Chinese
正如成熟不是原因一样，在梦中，睡眠也不是现象的习气成熟的原因。如果外境不存在，而自性成立的知识产生，那就不依赖于习气的成熟。因为从虚假的习气中产生梦中现象的虚假知识，所以在梦中，醒来时显现为外境事物，如色等的识也是虚假的。梦中的眼识，即识的因，即作为所依的，也应承认。这在注释中说： “在梦中完全断除境时，是缘于三者聚合。” 又如梦中没有色处和眼，也没有由二者产生的眼识一样。梦中虽然没有眼识等五者的境、根、识三者，但在做梦者的角度，有缘于这三者的，所以要承认梦中的眼、梦中的眼识和梦中的色三者，但并非认为这三者成立为眼等。就像承认幻化的马牛和幻化的人，但不必认为它们是马牛和人一样。因此，如此一来，这个唯识宗对中观宗所作的回答，都被视为与所立（即所要证明的）未成立相同。因此，要消除，即遮止这种争论，即这种唯识宗的说法。如果举例说明，中观宗说，醒来时的境、根、识三者，因为是自性成立，所以是空性的，因为是所缘，就像梦一样。当这样陈述时，唯识宗会说，醒来时的识是空于外境的，因为是识，就像梦中的识一样。并且，醒来时所缘 的境是虚假的，因为是境，就像梦中的境一样。同样，如果遍行（kunga，梵文：sarvatraga）的所依（kunbyang，梵文：ālaya）没有他性，那么遍行就不存在，因为没有所依，就像乌龟毛的衣服一样。他们会这样说。同样，也可以用眼翳的例子来说明。以上这些就是了。其中前两个论式，因为例子未成立，所以是能立
English
Just as maturity is not the cause, so in dreams, sleep is not the cause of the maturation of the habit of phenomena. If knowledge that is established by its own nature arises without an external world, then it does not depend on the maturation of habits. Because from false habits arises the false knowledge of dream phenomena, therefore, in dreams, the consciousness that appears as objects of the external world, such as form, etc., is also false. The eye-consciousness in dreams, that is, the cause of consciousness, that is, what serves as the basis, should also be acknowledged. This is stated in the commentary: "In dreams, when completely cutting off the object, one focuses on the aggregation of three." Also, just as in dreams there are no sense-sphere of form and eye, and no eye-consciousness produced by the two, although in dreams there are no three—object, faculty, and consciousness—of the five sense-consciousnesses such as eye-consciousness, from the perspective of the person who is dreaming, there is focus on these three. Therefore, one should acknowledge the dream eye, the dream eye-consciousness, and the dream form, but it is not that these three are considered to be established as eye, etc. Just as one acknowledges illusory horses and cattle and illusory people, but it is not necessary to consider them to be horses, cattle, and people. Therefore, in this way, whatever answers this Mind-Only school gives to the Madhyamaka school are seen as being the same as the unestablished thesis (i.e., what is to be proven). Therefore, this debate, that is, this statement of the Mind-Only school, is to be eliminated, that is, refuted. If we give examples, the Madhyamaka school says that the three—object, faculty, and consciousness—of the waking state are empty because they are established by their own nature, because they are objects of focus, just like a dream. When this is stated, the Mind-Only school will say that the consciousness of the waking state is empty of external objects, because it is consciousness, just like the consciousness of a dream. And the object of focus in the waking state is false, because it is an object, just like the object of a dream. Similarly, if the basis of the all-ground (kunga, Sanskrit: sarvatraga) (kunbyang, Sanskrit: ālaya) does not have other-power, then the all-ground does not exist, because there is no basis, just like a garment made of turtle hair. They would say this. Similarly, the example of cataracts can also be given. These are all. Of these, the first two syllogisms, because the example is not established, are proofs
Chinese
与您要证明的相同，因为在梦中存在着与意识本质不同的法处所的色。第三个论式是：因为想要证明一个遍计所执的所依是自相成立的，所以对于它来说，仅仅是所依不存在是不成立的，如果考虑到自性成立，那是不确定的。第三，像这样驳斥唯识宗的观点，不仅理证上没有损害，而且经典上也不可能存在损害，因为圆满正等觉的诸佛，在自己的宗派中，在任何经典中也没有说事物是真实存在的。如《楞伽经》中说：三有唯是假立，自性实无物。假立事物之体性，妄想者乃生妄想。自性非有亦非识，阿赖耶识及无物，愚童妄想者，如味此等而观察。这样说了。第一句偈颂显示了三有只是由分别假立而存在，第二句偈颂则显示了它的意义，也就是显示了没有自性成立的事物，所以说不是没有自性成立，而是事物完全不存在。像这样，对于仅仅由分别假立的事物，那些没有找到真实意义的论师们认为它是自性成立的事物，这两个“假立”一词就显示了这个意思。普遍地显示了没有自性成立，具体地分开显示的是：噜巴这个词既可以指自性，也可以指色，这里指的是有色，这是通过“识”这个词的力量来体现的。由于“无物”这个词的事物已经显示了没有意识和有色的事物，所以这里指的是体性，也就是指遮止了事物真实的体性，以及指其他不存在的事物。像味道一样，是因为没有能够辨别真实的心。这部经文遮止了三界中的他起是自性存在的观点。如果认为这些经文显示了一个是他起，另一个是遍计，能取所取是实体不同的自性空性，所以没有损害，那么，这种观点就不是真正的空性，因为智慧
English
It is the same as what you want to prove, because in dreams there are forms of objects of the dharma that are different in essence from consciousness. The third argument is: Because one wants to prove that a basis of complete purification is established by its own characteristics, for that, it is not established that there is no basis alone, and if one considers it to be established by its own characteristics, then it is uncertain. Third, like this, refuting the Mind-Only view, not only is there no harm in reasoning, but it is also impossible for there to be harm in scripture, because the perfectly complete Buddhas have never taught in any scripture in their own tradition that things are truly existent. As it is said in the Lankavatara Sutra: The three realms are only imputed, In essence, there is no thing. Imputed as the nature of things, Those who speculate will speculate. Self-nature is non-existent and consciousness is non-existent, The alaya is non-existent and there is no thing, Foolish children speculate, Like tasting these and observing. Thus it is said. The first verse shows that the three existences exist only as imputed by thought, and the second verse shows its meaning, that is, it shows that there is no thing established by its own essence, so it is said that it is not that there is no establishment by its own essence, but that things do not exist at all. Like this, for things that are only imputed by thought, those logicians who have not found the true meaning think that they are things established by their own essence, and these two words "imputed" show this meaning. It is generally shown that there is no establishment by its own essence, and specifically, it is shown separately: The word rupa can refer to both self-nature and form, but here it refers to the colored, which is manifested by the power of the word "consciousness". Since the thing of the word "non-thing" has already shown that there is no consciousness and colored thing, here it refers to the nature, that is, it refers to the nature that prevents the true nature of things, and refers to other non-existent things. Like taste, it is because there is no mind that can discern the truth. This scripture prevents the view that the other-dependent in the three realms is self-existent. If one thinks that these scriptures show that one is other-dependent, and the other is completely imputed, and that the apprehended and the apprehender are empty of self-nature of different entities, so there is no harm, then such a view is not true emptiness, because wisdom