English
The Madhyamaka-Prasaṅgikas, on the other hand, say that because the aggregates become the object, one relies on the baseless and clings to it as self, therefore, relying on the view of the perishable collection, it is called the view of the perishable collection, and they consider the intermediate word to be hidden. In this way, the Prasaṅgikas are like looking at many individual trees gathered together as a forest, and they admit to looking at the forest as baseless. In this way, even the pure aspects will be considered as forests. When an object is held or viewed by a subject, the subject's view and holding contradict the baseless, so the self-contradictory words spoken by oneself cannot be established. Even such erroneous hearings are regarded as infallible good sayings and believed in, which is undoubtedly a person with irrefutable wisdom. In general, the Madhyamikas do not establish things that rely on causelessness and baselessness, even in unexamined conventional truths that are established by reliance. Therefore, I also exist as an established thing in the face of unexamined innate wisdom. According to your view, it cannot become an established real thing in that face, because in that face, things cannot rely on or depend on baselessness or causelessness. Therefore, although you think that the object of the view of the perishable collection is actually baseless, it seems that you are attached to the idea that you must rely on the perishable collection to see the baseless, so it is called the view of the perishable collection. When viewing the object of the view of the perishable collection, which is actually baseless, when relying on the perishable collection to view, did you view its actual object, the baseless, or did you not view it? If you viewed it, then since the aggregates have become the object, there is no need to view it, and it has been established that you have viewed the object itself, the baseless. Therefore, you should change the name of the view of the perishable collection and call the self-view the view of the baseless. If you did not view it, then the view of the perishable collection only views the perishable collection, and does not view its actual object, the baseless. Therefore, it is also impossible to rely on the view of the perishable collection to view the baseless. Because if the baseless does not become an object, then who will view it? Moreover, it makes the five aggregates of the perishable collection the subject, and the person of the baseless the object, and the view of the perishable collection has not viewed it in this way. In short, your fallacious words are that, like this, when the conventional is not examined, even if the aggregates are not established as the basis of the substance of the self, the aggregates are also established as the basis for the imputed self.
Chinese
我执是安住在共同的所依上。鸟和野兽等，从无始以来就习惯于自身的蕴，所以执取我和我所，然后我想去啊！我饿了啊！我的手小啊！这样去分别，似乎只是从不理解中产生的。所以，把我的这些善说用融化的琉璃写在金板（294b）上，挂在颈间，反复观看吧！否则，月称论师所说的，在名言中，坏聚见不会变成坏聚见，这样去论证，对于增上生和决定胜任何一个都不需要，所以是徒劳无益的无用功。第二，以证悟无我的见山金刚杵，摧毁我与何者一同坏灭？安住在连绵不绝的坏聚见山，这些是顶峰高耸的。经中说：以智慧金刚杵摧毁二十个高耸的坏聚见山顶峰，从而现证入流果。意思是说，坏聚见山是被证悟无我的智慧金刚杵摧毁的，那么目标我和什么一同坏灭呢？所缘境是坏聚见山，烦恼的岩石，从无始轮回以来增长，所以高度遍布三界，安住在连绵不绝的地方，从无明的黄金地基上产生，这些是顶峰高耸的二十个。如果认为这二十个是遍计所执，那就是把见道所断作为了错误的来源。但它们不是遍计所执，因为遍计所执是依靠宗派等而暂时产生的，所以不是所有众生都有的。而这些是从无始以来所有众生都习惯的，是对蕴执着为我和我所的行相。第二方面，分两部分：陈述前派观点和破斥它。第一部分是：有些人认为不可言说，即是彼即是他，是常或无常等等的，实有的补特伽罗。认为它是六识的所知境，并且认为它是执我的所依。住母子说：补特伽罗不应与蕴相异，因为除了蕴之外，世间人无法成立补特伽罗。也不是蕴的自性，因为会堕入生灭。因此，我说我与蕴既非一亦非异（295a）。就是这样。
English
The clinging to self abides in a common basis. Even birds and wild animals, from beginningless time, have been accustomed to their own aggregates, so they grasp at "I" and "mine," and then, "I will go!" "I am hungry!" "My hand is small!" To conceptualize in this way seems to arise solely from not understanding. Therefore, write down my good explanations on a golden tablet (294b) with molten lapis lazuli, hang it around your neck, and look at it again and again! Otherwise, to argue that Chandrakirti's assertion that the view of the aggregates as perishable does not become the view of the aggregates as perishable in conventional truth is unnecessary for either higher rebirth or definite goodness, so it is a futile and fruitless task. Secondly: With the vajra of realizing selflessness, the mountain of views, What self and together with what will be destroyed? The mountain of the view of the aggregates as perishable abides thickly and continuously, These are the ones whose peaks have become high. The sutra says: "The twenty high peaks of the mountain of the view of the aggregates as perishable were destroyed by the vajra of wisdom, and thus the fruit of stream-entry was manifested." This means that the mountain of the view of the aggregates as perishable is destroyed by the vajra of wisdom that realizes selflessness. Then, what self, the object, and together with what will be destroyed? The object of focus is the mountain of the view of the aggregates as perishable, the rock of afflictions, which has grown from beginningless samsara, so its height pervades the three realms, abiding thickly and continuously, arising from the golden ground of ignorance, these are the twenty whose peaks have become high. To consider these twenty as imputed is to make what is to be abandoned by seeing into a source of error. But they are not imputed, because imputed things are temporarily conceived based on tenets and so forth, so not all sentient beings have them. But these are what all sentient beings have been accustomed to from beginningless time, the aspect of clinging to the aggregates as self and as belonging to self. Secondly, there are two parts: stating the former position and refuting it. The first part is: Some assert an inexpressible person who truly exists, who is the same as or different from the aggregates, permanent or impermanent, and so forth. They consider it to be the object of the six consciousnesses, and they also consider it to be the basis for the clinging to self. Sthiramati says: The person should not be different from the aggregates, because apart from the aggregates, the worldly person cannot establish the person. Nor is it the nature of the aggregates, because it would entail arising and ceasing. Therefore, I say that the self is neither the same as nor different from the aggregates (295a). That's how it is.
