Chinese
会变成过失等等。如果胜义谛和世俗谛是一个，那么胜义谛就会变成完全的烦恼的过失。有些人说世俗谛中本体是一个，也有些人说世俗谛中本体是不同的，这也是因为用理智分析世俗谛真理后说的，所以没有超出之前的所有的过失。有些人认为两个真理在意义上存在，并且说是不可说成既是它也不是其他的，还有些人说没有二法的法，这样说是适合裸体派和住子部等的宗派的，因为在意义上没有成立的情况下，假装存在，从而让其他人产生邪见。在意义上，两者都是自性成立的，如果自性不是一个，就必须是不同的，如果不是不同的，就必须是一个，因为一个和多个是互相排斥的。如《中观庄严论》中说：除了一个和多个之外，具有其他样子的事物是不可能的，因为这两者是互相排斥而存在的。又如《释量论》中说：除了这个之外，没有其他的实有。又说：除了这个之外，也没有其他的相状。等等，无边无际。因此（１４４页背面） 那么，对于说事物存在的人来说，在意义上存在，以及任何存在的事物所引出的不存在，以及像这样的存在和不存在，是和不是的三个范畴等，无论承认哪个，都是处于说事物存在与不存在的四大极端之中。对于承认意义上的存在与不存在的实事论者，中观派会说：如果意义上存在，那么就会变成意义上不存在；如果意义上不存在，那么就会变成意义上存在。对于那个方面，有很多陈述是承认相违的损害。如《辩破论》中说：如果自性不存在本身消失，那么就会变成自性本身成立。等等出现的原因。那样说的时候，即使在中观派自己的宗派中，如果意义上的存在与不存在等在两个真理中都没有成立，那么如果意义上存在，意义上不存在就会消失。在自己的宗派中，即使在梦中也不说，即使不做梦也在那里说，对于说其他人不合理，像那样说话者自己的语言也会损害的另一种说法，在那里重复说，像那样说是没有道理的，这样就驳斥了。
English
It will turn into faults and so on. If the ultimate truth and the conventional truth are one, then the ultimate truth will turn into the fault of being completely afflicted. Some say that in conventional truth the essence is one, and some say that in conventional truth the essence is different, this is also because it is said after analyzing the conventional truth with reason, so it has not escaped all the previous faults. Some people think that both truths exist in meaning, and say that it cannot be said to be neither it nor other, and others say that there is no dharma of two dharmas, saying so is suitable for the Naked Sect and the Sthavira Nikāya and other sects, because in the case where it is not established in meaning, pretending to exist, thereby causing others to generate wrong views. In meaning, both are self-established, if the essence is not one, it must be different, if it is not different, it must be one, because one and many are mutually exclusive. As it is said in the Ornament of the Middle Way: Apart from one and many, it is impossible for things with other appearances to exist, because these two are mutually exclusive and exist. Also, as it is said in the Commentary on Valid Cognition: Apart from this, there is no other real existence. It also says: Apart from this, there is no other aspect. And so on, infinitely. Therefore (page 144 verso) Then, for those who say that things exist, what exists in meaning, and the non-existence drawn by any existing thing, and like this existence and non-existence, whichever of the three categories of is and is not is admitted, is in the four great extremes of saying that things exist and do not exist. For the realists who admit existence and non-existence in meaning, the Madhyamikas will say: If it exists in meaning, then it will become non-existent in meaning; if it does not exist in meaning, then it will become existent in meaning. For that aspect, there are many statements that are contradictory damages. As it is said in the Refutation: If self-nature non-existence itself disappears, then it will become self-nature itself established. And so on for the reason of appearance. When saying that, even in the Madhyamika's own sect, if existence and non-existence in meaning, etc., are not established in both truths, then if it exists in meaning, non-existence in meaning will disappear. In one's own sect, even in a dream one does not say, even if one does not dream one says there, for saying that others are unreasonable, another saying that the speaker's own language will also damage, repeating there, saying like that is unreasonable, thus refuting it.
