowledge, then examine whether self-awareness is manifestly pervasive in its own nature, whether self-awareness and other-awareness are contradictory or not, and whether self-awareness has an object or not. First, some ancient people say that knowledge with dual appearances has two parts: the part that is merely clear in its own nature, and the part that knows other objects. The first is the apprehending aspect, so self-awareness is manifestly present in its own nature. The latter is the apprehended aspect, so self-awareness is not manifestly present in its own nature. If that is said, then the Vaibhashikas would say, in the eyes of the Buddhists, feelings of happiness, etc., do not recognize their own nature, because they do not recognize other objects. To this, it would be reasonable to admit that the answer is reasonable. And, the root consciousness that apprehends blue does not recognize blue, because it does not recognize its own nature. Here, if one admits that there is no self-awareness, then the inference that harms is not correct. Because it has been promised. If one admits it, then, as it says in the Pramanavarttika, "If the object is not manifest, then seeing the meaning will not be well established." And here it says, "If one does not even recognize one's own entity, how can one recognize the nature of others?" This contradicts what was said. Dartika says, if knowledge is its own nature, then self-awareness is manifestly pervasive in its own nature, then the conceptual thought that takes the pot, its own nature is the apprehended aspect, the apprehending aspect, and the nature that is neither of the two, on which one is self-awareness manifest? If it is the first case, then, that dharma, self-awareness is manifest, because of that reason. If it is the second case, then, that dharma, self-awareness is manifest in the apprehended aspect of its own nature, because it is promised. The apprehended aspect of one's own nature and the apprehending aspect of one's own nature, both of them, no matter which one they depend on in terms of place, time, or nature, are established, blissful, and the only substance. If one admits it, then as before. If it is the third case, then it is not reasonable, because there is no nature that is neither of the two. When that is said, others say that the apprehended aspect and the apprehending aspect of the manifest pot-taking, both of them, no matter which one they depend on in terms of place, time, or nature, are established, blissful, and the only substance, because the pot exists. Because it has been promised.
Chinese
如果这样认为，那么在没有以量成立的瓶子的处所，也同样会成为那二者容易成立是同一实体的过失。这种责难是不成立的，因为如果它依赖于处所而容易成立是同一实体，那么并不能遍及所有处所那二者都容易成立是同一实体。有些人说，那二者任何一个都不是的瓶执著识，其自性不成立，这个理由不成立，因为瓶执著识就是那个。这种说法仅仅是普遍的过失。因此，对于先前的宗派存在着违背承诺的过失。因此，如果“因为没有他觉”的场合中的自证是那个，那么自证必须是现量。如果自性的所取相是自证现量，那么自证必须是现量。这是周遍的，因为在那个场合，已经显示了以所取相作为所量而建立的量果。如果按照自宗是识，那么以自性是自证现量来周遍成立，需要依据教证和理证二者。第一，经中说：“分别也认为是自证，实际上并非如此，因为在那里分别。”又说：“此处自性非声义，因此对它是所有现量。”《庄严经论》中说：“识的自性从实物中，完全产生相反，凡不是实物的自性，那在这里就是自性之觉。”等等，无边无际，因为顾虑文句繁多，所以没有广说。第二，对于是自体验需要安立能立，对于不是自体验需要显示能害，分为二者。第一，取蓝色之根现量，对于自性是自证现量，因为成为它的体验对象的相，就是取蓝色之根现量的自性。如云：“以二理成立，也能成立大多数自证。”因此这样说。又是那个，从后来的忆念的证相来看，取蓝色之根现量在自身存在时，已经成立有体验者，并且没有其他的体验者实体。如云：“从忆念也能成立自证。”因此这样说。第二，对于安乐等，存在着其他的体验者实体，这是可以成立的，因为它有体验者，因为它没有体验它的自性。如果承认，那么是由与自身同时的识，其他的实体来体验呢？还是由后来产生的
English
If it is thought that, in a place where a vase is not established by valid cognition, it would follow that those two are easily established as the same entity. This criticism is not valid, because if it depends on the place to be easily established as the same entity, then it does not pervade that in all places those two are easily established as the same entity. Some say that the conceptual cognition grasping a vase, which is neither of those two, its own nature is not established, this reason is not established, because the conceptual cognition grasping a vase is that. This statement seems to be merely a general fault. Therefore, for the previous system, there is a fault of contradicting the commitment. Therefore, if the self-awareness in the case of "because there is no other awareness" is that, then self-awareness must be manifest. If the object-aspect of one's own nature is self-awareness manifest, then self-awareness must be manifest. This is pervasive, because in that case, it has shown one establishment of the result of valid cognition with the object-aspect made into the object to be measured. If according to one's own system it is consciousness, then to establish pervasively that one's own nature is self-awareness manifest, one needs to rely on both scripture and reasoning. First, the sutra says, "Discrimination is also considered self-awareness, but in reality it is not, because there is discrimination there." And it says, "Here, one's own nature is not sound and meaning, therefore for it, all is manifest." The Ornament for Clear Realization says, "The nature of consciousness is from the nature of matter, it arises completely opposite, whatever is not the nature of matter, that here is the awareness of self." And so on, endlessly, because of concern for many words, it is not elaborated. Second, for what is self-experience, one needs to establish the establisher, and for what is not self-experience, one needs to show the harmer, divided into two. First, the sense-manifest cognition grasping blue, for its own nature is self-awareness manifest, because the aspect that becomes its object of experience is the nature of the sense-manifest cognition grasping blue. As it says, "By establishing two reasons, one can also establish most self-awareness." Therefore, it is said. Again, it is that, from the sign of later memory, it is established that the sense-manifest cognition grasping blue has an experiencer at its own time, and there is no other entity of experiencer. As it says, "From memory, self-awareness is also established." Therefore, it is said. Second, for pleasure and so on, it can be established that there is another entity of experiencer, because it has an experiencer, because it does not experience its own nature. If it is admitted, then is it experienced by another entity of consciousness simultaneous with itself? Or by what arises later?
