English
Because it is not seen to prevent reversal. If it is not seen to be like what? It is not seen in the same way that eye consciousness arises after the eye, form, and attention, etc. The reason why the general characteristic is said not to arise from the general characteristic is the subject. There is also another necessity, namely, the object with parts established by the Vaiśeṣikas, such as a pot, and the attachment, namely, action, and the general characteristic of the pot itself, etc., and the number such as two or three, etc., and the particular, etc., and the collection, namely, the wisdom that grasps the six meanings of words, does not arise from objects, etc., because it does not arise after objects, etc., that is why it is said. From what does it arise? The conceptual mind that grasps objects, etc., is the subject. There is a reason, because it arises after only the internal parts such as the memory of recognizing terms and the activity of the mind, etc. The third has four: Refuting that hair, etc., are general characteristics; refuting that non-existent things are the same; explaining how hair appearance transforms into self-characteristic and general characteristic; refuting the debate about self-characteristic. First, if it is a general characteristic that cannot function ultimately, then, do the hairs, etc., that appear in erroneous sense consciousness also become general characteristics? Answer: The hairs, etc., that appear in erroneous sense consciousness are the subject. It is not a general characteristic, because the wisdom that appears to oneself does not make statements by way of clinging to it as real. Second, then, non-existent things should also become not general characteristics, because there is no clinging to them as real? Answer: For non-existent things, it is the subject. There will be no fault of becoming not a general characteristic, because it is established as a general characteristic by the way of conceptual mind holding it as an object of knowledge. Third, then, hair should also become a general characteristic, because conceptual mind holds it as an object of knowledge? Answer: The appearance object of the conceptual mind that is the wisdom of grasping such objects as hair, etc., of other wisdom, is the subject. There is no refutation that it is a general characteristic, because it is the appearance object of conceptual mind. The very aspect of the clear appearance of hair, etc., in erroneous sense consciousness is the subject. It is a self-characteristic, because it is the very meaning of the nature of wisdom. The conceptual minds, etc., after observing what is called hair, etc., are the subject. Your appearance object is not a self-characteristic, because you are a conceptual mind with the object of general characteristic. The sense consciousness appearing as hair is the subject. You
Chinese
既非所取境的自相或共相，因为你是无所取义者。第四：如果共相，即显现于分别念的相是法，则应成自相，因为是知识的本体义。如果这样说，经部宗是法，显现于分别念的相是自相，没有这种过失，因为他们承许显现于分别念的相是自相。那么，如何安立共相呢？显现于分别念的瓶等相是法，将执著外境义的体性部分安立为共相，因为执著外境义的体性部分在分别念前，对于所有显现瓶者，体性相同，并且在分别念前，它依赖于与非瓶子的相异。第二，宣说体性在事物中存在与否，分为二：成立共相在事物中不存在；成立事物即是自相。第一部分有八点：以声音的实际所诠释来成立；以彼者与他者不可说来成立；以坏灭的执著与显现方式相同来成立；以相异相同的共性来成立；以是否为果来分析成立；以是表示记忆的知识的显现境来成立；以没有自主执著的知识来成立；以以确定作用能力为空性的理证来成立。第一部分有二：安立宗因并成立周遍；成立周遍本身并遣除争论。第一：瓶等的共相是法，不是事物，因为是声音实际所诠释的。如果不周遍，则自相是法，你从显现而了知，则根识应成无意义，因为你从声音实际了知。不能这样承许，因为根等三种因不是果，即不是具有必要者，因为从显现而了知自相，没有其他的必要。第二部分有三：以说名相等遣除根等有意义；以说共相是事物遣除根等有意义；以现量了知故遣除根等有意义。第一部分有二：陈述所许并提出问题；分别遮破所问的三种边。第一：声闻众所敬重等说：
English
Neither the object of apprehension, whether it be a self-character or a universal, because you are devoid of an object of apprehension. Fourth: If the universal, that is, the appearance that appears to conceptual thought, is the subject, then it would follow that it is a self-character, because it is the very meaning of the essence of knowledge. If you say that, the Sautrāntika is the subject, there is no fault in the appearance that appears to conceptual thought being a self-character, because they assert that the appearance that appears to conceptual thought is a self-character. Then, how do you establish the universal? The appearance of a vase, etc., that appears to conceptual thought is the subject, and the aspect of clinging to the essence of external objects is established as the universal, because the aspect of clinging to the essence of external objects is the same in essence for all those who perceive a vase in conceptual thought, and in conceptual thought, it depends on being different from what is not a vase. Second, there are two parts to explaining whether or not a characteristic exists in a thing: establishing that a universal characteristic does not exist in a thing; and establishing that a thing is itself a self-character. The first part has eight points: establishing it by being the actual object expressed by sound; establishing it by being unspeakable as that or other; establishing it by the similarity