Chinese
是。如果名言谛和胜义谛是一个，那就不应该是异体；如果是异体，那就不应该是一个，这是世间人如果认为二谛是实体成立的，就会变成那样说的。因为对于实体成立的法来说，如果一和异体任何一个实体不成立，那就不会变成实体成立。那么对于中观派来说，也会变成承认二谛是一和异体任何一个吗？不会变成那样，因为我们中观派在详细观察（144b）时，对于二谛实体成立和不成立任何一个，都是远离言思表达的。要知道怎么会去执着二谛的体性是一和异体任何一个呢。这里宗喀巴大师师徒的教言说：如果名言量成立的事物，在它面前没有成立有无等，那就是诽谤因果，堕入最极端的断见；特别是中观应成派在自己和他人的观点的合理与不合理进行破立的时候，在自宗方面，如果实有，那就一定不是无；如果不是实有，那就一定是无，必须承认，因为《辩破论》中说：如果自性不存在被推翻，那就会变成自性成立。因此，空性的意义如果真实不成立，那就必须成立真实无；如果它的意义真实不存在，那就必须存在真实无，如果不是那样，那就无法用量来信赖任何事物。这是他们说的。那是不合理的，因为如果按照你们那样，那么《辩破论》的教证，因为中观应成派一定承认实有无与自宗相违，所以也必须承认实有无在中观应成派自宗中存在，如果那样，那承认实有无的中观应成派就明显不是真正的中观派了，因为承认实有无的边见，那被称作实事师并且成立。用理智彻底驳斥实有无等，对于实有无等任何都不安立的言（145a）思的表达所远离的人，那才被安立为中观派。因此，说中观应成派在自宗方面如果遮破实有，那就必须承认实无，这种说法在言辞上是中观
English
Yes. If conventional truth and ultimate truth are one, then they should not be different; if they are different, then they should not be one. This is what worldly people say if they believe that the two truths are established as entities. Because for a dharma that is established as an entity, if either one or different is not established as an entity, then it will not become established as an entity. So, for the Madhyamikas, will it also become an acceptance of either one or different for the two truths? It will not become that way, because for us Madhyamikas, when we examine in detail (144b), for the two truths, whether established as entities or not, we are free from speech, thought, and expression. How could we possibly fixate on the nature of the two truths as either one or different? Here, the teachings of the great Tsongkhapa and his followers say: If things established by conventional valid cognition do not establish existence or non-existence, etc., in their own right, then it is slandering cause and effect, and falling into the extreme of nihilistic views; especially for the Madhyamika-Prasaṅgikas, when refuting or establishing the rationality or irrationality of their own and others' views, in their own system, if something exists substantially, then it is definitely not non-existent; if it does not exist substantially, then it must be non-existent, and this must be accepted, because in the *Refutation of Debate* it says: If the absence of inherent existence is refuted, then it will become established as inherent existence itself. Therefore, if the meaning of emptiness is not established as true, then it must be established as truly non-existent; if its meaning does not truly exist, then it must exist as truly non-existent, and if it is not like that, then one cannot rely on anything with valid cognition. That is what they say. That is unreasonable, because if it is like that according to you, then the quote from the *Refutation of Debate*, because the Madhyamika-Prasaṅgikas must acknowledge that substantial existence and non-existence contradict their own system, then they must also acknowledge that substantial existence and non-existence exist in the Madhyamika-Prasaṅgika's own system, and if that is the case, then it is clear that the Madhyamika-Prasaṅgika who accepts substantial existence and non-existence is not a true Madhyamika, because accepting the extremes of substantial existence and non-existence is known and established as a realist. The person who has completely refuted substantial existence and non-existence, etc., with reasoning, and who is free from the expression of speech (145a) and thought that establishes anything as substantial existence and non-existence, etc., that person is established as a Madhyamika. Therefore, saying that if the Madhyamika-Prasaṅgika refutes substantial existence in their own system, then they must accept substantial non-existence, this statement is Madhyamika in words.