Tibetan
་ཤེས་པ་རྫས་གཞན་པས་མྱོང་བ་ཡིན་དང་པོ་ལྟར་ན། དོན་གང་ཉེ་བས་བློ་དང་ནི། །ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ་དྲན་པར་བྱའོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལྟར་ན། རིམ་གྱིས་འཛིན་ན་དེ་མྱོང་བ། །ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ་དྲན་པར་བྱའོ། །གཞན་ཡང་བུམ་འཛིན་རྟོག་པ་དེ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ལ་ཁ་ནང་དུ་བལྟས་པ་མི་སྲིད་པར་ཐལ། དེ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ལ་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་མིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། འདོད་ན། ཤེས་པ་མིན་པར་ཐལ་ལོ། །གལ་ཏེ་བུམ་འཛིན་རྟོག་པ་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བའི་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་དེ་ཁ་ནང་དུ་བལྟས་ཤིང་། བུམ་འཛིན་རྟོག་པ་དེ་ཁ་ཕྱིར་བལྟས་པ་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་པས་སྐྱོན་མེད་དོ་ཞེ་ན། འོ་ན་ཁ་ཕྱིར་བལྟས་ལ་རྟོག་པ་ཡིན། ནང་བལྟས་ལ་རང་རིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཤེས་པ་མི་སྲིད་པར་ཐལ། རྟོག་པ་ཡིན་ན། ཁ་ནང་དུ་བལྟས་པ་མིན་པས་ཁྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར། འདོད་ན། རྟོག་པའང་རང་རིག་ཉིད་དུ་འདོད། །ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་ལ་ཕྱོགས་བཤད་དུ་མ་སོང་བའི་འབྲུ་སྣོན་མཛོད། ཁ་ཅིག རྟོག་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཆོས་ཅན། རྫས་སུ་གྲུབ་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ལ་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་སོང་བའི་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་པ་ལ་འདོད་ལན་ཐེབས་པས་སྐྱོན་མེད་དོ། །ཡང་རྟོག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། རྟོག་པ་དེ་ཁྱོད་ལ་གསལ་བར་སྣང་བ་དང་། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་སྣང་ཡུལ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་རྟོག་པ་ལ་མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པར་རྟོགས་པའི་རྗེས་དཔག་ཆོས་ཅན། ཕྱི་དོན་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པར་རྟོགས་པའི་རྗེས་དཔག་གི་གཞལ་བྱར་གྱུར་པའི་རང་མཚན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་ཁས། ཡང་སྒྲ་རྟག་འཛིན་རྟོགས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྒྲ་རྟག་འཛིན་རྟོག་པ་ལ་ཚད་མར་ཐལ། དེ་ལ་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། འདོད་ན། དེ་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་འཇུག་ཡུལ་དུ་ཐལ། འདོད་པ་དེའི་ཕྱིར། འདོད་ན། ལོག་ཤེས་མིན་པར་ཐལ་ལོ་ཞེ་ན། འདི་དག་གི་ལན་ལ་ཁོ་བོ་ནི། རྟོག་པ་དེ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ལ་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན་ཀྱང་སྤྱིར་རྟོག་པ་ལ་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་ནི་ཁས་མི་ལེན་ཏེ། རྟོག་པ་ལ་རྟོག་པར་འགྱུར་བ་སྲིད་པའི་ཕྱིར། མ་གྲུབ་ན། རྟོག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། རྟོག་པ་དེ་ཁྱོད་ལ་རྟོག་པར་འགྱུར་བ་སྲིད་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་རྟོག་པའི་ཞེན་ཡུལ་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་སྲིད་པའི་ཕྱིར། གལ་ཏེ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ཆོས་ཅན། རྟོག་པ་དེ་ཁྱོད་ལ་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་མིན་པར་ཐལ། རྟོག་པ་དེ་ཁྱོད་ལ་རྟོག་པར་འགྱུར་བ་སྲིད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཁྱོད་རྟོག་པའི་ཞེན་ཡུལ་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་སྲིད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ནི་ཆོས་ཅན་སྐྱོན་ཅན་ཏེ། བུམ་པ་དེ་རང་འབྲས་བསྐྱེད་བྱེད་ཡིན་ནམ་མ་ཡིན།
Chinese
