Chinese
的缘故。如果存在，那么寻求牛的人就会陷入瓶衣等生灭同时的境地。第二，通过它来遮破无惭愧也分为两部分：显示被先前的理证遮破，以及显示其他的遮破理证。第一部分分为两点：以自性他异的理证遮破，以及以陷入混乱的理证遮破。第一点是：数论派认为一切事物自性为一的观点被遮破的理证，同样也遮破了其他的邪分别，即无惭愧者，也就是裸体外道们，无论由黑暗愚痴所幻化的宗义是什么，凡是说酸奶和奶渣二者自性相同而状态不同的那些观点，也都被破除了。如何破除呢？酸奶和奶渣二者，是所立宗，不是自性相同，因为存在极端，也就是非常不同的情况。第二点是：如果酸奶和奶渣都是自性和他性的本体，那么寻求酸奶的人，是所立宗，当被他人劝说喝酸奶时，为什么不跑去喝奶渣，而是应该跑去喝奶渣呢？因为应该跑去喝酸奶。遍布是肯定的，因为酸奶和奶渣的差别已经被消除了。然而，如果有一些比奶渣更优越的，比如白色和牛奶的形态等，那么凭借什么差别会倾向于酸奶呢？酸奶，是所立宗，不是酸奶和奶渣二者，而是应该成为与奶渣不同的东西。因为白色和牛奶的形态就是你，而那是其他奶渣所没有的。第二点是：如果酸奶和奶渣都是自性和他性的所有者，那么酸奶和奶渣二者，是所立宗，不同的心识和声音不会产生，因为自性是相同的。遍布是承认的，因为酸奶的声音被认为是凭借事物而产生的。如果承认，那么对于你这个说状态不同而自性相同的人来说，状态不同而自性相同的情况是不可能存在的，因为没有确定事物是不同的。到此为止，要知道，遮破其他宗义的所有情况，都是共同的事物论者。第二，从非事物遣除他法的角度进行阐述：因为事物具有自己的体性，所以是具有境的
English
Therefore. If it exists, then the person seeking a bull would fall into the situation of engaging in a pot-cloth, etc., where birth and destruction occur simultaneously. Secondly, refuting shamelessness with it is also divided into two parts: showing that it is refuted by the previous reasoning, and showing other refuting reasonings as well. The first part has two points: refuting with the reasoning of self-nature being different, and refuting with the reasoning of falling into confusion. The first point is: the reasoning that refutes the Samkhya school's view that all things have the same self-nature also refutes other wrong conceptions, namely the shameless ones, that is, the naked ascetics. Whatever doctrine is manifested by the darkness of ignorance, all those who say that yogurt and whey have the same self-nature but different states are also refuted. How is it refuted? Yogurt and whey, the subject, are not of the same self-nature, because there exists an extreme, that is, a very different situation. The second point is: if all yogurt and whey are the essence of both self and other, then the person seeking yogurt, the subject, when urged by others to drink yogurt, why doesn't he run to drink whey, but should run to drink whey? Because he should run to drink yogurt. The pervasion is affirmed, because the difference between yogurt and whey has been eliminated. However, if there are some things that are superior to whey, such as the white color and the appearance of milk, etc., then by what difference would one tend to yogurt? Yogurt, the subject, is not both yogurt and whey, but should become something different from whey. Because the white color and the appearance of milk are you, and that is something that the other whey does not have. The second point is: if all yogurt and whey are the owners of both self and other, then yogurt and whey, the subject, different cognitions and sounds will not arise, because the self-nature is the same. The pervasion is accepted, because the sound of yogurt is considered to arise by virtue of things. If accepted, then for you who say that states are different but self-nature is the same, it is impossible for states to be different and self-nature to be the same, because there is no certainty that things are different. Up to this point, it should be known that all the general cases of refuting other doctrines are common objectivists. Secondly, explaining from the perspective of negating others with non-things: because things have their own essence, they are the basis of objects.