Tibetan
སྨྲས་ཀྱང་དོན་ལ་དངོས་པོར་སྨྲ་བར་སོང་བ་ཡིན་ནོ། །འདིར་ཟི་ལུང་ཤཱཀྱ་པ་ཆེན་པོ་ན་རེ། རྩོད་ཟློག་གི་ལུང་དེ་དབུ་མ་པས་རང་ལུགས་སུ་ཁས་ལེན་མི་ལེན་གྱི་སྐབས་གཉིས་ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། བར་དུ་བདག་ཟློག་གི་སྐབས་སུ་དོན་གྱི་ཡོད་པ་བཀག་ན་དོན་གྱི་མེད་པ་ཁས་ལེན་ལ། ཐ་མ་ལྟ་ཞིག་ཀུན་ཟློག་གི་སྐབས་སུ་དོན་གྱི་བདག་བདེན་སོགས་ཡོད་པ་བཀག་ནས་དོན་གྱི་བདག་བདེན་སོགས་མེད་པར་མི་བསྒྲུབ་པའི་ཚུལ་ཕྱི་མ་འདི་ནི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་ལས་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བ་ཁྱད་པར་འཕགས་ཆོས་ཀྱི་རང་ལུགས་བླ་ན་མེད་པ་ཞིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་ཟེར་རོ། །མི་འཐད་དེ། དོན་གྱི་ཡོད་མེད་དང་དེ་གཞིར་བྱས་ཀྱི་དངོས་འགལ་སོགས་རང་ལུགས་ལ་དོན་ལ་ཡོད་པར་སྨྲ་བ་ནི་དངོས་པོར་སྨྲ་བ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ལ། དབུ་མ་པས་བར་དུ་བདག་ཟློག་གི་སྐབས་སུ་ཡང་དངོས་པོར་སྨྲ་བའི་ཕྱོགས་ལ་གནས་པའི་སྐབས་ཡོད་པ་མིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང༌། དེར་དབུ་མ་པས་དངོས་སྨྲ་བའི་ཕྱོགས་ལ་གནས་ནས་དེ་ལྟར་ཁས་ལེན་རིགས་ན། ལྟ་ཞིག་ཀུན་ཟློག་གི་སྐབས་སུ་ཡང་དེའི་ཕྱོགས་ལ་གནས་ནས་དེ་ལྟར་ཁས་ལེན་པ་ལ་མི་རིགས་པའི་འཐད་པ་གང་ཡང་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། བདག་ཟློག་གི་སྐབས་སུ་དོན་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཡོད་མེད་སོགས་མཐའ་བཞིའི་བདག་མ་བཀག་ན་བདག་བཟློག་པར་མི་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། (༡༤༥བ) དེར་དོན་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་བདག་ཡོད་བཀག་ནས་དོན་གྱི་བདག་མེད་ཡོད་པར་བསྒྲུབ་ན་དོན་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་བདག་ཡོད་པར་ཁས་ལེན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དོན་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་བདག་མེད་ཡོད་ན་དེས་བཀག་པའི་དོན་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་བདག་ཡོད་པར་ཁས་ལེན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར། དོན་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་མེས་དོན་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་གྲང་རེག་བཀག་ནས་མེད་པར་བྱས་པ་བཞིན། ཁྱེད་ལྟར་ལྟ་ཞིག་ཀུན་གཙོ་བོར་བཟློག་པའི་དགོས་པ་དོན་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་བདག་ཡོད་བདག་ཟློག་གི་སྐབས་སུ་བཀག་ཟིན་ནས། འདིར་དོན་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་བདག་མེད་ཡོད་པ་འགོག་པར་བྱེད་དོ་སྙམ་པ་དེ་ནི་མུན་སྤྲུལ་དུ་ཟད་དེ། བར་དུ་བདག་ཟློག་གི་སྐབས་སུ་གང་ཟག་དང་ཆོས་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་དོན་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་བདག་བདེན་ཐམས་ཅད་བདེན་པ་གཉིས་ཀར་མི་རིགས་པར་ཚར་བཅད་ནས། ཐ་མ་ལྟ་ཞིག་ཀུན་ཟློག་གི་སྐབས་སུ་དོན་དུ་མ་གྱུར་པའི་རྟོགས་པས་བཞག་པའི་དགག་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མཚན་མ་ཅུང་ཟད་ཙམ་ཡང་སྨྲ་བསམ་གྱི་བརྗོད་པ་དང་བྲལ་པར་བཀའ་བརྒྱུད་དྭགས་པོ་ལྷ་རྗེའི་གསུང་ངག་ལྟར་ན། རང་བབས་མ་བཅོས་ཐ་མལ་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་ཞེས་པའི་མིང་ཅན་དེ་ཉིད་དུ་ལ་ཟློ་བར་བྱེད་པའི་
Chinese
