Chinese
如果说，一切事物都具有法相（chos rtags），以及所证之法和有法（chos can）的差别在意义上并不存在，那么，以“所作性”之相来成立“声是无常”的论式，有法（chos can），并非是将立宗的意义的一部分作为相来安立，因为相、法、义三者是观待各异的差别而存在的。第二，如果说，那么相、法、义三者在意义上就变成有差别了吗？对于世俗谛的事物，以“所作性”之相来成立“声是无常”的相、法、义三者，在胜义谛中，遮止是彼性（de nyid）和他性（gzhan nyid），因为在胜义谛中，如果进行分析，则彼性和他性都不能成立。这是随念的衡量，如果是妄念的衡量，则成立为一。这里，随念的相、法、义三者被说成是世俗谛的事物，因此，那些认为世俗谛的事物可以作为事物依据的人，必须承认异体和具有作用能力的共同基础，这与法称论师的宗义相违背。如果这样，那么应如何安立所量和能量的名称呢？所量之法，以及能量之相，和义有法的名称存在，这并非依赖于意义上的差别，而是依赖于在分别念的意识中成立为境的观待差别，因为这是分别假立的。如果这样，那么所入之境就不能获得自相了吗？以“所作性”之相来成立“声是无常”的所立和能立的名称，你没有不能获得所入之境自相的过失，因为从非所作、常等反体的自性，即任何差别的究竟，从那之上通过传递而产生的意识，对于法和有法显现为差别，那是你的所依。第三，对于成立“声是常”而言，将声作为相来安立，这理应被指出是不成立之相，因为不具有通过自相传递而以名称安立的观待差别而执著的智慧相关联，因为将作为相所取的、不显现为观待差别的有法本身作为能立，即安立。第二，对于以瓶子的有为法来成立无常，将有为
English
If it is said that all entities have the characteristic of dharma (chos rtags), and that the distinctions of the dharma to be proven and the subject of dharma (chos can) do not exist in meaning, then, the reason for establishing "sound is impermanent" by the characteristic of "being made" is the subject of dharma. It is not that one aspect of the meaning of the proposition is established as a characteristic, because the three, characteristic, dharma, and meaning, exist with different aspects of difference. Second, if it is said, then will the three, characteristic, dharma, and meaning, become different in meaning? For the entities of conventional truth, the three, characteristic, dharma, and meaning, for establishing "sound is impermanent" by the characteristic of "being made," in ultimate truth, it will prevent being the same (de nyid) and being other (gzhan nyid), because in ultimate truth, if analyzed, then being the same and being other cannot be established. This is the measure of recollection, but if it is the measure of delusion, then it is established as one. Here, the three, characteristic, dharma, and meaning, of recollection are explained as conventional entities, therefore, those who think that conventional entities can serve as the basis of entities must admit the common basis of other-elimination and the ability to perform functions, which contradicts the tenets of Dharmakirti. If so, then how should the terms "object to be measured" and "measuring instrument" be established? The dharma to be measured, and the characteristic of the measuring instrument, and the existence of the term "subject of dharma" are not dependent on the difference in meaning, but are dependent only on the difference in aspects that are established as objects by conceptual consciousness, because this is a conceptual imputation. If so, then will the object of entry not obtain its own characteristic? The terms "to be proven" and "prover" for establishing "sound is impermanent" by the characteristic of "being made," you do not have the fault of not obtaining the self-characteristic of the object of entry, because the nature of the opposite of unmade, permanent, etc., is the ultimate end of any difference, and the consciousness that arises through transmission from that, the appearance of dharma and subject of dharma as different, that is your basis. Third, for establishing "sound is permanent," establishing sound as a characteristic, this should be pointed out as an unestablished characteristic, because it does not have the association of wisdom that grasps the difference in aspects established by the term related through the transmission of self-characteristic, because the subject of dharma itself, which is taken as the characteristic and does not appear as a difference in aspects, is made the prover, that is, the establishment. Second, for establishing impermanence by the compounded phenomena of a vase, the compounded
Chinese
如果说，将所作作为理由也无法成立，因为基和理由没有差别。如果反体不同就没有过失，因此，理由是法，理由和有理由的法两者并非没有差别，因为是差别和总相，所以基和理由二者之法反体不同。例如，勤发之声是法，是无常，因为是勤发之故，像这样以差别法和总相作为理由，所以是不同的。这里的总相和差别也是就已成立的理由和法而言，和前面一样。如果说，这里基和理由也没有差别，因为法被理由所区分。在成立勤发之声是无常时，勤发是法，是品，即使是法的支分或区分法，也并非与法没有差别，因为即使是法的区分法，也并不妨碍与法不同。例如，说这个有角之物是法，不是马，因为是有角之故，像这样安立时，理由是法的体性，但却成立了与法不同。或者，勤发是法，在勤发之声成为所立无常之时，并非是法的支分，即作为能诠存在，因为之前已经了知勤发之声的体性如同海螺之声，所以在成立它是无常之时，这个论式就成了与法之能诠相反的东西。这部论的意义，以前在雪域这里没有出现过。第三，在成立声是无常时，如果将所听作为理由，也会变成将立宗的意义的一部分作为理由，因为基和理由没有差别。如果说，在成立声是无常时，特别是所听的理由也是法，将立宗的意义的一部分作为理由的未成立是不合理的，因为基和理由二者之法反体不同。第三，为了理解表达方式而宣说因明，有三：显示对法进行分类的必要，遣除如果是法就没有后随，详细解释各自的分类的必要。第一，总的来说，因为因等
English
If it is said that establishing 'what is made' as a reason also becomes impossible because the basis and the reason are not different, then, since there is no fault if the reverse is different, therefore, the reason is the subject. It is not the case that the reason and the subject of the reason, the two subjects, are not different, because they are particular and general characteristics, so the two bases and reasons, the dharma, are different in their reverse. For example, the sound produced by effort is the subject, it is impermanent, because it is produced by effort itself, just as it is different when the particular subject and the general reason are taken as reasons. Here, the general and the particular are also made in terms of the reason and the subject that have already been established, just like the previous one. If it is said that here too, the basis and the reason will not be different, because the subject is distinguished by the reason, then, in establishing that the sound produced by effort is impermanent, the effort-produced is the subject. Even if the aspect is a part of the subject or a distinguishing dharma, it is not established as being different from the subject, because even if it is a distinguishing dharma of the subject, it does not harm being different from the subject. For example, this horned lump is the subject, it is not a horse, because it is horned itself, when it is stated like this, the reason is the nature of the subject, but it is established as being different from the subject. Or, the effort-produced is the subject, when the effort-sound becomes the object to be proven as impermanent, it is not a part of the subject, that is, it exists as a symbol, because previously the nature of the effort-produced sound has been understood as being like the sound of a conch shell, so when establishing that it is impermanent, that formulation becomes the opposite of the symbol of the subject of that context. The meaning of this text seems to be that it has not appeared here in the snowy land before. Third, in establishing that sound is impermanent, if what is heard is established as the reason, it will also become establishing one aspect of the meaning of the proposition as the reason, because the basis and the reason are not different. If it is said that in establishing that sound is impermanent, especially the reason of what is heard is also the subject, it is not reasonable that the non-establishment of establishing one aspect of the meaning of the proposition as the reason is not reasonable, because the two bases and reasons, the dharma, are different in their reverse. Third, in order to understand the way of expression, there are three explanations of reasoning: showing the necessity of classifying the subject of the aspect, refuting that if it is the subject, there is no subsequent occurrence, and explaining in detail the necessity of each classification. First, in short, because the reasons and so on