Chinese
如果有人怀疑，概念是由事物本身的力量所产生的，那么，非事物（无）作为所立宗，你（非事物）被表达的声音，并不是为了表达你的事物性的本质，因为你没有本质。因此，被称为“非事物”的声音，作为所立宗，确立了它能够区分或排除那些不同种类的对象，因为表达的声音不可能由事物本身的力量来作用于对象。正如《理智宝藏》中所说：“事物由因产生，不依赖于非事物。非事物不由因产生，通过排除事物而在心中确立。” 这说明，如果是事物，那就必然以其自身的本质真实存在，并且作为有境的声音，通过概念的排除而起作用。如果是非事物，那就必然是排除他者，这是排除他者的关键所在，不可或缺。第二，解释了作为确定基础的标志的分类，分为两种：差别和依赖。对纯粹者驳斥争论。第一，那么，先前所说的与所证之法和自性相关的，必须确定的自性之理是什么样的呢？为了证明所证之法，比如声音是无常的，所说的自性之理，作为所立宗，你有两种：因为你具有标志的自相在心中显现，以及依赖于标志的差别法之差别在心中显现的依赖性，或者是不依赖的唯一性。第一种，比如为了证明声音是坏灭的，而设立果（所作性）、或者勤发、或者有生作为标志。第二种，比如设立存在本身和事物作为标志。第二种分为两种：争论和回答。第一，数论师说：如果存在的自性可以作为证明无常等的理由，那么存在本身在证明主体的存在时，为什么不能作为所证呢？因为它们是相同的，如果能够证明主体存在，那么如果在已由量成立的所立宗之上仅仅证明存在，就没有必要了。如果存在被证明存在于常一等差别之中，那么主体虽然成立，但是这样的差别在例子中没有后随，因此理由无法证明。
English
If there is doubt that concepts arise from the power of things themselves, then, non-things (non-existence) as the subject, the sound that expresses you (non-things) is not meant to express your thing-like essence, because you have no essence. Therefore, the sound called "non-thing," as the subject, establishes that it can distinguish or exclude those different kinds of objects, because it is impossible for the expressing sound to act on the object by the power of the thing itself. As it is said in the 'Treasure of Reasoning': "Things are produced from causes, they do not depend on non-things. Non-things are not produced by causes, they are established in the mind by excluding things." This illustrates that if it is a thing, then it must be truly established with its own essence, and as the sound of the object-possessor, it functions through the exclusion of concepts. If it is a non-thing, then it must be the exclusion of others, which is the key to the exclusion of others, and is indispensable. Second, the explanation of the classification of the sign as the basis of certainty is divided into two: difference and dependence. Refuting arguments against the pure. First, then, what is the nature of the reason that must be determined, which is related to the dharma to be proven and its own nature, as previously stated? In order to prove the dharma to be proven, such as sound is impermanent, the reason of its own nature, as the subject, you have two: because you have the self-aspect of the sign appearing in the mind, and the dependence on the difference of the differentiating dharma of the sign appearing in the mind, or the uniqueness of non-dependence. The first is like establishing the effect (being made), or effort-born, or having birth as a sign to prove that sound is perishable. The second is like establishing existence itself and things as signs. The second is divided into two: argument and answer. First, the Samkhya says: If the nature of existence can be used as a reason to prove impermanence, etc., then why can't existence itself be used as the object to be proven when proving the existence of the principal? Because they are the same, if it is possible to prove the existence of the principal, then if only existence is proven on top of the subject that has already been established by valid cognition, there is no need. If existence is proven to exist in permanent, one, etc. differences, then although the principal is established, such a difference has no subsequent occurrence in the example, therefore the reason cannot prove.