雖然這麼說，但實際上已經變成在說實有了。在此，孜隆釋迦巴大師說：辯論時所引用的理證，中觀論者有兩種情況會承許或不承許。在中間遮遣我的時候，如果遮遣了實有的有，就承許實有的無。最後觀察一切遮遣的時候，如果遮遣了實有的我、真實等有，卻不成立實有的我、真實等無，後者這種方式，是勝過自續派中觀論者的應成派中觀論者，一種無上的殊勝法之自宗。這是不合理的，因為，實有的有無以及以此為基礎的相違等，在自宗認為是實有的，這就是說實有。中觀論者在中間遮遣我的時候，並沒有處於說實有的立場。如果在那個時候，中觀論者處於說實有的立場而那樣承許是合理的，那麼在觀察一切遮遣的時候，也處於那個立場而那樣承許，沒有任何不合理的理由。首先是成立的，因為，在遮遣我的時候，如果不遮遣成為實有的有無等四邊的自性，就不能遮遣我。（145b）在那裡，如果遮遣了成為實有的我，而成立實有的無我，就必須承許成為實有的我。因為，如果實有的無我存在，就必須承許它所遮遣的實有的我存在。就像實有的火遮遣了實有的冷觸而使其不存在一樣。按照你的觀點，觀察一切主要是為了遮遣，認為在遮遣我的時候，已經遮遣了成為實有的我，在這裡阻止實有的無我存在，這完全是愚昧的表現。因為，在中間遮遣我的時候，對於依賴於人與法的成為實有的我、真實的一切，已經在二諦中完全斷除了。最後在觀察一切遮遣的時候，對於沒有成為實有的，由認識所安立的少許的破立之相，也遠離了言說思維，按照噶舉派達波拉傑的口訣，將其回歸到被稱為「自然安住，未經改造的平凡意識」的狀態。
English
Although saying so, it has actually become speaking of things as truly existent. Here, the great Zilong Shakya says: The reasoning cited in debate, Madhyamikas have two situations in which they either accept or do not accept it as their own system. In the middle, when refuting self, if one refutes the truly existent "is," then one accepts the truly existent "is not." Finally, when observing all refutations, if one refutes the truly existent self, truth, etc., but does not establish the truly existent self, truth, etc., as non-existent, this latter way is the Prasangika Madhyamika, who is superior to the Svatantrika Madhyamika, an unsurpassed and excellent Dharma of one's own system. This is unreasonable, because speaking of truly existent "is" and "is not," and the contradictions based on them, as truly existent in one's own system, is precisely speaking of things as truly existent. And it is not the case that Madhyamikas, in the middle, when refuting self, have a time when they are in the position of speaking of things as truly existent. If at that time, Madhyamikas are in the position of speaking of things as truly existent and it is reasonable to accept it that way, then when observing all refutations, there is no reason why it would be unreasonable to be in that position and accept it that way. First, it is established, because, when refuting self, if one does not refute the self of the four extremes, such as truly existent "is" and "is not," then one cannot refute self. (145b) There, if one refutes the truly existent self and establishes the truly existent non-self as existent, then one must accept the truly existent self as existent. Because, if the truly existent non-self exists, then one must accept that the truly existent self, which it refutes, exists. Just as the truly existent fire refutes the truly existent cold touch and makes it non-existent. According to your view, observing all is mainly for refuting, thinking that the truly existent self has already been refuted when refuting self, and here one is preventing the truly existent non-self from existing, this is completely foolish. Because, in the middle, when refuting self, all the truly existent self and truth that depend on persons and phenomena have already been completely cut off in both truths. Finally, when observing all refutations, even the slightest bit of the characteristics of affirmation and negation, which are not truly existent but are established by cognition, are separated from speech and thought, and according to the oral instructions of the Kagyu Dagpo Lhaje, it is returned to the state called "naturally abiding, unaltered ordinary consciousness."