of the apprehension and appearance of destruction; establishing it by being a universal with the same difference; establishing it by analyzing whether or not it is a result; establishing it by being the object of appearance of the knowledge of remembering signs; establishing it by the absence of knowledge that apprehends autonomously; and establishing it by the sign of being empty of the certainty of the ability to perform a function. The first part has two: establishing the reason and establishing the pervasion; and refuting the objections to the establishment of the pervasion itself. First: The universal of a vase, etc., is the subject, it is not a thing, because it is the actual object expressed by sound. If it is not pervasive, then the self-character is the subject, and if you understand it from appearance, then sense consciousness would be meaningless, because you actually understand it from sound. It is not possible to assert this, because the three causes, such as the senses, are not the result, that is, they are not necessary, because there is no other necessity than understanding the self-character from appearance. The second part has three: refuting the meaningfulness of the senses, etc., by speaking of names, etc.; refuting the meaningfulness of the senses, etc., by speaking of the universal as a thing; and refuting the meaningfulness of the senses, etc., because it is known by direct perception. The first part has two: stating the assertion and posing the question; and refuting each of the three extremes of the question. First: The Śrāvakas, who are revered by many, say:
Chinese
虽然声音直接表达事物，但感官等不会变得无意义。即名称，声音的形态；以及表征，即事物的形态：色、受、想、行、识。与心和心所之外的物质不同的非相应行，声音直接表达，并且为了认识色等自相，需要感官等，是吗？那么，“瓶子”这个声音，是表达与讲述者和听者的心识相关的名称等吗？还是表达与所表达的瓶子相关的名称等？还是表达与心识和事物都无关的名称等？第二种情况有三种：否定表达与心识相关；以此方式排除表达无关；否定表达与事物相关。第一种情况有五种：提出推论以否定免除过失；提出与自身不相似的理由；那个理由在其他方面不存在；即使存在也无法成立所希望的；否定能立识的一切具有意义。第一种是：如果说表达只与讲述和听闻者的心识相关的名称等，那么，有求义者，瓶子这个声音不会指向瓶子自相的意义，因为瓶子这个声音不表达瓶子的自相。如果因为瓶子的名称等和瓶子的自相两种方式相似而混淆为一，从而从表达瓶子的名称等的声音指向意义，那么，瓶子这个声音，你在指向意义的时候，不会总是因为将瓶子的名称等误认为瓶子而指向，因为你在指向意义的时候，仅仅因为瓶子的名称等和瓶子相似而混淆为一。例如，如果双胞胎仅仅因为相似而混淆，就会互相混淆。再说，瓶子这个声音，你在指向意义的时候，不会将各自确定的瓶子的名称等和瓶子混淆为一，因为你仅仅因为瓶子的名称等和瓶子相似而混淆为一。例如，即使有两个相似的拉辛，如果对前面的说“给拉辛”，也不会对后面的混淆。第二种是：声音不指向事物，这个推论的过失你也同样有，因为声音表达所知的形态，而不表达事物，是吗？分别的识
English
Although sound directly expresses things, the senses, etc., do not become meaningless. Namely, the name, the form of sound; and the characteristics, i.e., the form of things: form, feeling, perception, formation, and consciousness. Non-associated formations that are different in substance from mind and mental factors are directly expressed by sound, and in order to recognize the self-characteristics of form, etc., senses, etc., are needed, right? So, does the sound "pot" express the name, etc., related to the minds of the speaker and listener? Or does it express the name, etc., related to the object to be expressed, the pot? Or does it express the name, etc., that is not related to either mind or object? The second case has three aspects: negating the expression related to mind; in this way, excluding the expression of unrelatedness; negating the expression related to the object. The first case has five aspects: posing a consequence to negate the avoidance of fault; stating a reason dissimilar to oneself; that reason does not exist in others; even if it exists, the desired outcome will not be achieved; negating that all valid cognitions are meaningful. The first is: if it is said that the name, etc., expresses only what is related to the minds of the speaker and listener, then, an inquirer, the sound "pot" will not refer to the meaning of the pot's own characteristic, because the sound "pot" does not express the pot's own characteristic. If, because the name, etc., of the pot and the pot's own characteristic are similar in two ways, they are confused as one, and thus the sound expressing the pot's name, etc., refers to the object, then, the sound "pot", when you refer to the object, you will not always refer by mistaking the pot's name, etc., for the pot, because when you refer to the object, you are confused as one merely because the pot's name, etc., and the pot are similar. For example, if twins are confused merely because they are similar, they will confuse each other. Furthermore, the sound "pot", when you refer to the object, you will not confuse the pot's name, etc., and the pot, which are definite in their respective places, as one, because you are confused as one merely because the pot's name, etc., and the pot are similar. For example, even if there are two similar Lhas, if one says "Give to Lhas" to the one in front, one will not confuse it with the one in the back. The second is: the fault of the consequence that sound does not refer to the object is also the same for you, because sound expresses the form of what is known, but does not express the object, right? Conceptual cognition