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因此，一切事物都从其自身的近取因和共同作用的条件中产生，除此之外没有其他的作者。第二，从进入方式上区分，有进入顺方作为遍及的正确因，和进入两种方式的正确因两种。定义的顺序是：任何正确的因，当其作为因的立敌者，以与在所有顺方中确立和证明的方式相一致的方式确定，或者不确定。第一种，有自性和非显现的正确因两种。第一种是：声音，有法，是无常的，因为是所作的，等等。第二种是：以量未见的瓶子的东方处，有法，没有瓶子，因为瓶子未被量所见，等等。后者有果、自性、非显现的三种理由，第一种是：有烟的山，有法，有火，因为有烟，等等。第二种是：海螺声，有法，是无常的，因为是从努力中产生的，等等。第三种是：无火的夜晚的海中，有法，没有烟，因为没有火，等等。第三，从能立的角度区分有三种，即事物力量、信任、名声的正确因三种。第一种是：前面所说的果、自性、非显现的三种因中，在自利品中主要显示事物力量的理由，因此仅仅显示这三种的分类的要点也在于此。后两种，在他利品中，《彼处承诺果之相，于众所周知自性相》所显示，对于信任的正确因，定义、例子、三审查清净的意义三种，第一种是：以自己的意愿来证明极隐蔽的所证，具备三相的果相，作为圣言量之因。第二种是：《八千颂般若经》，有法，是通达自己教义的先前量，因为是三审查清净的圣言量，即教义有显现、隐蔽、极隐蔽三种，其中前两种以圣言量之因来证明，在释量论的他利品中被广泛遮破，因此，意愿极隐蔽的证明
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Therefore, all things arise from their own immediate cause and the conditions that work together, and there is no other agent besides that. Secondly, distinguishing from the perspective of how they enter, there are two types of valid reasons: those that enter into the concordant side as pervasive, and those that enter into two ways. The definitions are in order: Any valid reason that, when the opponent to whom it serves as a reason is certain in accordance with the way of establishing and proving in all concordant sides, or is uncertain. The first has two types: the nature and the non-apprehension valid reasons. The first is: sound, subject, is impermanent, because it is produced, and so on. The second is: the eastern place where the pot is not apprehended by valid cognition, subject, there is no pot, because the pot is not apprehended by valid cognition, and so on. The latter has three reasons: effect, nature, and non-apprehension. The first is: the mountain with smoke, subject, there is fire, because there is smoke, and so on. The second is: conch sound, subject, is impermanent, because it arises from effort, and so on. The third is: in the ocean at night without fire, subject, there is no smoke, because there is no fire, and so on. Thirdly, distinguishing from the perspective of the means of proof, there are three: the force of things, trust, and the valid reason of fame. The first is: among the three reasons of effect, nature, and non-apprehension mentioned earlier, the chapter on self-interest mainly shows the reason of the force of things, so the key to showing only the classification of these three is also there. The latter two, in the chapter on the benefit of others, are shown by "There, the promised effect is the sign, fame among beings is the sign of nature." For the valid reason of trust, there are three: definition, example, and the meaning of being purified by three examinations. The first is: with one's own intention, to prove the extremely obscure to be proven, whatever effect sign that possesses the three aspects, which has become a scriptural statement as a sign. The second is: The Eight Thousand Verse Prajnaparamita, subject, is the previous valid cognition that understands its own doctrine, because it is a scriptural statement purified by three examinations, that is, the doctrine has three: manifest, hidden, and extremely hidden. Among them, the first two are proven by the sign of the scriptural statement, which is widely refuted in the chapter on the benefit of others in the Commentary on Valid Cognition. Therefore, the proof of the intention that is extremely hidden
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完毕。对此，早期的人认为，可信赖的自语和圣言有二者，因此认为有二者成为标志的圣言。而后期的人认为，无理由地分为果、自性、不现见三种理由，这在总义中已被驳斥。第三是，对于显现的，没有现量妨害。对于隐蔽的，主要是显示圣者的四谛，没有比量妨害。对于极隐蔽的，没有自语的直接和间接含义，以及前后矛盾的承诺。因为对于要作为此处的法，需要显示所有三种可量之处。因为前两者在以二量没有妨害的总的方面，在显示极隐蔽之时，不欺骗所教之义地进行论证是此时的意义。第三，对于名声的正理，区分名声的真实相和名声的标志，以及确定名声的标志，二者中，第一，如果名声是定义，则必须是能诠之声。如果是这样，则一切事物都必须是可说的。一切事物都可以用能诠之声来说，这是名声的假立，因为对于名声的境，是名声之名的假立。例如，对于现量和比量的境所造成的损害，假立为现量和比量造成的损害一样。就像这样，也说：从名言中产生的法，可以用名声之声来说。现量等的所量，也假立为能量的声音来说。这样说。对于这个名声的假立，经部中称为声音产生的名声。第二，分为论证境是可行的，以及论证有境是可行的。第一，有兔子的东西，法，可以用名为月亮的声音来说，因为存在于分别的境中。第二，名为月亮的声音，法，可以适用于一切事物，因为是随欲而适用的声音。这是这样说的。第四，从论证方式的角度来分，有论证义的正理，以及论证名称的正理两种。虽然这两者被认为是此宗的自性之相的分类，但在自释四千五百颂中，广
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Completed. Regarding this, early scholars believed that there were two types of trustworthy statements: self-utterances and scriptural statements. Therefore, they believed that there were two scriptural statements that became signs. Later scholars, without reason, divided them into three types of reasons: effect, nature, and non-apprehension. This has already been refuted in the general meaning. Third, for the manifest, there is no harm from direct perception. For the hidden, mainly showing the Four Noble Truths of the noble ones, there is no harm from inference based on the power of reality. For the extremely hidden, there is no contradiction between the direct and indirect meanings of self-utterances, and no contradiction between prior and subsequent commitments. Because for what is to be taken as the subject here, it is necessary to show all three measurable places. Because the first two, in the general aspect where there is no harm from the two valid cognitions, at the time of showing the extremely hidden, proving without deceiving the meaning of what is taught is the meaning of the occasion. Third, for the valid reason of fame, distinguishing between the reality of fame and the sign of fame, and identifying the sign of fame, among the two, first, if fame is a definition, then it must be an expressive sound. If so, then all things must be speakable. That all things can be spoken with an expressive sound is the imputation of fame, because for the object of fame, it is the imputation of the name of fame. For example, just as the harm caused by the objects of direct perception and inference is imputed as the harm caused by direct perception and inference. Like this, it is also said: The Dharma that arises from terminology can be spoken with the sound of fame. The measurable objects of direct perception, etc., are also spoken by imputing the measuring sound. It is said like this. For this imputation of fame, in the scriptures, it is called the fame arising from sound. Second, it is divided into proving that the object is feasible, and proving that the possessor of the object is feasible. First, the one with a rabbit, the subject, can be spoken with the sound called moon, because it exists in the object of conceptualization. Second, the sound called moon, the subject, can apply to all things, because it is a sound that applies according to desire. It is said like this. Fourth, dividing from the perspective of the method of proof, there are two types: the valid reason for proving the meaning, and the valid reason for proving the name. Although these two are considered to be the classification of the characteristic mark according to the tradition of this system, in the self-commentary of four thousand five hundred verses, extensively,
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以及周遍的对境未现，都是二者的理由。如是，仅仅成立自性未现的理由这一术语，以及原因周遍的对境未现这二者，是成立意义和术语二者的理由，依靠这样来分别开来的。这样一来，自性的标志分这二者，是从果的标志中区分开来的，因为如果是果的标志，就必须是成立意义的理由。第五，从所立的法方面来分，有破斥的正确标志和成立的正确标志两种。前者是，之前所说的未现的理由等。后者是，果和自性的理由等。第六，从关系方面来分，有依靠一体关系的，以及依靠彼生关系的理由两种。前者是，本体果一体关系的，以及相违关系一体关系的二种。前者是，自性的理由等。后者是，周遍对境未现的理由等。后者又分，本体果彼生关系的，以及相违关系彼生关系的二种。前者是，果的标志等。后者是，原因未现的理由等。那么，相违现的理由等依靠什么关系呢？最终是依靠一体关系，因为最终以量未见的角度，和成立必须没有破斥对境是相同的。第七，从作为标志安立的角度来分，有无遮成为标志的，以及非遮成为标志的二种。前者是，相关对境未现的理由等。后者是，相违对境现的理由，以及果和自性的理由等。第八，从安立的方式来分，有安立方式是“是”的安立，以及“有”的安立二种。前者分，成立方式是“是”的成立，以及“有”的成立二种。前者是，声，有法，是无常，因为是所作的缘故。后者是，虚空的青烟，这个盲人，有法，它的因是火在前，因为是烟的缘故等等。后者分，成立方式是“是”的成立，以及“有”的成立二种。前者
