English
If both views are valid, then they are equally valid, and if they are not valid, then they are equally invalid. If analyzed as before, the analyzer will not find the latter, and in the appearance of delusion, the former also exists. If that is the case, then in the 'Entering the Middle Way,' it says, 'This should not be the basis for self-grasping, nor should it be desired to exist in conventional truth.' And, 'The non-Buddhists who are greatly disturbed by the sleep of ignorance, with their examination of the self as it is, and the examination of illusions, mirages, etc., those are not even existent in the world.' Etc., because the tenets of other schools of thought, both self and other, are not established by ultimate truth, and the objects of clinging to illusions as horses and cows, and clinging to mirages as water, etc., saying that these do not even exist in conventional truth, these statements become unreasonable. Because even those with deluded minds would not cling to them in that way, and because they exist in the appearance of delusion, they become existent in name. And, the statements that are refuted by reason, such as 'birth from self and other, etc., are not even established in name,' also become unable to refute. Those delusions are not the self-gratifying delusions of sentient beings that have been passed down from beginningless time, nor can it be said that there is no fault in establishing something as existing in conventional truth merely because it exists in the appearance of delusion that has been passed down from beginningless time without analysis. If that were the case, then the object of clinging of the innate self-grasping, which clings to permanence by clinging to past and future as one, and clings to persons and phenomena as being established by their own characteristics, would also become existent in name. Therefore, if it exists in name, then it contradicts finding how it exists by searching with reasoning consciousness, but it is necessary to determine that there is something that is not harmed by valid reasoning consciousness, and it is also necessary that there is something that is not harmed by any other valid conventional consciousness, because things that exist in name need to be established by valid cognition. If that is the case, then it is contradictory that things that exist in name are merely established by the power of the name's designation. If you say that, then there is no fault, for example, the person, which exists in conventional truth, is merely established by the power of the name's designation, the word 'merely' prevents the person from not being established by the power of the name's designation, but it does not prevent the person from being established by valid cognition, and it also does not show that all things established by the power of the name's designation exist in conventional truth. So, what kind of things that are not established by the power of the name's designation will it prevent?