Chinese
因此，为了详细解释这种通过陈述论证来驳斥错误观念的方法的重要性，所谓“成立”，是指法，例如眼睛，以及例子，例如瓶子，以及理由，例如不看自身，以及所要证明的法，例如蓝色等等，这些都不被自己的宗派所承认。仅仅是被他人所承认，因此，说理由和周遍等等仅仅在对方那里成立是没有意义的。那么，应该怎样理解呢？虽然这些在自己的宗派中也被承认，但是用以证明它们的量，即以自性成立的方式来衡量所量，在自己的宗派中连名言也不存在。对于声称自性存在的人来说，这些的成立必然依赖于量的成立，因此，由于不存在以自性成立的方式来衡量，从而在两者看来都一致成立的量，所以对两者来说都不是成立，而是被称为“为他所知”或“为他所成立”。那么，由于这样的量连名言中也不存在，因此认为它能成立，就像是虚构自性一样，会被理证所损害。如果依靠这些能成立的事物就能找到中观的见解，那么依靠量所损害的理由就能找到不错误的见解，那么所有的颠倒宗派也都能找到它了。如果有人这样问，那么，这位外来的辩论者认为法，例如眼睛，以及理由，例如不看自身，以及例子，例如瓶子，以及不看蓝色等等的所执持的境，在自己的宗派中也是以名言的方式存在的，因此这些不会被理证所损害。然而，由于这位外来的辩论者没有区分这些以自性存在和存在这二者，因此，虽然理证会损害他认为这些是以自性成立的方式来衡量所量，并由量所成立的境，但是，他的相续中的名言识所成立的事物，理证又怎么会阻止呢？因此，由于在他的宗派和自己的宗派中，都没有共同承认以自性成立的方式来衡量所量的量，所以不是用自续来证明，而仅仅是揭示他自己的承诺的矛盾。这种情况是，以先前所陈述的为他所知的论证为例，对于法，即眼睛来说，不看自身的理由在名言中是存在的，而看蓝色等等以自性成立，这在名言中也不存在，因此前者会遮止后者。
English
Therefore, in order to explain in detail the importance of this method of refuting erroneous conceptions by stating arguments, the so-called "establishment" refers to the dharma, such as the eye, and examples, such as the vase, and the reason, such as not seeing itself, and the dharma to be proven, such as blue, etc., which are not admitted by one's own school. It is only admitted by others, therefore, it is meaningless to say that the reason and pervasion, etc., are established only in the opponent's view. So, how should it be understood? Although these are also admitted in one's own school, the valid cognition that proves them, that is, measuring the measurable in a self-established way, does not even exist in name in one's own school. For those who claim that self-nature exists, the establishment of these necessarily depends on the establishment of the valid cognition, therefore, since there is no valid cognition that measures in a self-established way, thereby being consistently established in the view of both, it is not established for both, but is called "known to others" or "established for others." Then, since such a valid cognition does not even exist in name, thinking that it can establish is like fabricating self-nature, which will be harmed by reasoning. If one can find the Madhyamaka view by relying on these things that can be established, then one can find the unerring view by relying on the reason that is harmed by valid cognition, then all the inverted schools will also be able to find it. If someone asks this, then, this external debater believes that the objects held by the dharma, such as the eye, and the reason, such as not seeing itself, and the examples, such as the vase, and not seeing blue, etc., also exist in name in his own school, therefore these will not be harmed by reasoning. However, since this external debater does not distinguish between these two, existing in self-nature and existing, therefore, although reasoning will harm the object he thinks is measuring the measurable in a self-established way and is established by valid cognition, how can reasoning prevent the things established by the nominal consciousness in his continuum? Therefore, since there is no commonly admitted valid cognition that measures the measurable in a self-established way in his school and one's own school, it is not proven by self-continuum, but only reveals the contradiction of his own promise. The situation is that, taking the previously stated argument known to others as an example, for the dharma, that is, the eye, the reason for not seeing itself exists in name, while seeing blue, etc., is established in self-nature, which does not even exist in name, therefore the former will prevent the latter.
