English
Refuting the arguments about inference, and refuting the arguments about other consciousnesses. Firstly, if according to one's own system, it must be accepted that all cognitions such as blue cognition exist, and if so, how is the existence of this known? It is not permissible to say that it exists even without being apprehended. Just as it is said to others, it also becomes a fault for oneself, if the blue cognition itself knows that it exists, then self-awareness must be admitted, because it is also unreasonable for consciousness to be known by other things. If so, this seems to be a very difficult point, so it must be explained, and if it is explained by taking the example of how objects and object-possessors are remembered, it will be easier to understand. In that, just by remembering the object, the object-possessor is also remembered, just as there is no need to separately remember the object-possessor, just as the object of blue cognition, the blue itself is established, the measurer of blue is also established, and there is no need for the way the measurer of blue is established other than the way the blue is established. That is, the blue casts a likeness of itself onto the blue cognition, and just by appearing, the establishment of blue is the same as other systems. However, the difference is that when the blue cognition is established, it is established through the self-awareness that experiences the unapprehended appearance of awareness free from dualistic appearance, and other systems think that this is the same for all consciousnesses. But here, as stated in the Madhyamaka Jewel Garland and the Root Text and Commentary on the Two Truths, it is held that such an unapprehended appearance of awareness is impossible. Therefore, it is not established by the self-awareness that experiences it, but just by the blue being established, the blue cognition is established, for example, just by remembering the object, the object-possessor is remembered, not like before when the object-possessor experiences itself, other systems think that the memory arises by the power of experience. It must be done like that, because the Clear Words says: Because the number of valid cognitions is determined by the power of the object of measurement being other, and just by following the appearance of the object of measurement, the valid cognitions that find their own essence exist, in order to establish the own essence of the valid cognitions. The meaning of these words is that the determination of valid cognition as two is because of the power of the object of measurement being determined as two, and because the appearance of the object of measurement appears on the valid cognition, the own essence of the valid cognition of the measurer is established as existing, and the meaning of "just" is, as the Mind-Only school and the Sutra school think, whatever the appearance of the valid cognition and the object of measurement is,
Chinese
通过随行，所量便能成立。之后，成立量的方式是，阻止从先前之外，于量自身的体性上，以远离二取之执相，体验飘忽不定的觉知的自证而成立，而是以仅仅成立所量的方式而成立的意义。这是圣者所说：‘若从自性成量，不观待于所量，汝之量若成立于此，不待他者极成立。’之意。对于量的成立，仅仅成立所量是不够的，如果如其他宗派所认为的，量从自身成立量，那么量将不观待于所量而成立。如果承认这一点，事物将不观待于其他因缘而极成立。’通过遮止，暗示了仅仅成立所量，量就能成立。如此一来，青色之执并非如其他宗派所认为的，通过自证而成立，而是通过根识现量而成立，因为它的存在是通过青色之执成立所量的那一刻而证知的缘故。因此，凡是量，都是通过成立其自身的所量而成立的。第二点是：那么，按照此宗，影像和声音等，也如先前所说的那样，被安立为色和声的生处等，并且在《明句论》中也说：‘二月等，观待非眼花缭乱之识，则非现量，观待眼花缭乱者等，则唯是现量。’如此，此宗在表示对于色声等境，现量的词语是实名，对于执持它们的有境是假名的时候，双月显现等是观待世间自许者的，虽然存在所量是否是现量的差别，但在自宗看来，双月显现等也是所量现量显现。因此，根识无论是观待世间自许者的错觉还是非错觉，都因为成立其自身的所量而成立有境。然而，对于不承认自证者来说，基础时期的意识显现和于耽著境上的错觉等，是不会成立存在的，因为对于它们来说，由于没有衡量其自身的所量，所以没有有境的成立。如果这样问，那么，对此应当解释，此宗的识
English
Through following, the object to be measured is established. Then, the way to establish validity is to prevent the establishment of validity itself from the previous, on the nature of validity itself, with self-awareness experiencing the uninhibited grasping aspect that is free from dualistic appearance, but rather to establish it by merely establishing the object to be measured. This is the meaning of what the noble one said: 'If validity is established from itself, without depending on the objects to be measured, if your validity is established here, it will be extremely established without depending on others.' For the establishment of validity, it is not enough to merely establish the object to be measured. If, as other schools believe, validity is established from itself, then validity will be established without depending on the object to be measured. If this is admitted, things will be extremely established without depending on other causes and conditions.' By refuting this, it is implicitly shown that validity can be established by merely establishing the object to be measured. In this way, the apprehension of blue is not established by self-awareness as other schools believe, but by sense direct perception, because its existence is realized by the very moment when the