English
To proclaim the teacher as supreme is to distinguish him from others (teachers). What is the proof? It is the noble Nagarjuna. The time is the beginning of composing the treatise. The necessity is to show oneself as supreme and to inspire others to have reverence for the teacher. There are many ways to praise the teacher, but praising through the way of explaining dependent origination, this way and many others have been explained. As it is said in the offering verse of the "Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning", by the reason of dependent origination, all extremes such as arising and ceasing are prevented. Therefore, this great being's mind is very pleased, and this is also the main point of reasoning. The second part is divided into two points: arranging the chapters of the treatise into the order of practice, and explaining the meaning of each chapter separately. The first part is divided into two points: identifying the mind that grasps the object to be refuted by reasoning, and how the treatise explains it as a component of refutation. The first part is divided into two points: the actual meaning, and the way of adding qualifications to the object of refutation. The first point is: in the twenty-sixth chapter, it explains the order of entering samsara due to the power of ignorance, and the order of reversing samsara due to the cessation of ignorance. And, "The cause of the cessation of ignorance is, through wisdom, meditating on suchness." Therefore, by meditating on the meaning of knowing suchness, ignorance can be abandoned. Therefore, knowing the meaning of suchness, relying on knowledge and ignorance, will transform into samsara and nirvana. If ignorance is not identified, one will not know the method of abandoning ignorance, which is like shooting an arrow without seeing the target. Therefore, ignorance should be identified. Moreover, it is not merely not knowing suchness, nor is it merely different from suchness, but it is grasping the opposite, contradictory, and inconsistent aspects of the way of grasping suchness, therefore it is a grasping of things as truly existing. The "Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness" says: "Things born from causes and conditions, whatever thought is of their true existence, the teacher said that is ignorance, from which the twelve branches arise." And the "Precious Garland" also says: "Like a mirage, whether the world exists or not, grasping at this is delusion, and if there is delusion, there is no liberation." The delusion of grasping at non-existence mentioned here refers to the ignorance of karma and its effects, so it is not relevant here. The world.
Chinese
执著于实有，是实执的无明。它分为两种，其中对法之我愚昧的无明，是指缘于眼耳等法，执著于以自性成立之相。对补特伽罗之我愚昧的无明，是指缘于补特伽罗，执著于以自性成立之相。其中，缘于他相续的补特伽罗而如此执著，虽是补特伽罗我执，但并非俱生我见。缘于生起“我”之念的所依“我”，执著于以自性成立之相，既是俱生我见的我执，也是对补特伽罗之我愚昧。缘于“我所”，执著于以自性成立之相，既是执著于“我所”的俱生我见，也是对补特伽罗之我之“我所”愚昧。缘于“我所”之所依眼耳等而如此执著，是法我执，因此所谓缘于“我所”，并非缘于那些。无有之所依，唯一性，在补特伽罗和法之上遮止，安立为二种无我，因此二我虽以所依各自的差别而安立，但在我本身上没有差别。因此，二种我执，除了所缘各异之外，行相相同。如《百论释》中说：“所谓我，是指诸事物不依赖于他者的自性，无此即是无我。它通过法和补特伽罗的差别而分为二，即法无我和补特伽罗无我。”佛护也说，所说的“一切法无我”中的“我”字，解释为自性的意思。还有一种将“我”作为“我”之念的所缘的第二种方式，这被认为是世俗谛中存在，并且是“我执”的所依。俱生我见是与“我”和“我所”之相相关的，因此没有不缘于“我”的俱生我执。对补特伽罗和法之实执的愚昧，也在《入行论释》和《百论释》中阐述，佛护也如此认为。这与圣天父子的观点已经多次论证，故不再赘述。
English
Grasping at things as truly existent is the ignorance of grasping at truth. It is divided into two types. The ignorance of being deluded about the self of phenomena refers to grasping at the aspect of being established by its own nature, based on objects such as the eyes and ears. The ignorance of being deluded about the self of a person refers to grasping at the aspect of being established by its own nature, based on a person. Among these, grasping at another person's continuum in this way, although it is a grasping at the self of a person, is not an innate view of self. Grasping at the aspect of being established by its own nature, based on the basis of the arising of the thought "I," is both the innate view of self of grasping at self and the ignorance of being deluded about the self of a person. Grasping at the aspect of being established by its own nature, based on "mine," is both the innate view of self of grasping at "mine" and the ignorance of being deluded about the "mine" of the self of a person. Grasping in this way, based on the basis of "mine," such as the eyes and ears, is a grasping at the self of phenomena. Therefore, the so-called grasping at "mine" does not refer to grasping at those. The absence of a basis, the oneness, is negated on the basis of persons and phenomena, and is established as two types of selflessness. Therefore, although the two selves are established by the distinctions of their respective bases, there is no difference in the self itself. Therefore, the two types of grasping at self have the same aspect, except for the difference in their objects. As the Commentary on the Hundred Verses says, "The so-called self refers to the nature of things that does not depend on others. The absence of this is selflessness. It is understood as two types by the distinction of phenomena and persons, namely, the selflessness of phenomena and the selflessness of persons." Buddhapalita also said that the meaning of the word "self" in "all phenomena are selfless" is explained as the meaning of nature. There is also a second way of establishing "I" as the object of the thought "I," which is said to exist in conventional truth and is the basis of grasping at self. The innate view of self is involved in the aspects of "I" and "mine." Therefore, there is no innate grasping at self that does not rely on "I." The ignorance of grasping at the truth of persons and phenomena is also explained in the Commentary on the Entrance to the Middle Way and the Commentary on the Hundred Verses, and Buddhapalita also holds this view. This has been repeatedly proven to be the view of the noble father and son, so I will not elaborate further.