Chinese
可以的。如果眼睛上的记号和需要否定的法，两者要么同时存在，要么同时不存在，那么这两者怎么能成为损害者和被损害者呢？因此，他称的论式的有法、法和理由等，必须是名言中存在的。仅仅他承认存在是不行的。有法眼睛等那些，因为他自己承认存在，中观派怎么需要去成立那些呢？如果对此也否认，说我们没有成立，请成立吧，那么没有不否认的人，与那些争论没有结果，谁会做那种事呢？这里有些人说，如果向对方显示不观待自己和观待蓝色等以自性成立的自性存在，有什么理由知道是相违的呢？如果是以量成立是相违的，那么双方都必须成立，所以不能说是他称的。如果是以承诺来安立相违，那么不观待自己和观待他者，对方认为是不相违的。因此，以他的承诺来安立相违是不合理的。如果是自己承诺是相违来安立，那么就太过分了，对外道说，您认为这个不相违是不合理的，因为我承诺这个是相违的。这样怎么能说呢？过失
English
Okay. If the sign on the eye and the dharma to be negated, both either exist together or do not exist together, then how can these two be the harmer and the harmed? Therefore, the subject, dharma, and reason of the other-accepted syllogism must be something that exists in name. It is not enough for him to merely admit that it exists. Since he himself admits that the subject, such as the eye, exists, why would the Madhyamika need to establish those? If he also denies this, saying that it is not established for us, please establish it, then there is no one who does not deny, and arguing with those is fruitless, so who would do such a thing? Here, some say, if one shows the contradiction to the opponent who believes in not looking at oneself and looking at blue, etc., as having a nature that is established by its own essence, how does one know that it is contradictory? If it is established by valid cognition that it is contradictory, then it must be established for both parties, so it should not be called 'other-accepted.' If contradiction is established by commitment, then since the opponent believes that not looking at oneself and looking at others are not contradictory, it is unreasonable to establish contradiction by his commitment. If it is established by one's own commitment that it is contradictory, then it is too extreme, saying to the outsider, 'It is unreasonable for you to believe that this is not contradictory, because I have committed that this is contradictory.' How can one say that? The fault
Tibetan
་བལྟ་བ་ལ་གཞན་ལ་བལྟ་བ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་གྲུབ་པ་མེད་པས་ཁྱབ་ལུགས་ཇི་ལྟར་སྟོན་སྙམ་ན། བུད་དྷ་པཱ་ལི་ཏའི་འགྲེལ་པ་བཞིན་བཤད་པར་བྱའོ། །དཔེར་ན་ཆུ་དང་ལྡན་པས་ས་ལ་རླན་དང༌། མེ་དང་ལྡན་པས་ཆུ་ལ་ཚ་བ་དང༌། སྣ་མའི་མེ་ཏོག་དང་ལྡན་པས་གོས་ལ་དྲི་ཞིམ་པ་དམིགས་པ་ནི། ཆུ་ལ་སོགས་པ་གསུམ་པོ་དེ་ལ་རླན་ལ་སོགས་པ་གསུམ་པོ་དེ་དམིགས་པ་ལ་ལྟོས་དགོས་པར་མཐོང་ཞིང༌། ཁྱེད་རང་ཡང་འདོད་པ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ། དངོས་ པོ་རྣམས་ལ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་གྲུབ་པའི་རང་བཞིན་འགའ་ཞིག་ཡོད་ནའང་རང་བཞིན་དེ་རང་ལ་དམིགས་ནས་དེ་ནས་དེ་དང་ལྡན་པས་གཞན་ལ་ཡང་དམིགས་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །གལ་ཏེ་དེ་ཐོག་མར་རང་ལ་མ་དམིགས་ན་དེ་དང་ལྡན་པ་ན་གཞན་ལ་ཡང་ཇི་ལྟར་མཐོང་བར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན་སྣ་མའི་མེ་ཏོག་ལ་དྲི་མི་ཞིམ་པ་མ་དམིགས་ན་དེ་དང་ལྡན་པའི་གོས་ལ་ཡང་དྲི༌ང་བ་མི་དམིགས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་ཕྱི་རྒོལ་རང་ལ་གྲགས་པའི་འཐད་པས་རྗེས་སུ་འགྲོ་ལྡོག་ངེས་སུ་བཅུག་ནས། དེ་ནས་སྐབས་ཀྱི་དོན་ལ་སྦྱོར་བ་ནི། དེའི་ཕྱིར་མིག་ལའང་ལྟ་བའི་རང་བཞིན་ཡོད་ན་ཐོག་མར་རང་ལ་བལྟ་བ་དམིགས་ནས། དེ་ནས་གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་དང་ཚོགས་པ་ན་གཟུགས་ལ་བལྟ་བ་ཡང་དམིགས་པར་འཐད་པ་ཞིག་ན། མིག་ལ་རང་ལ་བལྟ་བ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཞན་ལ་བལྟ་བ་ཡང་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་སྟོན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །བཞི་བརྒྱ་པ་ལས་ཀྱང༌། དངོས་པོ་ཀུན་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་ནི། །ཐོག་མར་བདག་ལ་སྣང་འགྱུར་ན། །མིག་ཉིད་ལ་ཡང་མིག་གིས་ནི། །ཅི་ཡི་ཕྱིར་ན་འཛིན་མི་འགྱུར། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ལྟར་རོ། །གལ་ཏེ་མེས་རང་མི་བསྲེག་ཀྱང་གཞན་བསྲེག་པ་བཞིན་དུ། མིག་གིས་རང་ལ་མི་བལྟ་ཡང་གཞན་ལ་བལྟ་བ་མི་འགལ་ལོ་སྙམ་དུ་སེམས་ན། སྤྱིར་མེས་བུད་ཤིང་བསྲེག་པ་དང་མིག་གིས་གཟུགས་ལ་བལྟ་བ་ཙམ་འགོག་པ་མ་ཡིན་གྱི། མིག་ལ་གཞན་ལ་ལྟ་བ་ངོ་བོས་ཡོད་པ་འགོག་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ལྟ་ཡིན་དང་། མེས་བུད་ཤིང་བསྲེག་པ་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་པ་དཔེར་བྱེད་དགོས་པས་དེའི་ ཚེ་དཔེ་ཡང་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་བཞིན་དུ་མི་འཐད་དེ། འདི་ལྟར་མེ་དང་བུད་ཤིང་གཉིས་ལ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོས་གྲུབ་པའི་རང་བཞིན་ཡོད་ན་རང་བཞིན་གཅིག་དང་ཐ་དད་གཉིས་ལས་མི་འདའ་བས་དེ་གཉིས་གང་ཡིན། གཅིག་ཡིན་ན་ནི། མེས་རང་ཉིད་བསྲེག་པར་འགྱུར་ལ། གཞན་ཡང་མེ་སྲེག་བྱེད་དང་བུད་ཤིང་བསྲེག་བྱར་ཇི་ལྟར་འགྱུར། འགྱུར་ན་ནི་ཁོ་བོས་ཀྱང་མེ་ནི་བསྲེག་བྱའོ། །བུད་ཤིང་ནི་སྲེག་བྱེད་དོ་ཞེས་སྨྲས་ན་ལན་ཅི་ཞིག་ཡོད། གལ་ཏེ་རང་བཞིན་སོ་སོ་བ
