Chinese
不是。因此，那些也不是形状。如是说。如果像车一样，瓶子不是自身支分聚合的形状，那么腹部膨胀等就不再是它的特征，因为那些是形状。如果这样想，那么，凡是腹部膨胀和颈部细长的，就认为是瓶子，但不认为腹部膨胀等的形状是瓶子。否则，也必须认为是腹部和颈部。对于此，驳斥辩论如下：在此，实在论者说，用辨别自性有无的理智，如前所说的那样，以七相之门寻找车，如果这样也找不到车，那么就必须没有车。如果那样，世间安立车的名称都将成为不可能，那也是不合理的。因为，‘买车！’‘卖车！’‘驾车！’等等都是可以见到的。因此，车等是存在的。如果这样说，对此，入行论的注释中说了过失唯独存在于实在论者，以及自己没有过失的两种方式。第一种是，‘买车！’等等的世间名称，按照你们的观点，必须成为不存在。因为你们安立事物存在，是用寻找自性有无的理智来辨别而安立的。用那种理智寻找时，在七相中的任何一处都找不到车，并且，也不承认其他成立事物的方法，所以，车是不存在的。在用寻找自性有无的理智寻找时，如果找不到车，那么车就不是存在的。这种实在论者的辩论，现在似乎被那些想要说中观意义的人认为是中观宗的观点。因此，对于这样认为的人们，无疑会产生一切名言安立都成为不可能的过失。自己没有过失的方式是：‘彼于彼自体，或于世间中，七相皆非成，然于世间中，未以理分析，唯依自支分，而立车之名。’想要用这个来表示。它的意思是，用寻找自性有无的理智寻找时，车在那七相中的任何一处也
English
It is not. Therefore, those are not shapes either. So it is said. If, like a chariot, a pot is not the shape of its own assembled parts, then having a bulging belly and so forth would no longer be its characteristics, because those are shapes. If one thinks this way, then whatever has a bulging belly and a long neck is considered a pot, but the shape of having a bulging belly and so forth is not considered a pot. Otherwise, one would also have to consider the belly and neck as pots. To refute this, the argument is as follows: Here, the realists say that if one searches for a chariot with the reasoning that examines whether something has inherent existence or not, in the manner described above, through the sevenfold analysis, and one does not find it, then the chariot must not exist. If that were the case, then the application of the term "chariot" in the world would become impossible, which is also unreasonable. For, one sees things like, "Buy a chariot!" "Sell a chariot!" "Drive a chariot!" Therefore, chariots and so forth do exist. If one says this, in response, the commentary on the Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds states that the fault lies only with those who assert things as real, and that there are two ways in which one does not have the fault oneself. The first is that worldly terms such as "Buy a chariot!" would have to become nonexistent according to your view. Because you establish things as existing by analyzing them with the reasoning that seeks whether they have inherent existence or not. When searching with that reasoning, one does not find the chariot in any of the sevenfold analyses, and also, one does not accept any other means of establishing things, so the chariot does not exist. When searching with the reasoning that seeks whether something has inherent existence or not, if one does not find the chariot, then the chariot does not exist. This argument of the realists is now seen as being considered by those who want to speak about the meaning of the Middle Way as the view of the Madhyamikas. Therefore, for those who think this way, there is no doubt that the fault of all conventional establishments becoming impossible will arise. The way in which one does not have the fault oneself is: "It is not established as that itself, or in the world, through the sevenfold analysis, but in the world, without analysis, it is applied relying on its own parts." This is what is intended to be shown. Its meaning is that when searching with the reasoning that seeks whether something has inherent existence or not, the chariot is not found in any of those sevenfold analyses.