Chinese
因此，其他论师认为是所知障的法我执，在这里被认为是烦恼。瑜伽行派和自续中观派认为，在人与法上不存在的二种我，是截然不同的，因为这个理由，证悟人无我，是否需要证悟法无我，他们也不一致。所破遍计所执，对于没有被宗派改变心意的人来说是不存在的，因此不是束缚一切有情轮回的因素，所以束缚的因素是二者都具有的俱生我执。《百论》中说：“由分别所见为束缚，此于此处应遮遣。”意思是说，由执著自性的分别念所束缚，因此要遮止它的对境。第二，所破的执著，不是所有执著存在的分别念，而是执著胜义谛中，或者以自相存在的执著。对此，诸佛所宣说的法，完全依赖于二谛。意思是说，必须了解生灭等存在是世俗谛，不存在是胜义谛的二谛差别。宝鬘论中也说：“如是幻化的世间，生和灭的显现虽然有，但在胜义谛中，生和灭是不存在的。”因此，不是遮止生灭等存在本身，而是胜义谛中存在是所破，以及如此执著的心是执著所破的心。同样，它们不是从自性中存在的，因此烦恼不是真实存在的。这里对从自性中存在和真实存在加以区分。宝鬘论中说：“如果种子是虚假的，它的产生怎么会是真实的呢？”这里对真实加以区分，并且在了义经中也有许多区分。从自性、自性和自相中存在，以及从自己的自性中存在等是相同的，也经常出现“从自身成立”的说法。其中，自续中观派认为，如果加上胜义谛、真实、真如和如实等的区分，就能遮止存在，如果不加上这些区分，即使加上从自性或者从自性中存在等，也无法遮止。佛护和月称
English
Therefore, the self-grasping of phenomena, which other teachers consider to be the obscuration to knowledge, is here regarded as afflictions. The Yogācāra and Svātantrika-Madhyamaka schools consider the two selves, which do not exist in persons and phenomena, to be very different. For this reason, they disagree on whether or not one needs to realize the selflessness of phenomena when one realizes the selflessness of persons. The object of negation, the imputed self-grasping, does not exist for those whose minds have not been transformed by tenets, so it is not a factor that binds all sentient beings to saṃsāra. Therefore, the binding factor is the innate self-grasping that both have. The *Śataśāstra* says, "What is seen by conceptualization is a binding; this should be refuted here." This means that one is bound by the conceptualization that imputes inherent existence, so its object should be refuted. Secondly, the conceptualization that grasps the object of negation is not just any conceptualization that grasps existence, but the grasping of existence in the ultimate sense or by its own characteristics. Regarding this, the Buddhas taught the Dharma, relying entirely on the two truths. This means that one must understand the distinction between the two truths, where existence such as arising and ceasing is conventional truth, and non-existence is ultimate truth. The *Ratnāvalī* also says, "Likewise, in the illusory world, although there appears to be arising and ceasing, in the ultimate sense, there is no arising or ceasing." Therefore, it is not the mere existence of arising and ceasing that is negated, but existence in the ultimate sense is the object of negation, and the mind that grasps it as such is the mind that grasps the object of negation. Similarly, they do not exist from their own nature; therefore, afflictions do not truly exist. Here, a distinction is made between existing from one's own nature and truly existing. The *Ratnāvalī* says, "If the seed is false, how can its arising be true?" Here, a distinction is made regarding truth, and there are also many distinctions in the definitive meaning sūtras. Existing from own-being, own-nature, and own-characteristics, and existing from one's own own-being, etc., are the same, and the phrase "established from itself" also often appears. Among these, the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school believes that if the distinctions of ultimate truth, reality, truth, and suchness are added, existence can be negated, but if these distinctions are not added, even if one adds from own-being or existing from own-being, etc., it cannot be negated. Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti