Chinese
就像安立补特伽罗一样，也安立了人。因为这被说是轻易获得甚深见解的方法，所以应当知道，这些理路是遮破人我的理路之主要部分。如《入行论》中说：“以七相推求无，瑜伽师亦不得，云何彼为有？由彼易入彼，故此如是成，当许此成立。”这说的是，首先以七种方式寻找人而找不到，以及依靠自己的蕴而安立，这很容易理解，所以引导的次第也是如此。这也是仅仅依靠蕴而安立，因此在那七者中找不到人，这是人无我的意义，所以归结于缘起的理路。这样，依靠产生和依靠安立的理由，遮破了自生等四种，以及自性一异等七种，对法和人进行遮破，这应当作为所有理路的要点来把握。第二，那么，以缘起的理由遮破了自相成立，即使在世俗中也遮破，这似乎是此宗解释圣者意趣的特点，那么对此作何种特别的破斥呢？这非常重要，所以要进行解说。对此，《入行论》的根本颂中有三种理路，注释中有一种理路，共四种进行遮破。其中第一种是圣者等持成为事物坏灭之因的过失：如果事物具有以自相成立的自性，那么瑜伽师在现量证悟一切法无自性时，那个智慧必须缘取色受等，但由于没有缘取，所以它们会变得不存在。事物先前存在后来不存在就是坏灭，而那个坏灭之因是那个智慧所为，所以它会成为坏灭之因，那样是不合理的，因此在任何时候都不承认自相的产生。如《入行论》中说：“若谓自性为所依，彼坏故物应毁坏，空性成坏法之因，是故真实非有物。”如果仅仅是以自相存在，那个智慧不需要缘取，而是以胜义存在，那么
English
Just as the pudgala is posited, so too is the person posited. Because this is said to be a method for easily attaining the profound view, it should be known that these reasonings are the main part of the reasonings that refute the self of the person. As it is said in the Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds, "How can that which is not found by searching in seven ways be said to exist? Because by that, one easily enters into that, therefore, this is established in that way, it should be admitted that this is established." This says that, first, if one searches for a person in seven ways, one will not find it, and that it is easy to understand that it is posited in reliance on one's own aggregates, so the order of guidance is also the same. This is also merely posited in reliance on the aggregates, therefore, one does not find a person in those seven, this is the meaning of the selflessness of the person, so it comes down to the reasoning of dependent arising. Thus, the reason of arising in dependence and the reason of being posited in dependence, refutes the four, such as self-arising, and the seven, such as self-nature being one or different, refuting phenomena and persons, this should be grasped as the main point of all the reasonings. Secondly, then, it seems to be a special characteristic of this system of explaining the intention of the noble ones that the sign of dependent arising refutes self-established existence, even in conventional truth, so what kind of special refutation is made against that? This is very important, so it will be explained. For this, there are three reasonings in the root verses of the Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds, and one reasoning in the commentary, so four in total refute it. Among them, the first is the fault that the samadhi of the noble ones becomes the cause of the destruction of things: If things had a self-nature that was established by their own characteristics, then when a yogi directly realizes that all phenomena are without self-nature, that wisdom must apprehend forms, feelings, etc., but because it does not apprehend them, they would become non-existent. A thing that previously existed and later does not exist is destruction, and the cause of that destruction is done by that wisdom, so it would become the cause of destruction, that is not reasonable, therefore, the arising of self-characteristics is not admitted at any time. As it is said in the Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds, "If it is said that self-nature is the basis, then things should be destroyed because it is destroyed, emptiness becomes the cause of destroying phenomena, therefore, reality is not a thing." If it is merely existence by its own characteristics, that wisdom does not need to apprehend it, but if it exists in ultimate truth, then
Chinese
