Chinese
如是，如眼识，以及与其同时生起且相应的受等所有心所，如同是互相同时的因果。如果说，眼与色与受等同时生起之法，仅仅在同时生起眼识，如同眼等与心等也仅仅在同时成为受等之缘，则不然。如果，作为果的眼识，对于自己的生起者，即与自己同时的眼与色等，以及与自己同时生起的想等心与心所，如果它们存在于眼识之外，那么眼识就必须存在，因为如果不存在，就无法将其安立为与眼识相异。如果承认存在，那么对于已经成立的果，再次生起又有什么必要呢？因此，这会变成不存在。如果已经成为已生的存在，那么眼与想等作为生起者就没有意义了。如果因为不希望没有生起，所以认为眼识不存在，那么对这样说的人，已经驳斥了“眼等不是从非有之识中产生的”这个过失。因此，在任何情况下，“从他者生”这句话都只剩下空洞的声音而已。即使在如同同时的情况下，可以假设有他者，但不可能有生起。因为不可能有生起，所以两者都不可能。而在如同先后两种情况中，可以假设有生起，但不可能有他者。因为不可能有他者，所以两者都不可能。第三是：如果能生者所生之异于己者是因，那么，所生之物是有，或是无，或是二者，或是离于二者？若有，则生者何用？若无，则彼何为？于二者，彼何为？离二者，彼何为？在因果二者中，果不是在依赖因之时存在的（136b）。意思是说，如果能生者，以其所生之物，生起与自己不同的事物，那么这个能生者就是因，那么所生之物是有，还是无，还是二者，还是离于二者呢？当它生起彼物时，不能以不同于彼物的方式生起。数论派、毗婆沙宗和某些雪山派认为果是已存在的而生起。而胜论派、经部宗和瑜伽行派则认为无
English
Thus, like eye consciousness, and all mental factors such as feeling that arise simultaneously and are concordant with it, are like mutually simultaneous cause and effect. If it is said that phenomena such as eye, form, and feeling that arise together only generate eye consciousness at the same time, just as eye and so on and mind and so on also only become the condition for feeling and so on at the same time, then it is not so. If, as the result, eye consciousness, for its own generator, namely eye and form and so on that are simultaneous with itself, and mental and mental factors such as perception that arise simultaneously with itself, if they exist outside of eye consciousness, then eye consciousness must exist, because if it does not exist, it cannot be established as different from eye consciousness. If you admit that it exists, then what is the need for arising again for the already established result? Therefore, it will become non-existent. If it has become an already arisen existence, then eye and perception and so on as generators are meaningless. If, because you do not want non-arising, you think that eye consciousness does not exist, then to those who say this, the fault of "eye and so on are not produced from non-existent consciousness" has already been refuted. Therefore, in any case, the statement "arising from another" is only left with an empty sound. Even in the case of simultaneity, it can be assumed that there is another, but there can be no arising. Because there can be no arising, both are impossible. And in the two cases of before and after, it can be assumed that there is arising, but there can be no other. Because there can be no other, both are impossible. The third is: If the producer, the produced, the other produced by the producer is the cause, then, is the produced existent, or non-existent, or both, or separate from both? If it is existent, what is the use of the producer? If it is non-existent, what does it do? What does it do to both? What does it do to what is separate from both? Among the two, cause and effect, the effect is not existent at the time of relying on the cause (136b). It means that if the producer, with its produced, produces something different from itself, then this producer is the cause, then is the produced existent, or non-existent, or both, or separate from both? When it produces that thing, it cannot produce it in a way that is different from that thing. The Samkhya, Vaibhashika, and some Gangchenpas believe that the result is existent and arises. While the Vaisheshika, Sautrantika, and Yogachara believe that it is non-
Chinese
认为存在产生，裸体外道等认为有无二者产生。这样一来，存在不应产生，因为如果存在，要生起者做什么呢？因为已经产生，不应再次产生。不存在不应产生，因为即使没有所生之物，生起者又能做什么呢？因为如同驴角一样，不是能作用之处。百论中说：凡是认为果已存在，凡是认为果不存在，为了房屋的缘故，柱子等，装饰的意义也就不存在了。中观论中也说：如果果的自性存在，因又能生起什么呢？如果果的自性不存在，因又能生起什么呢？如果生存在，因本身就不合理了。如果因本身合理存在，果又是谁的呢？这样说的。所生之物有无二者本身就不合理，这样一来，缘又能做什么呢？因为两种过失都会发生。有和无的自性二者在一个事物上不可能存在，因此具有有无二者自性的（137页）事物是不可能存在的，因为不是缘能作用之处。经论中说：涅槃如何能成为事物和非事物二者呢？以及，成为作者和不成为作者，成为和不成为，那是不作用的。成为和不成为，互相矛盾，怎么能行呢？这样说的。所生之物远离二者是不应产生的，因为对于远离二者的事物，缘又能做什么呢？因为舍弃有无二者的果是不存在的。如果所破的有无二者不存在，那么破除它们的二者都不是也不可能存在。经论中说：不是事物也不是非事物，谁宣说涅槃？如果非事物和事物成立，那么它就成立。这样说的。这些论典不仅说明了由他生起，从四边产生的结果是不合理的，而且对于说从自、二者、无因、自性、自在等产生的结果，四边中的任何一边也都是不合理的。对于缘起的生起，也显示了远离四边戏论。第二，前方的观点和对此的驳斥
English