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and the non-apprehension of what pervades are both reasons for both. Thus, only the term 'non-apprehension of the nature' is established as a reason, and the two, the non-apprehension of the cause and the pervader, are said to be reasons that establish both the meaning and the term, and the distinction is made based on that. Thus, the division of the sign of the nature into these two is a distinction from the sign of the effect, because if it is a sign of the effect, it must be a reason for establishing the meaning. Fifth, dividing from the aspect of the dharma to be established, there are two types: valid refutation signs and valid establishment signs. The former are the non-apprehension reasons previously explained. The latter are the effect and self-nature reasons. Sixth, dividing from the aspect of relation, there are two types of reasons: those that rely on a single identity relation and those that rely on a dependent origination relation. The former are two types: those that rely on a single identity relation of substance and effect, and those that rely on a single identity relation of opposition. The former are the self-nature reasons. The latter are the reasons of non-apprehension of the pervader. The latter are divided into two: those that rely on a dependent origination relation of substance and effect, and those that rely on a dependent origination relation of opposition. The former are the effect signs. The latter are the reasons of non-apprehension of the cause. So, what relation do the reasons of contradictory apprehension rely on? Ultimately, they rely on a single identity relation, because ultimately, from the perspective of non-apprehension by valid cognition, it is the same as establishing the certainty of the absence of the object to be refuted. Seventh, dividing from the aspect of what is to be posited as a sign, there are two types: negation that becomes a sign and non-negation that becomes a sign. The former are the reasons of non-apprehension of related objects. The latter are the reasons of apprehension of contradictory objects and the reasons of effect and self-nature. Eighth, dividing from the aspect of the mode of positing, there are two types: the mode of positing as 'is' and the mode of positing as 'exists'. The former is divided into two: the mode of establishing as 'is' and the mode of establishing as 'exists'. The former is: sound, the subject, is impermanent, because it is produced. The latter is: this blue smoke in the sky, the blind man, the subject, its cause is fire preceding it, because it is smoke, and so on. The latter is divided into two: the mode of establishing as 'is' and the mode of establishing as 'exists'. The former
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例如：声音，是所立法，是无常，因为是存在之故。后者例如：有烟的地方，是所立法，有火，因为有烟之故。第九，从辩论的角度来分，有自利时的正确因和利他时的正确因两种。第一者的定义：以前的辩论者没有在后来的辩论者面前陈述的，具备三种方式的理由。例如，从烟是突然产生的因，立即推知有火时，烟就是例子。后者的定义：以前的辩论者在后来的辩论者面前陈述的，具备三种方式的理由。例如，以前清净的辩论者在后来的清净的辩论者面前陈述：声音，是所立法，是无常，因为是所作之故。此时，所作就是例子。第十，从想要表达的角度来分，《释量论》中说：在相违因的情况下，有时是从法，有时是从有法，有时是从它们的差别来做的缘故，所以要区分它们。依靠这个，《理藏论》中说：直接或间接的法和有法的，相违的表达意愿是靠力量的。将所说的这个分类应用到正确的因上，有些是直接表达的正确因，有些是表达的势力的正确因，有些是从表达法，有些是从表达有法的角度变成正确因，这四种是依次：声音，是所立法，是无常，因为是所作之故。瓶子，是所立法，不是同时产生所有自果的，因为是依赖于缘而产生自果之故。声音，是所立法，不是与无常不同的事物，因为是所作之故。无常的声音，是所立法，是存在的，因为是所作之故。像这些例子一样。《释量论》中也说：像相违一样，因也是，如果不是不同，那谁来阻止区分呢？它的意义《理藏论》中说：如果对正确的也一样，因为作用相同，所以采取中立。第二，似因，有定义和分类两种。第一，定义：不具备三种方式的因。第二，