如果有人说，必须驳斥这种观点，而且我们不承认这一点，因为以自相成立的事物存在于名言中。这虽然是驳斥错误的真正基础，但却无法驳斥，这将在下部理学中讨论。如果名言谛成为理性分析的对象，那么如果事物以自相成立，例如，在施加“生”这个名称时，对于施加的对象，我们应该考察这个幼苗是从种子中产生一个自性不同的事物，还是一个自性相同的事物。在考察时，考察者必须能够找到答案。否则，它就仅仅是名称的施加，因此没有以自相成立的意义。因此，在寻找和考察时，除了不生不灭的真如自性之外，找不到其他的生等现象。因此，世俗的诸法不应被视为通过这种考察可以找到的意义。《入行论》中说：“因为如果分析这些事物，就找不到存在于真如自性事物之外的其他事物。因此，不应对世俗的名称进行分析。”对此，正如之前所说，由于在以何种程度的分析来判断是否成立真如的理性界限上存在差异，因此，虽然以类似于此处所说的分析方法可以进行分析，但不认为以判断是否成立真如的理性可以进行分析，因此说没有损害是驳斥错误的真正基础，这与之前的驳斥错误的关键相同。之所以无法驳斥这些错误，原因在于，正如之前多次提到的，月称论师在许多场合都说过，在世俗中存在的事物是存在于世间名称中的。世间名称所安立的士夫和法，仅仅是不分析名称的意义如何存在而安立的。因此，相反地，经过分析后安立为存在的事物，就是所说的胜义存在。因此，如果以自相存在，就必须能够被理智所分析，并且必须能够被胜义现量所衡量。如果诸如根识等无害的识，不是由于显现的力量而安立，而是由于事物自身存在方式的力量而存在，那就是胜义存在。因此，事物自身的存在方式。
English
If someone says that this view must be refuted, and we do not accept this, because things established by their own characteristics exist in name. Although this is the real basis for refuting errors, it cannot be refuted, which will be discussed in the lower logic. If conventional truth becomes an object of rational analysis, then if things are established by their own characteristics, for example, when the name "birth" is applied, we should examine whether this sprout produces something of a different nature from the seed, or something of the same nature. When examining, the examiner must be able to find the answer. Otherwise, it would only be the application of the name, so there is no meaning of being established by its own characteristics. Therefore, when searching and examining, apart from the unborn and unceasing Suchness nature, no other phenomena such as birth can be found. Therefore, mundane dharmas should not be regarded as meanings that can be found through such examination. The Entering the Middle Way says: "Because if you analyze these things, you will not find anything other than the reality of things that possess that nature. Therefore, do not analyze the truth of worldly conventions." Regarding this, as mentioned earlier, since there are differences in the rational boundaries of judging whether or not Suchness is established by what degree of analysis, although it can be analyzed by the method of analysis similar to what is said here, it is not considered that it can be analyzed by the reason of judging whether or not Suchness is established, so saying that there is no harm is the real basis for refuting errors, which is the same as the key to the previous refutation of errors. The reason why these errors cannot be refuted is that, as mentioned many times before, Chandrakirti has said on many occasions that what exists in the conventional is said to exist in the world's names. The individuals and dharmas established by worldly names are established only without analyzing how the meaning of the names exists. Therefore, conversely, what is established as existing after analysis is said to be ultimately existent. Therefore, if it exists by its own characteristics, it must be able to be analyzed by reason, and it must be able to be measured by the ultimate direct perception. If consciousness, such as sense consciousness, etc., is not established by the power of appearance without harm, but exists by the power of the thing's own mode of existence, then it is ultimately existent. Therefore, the thing's own mode of existence.
Chinese
如果说，要知道不是因为自在（ī dbang）而有，而是因为无害和显现的自在而有，这在世俗的言语中是有的，但不是因为名称的言语而安立的。如果是这样，那么就与所说的“一切法唯是名、诠释和假立”相违背，而且这也是世间的诠释和言语所具有的，但在胜义中则不是。如果对假立的言语所假立的意义进行考察，就能找到存在的意义，那么“唯”字的语音又断除了什么呢？又怎么能说“由世间的诠释而有”呢？对于世间人如何承认假立的言语的意义的方式，如果说与此极不相符，就是存在于世间的言语中，那也只是说了而已，因为并不想表达这个意思。对于在补特伽罗的言语的意义上进行寻找和考察，所找到的意义不能安立为补特伽罗，这是七相推理；对于在生等法的言语的意义上进行考察，所找到的意义不能安立为生等法，这是因为在言语中，以遮止他生等理，已经在其他地方详细地确定了，应该从中了解。因此，“苗芽生长”和“我看见”等，是法和补特伽罗的言语；“苗芽从种子等其他物质产生”和“实有的我看见”等言语，对于在什么上作了言语，如果寻找其意义如何存在，即使没有发现也没有差别。然而，对于如其所安立一样存在的意义，其他量是否会造成损害，这一点非常重要，因此前两者存在于言语中，而后两者则甚至不存在于言语中。这也要依靠很好地区分理智造成的损害和不堪忍受考察这两者的差别，以及理智没有发现存在和见到不存在这两者的差别，因为这些已经在其他地方详细地阐述过了。在没有圆满地辨别这些的考察之前，如果以相似的理证遮止了胜义中成立的事物，并且以错乱的意识执着于世俗中存在的事物，那么仅仅以在那里的显现就能成立，因为它的意义仅仅是存在于错乱的显现中。如果认为自在和主宰等产生苦乐，以及从黑白业中产生
