English
Because power cannot generate self-grasping wisdom. If this is not pervasive, then the appearance is established as the appearance of the general, which is not included in the ability to generate general-grasping wisdom, but the faculty is included in the general-grasping, therefore it is established as the appearance of the general. If you say so, then the appearance, just as eye medicine and so on benefit the eye faculty, from you the faculty is not included in the general-grasping, because when you exist and do not exist, the faculty's recognition of the general has no difference between clear and unclear. Second, if the appearance is merely the appearance of these kinds, it is also considered to have or exist in the kind, then the lamp and so on, the faculty mind, dharma, obtain having or existing in the general of cow and so on, because these generals are the cause of the appearance of wisdom. Second, for existence itself, showing harm, there are three: it follows that others have no general thought, the reason for the fault is established in others, refuting the other's answer of non-establishment. First, those Vaibhashikas who consider the kind to be a different thing from the appearance, or the Samkhyas who consider it not to be a different thing but to exist as one, according to their view, for the appearance of the cow that did not appear before, dharma, how does the wisdom of the general arise through the way the cow general exists? It cannot arise, because seeing the cow general existing in the previous appearance, it is impossible to see it in the other you. Second, if you say the reason is not established, then according to the Samkhya view, the general, dharma, actually does not follow in the later appearance, because it is not different from the previous appearance, that is, it is one. According to the Vaibhashika view, if the general is a different thing from the appearance, then the general, dharma, does not exist in the other later appearance, because the other later appearance does not depend, because you exist in the previous appearance, you will not go to the later appearance. When the later appearance arises, you also do not exist. You also do not have two parts of existing in the previous appearance and existing in the later appearance. The first reason is established, because the general's basis, the previous appearance, will not be completely abandoned. Therefore, for the appearance that arises earlier and the appearance that arises later, saying that one general exists, also
Chinese
是不会落空的因。第三部分分为两点：驳斥明之间的总相不存在，驳斥明之间的总相存在。第一点是：胜论派的导师食碎认为，有一个总相是不动的、无分的、遍及一切明的、显现可知的。他的弟子贝塔认为“非所依故”这个理由不成立，因为即使在没有明的间隙中没有总相，但先前明的总相会随顺于后来的明。如果这样，那么后来的明就不应有总相。另外，安住在先前明上的总相，不会从自己的处所先前明移动到其他地方。如果从先前明存在的地方，新的明产生于其他处所，而总相安住在那里，那么后来的明有总相是非常合理的，但这是不可能的。如果说总相不从先前明移动，但遍及后来的明，那么新产生的明的事物所安住的地方，总相既不关联，后来的那些事物的处所，即存在于那里的明所遍及之处，这是法，多么令人惊奇啊，因为这超出了理智。第二点是贝卢迦说：“非所依故”这个理由不成立，如果一切处所都有族类，那么新产生的明也有总相。如果这样，那么总相是法，应在明存在与不存在的一切方所都能见到。在明存在的某一方所，明使你显明，这又有什么用呢？因为一切方所没有差别。如果总相在一切方所都存在，但在某些地方见不到，因为见到总相依赖于明所显明，那么见到总相也不依赖于明，如果依赖于明，那么能显明的明没有被认识，那么所显明的总相也没有被正确认识。因为已经承诺了这一点。如果承认，那么总相和具有总相的明的主体，为什么认为认识的方式是颠倒的呢？因为先前承诺了先执持总相然后认识明，而这里却承诺了依赖于明然后认识总相。第二，对于听者进入的不遍有二：安立不遍的论证，驳斥他人所说的过失。第一点是，在众多事物上声音的意
English
It is the cause of not being in vain. The third part has two points: refuting the absence of generality between illuminations, and refuting the existence of generality between illuminations. The first point is: the teacher of the Vaisheshika school, Kanāda, believes that there is one generality that is immovable, indivisible, pervasive to all illuminations, and manifestly knowable. His disciple, Beta, argues that the reason "not a substrate" is not established, because even if there is no generality in the interval where there is no illumination, the generality of the previous illumination follows the later illumination. If this is the case, then the later illumination should not have generality. Furthermore, the generality that abides in the previous illumination does not move from its place, the previous illumination, to another place. If, from the place where the previous illumination exists, a new illumination arises in another place, and the generality abides there, then it is very reasonable for the later illumination to have generality, but this is impossible. If it is said that the generality does not move from the previous illumination, but pervades the later illumination, then the place where the newly arisen object of illumination abides, the generality is neither related to that place, nor does it pervade the illumination that is the locus of those later things, that is, the one that exists