It is believed that existence arises, and naked ascetics and others believe that both existence and non-existence arise. In this case, existence should not arise, because if it exists, what is the need for a generator? Because it has already arisen, it should not arise again. Non-existence should not arise, because even if there is nothing to be generated, what can the generator do? Because it is like a donkey's horn, it is not a place where it can function. The Hundred Treatises says: "Whoever thinks that the fruit exists, and whoever thinks that the fruit does not exist, for the sake of the house, pillars, etc., the meaning of decoration also does not exist." The Madhyamaka also says: "If the nature of the fruit exists, what does the cause generate? If the nature of the fruit does not exist, what does the cause generate? If birth exists, the cause itself is not reasonable. If the cause itself is reasonably existent, whose fruit will it be?" It is said like this. The object to be generated, both existence and non-existence, is not reasonable in itself. In that case, what can the condition do? Because both faults will occur. The nature of existence and non-existence cannot exist in one thing, so a thing (137n) with the nature of both existence and non-existence cannot exist, because it is not a place where conditions can function. The scriptures say: "How can Nirvana become both a thing and a non-thing?" And, "Becoming an agent and not becoming an agent, becoming and not becoming, that is not acting. Becoming and not becoming, contradicting each other, how can it work?" It is said like this. The object to be generated, which is separate from the two, should not arise, because what can the condition do for the object that is separate from the two? Because the fruit that abandons both existence and non-existence does not exist. If the object to be refuted, both existence and non-existence, does not exist, then the two that refute them cannot exist either. The scriptures say: "Neither a thing nor a non-thing, who proclaims Nirvana? If non-things and things are established, then it is established." It is said like this. These treatises not only explain that the result of arising from others and arising from the four extremes is unreasonable, but also that the four extremes of the result are unreasonable for those who say that it arises from self, both, without cause, nature, and freedom, etc. For the arising of dependent origination, it also shows that it is free from the four extremes of elaboration. Second, the previous view and its refutation.
Tibetan
པའོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། གང་གིས་རང་ལྟ་ལ་གནས་འཇིག་རྟེན་ཚད་མར་འདོད་པས་ན། །འདིར་ནི་རིག་སཔ་སྨྲས་པ་ཉིས་ཀྱིས་ལྟ་ཀོ་ཅི་ཞིག་བྱ། །གཞན་ལས་གཞན་འབྱུང་བ་ཡང་འཇིག་རྟེན་པ་ཡིས་རྟོགས་འགྱུར་ཏེ། །དེས་ན་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་ཡོད་འདིར་ནི་རིགས་པ་ཅི་ཞིག་དགོས། །ཁོ་བོས་གཞན་སྐྱེ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་པ་གང་སྨྲས་དེ་དག་བུད་ཤིང་སྣུམ་གྱིས་བྲན་པ་ལྟར་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་བློའི་མེས་མ་ལུས་པར་བསྲེགས་པས། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་མེ་སྤོར་བ་ལྷུར་བྱེད་པའི་རིགས་པའི་བུད་ཤིང་བསྐུལ་བ་དགོས་པ་མེད་པས་ཆོག་གོ། །དེས་ན་རིགས་པས་མ་གྲུབ་ཀྱང་རང་གི་འདོད་དོན་གྲུབ་པ་ཡོད་དེ། འཇིག་རྟེན་དུ་གྲུབ་པའི་དོན་དེ་རིགས་པས་གནོད་པར་བྱར་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་(༡༣༧བ) མཐོང་བ་ནི་ཤིན་ཏུ་སྟོབས་དང་ལྡན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་པ་ནི་འཇིག་རྟེན་པ་གང་གི་རིགས་མི་རིགས་ཀྱི་རྗེས་སུ་མ་ཞུགས་པར་རང་གི་མཐོང་བ་སྟེ་ལྟ་བ་ལ་གནས་ནས་ཡུལ་ལ་འཇུག་ལྡོག་བྱེད་ཅིང༌། དེ་ལྟར་བྱས་པས་དོན་ཐོབ་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་མངོན་སུམ་ཚད་མར་འདོད་པས་ན། གཞན་སྐྱེ་བར་འཐད་པ་བརྗོད་པ་འདིར་ནི་དེ་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ་སྨྲས་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ལྟ་ཀོ་ཅི་ཞིག་བྱ་སྟེ་བྱ་མི་དགོས་ཏེ། རྒྱུ་གཞན་ལས་འབྲས་བུ་གཞན་འབྱུང་བའང་འཇིག་རྟེན་པའི་མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར། དེས་ན་རིགས་པས་བསྒྲུབ་མི་དགོས་པར་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་པར་གྲུབ་པས་འདིར་ནི་རིགས་པས་འབད་ནས་ཅི་ཞིག་སྒྲུབ་དགོས་ཏེ་མི་དགོས་པར་ཐལ། རིགས་པ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་མངོན་སུམ་མིན་པ་ལ་བརྗོད་པར་འོས་ཀྱི། མངོན་སུམ་ལ་མི་འོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། གཉིས་པ་ལ། གཞན་སྐྱེ་གྲུབ་ཀྱང་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་སྤྱོད་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་མི་གནོད་པ་དང༌། གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་འཇིག་རྟེན་པ་ལ་ཡང་མ་གྲུབ་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ། ཞར་བྱུང་བདེན་པ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག དཀྱུས་མ་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱིས་མི་གནོད་པར་བསྟན་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ། བདེན་གཉིས་ཀྱི་དབྱེ་བ་སྤྱིར་བསྟན། སོ་སོའི་ངོ་བོ་རྒྱས་པར་བཤད་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ། དངོས་དང༌། ཞར་ལ་མཐོང་བ་བརྫུན་པའི་དབྱེ་བ་བསྟན་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། དངོས་ཀུན་ཡང་དག་བརྫུན་པ་མཐོང་བ་ཡིས། །དངོས་རྙེད་ངོ་བོ་གཉིས་ནི་འཛིན་པར་འགྱུར། །ཡང་དག་མཐོང་ཡུལ་གང་དེ་དེ་ཉིད་དེ། །མཐོང་བ་བརྫུན་པ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པར་གསུངས། །རྟེན་འབྱུང་ཟབ་མོ་སྟོན་པའི་བསྟན་བཅོས་ཀྱི་དོན་མ་རྟོགས་པར། དངོས་འཛིན་གྱི་བག་ཆགས་སྨིན་པས་དངོས་པོར་ཞེན་ཅིང་ད
Chinese
པའོ། 第一，由于有人认为安住于自己观点的世间是可靠的，那么，在这里说理辩论有什么用呢？从他者产生他者，世间人也能理解，因此，既然存在从他者产生，这里还需要什么道理呢？我所说的那些证明他者产生的道理，就像木柴被油浸透一样，被你的智慧之火完全烧毁了。因此，不需要推动你智慧之火燃烧的道理之木柴。因此，即使道理上不成立，也有自己想要成立的事情，因为世间成立的事情不会被道理损害，因为世间的（137b） 见解非常有力。也就是说，不随顺任何种姓的世间人，安住于自己的见解，即观点，从而对境进行取舍。这样做，仅仅因为获得了意义，就认为世间的现量是可靠的。因此，在这里说他者产生是合理的，仅仅说出证明它的道理有什么用呢？不需要，因为从他者产生果，世间人的现量也能理解。因此，既然不需要道理来证明，就已经成立了从他者产生，那么在这里努力用道理证明什么呢？不需要，因为道理适合于不是现量的事物，不适合于现量。如果是这样，那么第二，即使成立了他者产生，也不会在修行真如的时候造成损害，而且，从他者产生，世间人也不一定成立。第一，附带说明二谛的分类，说明世间不会损害世俗。第一，总的说明二谛的差别，详细解释各自的体性。第一，说明事物和附带的虚假见解的差别。第一，一切事物通过真实和虚假的见解，会执着事物的获得和体性两种。真实所见之境即是真如，虚假所见则被称为世俗谛。由于没有理解宣说甚深缘起的论典的意义，实执的习气成熟，因此执着于事物。
English
Pa'o. Firstly, since some consider the world that abides in its own view to be reliable, what is the use of arguing here? The world also understands that other arises from other, therefore, since there is arising from other, what reason is needed here? The reasons I have stated to prove the arising of other, like firewood soaked in oil, are completely burned by the fire of your wisdom. Therefore, there is no need to promote the firewood of reason that makes the fire of your wisdom burn. Therefore, even if it is not established by reason, there are things that one wants to establish, because things established in the world will not be harmed by reason, because the world's (137b) view is very powerful. That is to say, worldly people who do not follow any caste, abide in their own view, that is, the view, and thus take and abandon objects. By doing so, just because they have obtained meaning, they consider the world's direct perception to be reliable. Therefore, it is reasonable to say here that other arises, what is the use of merely stating the reasons to prove it? There is no need, because the world's direct perception can also understand that the result arises from other causes. Therefore, since there is no need to prove it by reason, it has already been established that it arises from other, then what is the need to try to prove it by reason here? There is no need, because reason is suitable for things that are not direct perception, and not suitable for direct perception. If so, then secondly, even if the arising of other is established, it will not cause harm when practicing Suchness, and also, the arising from other is not necessarily established for worldly people. Firstly, incidentally explain the classification of the two truths, and explain that the world will not harm the conventional. Firstly, generally explain the difference between the two truths, and explain the nature of each in detail. Firstly, explain the difference between things and incidental false views. Firstly, all things, through true and false views, will cling to the acquisition and nature of things. The object seen by the truth is Suchness, and the false seen is called the conventional truth. Because the meaning of the scriptures that explain the profound dependent arising is not understood, the habit of clinging to reality matures, so they cling to things.