English
। The habit is greatly awakened, therefore the mind is decisive and does not depend on external objects. Thus it is said. The Vijnanavada-asatvavadin believes that the object-aspect that appears as an object is a fabricated object of measurement, the consciousness that grasps it as real is a valid cognition, and the one who experiences that appearance is established as self-awareness and considered the result. That consciousness that grasps it as real, namely the fabricated object-aspect, is not its own nature, therefore it is a fabricated self-awareness, but in its own essence it is the nature of self-awareness. When self is placed as an object, from the place where it is said, the result of the valid cognition of the nature of self-awareness, the Vijnanavada-asatvavadin also accepts it. In short, if one understands that the object-aspect consciousness is real, it is the tenet of the Sautrantika and Vijnanavada-satya, and the object-consciousness is not real anywhere, it is the tenet of the Vijnanavada-asatvavadin, then when the object-aspect is taken as the object of measurement, in the result, the difference between the nature of self-awareness and the fabricated one will arise, then one can be without ignorance. Nowadays, if it is an object-aspect, then it is pervaded by consciousness, those who speak of the tenet of Vijnanavada-asatvavadin will not be able to understand that meaning even if they strive until the end of the kalpa, and they will also be ignorant of the difference between Vijnanavada-satya and asatya. Second, both Vijnanavada-satya and asatya, in name, take the blue that becomes an external object as the object of measurement, and the object-aspect of the blue that clearly appears on the consciousness that arises from the firm habit is valid cognition. In name, the external object blue is the object of knowledge, the manifest result. To establish this, there are three ways: establishing by scripture, establishing by reason, and explaining the meaning of name. First, in the *Alambanapariksa*, it is said, "The nature of the internal object of knowledge is what appears like an external object, because the object-nature is the nature of consciousness, therefore it is also a cause." With the first two sentences, in name, the basis for establishing the external object is determined, and with the words "object-nature", it is shown that it is established as object-nature in name, and with "because it is the nature of consciousness", it is shown that the object is the nature of consciousness itself. The last sentence establishes the relationship of not arising without it in name, therefore it is established by the name of the object-condition. Similarly, in the *Pramanaviniscaya*, it is said, "The object exists, because it is the nature of self-awareness, although it is self-awareness, but in the result this is"
Chinese
认为是知识。并且，《释量论》中说：“安立义彼性故，虽是自证许为义。”所说的意思也是，在名言中安立为义识的此根识，在自身现起时，了知对境是自性，虽然根识的果是决定的，但在识的自性中，外境是名言中所安立的对境。所谓“从果”是因为根识的果是决定的缘故。 “何时所知为义时，立故”以及“彼即于义极决定”等，之前所引用的根本和注释，也都在名言中显示外境是所量。总摄所有这些意义后，《理藏自释》中说：“在名言世俗中，如经部宗一样，是义识的量果，安立义彼性故，虽是自证许为义。”无论如何，都是两种识的方式。第二，对于所有宗派的论者来说，有两种方式：一种是在观察实相的智慧面前安立的分别，另一种是按照世间的名言如何流传来安立。所以，这里也必须确定这一点。对此，有两种识的方式，并且用成立自证的理智来观察时，根识在自身现起时，遮破了外境的存在。但在世间的名言中，对此进行外境的分别，因为“何故如是义自体，住于识上如是者，此乃如是安住故，决定自体即是识。”如是所说，根识在自身现起时，世间人会对此进行清净不清净，是蓝色不是蓝色等的名言。对于名言中是外境的这一点，也需要串习坚固的意识，这是通过《释量论》的教证所了解的。第三，那么名言的意义是什么呢？对于所有无论是否进入宗派的人来说，共同存在的是，由二量所引生的决定的意识，安立为决定的识的名言，以及由决定的意识所引生的能诠释的语词，安立为诠释语词的名言。对于如此决定的意识所引生的量，安立为普遍名言的量，这在《释量论》中清楚地显现出来，并且
English
It is regarded as knowledge. Furthermore, the *Pramanavarttika* states, "Because of establishing the meaning as its nature, although it is self-awareness, it is considered meaning-awareness." The meaning of this is that, in conventional terms, this sense consciousness, which is established as meaning-awareness, when it appears in its own time, knowing the object is its own nature. Although the result of sense consciousness is definite, in the nature of the mind of ascertainment, the external object is what is established as the object in conventional terms. The phrase "from the result" is because the result of sense consciousness is ascertainment. "When the knowable is established as the object, because it is established" and "That itself is completely ascertained as the object," etc., the root text and commentary quoted earlier also show that the external object is the object to be measured in conventional terms. Summarizing the meaning of all of this, the *Rikter Self-Commentary* states, "In conventional truth, like the Sautrantikas, it is the valid result of meaning-awareness, because of establishing the meaning as its nature, although it is self-awareness, it is considered meaning-awareness." In any case, it is a dual way of thinking. Secondly, for all proponents of philosophical systems, there are two ways: one is the distinction made in the face of wisdom that examines reality, and the other is the way of establishing things according to how they are known in worldly conventions. Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain this here as well. There are two ways of thinking about this, and when examining it with the reasoning that establishes self-awareness, the appearance of sense consciousness in its own time refutes the existence of an external object. However, in worldly conventions, the distinction of an external object is made for it, because "Why is the nature of the object such that it abides in consciousness in such a way? This is because it abides in such a way, the determining nature is consciousness itself." As it is said, when sense consciousness appears in its own time, worldly people make conventions about it, such as clean or unclean, blue or not blue, etc. For this reason, it is known from the scripture of the *Pramanavarttika* that even for this which is an external object in conventional terms, a consciousness with stable imprints is necessary. Thirdly, what then is the meaning of convention? For all those who have or have not entered a philosophical system, what is commonly present is that the definite consciousness brought about by the two valid cognitions is established as the conventional term for the definite mind, and the expressive sounds brought about by that definite consciousness are established as the conventional term for expressive sounds. The valid cognition that brings about such a definite consciousness is established as the universally conventional valid cognition, which is clearly shown in the *Pramanavarttika*, and
Chinese
从意义之宝藏中如实显现，其他藏人连只言片语都未见，意义更不必说。一旦认识到这样的术语，对于有部宗来说，术语存在并不普遍，而对于中观宗来说是普遍的，这也将理解到这是因为存在于审视实相的智慧面前，是否承认的差别。第三，对意义之量的果进行考察，从而将自证果展示出来，这有三点：简略地展示，详细地解说，遣除诤论。第一点是，《释量论》中说：“因为见到对于同一个自性，一个喜欢而另一个不喜欢。”以及“对于其他没有差别的声音，气味等等的差别，各种有情各自的根识不会产生快乐。”这样解释了外境同一个境的各自根识产生不同的显现。因此，这不仅仅是唯识宗的观点，而是在唯识宗的量果的场合中进行了解释，并且那个宗派在名言中承认外境为所量，因此，这也不是经部宗的观点。由于除了这两者之外，没有其他的自宗的宗义论著出现在这里，因此，此处直接阐述的量果，是经部宗和唯识宗两者的观点。然而，对于如何安立外境为所量存在差别，并且凭借那个力量，对于所取相也存在差别，因此，对于自证的体验也存在差别。第二点是，总结：经文的场合和所量也是声音，量和果，考察和不考察，信赖圣教，从经部宗和唯识宗两者，我（作者）认为这种证果的方式是合理的。这就是说，这有七个要点，第一个是将经文的场合应用于两者，如果是经部宗的观点，那么在意义之量的果圆满之后，在没有产生唯识的量果之前，会出现这种情况，因为对于经部宗的意义之量的果是唯一的考察对象，并且因为唯识宗没有这种情况。如果是唯识宗的观点，那么应该在“自证”之后出现，因为“虽然智慧的主体没有分别”，等等的经文，是将所取相作为所量的量果。
English
It appears as it is from the treasure of meaning. Other Tibetans have not seen even a single word, let alone the meaning. Once such terminology is recognized, for the Vaibhashika school, the existence of terms is not universal, while for the Madhyamika school it is universal. This will also lead to the understanding that this is due to the difference of whether or not to acknowledge its existence in the face of the wisdom that examines reality. Third, examining the result of the measure of meaning, thereby demonstrating the fruit of self-awareness, there are three points: briefly showing, explaining in detail, and refuting disputes. The first point is, in the "Pramanavarttika": "Because it is seen that for the same nature, one likes it and the other does not." And "For other undifferentiated sounds, the differences of smell, etc., the sense consciousness of various sentient beings themselves do not produce happiness." Thus, it is explained that the respective sense consciousnesses of the same external object produce different appearances. Therefore, this is not only the view of the Mind-Only school, but it is explained in the context of the measure and result of the Mind-Only school, and that school nominally acknowledges external objects as measurable. Therefore, this is not only the view of the Sautrantika school either. Since no other tenet treatises of one's own school other than these two appear here, therefore, this measure and result directly stated here is the view of both the Sutra school and the Mind-Only school. However, there is a difference in how to establish external objects as measurable, and by that power, there is also a difference in the apprehended aspect. Therefore, there is also a difference in the experience of self-awareness. The second point is, the summary: The occasion of the text and the measurable are also sound, measure and result, examination and non-examination, reliance on scripture, from both the Sutra school and the Mind-Only school, I (the author) see this way of realizing the result as reasonable. That is to say, there are seven key points to this. The first is to apply the occasion of the text to both. If it is the view of the Sutra school, then after the result of the measure of meaning is complete, before the measure and result of Mind-Only arises, this situation will occur, because the result of the measure of meaning of the Sutra school is the only object of examination, and because the Mind-Only school does not have this situation. If it is the view of the Mind-Only school, then it should appear after "self-awareness," because the text "although the subject of wisdom is not differentiated," etc., is the measure and result of taking the apprehended aspect as the measurable.