apprehension of blue establishes the object to be measured. Therefore, whatever is valid is established by establishing its own object to be measured. The second point is: Then, according to this system, images and sounds, etc., are also established as the sources of color and sound, etc., as previously explained, and in the Clear Words it is also said: 'Two moons, etc., are not direct perception in relation to non-blurred consciousness, but only direct perception in relation to blurred ones, etc.' Thus, this system, when expressing that for objects such as color and sound, the term 'direct perception' is a real name, and for the subject that holds them, it is a metaphorical name, the appearance of two moons, etc., depends on the self-proclaimed of the world. Although there is a difference in whether the object to be measured is direct perception or not, in our own system, the appearance of two moons, etc., is also considered to be the object to be measured as manifest direct perception. Therefore, whether the sense consciousness is an illusion or not, depending on the self-proclaimed of the world, the subject is established by establishing its own object to be measured. However, for those who do not accept self-awareness, the appearance of mind consciousness at the base time and the illusions on the object of attachment, etc., will not be established, because for them, since there is no measurement of their own object to be measured, there is no establishment of the subject. If this is asked, then it should be explained that the consciousness of this system
Chinese
因此，由于不承认与六识本质不同的意识，所以只有两种量，即真实依赖于有色根的量和仅依赖于意根的量。关于量，在《明句论》中，所说的现量、比量、圣教量和通过相似或譬喻衡量的量这四种量，是依赖于辩论、反驳和技巧的解释。后两种量包含在比量中，并且在《四百论》的注释中也说：并非所有事物都必须通过现量来理解，有些事物也必须通过比量来理解。如是说。对于现量，驳斥了其他学派所说的四种现量中的自证现量，并且也不承认像量论中所说的意现量。因为在《四百论》的注释中说：解释《阿毗达磨》中所说的五境等各自被根和意识所知，意思是说：两种识不是识知同一个事物，一种是直接断定境的相状，也就是最初产生的。第二种不是直接断定，而是由于根识的力量而如此认识和产生，因此也近似地认为它识知了那个事物。也就是说，最初根识直接认识色等境，而意识凭借根识的力量来认识，不像根识那样直接认识，并且也说是忆念。又在《四百论》的注释中说：不像感受等那样是体验的相状，也不像色和声等那样是通过根门完全断定的。如是说，因此，对于显现的衡量，说了两种，一种是像根识断定色等那样，另一种是像感受苦乐等那样在内部通过体验完全断定。这两种的后一种，从根本上就必须承认，并且由于这里也没有说比四种现量更多，以及瑜伽现量、根现量和自证现量不能被认为是量，所以被认为是意现量。虽然意现量与量论家不一致，但即便如此，也不是不承认意现量。如是
English
Therefore, since it is not accepted that there are consciousnesses different in essence from the six consciousnesses, there are only two valid cognitions: those that rely directly on the sense organs that have form, and those that rely only on the mental faculty. Regarding valid cognition, the Clear Words states that the four valid cognitions—direct perception, inference, scriptural valid cognition, and valid cognition that measures through similarity or analogy—are based on debate, refutation, and skillful explanation. The latter two valid cognitions are included in inference, and the commentary on the Four Hundred also states: 'Not all things are to be understood by knowing them directly; some are also to be realized by inferring them.' Thus it is said. Regarding direct perception, the self-awareness direct perception, which is explained as one of the four direct perceptions by other systems, is refuted, and mental direct perception is also not accepted as explained in the valid cognition texts. For the commentary on the Four Hundred states: 'Explaining the meaning of the Abhidharma's statement that each of the five objects, such as forms, are known by the sense organs and consciousness, it means that two consciousnesses do not cognize the same object; one directly ascertains the aspect of the object, which is the one that arises first. The second is not itself directly ascertaining, but because it arises cognizing in that way through the power of the sense consciousness, it is approximated that it also cognizes that object.' That is, the sense consciousness directly cognizes the object of forms, etc., and the mental consciousness cognizes through the power of the sense consciousness, not directly like the sense consciousness, and it is also said to be recollection. Furthermore, the commentary on the Four Hundred states: 'It is not like the aspect of experiencing feelings, etc., nor is it to be completely ascertained through the sense organs like forms and sounds, etc.' Thus it is said, and therefore, regarding manifest measurement, two are stated: one is like the sense consciousness ascertaining forms, etc., and the other is like completely ascertaining internally through the experience of feelings, pleasure, pain, etc. The latter of these two must be accepted from the beginning, and since more than the four direct valid cognitions are not explained here, and since yogic direct perception, sense direct perception, and self-awareness direct perception cannot be established as valid cognitions, they are established as mental direct perception. Although mental direct perception is inconsistent with the logicians, even so, it is not that mental direct perception is not accepted. Thus