Tibetan
་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ་མི་རུང་ཞེས་པའི་སྐྱོན་མེད་དམ་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ནི་ཡོད་པ་རྟགས་སུ་བྱེད་པ་ལ་ཡང་མཚུངས་ཏེ། ཡོད་ཙམ་རྟགས་སུ་བྱེད་ན་དགོས་པ་མེད། ཡོད་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་སྒྲའི་ཡོད་པ་ལྟ་བུ་རྗེས་འགྲོ་མེད་པས་སོ། །དེས་ན་ཡོད་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་རྗེས་འགྲོ་མེད་པ་ནི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་གྱིས་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་གཉིས་ཀ་དག་ལས་ཉམས་པར་མཚུངས་སོ་ཤེ་ན། གཉིས་པ་ལ་བཞི་སྟེ། བསྒྲུབ་བྱར་བཟུང་ན་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་མཚན་ཉིད་མེད། །རྟགས་སུ་བཟུང་ན་རྟགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཚང་། །བསྒྲུབ་བྱར་བཟུང་ན་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ཡང་དག་མེད། །རྟགས་སུ་བཟུང་ན་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་གོ་བྱེད་ཡིན་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། ཡོད་པ་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་ན། ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པའི་ཆོས་ཅན་གྱི་སྟེང་དུ་ཡོད་ཙམ་མམ། གཙོ་བོའི་སྟེང་དུ་རྟག་གཅིག་གིས་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་བྱས་པའི་ཡོད་པ་གང་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་ཡིན། དང་པོ་ལྟར་ན་གཙོ་བོ་ཡོད་མེད་རྩོད་པའི་རྒོལ་ཕྱིར་རྒོལ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་མཐུན་སྣང་དུ་གྲུབ་པའི་སྤྱིའི་ཆོས་ཅན་ལ་ཡོད་པས་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་བྱས་པ་ཙམ་དུ་ནི་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བ་དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་གཞན་དོན་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡང་དག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ལས་སྔར་རྒོལ་གྱི་དོན་འགའ་ཞིག་ཀྱང་འགྲུབ་པར་མི་འགྱུར་ཞིང་། ཁྱོད་དེ་འདྲ་བ་ཡང་ཕྱིར་རྒོལ་ལ་བཀག་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ལྟར་ན་གཙོ་བོའི་སྟེང་དུ་ཁྱད་པར་རྟག་པ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་བདག་ཉིད་ཅན་གྱི་ཡོད་པ་བསྒྲུབ་བྱར་བཟུང་ན་ཁྱད་པར་དེ་ལྟ་བུ་དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། གཞི་འགའ་ཞིག་གི་སྟེང་དུ་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་མི་འགྲུབ་པར་ཐལ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དེ་ཆོས་ལྡན་གྱི་དཔེ་གང་ལ་ཡང་རྗེས་སུ་འགྲོ་བ་མེད་པ་ཅན་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཡོད་ཙམ་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ལ་དགོས་པ་མེད་པས་ཡོད་པ་བསྒྲུབ་བྱར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་ན་ཡོད་པ་དེ་རྟག་གཅིག་ལ་སོགས་པས་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་བྱས་པ་དག་ནི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱར་བྱེད་དགོས་པར་འགྱུར་ཞིང་ཁྱད་པར་དེ་ཆོས་ཅན་གང་གི་སྟེང་དུ་ཡང་བསྒྲུབ་པར་མི་ནུས་པས་ན་གཙོ་བོའི་སྟེང་དུ་ཡོད་པ་བསྒྲུབ་བྱར་མི་འཐད་དོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། གཏན་ཚིགས་སུ་བྱས་པ་ལ་ཡང་མཚུངས་སོ་ཞེ་ན། ཡོད་པ་དེའི་ཁྱད་པར་སྒྲའི་ཡོད་པ་ལྟ་བུ་རྟགས་སུ་བཟུང་བ་མེད་པར་དངོས་པོ་ཙམ་ཞིག་ནི་སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པར་བསྒྲུབ་པའི་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་དུ་བཀོད་པ་ན་དངོས་པོ་དེ་ཙམ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ཡང་དག་ཏུ་རུང་སྟེ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་གྲུབ་ཅིང་རང་གི་མཐུན་དཔེ་ལ་ཁྱབ་བྱེད་རང་གི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཡི་ཆོས་མི་རྟག་པས་ཁྱབ་པ
Chinese