there. This is a dharma, how amazing, because it transcends reason. The second point is that Beluka says: "not a substrate" this reason is not established, if there are genera in all places, then the newly arisen illumination also has generality. If this is the case, then generality is a dharma, and should be seen in all directions where illumination exists and does not exist. In a certain direction where illumination exists, illumination makes you manifest, what is the use of this? Because there is no difference in all directions. If generality exists in all directions, but is not seen in some places, because seeing generality depends on what is illuminated by illumination, then seeing generality does not depend on illumination either. If it depends on illumination, then the illuminating illumination is not recognized, then the illuminated generality is not correctly recognized either. Because this has been promised. If admitted, then why do generality and the subject of illumination that possesses generality think that the way of knowing is reversed? Because it was previously promised that first holding generality and then recognizing illumination, but here it is promised that relying on illumination and then recognizing generality. Second, there are two aspects to the non-pervasion of the entering listener: establishing the proof of non-pervasion, and refuting the faults spoken by others. The first point is that the sound of intention on many things
Chinese
如果说一个总的实体是声音产生的原因，那是不周遍的。因为没有总的实体，也能用一个声音来称呼多个做饭者和取出者等等。第二点分为两点：做饭的业不是听觉的原因，做饭的总相不是听觉的原因。第一点：如果说那些人做饭等等的同一个业是同一个声音和意识的原因，那么每个人所做的不同的业，就不是同一个声音和意识的原因，因为它们不是不相同的。如果说业的自相虽然不同，但是业的种类是相同的，所以它是原因，那么，这个业的种类，不是用“做饭者”来称呼多个人的同一个声音和意识的原因，因为它不是直接与人相关，而是直接与业相关。因为这个原因，除了人之外，业的差别是听觉“做饭”的原因。此外，停止做饭时的那个人，不应该被称为“做饭者”，因为做饭的业已经停止，不存在了。如果说业的种类与业相关，业也与事物相关，所以业的种类通过传递与事物相关，那么，事物人是同一个声音和意识“做饭者”的原因。那么，停止做饭时，业的种类与业不相关，因为业已经消失了。如果承认，那么业的总相，在停止做饭时，不应该是人产生同一个声音和意识的原因，因为它即使通过业来传递，也与人没有关系。不周遍，因为关系没有成立，因为它不是产生一个声音的原因。如果说是种类，那么马也极度荒谬地成为牛产生同一个声音和意识的原因。如果说以前做过的和以后将要做的业是现在声音和意识的原因，那么，以前和以后的业，不应该是现在的知识和语言的原因，因为它们现在不存在。如果不周遍，那么这些知识和语言就不是有原因的，也就是说，会变成无因。如果不存在，那么它就不是原因，所以是不周遍的。
English
If it is said that a general entity is the cause of sound production, that is not pervasive. Because even without a general entity, multiple cooks and extractors, etc., can be referred to with one sound. The second point is divided into two: the act of cooking is not the cause of hearing, and the general characteristic of cooking is not the cause of hearing. First point: If it is said that the same act of cooking, etc., done by those people is the cause of the same sound and consciousness, then the different acts done by each person are not the cause of the same sound and consciousness, because they are not dissimilar. If it is said that although the self-characteristics of the acts are different, the kind of act is the same, so it is the cause, then this kind of act is not the cause of the same sound and consciousness of calling multiple people "cooks," because it is not directly related to people, but directly related to the act alone. Because of this reason, the differences in acts other than people are the cause of hearing "cooking." Furthermore, the person at the time of stopping cooking should not be called "cook," because the act of cooking has stopped and no longer exists. If it is said that the kind of act is related to the act, and the act is also related to the thing, so the kind of act is related to the thing through transmission, then the thing person is the cause of the same sound and consciousness "cook." Then, at the time of stopping cooking, the kind of act is not related to the act, because the act has disappeared. If it is admitted, then the general characteristic of the act should not be the cause of a person producing the same sound and consciousness at the time of stopping cooking, because it has no relationship with the person even through the transmission of the act. Not pervasive, because the relationship is not established, because it is not the reason for producing one sound. If it is said to be a kind, then the horse also becomes extremely absurdly the cause of the cow producing the same sound and consciousness. If it is said that the acts done in the past and to be done in the future are the cause of the present sound and consciousness, then the acts of the past and the future should not be the cause of the present knowledge and language, because they do not exist now. If it is not pervasive, then these knowledge and language are not causally related, that is, they will become causeless. If it does not exist, then it is not the cause, so it is not pervasive.