Chinese
因为生起仅仅是心的乐等。如果外境也是有法，是乐等，因为是具有乐等自性的心或大自在的所取境。周遍，因为种类不同不是能取所取，如果这样说。我和知识的补特伽罗是有法，不应成为一切境的执持者，因为一切境是物质，因为与它们种类不相同。如果承许，那么它是有法，成为一切境的享用者相违。因为不是一切境的执持者，因此的缘故。以遮止种类不同不是能取所取的理性能成立，外境是有法，是乐等，因为是安立具有乐等自性的心的行相之因。周遍，因为种类不同不能成为因和果的缘故，这也遮除了。如何呢？补特伽罗是有法，不应成为一切境安立行相之果，因为与一切境种类不相同。如果承许，就不应成为一切境的享用者，以这种方式。或者外境的乐等和心或大自在是有法，不应成为安立行相之因，以及它所安立之果，因为种类不同，不存在能取和所取。如果假设存在，仅仅如此也不能成为因果，如果成为因果，那么其他补特伽罗和境也是有法，应成为因果，因为是能取所取。第三，遮破乐等不是心识，有二，以是所受用而成立是心识，遮破由其他受用者受用。第一，乐等是有法，是内，因为你串习之后，你的体性变得特殊。又是乐等有法，是心识，因为是心识所受用之故。周遍，因为任何受用者的自性不是所受用的自性，那么它不是所受用的受用者所周遍。这遮破了心识与心所是实体不同。第二有二，以未见心识受用不同之理而遮破。遮破表示周遍不决定的两个例子。第一，如果乐等不是它的自性
English
Because arising is solely the mind's pleasure, etc. If external objects are also subjects, they are pleasure, etc., because they are the objects of apprehension of the mind or the great lord that possesses the nature of pleasure, etc. It is pervasive, because different kinds are not apprehender and apprehended. If you say that, the person of self-knowledge is the subject, it should not become the holder of all objects, because all objects are matter, because they are not of the same kind as them. If you accept, then it is the subject, it is contradictory to be the enjoyer of all objects. Because it is not the holder of all objects, therefore. With the reasoning that prevents different kinds from being apprehender and apprehended, external objects are subjects, they are pleasure, etc., because they are the cause of establishing the appearance of the mind that possesses the nature of pleasure, etc. It is pervasive, because different kinds cannot become cause and effect, this is also eliminated. How is it? The person is the subject, it should not become the result of all objects establishing appearance, because it is not of the same kind as all objects. If you accept, you should not become the enjoyer of all objects, in this way. Or the pleasure, etc. of external objects and the mind or the great lord are subjects, they should not become the cause of establishing appearance, and the result established by it, because different kinds do not exist as apprehender and apprehended. If we assume that they exist, merely that cannot become cause and effect, if they become cause and effect, then other persons and objects are also subjects, they should become cause and effect, because they are apprehender and apprehended. Third, refuting that pleasure, etc. are not mind, there are two: establishing that it is mind because it is to be experienced, and refuting that it is experienced by other experiencers. First, pleasure, etc. are subjects, they are internal, because after you are accustomed to it, your nature becomes special. Again, pleasure, etc. are subjects, they are mind, because they are to be experienced by the mind. It is pervasive, because whatever experiencer's nature is not the nature of the experienced, then it is pervasive that it is not the experiencer of the experienced. This refutes that mind and mental factors are different entities. Second, there are two: refuting with the reason of not seeing the difference between mind and experience. Refuting the two examples that indicate pervasive uncertainty. First, if pleasure, etc. are not its nature
Chinese