如果问，有没有说“不应成为所立之法”的过失呢？答：这和以“有”作为理由（རྟགས།）的情况相同。如果仅仅以“有”作为理由，则没有必要。因为“有”的差别，比如声音的“有”那样，没有后随性。因此，如果说“有”的差别没有后随性，那么原因在因（རྒྱུ་མཚན།）和所立之法（བསྒྲུབ་བྱ།）两方面都同样地退失。如果问：第二种情况有四点：如果执为所立，则没有所立的体性；如果执为理由，则理由的体性圆满；如果执为所立，则没有正确的能立；如果执为理由，则是能使所立被理解的。第一种情况是：如果“有”是所立之法，那么在以量成立的法（ཆོས་ཅན།）之上，仅仅是“有”呢？还是在主体的上面，以常一等差别所区分的“有”是所立之法？如果按照第一种情况，主体存在与否是争论的对境，因为对于敌对双方都共同显现成立的共同法（ཆོས་ཅན།）来说，仅仅以“有”来区分，那么所要成立的那个法（ཆོས་ཅན།），你不是为了他者而成立的正确的所立，因为从你那里，先前敌方的某些意义也不会成立，而且你那样对于反驳者也没有遮止的缘故。如果按照第二种情况，如果在主体的上面，执着于以常等自性所区分的“有”作为所立，那么像那样的差别，那个法（ཆོས་ཅན།），在某些基之上，不可能以理由来成立，因为成立它的因（གཏན་ཚིགས།）会变成在任何有法的例子上都没有后随性。因为成立仅仅是“有”没有必要，所以如果以“有”作为所立，那么那个“有”就必须以常一等来区分，而且那个差别在任何法（ཆོས་ཅན།）之上都无法成立，因此在主体之上，以“有”作为所立是不合理的。第二种情况是：如果问，作为因的情况也相同吗？答：如果“有”的差别，比如声音的“有”那样，不执为理由，而仅仅将事物本身作为成立声音无常的能立，那么那个事物本身，那个法（ཆོས་ཅན།），可以成为成立声音无常的正确的能立，因为它成立宗法已成立，并且在自己的同品例子上，遍及自己的所立之法无常。
English
If asked, is there a fault of saying "it should not become the object to be established"? Answer: This is the same as taking "existence" as a reason (རྟགས།). If only "existence" is taken as a reason, then there is no need. Because the difference of "existence," like the "existence" of sound, has no subsequent occurrence. Therefore, if it is said that the difference of "existence" has no subsequent occurrence, then the reason is equally deficient in both the cause (རྒྱུ་མཚན།) and the object to be established (བསྒྲུབ་བྱ།). If asked: The second situation has four points: if held as the object to be established, then there is no characteristic of the object to be established; if held as the reason, then the characteristic of the reason is complete; if held as the object to be established, then there is no correct proof; if held as the reason, then it is what makes the object to be established understandable. The first situation is: if "existence" is the object to be established, then on the subject established by valid cognition (ཆོས་ཅན།), is it merely "existence"? Or on the subject, is the "existence" distinguished by the difference of permanence, etc., the object to be established? If according to the first situation, whether the subject exists or not is the object of dispute, because for the common phenomenon (ཆོས་ཅན།) that is commonly apparent to both opponents, merely distinguishing it by "existence," then that phenomenon (ཆོས་ཅན།) to be established, you are not a correct object to be established for the sake of others, because from you, some meanings of the previous opponent will not be established, and also you like that are not prevented for the rebuttal. If according to the second situation, if on the subject, holding the "existence" distinguished by the nature of permanence, etc., as the object to be established, then that kind of difference, that phenomenon (ཆོས་ཅན།), on some bases, cannot be established by reason, because the cause (གཏན་ཚིགས།) that establishes it will become one that has no subsequent occurrence in any example of a subject possessing the property. Because there is no need to establish merely "existence," so if "existence" is taken as the object to be established, then that "existence" must be distinguished by permanence, etc., and that difference cannot be established on any phenomenon (ཆོས་ཅན།), therefore on the subject, taking "existence" as the object to be established is unreasonable. The second situation is: if asked, is it the same for being made a reason? Answer: If the difference of "existence," like the "existence" of sound, is not held as a reason, but merely the thing itself is set up as the proof for establishing the impermanence of sound, then that thing itself, that phenomenon (ཆོས་ཅན།), can become a correct proof for establishing the impermanence of sound, because it establishes that the property of the subject is established, and in its own similar example, it pervades the impermanence of its own object to be established.