如果说识由其他事物体验，那么如第一种情况，应当忆念“以何物接近，即为智慧”等理路。如第二种情况，应当忆念“次第执持，则彼体验”等理路。此外，执瓶分别识不可能向内观察自己的体性，因为对于自己的体性来说，它不是自证现量。如果承认，则应成为非识。如果说，体验执瓶分别识的自证现量是向内观察的，而执瓶分别识仅仅是向外观察的，所以没有过失。那么，向外观察的是分别，向内观察的是自证，这种识是不可能的，因为如果是分别，则遍及不是向内观察。如果承认，则也承认分别即是自证。应当补充这些没有成为对经论进行片面解释的要点。有些人认为，分别的自性，作为法，应成为实有，因为你具有成为自证现量的识，这种说法可以通过承认来回答，所以没有过失。还有，分别，作为法，那个分别对你来说是清晰显现的，并且是你的显现对象，因为你对分别来说是现量的。了知声音是无常的后比量，作为法，应成为外境，因为是了知声音是无常的后比量的所量，即自相。承许宗法。还有，执声音为常的分别，作为法，执声音为常的分别应成为量，因为它具有自证现量。如果承认，则它应成为你的行境，因为是所承认的缘故。如果承认，则应成为非颠倒识，如果这样说。对于这些回答，我则认为，虽然分别识对于自己的体性来说是自证现量，但总的来说，我不承认分别具有自证现量，因为分别可能成为分别。如果不成立，那么分别，作为法，那个分别可能成为你的分别，因为你可能成为分别的耽著境。如果说，自己的体性，作为法，那个分别对你来说不是自证现量，因为那个分别可能成为你的分别，因为你可能成为分别的耽著境，如果这样说，那么这是有缺陷的法，瓶子是产生自果的，还是不产生自果的？
English
If it is said that consciousness is experienced by other things, then as in the first case, one should remember the reasoning of "by what is close, is wisdom," and so on. As in the second case, one should remember the reasoning of "if holding in sequence, then that is experienced," and so on. Furthermore, it is impossible for the conceptual cognition of a pot to look inward at its own nature, because for its own nature, it is not self-aware direct perception. If you admit it, then it should become non-consciousness. If you say that the self-aware direct perception that experiences the conceptual cognition of a pot is looking inward, and the conceptual cognition of a pot is only looking outward, so there is no fault. Then, what looks outward is conceptual cognition. It is impossible for the consciousness that looks inward to be self-awareness, because if it is conceptual cognition, then it is pervaded by not looking inward. If you admit it, then you also admit that conceptual cognition is self-awareness itself. One should supplement these key points that have not become one-sided explanations of the scriptures. Some people think that the nature of conceptual cognition, as a dharma, should become real, because you have the consciousness that has become self-aware direct perception, this can be answered by admitting it, so there is no fault. Also, conceptual cognition, as a dharma, that conceptual cognition appears clearly to you, and is your object of appearance, because you are direct perception for conceptual cognition. The subsequent inference that understands sound as impermanent, as a dharma, should become an external object, because it is the own-character that is the object to be measured of the subsequent inference that understands sound as impermanent. The sign is admitted. Also, the conceptual cognition that holds sound as permanent, as a dharma, the conceptual cognition that holds sound as permanent should become valid, because it has self-aware direct perception. If you admit it, then it should become your object of engagement, because it is what is admitted. If you admit it, then it should become non-inverted consciousness, if you say so. For these answers, I think that although conceptual cognition is self-aware direct perception for its own nature, in general, I do not admit that conceptual cognition has self-aware direct perception, because conceptual cognition may become conceptual cognition. If it is not established, then conceptual cognition, as a dharma, that conceptual cognition may become your conceptual cognition, because you may become the object of clinging of conceptual cognition. If you say that one's own nature, as a dharma, that conceptual cognition is not self-aware direct perception for you, because that conceptual cognition may become your conceptual cognition, because you may become the object of clinging of conceptual cognition, if you say so, then this is a flawed dharma, is the pot producing its own result, or not producing its own result?