如果说，体验是智慧之士安住于心或大乐之中，即显现的安乐等相是觉知，但不是以安乐等自性生起的方式来觉知。那么，安乐等这些法，具有显明体验的现量之相，以及与分别念和随念相关的忆念之相的这两种体验之外，你还有什么显现的心或大乐呢？没有。因为除了这两种之外，你显现的心或大乐是能够显现却无法指认的缘故。为什么呢？因为见到依靠所欲之义和不欲之义，安乐和痛苦等会与自己体验的知识成为一体。在所境和知识二者之间，法，没有其他的心或大乐，因为如果有其他的心之大乐，应该是能够显现的，但却没有见到。第二部分分为两点：驳斥外在的例子，驳斥内在的例子。第一点是：就像铁被火烧时，铁块和火虽然是不同的，但却无法区分不同，同样，心和体验虽然是不同的，但因为混合在一起，所以无法分辨，实际上是不同的。如果这样说，那么，对于一切事物来说，这个是多，那个是少，这种区分不同和这个是一，那种不区分不同的安立将会瓦解。因为现量所见是同一种事物，所以无法成立是同一种事物。因此，现量所见是不同的事物，这无法成为成立是不同事物的理由。因为现量所见是同一种事物，所以这不是成立是同一种事物的理由。普遍来说，如果现量体验到没有不同的事物，那么它就成立为同一种事物。但事实并非如此，因为现量体验到不同的事物，它就成立为具有不同的事物，否则就无法成立。此外，安立某些事物是不同的，某些事物是不不同的，这有什么理由呢？没有理由。因为感受痛苦等，以及白色等五种感官对象，虽然都显现，但却不是不同的。而心和体验虽然显现为没有不同，但实际上是不同的缘故。第二点是：在一个识蕴中，感受安乐等是清晰的
English
If it is said that experience is the abode of the wise in mind or great bliss, that is, the appearance of bliss and so on is awareness, but it is not awareness in the way that it arises as the nature of bliss and so on. Then, these dharmas such as bliss, have the appearance of manifest experience and the appearance of memory related to conceptualization and recollection. Apart from these two experiences, what mind or great bliss do you have that appears? There is none. Because apart from these two, your mind or great bliss that appears is something that can appear but cannot be identified. Why? Because seeing that relying on the meaning of what is desired and what is not desired, happiness and suffering, etc., will become one with one's own experienced knowledge. Between the object and knowledge, dharma, there is no other mind or great bliss, because if there were another great bliss of mind, it should be able to appear, but it has not been seen. The second part is divided into two points: refuting external examples, refuting internal examples. The first point is: Just as when iron is burned by fire, the iron block and the fire are different, but they cannot be distinguished as different, similarly, although the mind and experience are different, they are mixed together, so they cannot be distinguished, but in reality they are different. If this is said, then, for all things, the establishment of distinguishing this as many and that as few, and this as one and that as not distinguishing will collapse. Because what is seen by direct perception is the same thing, so it cannot be established as the same thing. Therefore, what is seen by direct perception as different things cannot be established as the reason for being different things. Because what is seen by direct perception as the same thing, this is not the reason for establishing it as the same thing. Generally speaking, if direct perception experiences that there are no different things, then it is established as the same thing. But this is not the case, because direct perception experiences different things, it is established as having different things, otherwise it cannot be established. Furthermore, what is the reason for establishing some things as different and some things as not different? There is no reason. Because feeling suffering, etc., and the five sense objects such as white, etc., although they all appear, they are not different. But the mind and experience, although they appear as not different, are actually different. The second point is: In one aggregate of consciousness, feeling happiness, etc., is clear.