English
If it is said that knowing that it does not exist by the power of Īśvara (ī dbang), but exists by the power of harmlessness and appearance, this exists in worldly terms, but it is not established by the power of nominal terms. If so, then it contradicts what is said, "All dharmas are merely names, expressions, and designations," and that this also exists by worldly expressions and terms, but not in the ultimate sense. If, upon examining how the designated object of a designated term exists, an existing meaning is found, then what does the word "merely" cut off? And how can it be said that it exists by worldly expression? If it is said that it exists in worldly terms, even though it is very inconsistent with how worldly people accept the meaning of designated terms, it is merely saying it because it does not want to express that meaning. Examining and investigating the meaning of the term "person," the meaning found cannot be established as a person, which is the sevenfold analysis. Examining the meaning of the term "arising" and other dharmas, the meaning found cannot be established as arising and other dharmas, because in terms, it has already been determined in detail elsewhere by reasoning such as preventing other-arising, and it should be understood from that. Therefore, "a sprout grows" and "I see" are terms for dharmas and persons. The terms "a sprout arises from other substances such as seeds" and "the existing self sees," even though there is no difference in searching for how the meaning exists in what is termed, the fact that other valid cognitions do or do not harm the meaning that exists as it is established is very important. Therefore, the former two exist in terms, while the latter two do not even exist in terms. This also depends on clearly distinguishing the difference between harm caused by reasoning and being unable to withstand examination, and the difference between reasoning not finding existence and seeing non-existence, because these have already been explained in detail elsewhere. Before the examination that distinguishes these is complete, if things that are established in the ultimate sense are prevented by seemingly valid reasoning, and if things that exist in the conventional sense are grasped as existing by mistaken consciousness, then they can be established merely by their appearance there, because their meaning is merely existing in mistaken appearance. If it is thought that happiness and suffering arise from Īśvara and the chief, and from black and white actions arise
Chinese
如果两种观点都成立，那么就都同样成立，如果不成立，那么就都同样不成立。如果像以前一样进行分析，那么进行分析者也无法找到后者，而在错觉的显现中，前者也是存在的。如果是这样，那么《入行论》中说：“此不应为我执之所依，此亦不欲存在于世俗中。”以及“无知睡眠所扰之外道，以彼等如实观察之我，幻术阳焰等之观察，彼等亦非存在于世间。”等等，因为自他宗派的其他宗义并非胜义所立，以及对于幻术执著为马牛，对于阳焰执著为水等的境，说这些在世俗中也不存在，这些说法就不合理了。 因为即使是心怀错觉者也不会那样执著，并且因为在错觉的显现中存在，所以就成为名言中存在。并且，以理智遮止的“自他所生等在名言中也不成立”等说法，也无法遮止。那些错觉并非从无始以来就延续下来的众生自以为是的错觉，也不是仅仅因为未经分析而从无始以来就延续下来的错觉显现中存在，就安立为世俗中存在，这样说也是不行的。如果是这样，那么执著前后为一的常执，以及执著人我和法以自性成立的俱生我执的执著境，也都会成为名言中存在了。因此，如果名言中存在，那么用理智去寻找它是如何存在的，找到它就相违，但是必须确定有理智量不损害的东西，并且也需要有名言量的其他任何量都不损害的东西，因为名言中存在的事物需要以量来成立。如果是这样，那么名言中存在的事物仅仅是凭借名称的名言而安立的，这就有矛盾了。如果这样说，那么没有过失，比如人我，存在于世俗中，仅仅是凭借名称的名言而安立的，这个“仅仅”的词语是遮止人我不是凭借名称的名言而安立的，但并不遮止人我是以量成立的，并且也不是显示所有凭借名称的名言而安立的事物都存在于世俗中。那么，会遮止什么样的不是凭借名称的名言而安立的事物呢？