Chinese
对于常与无常等也无法言说，因为会变成常断。像这样的补特伽罗被认为是实有，因为对于他会说是作者和受者，并且与轮回涅槃束缚解脱有关联。那个补特伽罗不是以自性为所知，而是通过将色等六处作为意识的对境来了解他，因此认为那个补特伽罗是六识的所知。那也是世间我执的基础或对境。第二，破斥我为实有，显示为假有，以及显示因无事物之法而不能成立的三部分。第一部分是：因为从色蕴中无法说出心，也无法了知。实有不是能说和能知的。如果某个我成立为事物，就不会像心一样成为能说和能知的实物。如果成立为实有，就不应该无法言说，因为就像从色蕴中无法说出心是同一还是他异一样，凡是实有的东西，就不是无法了知其是同一还是他异的。如果成立为实有，就不会超出这二者中的任何一个。如果某个我成为实有的事物，那么它就会被像心和色蕴一样成立的事物所遍及，因此不会无法说出是同一还是他异。第二部分是：因为你的瓶子不是成立的事物，所以它的自性会从色等中变得不可言说。任何我从蕴中变得不可言说，都不应认为它是以自性而成立的。如果不能说是一还是异，那就是假有，因为你的瓶子不是成立的事物，仅仅是假有。理由是瓶子的自性从色等中变得不可说是同一还是他异，同样，任何我从蕴中变得不可言说（295b），因此，不应认为我是以自性而实有成立的，而应了知是假有。第三部分是：你的识不是与自我的自体相异，不希望从色等之外希望有实物，实物上会显现那两种相，因此无我，因为远离实物之法。你的实有我识不是与自己的自体相异的
English
It is also impossible to speak of permanence and impermanence, etc., because it would become permanent and annihilated. Such a person is considered to be substantially existent, because it is said that he is the agent and the enjoyer, and because he is related to samsara and nirvana, bondage and liberation. That person is not knowable by his own nature, but he is known by making the six sense bases, such as form, the object of consciousness, so that person is considered to be the object of knowledge of the six consciousnesses. That is also considered to be the basis or object of the ego-grasping of the world. Secondly, there are three parts: refuting the substantial existence of the self, showing it as nominally existent, and showing that it is not established because it lacks the qualities of a thing. The first part is: Because the mind cannot be spoken of from form, nor can it be understood. What is substantially existent is not what can be spoken of and understood. If some self were to be established as a thing, it would not become a speakable and knowable thing like the mind. If it were established as substantial, it should not be unspeakable, because just as the mind cannot be spoken of as being the same as or different from form, whatever is substantially existent is not what cannot be understood as being the same or different. If it were established as substantial, it would not go beyond either of these two. If some self becomes a substantially existent thing, then it will be pervaded by things that are established like mind and form, so it will not be impossible to say whether it is the same or different. The second part is: Because your pot is not an established thing, its nature will become unspeakable from form, etc. Whatever self becomes unspeakable from the aggregates, it should not be thought that it is established by its own nature. If it cannot be said to be the same or different, then it is nominally existent, because your pot is not an established thing, it is merely nominally existent. The reason is that the nature of the pot becomes unspeakable from form, etc., as being the same or different, similarly, whatever self becomes unspeakable from the aggregates (295b), therefore, it should not be thought that the self is substantially established by its own nature, but it should be understood as nominally existent. The third part is: Your consciousness is not different from your own self, you do not want to hope for a real thing other than form, etc., those two aspects will appear on the real thing, therefore there is no self, because it is separated from the qualities of the real thing. Your substantially existent self-consciousness is not different from your own self.