Tibetan
ར་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཚེ་སྡུག་བསྔལ་སོགས་ཐ་དད་དུ་མ་དམིགས་ཀྱང་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པ་བཞིན་དུ་བློ་མྱོང་གཉིས་པོ་ཐ་དད་དུ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་ཐ་དད་དུ་མ་དམིགས་སོ་ཞེ་ན། སེམས་གཟུགས་འཛིན་མིག་གི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་འཁོར་དུ་ཚོར་བ་བདེ་བ་གསལ་པོར་སྐྱེས་པ་གཅིག་གི་ཚེ་བདེ་བ་གསལ་བས་སྡུག་བསྔལ་སོགས་བསྒྲིབས་ནས་མ་རྟོགས་ན་ཡང་ཚོར་བ་བདེ་སྡུག་ཐ་དད་པའི་རྣམ་གཞག་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་རྒྱུན་ཕྱི་མ་དག་ལ་ཚོར་བ་སྡུག་བསྔལ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཚེ་སྔར་གྱི་བདེ་བ་དེ་ལས་ཐ་དད་པར་ནི་མཐོང་བའི་ཕྱིར། འདིར་བོད་ཕལ་ཆེར་གཙོ་སེམས་གཅིག་གི་འཁོར་དུ་སེམས་བྱུང་ཚོར་བ་ལྟ་བུ་གསལ་པོ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཚེ་སེམས་བྱུང་གཞན་རྣམས་བསྒྲིབས་ནས་ཐ་དད་པར་མ་མཐོང་ན་ཡང་ཞེས་སོགས་འཆད་པ་ནི་སེམས་སེམས་བྱུང་དང་། སེམས་བྱུང་ནང་ཕན་ཚུན་རྫས་ཐ་དད་པ་བྱེ་བྲག་ཏུ་སྨྲ་བའི་ལུགས་སྙིང་ལ་འཚངས་པའི་སྐྱོན་ཡིན་ཅིང་། གཞན་དུ་ན་ཚོར་བ་གསལ་པོར་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཚེ་ཀུན་འགྲོ་གཞན་རྣམས་ཡོད་དམ་མེད། མེད་ན་གཙོ་བོ་སེམས་ཡིན་ན་ཀུན་འགྲོ་ལྔ་དང་ལྡན་པས་མ་ཁྱབ་པར་འགྱུར་ཞིང་། ཡོད་ན་དེ་དང་ཚོར་བ་རྫས་གཅིག་ཡིན་ནམ་རྫས་གཞན་ཡིན། དང་པོ་ལྟར་ན་འདོད་པ་གྲུབ་ལ། ཕྱི་མ་ལྟར་ན་རྫས་གཞན་དུ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་རྫས་གཞན་དུ་ཚད་མས་མ་རྟོགས་པ་འདིའི་ཕྱོགས་སྔ་ཁས་ལེན་པར་སྣང་བས། ཐ་དད་ཐ་དད་མི་གཞག་ཉམས། །ཞེས་པ་དང་། ཐ་དད་ཐ་དད་མེད་རྟེན་ཅན། །ཞེས་པའི་རིགས་ཅན་ཐམས་ཅད་གནོད་བྱེད་དུ་ཅི་ཕྱིར་མི་འབབ་ལེགས་པར་སེམས་ལ་སྨྲོས་ཤིག དེས་ན་གཙོ་སེམས་གཅིག་གི་རྒྱུན་ལ་སྔ་ཕྱིར་འབྱུང་དུ་རུང་ཞིང་། ཅིག་ཆར་དུ་འབྱུང་དུ་མི་རུང་བའི་སེམས་བྱུང་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་ནས་གཞུང་འདི་གསུངས་པ་ཡིན་གྱི། ཅིག་ཆར་དུ་འབྱུང་བའི་སེམས་བྱུང་རྣམས་ནི་རྫས་གཅིག་ཡིན་པས་གཅིག་གསལ་པོར་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཚེ་གཞན་སྒྲིབ་པའི་དོན་མེད་དོ། །བཞི་པ་ཡང་དག་གསལ་སྣང་བསྒྲུབས་ཏེ་རྣལ་འབྱོར་མངོན་སུམ་བཤད་པ་ནི། ཚད་མ་མདོར། རྣལ་འབྱོར་རྣམས་ཀྱི་བླ་མས་བསྟན། །མ་འདྲེས་པ་ཡི་དོན་ཙམ་མཐོང་། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་རྣམས་ཀྱི་བླ་མ་ནི་བདག་མེད་པའི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་ཡིན་ལ། དེས་མཐོང་ཞེས་སྦྱོར་རོ། །ཇི་ལྟར་ཞེ་ན་བསྟན་པ་སྟེ་བརྗོད་པ་དང་མ་འདྲེས་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་སོ། །གང་མཐོང་ན་བདག་མེད་པས་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་བྱས་པའི་རང་མཚན་གྱི་དོན་ཙམ་སྟེ། མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་ལུགས་ཀྱི་བདག་མེད་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་མཐོང་བའི་དོན་བདག་མེད་པས་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་
Chinese
如果有人问：就像牛犊出生时，虽然不认为痛苦等是不同的，但它们确实是不同的；同样，心和体验两者虽然是不同的，但也不认为它们是不同的，那该怎么办？心，即执持色法的眼识，具有这样的性质：当你的眷属中清晰地生起一种感受，即快乐时，虽然由于快乐的清晰而遮蔽了痛苦等，以至于无法觉察到，但感受快乐和痛苦是不同的这一论断是成立的。因为在你的后续差别相续中，当痛苦的感受生起时，你会看到它与之前的快乐是不同的。这里，大多数藏人解释说，当像心所感受这样清晰的东西在一个主要心识的眷属中生起时，即使其他的心所被遮蔽而无法看到它们的差别，等等，这是一种将分别说部的心识和心所，以及心所之间物质不同的观点强加于心的错误。否则，当感受清晰地生起时，其他的遍行心所存在还是不存在？如果不存在，那么作为主要的心识，它就不能遍及五种遍行心所；如果存在，那么它和感受是同一物质还是不同物质？如果是前者，那么就达到了目的；如果是后者，虽然存在不同的物质，但并没有通过量来认识到这种不同的物质，这似乎是前者的主张。因此，“不同不同不成立，以及不同不同无所依”等所有类似的论点，为什么不能成为有效的反驳呢？请好好思考。因此，这部论典是针对那些可以在一个主要心识的相续中先后生起，但不能同时生起的心所而说的。对于那些同时生起的心所来说，它们是同一物质，因此当一种清晰地生起时，没有必要遮蔽其他的。第四，通过建立正确的显现来解释瑜伽现量，如《量论》中说：“瑜伽士之尊所说，不杂之义唯见彼。”这里所说的瑜伽士之尊是不我之瑜伽，以彼见之而连接。如何见呢？即以所说，不杂之方式。见何者？即由无我所区分之自相之义，仅此而已。经部宗认为现量见无我之义，即由无我所区分