Chinese
如果有人问，观察时，因为观察其他事物不具有自性，那么如何证明这种遍及性呢？ 应该像佛护（Buddhapālita）的注释那样解释。 例如，因为有水，所以土地潮湿；因为有火，所以水温暖；因为有茉莉花，所以衣服有香味。 观察到这三种情况，似乎需要依赖于观察水等三种事物上的潮湿等三种性质。 你们也同样认为，如果事物具有某种自性，即以自性成立，那么这种自性必须首先被观察到，然后因为它与自身相关联，才能观察到其他事物。 如果它最初没有被观察到自身，那么当它与自身相关联时，又如何能观察到其他事物呢？ 例如，如果没有观察到茉莉花不香，那么与它相关的衣服也不会被观察到有香味。 这样，通过外道自身所承认的理由，使其确信了随行和背离，然后将此应用于当前的情况： 因此，如果眼睛也具有观察的性质，那么首先应该观察到它观察自身，然后当它与色等聚集时，才能合理地观察到色。 因为眼睛没有观察自身的能力，所以它也没有观察其他事物的能力。 《四百论》中也说： “一切事物的自性，如果首先显现于自身，那么眼睛自身，为什么不能观察到自己呢？” 就像火不烧自身却能烧其他事物一样，眼睛不看自身却能看其他事物，这并不矛盾，如果你这样想，那么，一般来说，阻止的不是火烧木柴和眼睛看事物，而是阻止眼睛具有以自性存在的看其他事物的能力。 如果是这样，那么火烧木柴必须以自性成立作为例子，这样一来，这个例子也像要证明的事物一样不合理。 就像火和木柴这两个事物，如果具有以自性成立的自性，那么这种自性不外乎是一或异，那么这两种情况是哪一种呢？ 如果是一，那么火就会烧自身。 此外，火怎么会是能烧者，而木柴是被烧者呢？ 如果是这样，那么我也可以说火是被烧者，木柴是能烧者，你有什么回答呢？ 如果自性是各自不同的
English
If someone asks, when observing, since observing other things does not have self-nature, then how to prove this pervasiveness? It should be explained like the commentary of Buddhapālita. For example, because there is water, the land is moist; because there is fire, the water is warm; because there is jasmine, the clothes have a fragrance. Observing these three situations, it seems necessary to rely on observing the moisture, etc., on the three things such as water. You also think the same way, if things have some self-nature, that is, established by self-nature, then this self-nature must first be observed, and then because it is related to itself, other things can be observed. If it is not initially observed itself, then when it is related to itself, how can other things be observed? For example, if it is not observed that jasmine is not fragrant, then the clothes related to it will not be observed to have a fragrance. In this way, through the reason admitted by the outsiders themselves, they are made to believe in the following and the deviation, and then this is applied to the current situation: Therefore, if the eye also has the nature of observation, then it should first be observed that it observes itself, and then when it gathers with form, etc., it is reasonable to observe form. Because the eye does not have the ability to observe itself, it also does not have the ability to observe other things. The Four Hundred Verses also say: "The self-nature of all things, if it first appears to itself, then why can't the eye itself observe itself?" Just as fire does not burn itself but can burn other things, the eye does not see itself but can see other things, this is not contradictory, if you think so, then, in general, what is prevented is not fire burning firewood and the eye seeing things, but preventing the eye from having the ability to see other things that exists by its own nature. If so, then fire burning firewood must be established by its own nature as an example, in this way, this example is also as unreasonable as the thing to be proved. Just like the two things of fire and firewood, if they have a self-nature established by their own nature, then this self-nature is nothing more than one or different, then which of these two situations is it? If it is one, then the fire will burn itself. In addition, how can fire be the burner and firewood be the burned? If so, then I can also say that fire is the burned and firewood is the burner, what is your answer? If the self-natures are different