English
If someone asks: Just as when a calf is born, although one does not perceive suffering etc. as different, they are indeed different; similarly, although mind and experience are different, one does not perceive them as different, what should be done? Mind, which is the eye consciousness that grasps form, has such a nature: when a feeling, namely happiness, arises clearly in your retinue, although suffering etc. are obscured by the clarity of happiness so that they cannot be perceived, the assertion that feeling happiness and suffering are different is established. Because in your subsequent different continuums, when the feeling of suffering arises, you see that it is different from the previous happiness. Here, most Tibetans explain that when something clear like a mental factor of feeling arises in the retinue of a main mind, even if the other mental factors are obscured and one cannot see their differences, etc., this is a mistake of imposing the view of the Vaibhashikas that mind and mental factors, and mental factors among themselves, are different substances on the heart. Otherwise, when feeling arises clearly, do the other omnipresent mental factors exist or not? If they do not exist, then as the main mind, it cannot pervade the five omnipresent mental factors; if they exist, then are they and feeling the same substance or different substances? If the former, then the desired is accomplished; if the latter, although different substances exist, they have not been recognized as different substances by valid cognition, which seems to be the former's assertion. Therefore, why cannot all similar arguments such as "Different different does not hold, and different different has no basis" become valid refutations? Please think carefully. Therefore, this treatise is spoken with regard to those mental factors that can arise successively in the continuum of a main mind, but cannot arise simultaneously. For those mental factors that arise simultaneously, they are the same substance, so when one arises clearly, there is no need to obscure the others. Fourth, explaining the direct perception of yoga by establishing the correct appearance, as it says in the Pramana Sutra: "Taught by the master of yogis, only the meaning of the unmixed is seen." The master of yogis mentioned here is the yoga of non-self, and it is connected by seeing it. How is it seen? That is, by the way of speaking, unmixed. What is seen? That is, only the meaning of the self-characteristic distinguished by non-self. The Sautrantikas believe that the meaning of directly perceiving non-self is distinguished by non-self.