Chinese
既然通过二谛都无法找到，那么通过七相推理无法找到，又怎么能否定车呢？即使如此，承认车并非是通过辨析自性有无的理智来成立的，而是舍弃理智的分析，仅仅通过世俗谛，也就是名称上的知识，在无害的情况下自以为是地成立的。因此，它的安立方式是依靠自己的支分而假立的假有而成立的。如果瑜伽士这样分析时，因为理智无法找到车，所以它没有以自己的体性成立的自性，但如果认为它的支分是有自性的，那么你就像在烧焦的布的灰烬中寻找线头一样，是可笑的。如云：“若无车存在，彼时则无支，无支则无支分。”因此，如果无有支分者，则也无有支分。 如果说这不合理，因为车坏了的时候，可以见到轮子等支分集合，那么并非如此。仅仅因为以前见过车，才会认为轮子等是车的，其他人则不会这样认为。车坏了的时候，轮子等与车没有关联，因此不是车的支分。因此，即使没有支分者车，也不可能有车的支分。那时，从车的角度来说，支分和支分者都没有，但轮子等相对于自己的部分来说是支分者，那些部分是它的支分，因此无法安立没有支分者的支分。此外，没有支分者就没有支分的意思是，就像车烧毁了就没有支分一样。如云：“如火焚烧支分者，亦焚烧支分。”应如是理解此比喻。第三，从名称的差别方面成立的方式是，《入行论释》中说：“通过这种方式，在世间广为人知的安立车的名称最为明显地成立，不仅如此，此处的名称差别是什么，也应无需分析，从世间广为人知的角度来承认。例如，它本身是支分者，也就是具有部分的；车本身是作者
English
Since it cannot be found through either of the two truths, how can the chariot be refuted since it cannot be found by the sevenfold reasoning? Even so, the acceptance of a chariot is not established by the reasoning that examines whether or not there is self-nature, but by abandoning the analysis of reasoning, it is established by the worldly, that is, the knowledge of terms, just being harmless and self-satisfied. Therefore, its establishment is established as a dependent existence that is imputed in dependence on its own limbs. If a yogi analyzes it in this way, since the chariot cannot be found by reasoning, it does not have self-nature established by its own entity, but if he thinks that its limbs have self-nature, then you are like looking for threads in the ashes of burnt cloth, which is ridiculous. As it is said, "If there is no chariot, then there are no limbs, and if there are no limbs, then there are no parts." Therefore, if there is no possessor of limbs, then there are no limbs. If it is said that this is unreasonable, because when the chariot is broken, the collection of limbs such as wheels can be seen, then it is not so. Only because one has seen the chariot before, one thinks that the wheels and so on belong to the chariot, but others do not think so. When the chariot is broken, the wheels and so on are not related to the chariot, so they are not limbs of the chariot. Therefore, even if there is no chariot with limbs, there cannot be limbs of the chariot. At that time, from the perspective of the chariot, neither the limbs nor the possessor of limbs exist, but the wheels and so on are possessors of limbs in relation to their own parts, and those parts are its limbs, so it is not possible to establish limbs without a possessor of limbs. Furthermore, the meaning of no limbs without a possessor of limbs is like there are no limbs when the chariot is burned. As it is said, "As fire burns the possessor of limbs, it also burns the limbs." This analogy should be understood in this way. Third, the way of establishing from the difference of names is stated in the Commentary on Entering the Middle Way: "In this way, the establishment of the name of the chariot, which is widely known in the world, is most clearly established, not only that, but also whatever differences of names there are here should be acknowledged from the perspective of being widely known in the world without analysis. For example, it itself is the possessor of limbs, that is, having parts; the chariot itself is the maker.
Tibetan
་ཞེས་འགྲོར་བསྙད། །སྐྱེ་བོ་རྣམས་ལ་ལེན་པོ་ཉིད་ དུ་གྲུབ། །ཅེས་གསུངས་པ་ལྟར་རོ། །དེ་ཡང་ཤིང་རྟ་ནི་འཕང་ལོ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཡན་ལག་དང་ཆ་ཤས་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་ཡན་ལག་ཅན་དང་ཆ་ཤས་ཅན་ཞེས་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱི་དོན་དུ་གྲུབ་བོ། །དེ་བཞིན་དུ་འཕང་ལོ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཉེ་བར་ལེན་པའི་བྱ་བ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་བྱེད་པ་པོ་དང༌། ཉེ་བར་ལེན་པ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་ཉེ་བར་ལེན་པ་པོའི་མིང་གི་ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱང་གདགས་པར་བྱའོ། །རང་སྡེ་འགའ་ཞིག །ཡན་ལག་དང་ཆ་ཤས་འདུས་པ་ཙམ་ཡོད་ཀྱི། དེ་དག་ལས་ཐ་དད་པར་མ་དམིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཡན་ལག་ཅན་དང་ཆ་ཤས་ཅན་མེད་པར་སྨྲ་བ་དང༌། དེ་བཞིན་དུ་ལས་འབའ་ཞིག་ཡོད་ཀྱི་བྱེད་པ་པོ་མེད་པ་དང༌། ཉེ་བར་ལེན་པ་ལས་ཐ་དད་པར་མ་དམིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཉེ་བར་ལེན་པ་ཡོད་ཀྱི་ཉེ་བར་ལེན་པ་པོ་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་སྨྲ་བ་དེ་དག་ནི་འཇིག་རྟེན་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ལ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཏུ་སྨྲ་བ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་ལྟར་ན་ཡན་ལག་ལ་སོགས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ལ་དགོངས་ནས་འཇུག་པར། འཇིག་རྟེན་གྲགས་པའི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་མ་བརླག་ཅིག །ཅེས་གསུངས་སོ། །དེས་ན་དོན་དམ་པར་ནི་ཡན་ལག་ཅན་ལ་སོགས་པ་མེད་པ་ལྟར་ཡན་ལག་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཡང་མེད་ལ། ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་ནི་ཡན་ལག་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ལྟར་ཡན་ལག་ཅན་ལ་སོགས་པ་ཡང་ཡོད་པར་སྨྲ་བ་ནི་བདེན་པ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཚུལ་ལས་མ་ཉམས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །བཞི་པ་དེ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་ལྟ་བ་མྱུར་དུ་རྙེད་པའི་ཕན་ཡོན་ནི། འཇུག་འགྲེལ་ལས། གང་གི་ཕྱིར་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཀུན་རྫོབ་འདི་དེ་ལྟར་རྣམ་པར་དཔྱད་པ་ན་ཡོད་པར་མི་འགྱུར་ཞིང་མ་བརྟགས་པར་གྲགས་པས་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཕྱིར། རྣལ་འབྱོར་པས་རིམ་པ་ འདི་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་འདི་ལ་རྣམ་པར་དཔྱོད་པ་ན་ཆེས་མྱུར་བ་ཁོ་ནར་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་གཏིང་དཔོགས་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །ཇི་ལྟར་ཞེ་ན། རྣམ་བདུན་གྱིས་མེད་གང་དེ་ཇི་ལྟ་བུར། །ཡོད་ཅེས་རྣལ་འབྱོར་པས་འདིའི་ཡོད་མི་རྙེད། །དེས་དེ་ཉིད་ལའང་བདེ་བླག་འཇུག་འགྱུར་བས། །འདིར་དེའི་གྲུབ་པ་དེ་བཞིན་འདོད་པར་བྱ། །ཞེས་ཤིང་རྟའི་དཔྱད་པ་དེ་འདྲ་བ་དེས་ནི་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པའི་དོན་གྱི་གཏིང་མྱུར་དུ་དཔོགས་པར་གསུངས་པས། འདི་ནི་ཤིན་ཏུ་གནད་ཆེ་བར་སྣང་ངོ་། །འདི་ལྟར་ཡིན་ཚུལ་རྣམ་པར་དཔྱོད་པའི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་པས་གལ་ཏེ་ཤིང་རྟ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པ་ཞིག་ཡོད་ན་ནི། ཐེ་ཚོམ་མེད་པར་གཅིག་དང་ཐ་དད་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རྣམ་པ་བདུན་པོ་དེའི་སྒོ་ནས་རང་བཞིན་ཡོད་མེད་ཚོལ་བའི་རིགས་པས་བཙལ་བ་ན།
Chinese
说为行。对于众人来说，是能取者。 如是说。也就是说，车是依赖于轮辐等支分和部分，而成立为具有支分和具有部分的名称之义。同样，轮辐等依赖于近取之作用，而安立为作者，依赖于近取，也应安立为近取者的名称。有些自宗，仅仅认为支分和部分聚集在一起，因为没有观待到与那些相异，所以说没有具有支分和具有部分，同样，仅仅有作用而没有作者，因为没有观待到与近取相异，所以说有近取而没有近取者，那些是颠倒宣说世俗谛，如果那样，支分等也将会变成没有的缘故。考虑到那点，《入行论》中说：“莫坏世间名言。”如是说。因此，就胜义谛而言，如同没有具有支分等一样，支分等也没有，就世俗谛而言，如同有支分等一样，也说有具有支分等，这没有脱离二谛之理。第四，依赖于此而快速获得见解的利益是，《入行论释》中说：因为如此这般分析世间的世俗谛，就不会成立为有，不分析而以名声存在，就因为那样的缘故，瑜伽士以这个次第分析此，就会非常快速地通达那实性的深义。如何呢？以七相无所有，瑜伽士如何能找到此有？因此也能轻易进入那实性，因此应如是承认此处的成立。如是关于车的分析，就说能快速通达那实性无自性的意义之深义，因此这显得非常重要。像这样，分析观察的瑜伽士，如果车这个事物有自性成立，那么毫无疑问地，以一与异等七种方式，以寻求自性有无的道理来寻找时，
English
It is said to be going. For the people, it is established as the taker. As it is said. That is, a chariot is established as the meaning of the term 'having parts' and 'having components' in dependence on the spokes and other limbs and parts. Similarly, the name 'agent' should be applied in dependence on the function of taking nearby spokes and so on, and the name 'taker' should also be applied in dependence on taking nearby. Some of our own schools say that there are no parts or components because they only see the collection of limbs and parts and do not see them as different from each other. Similarly, they say that there is only action and no agent, and that there is taking but no taker because they do not see it as different from taking nearby. Those are the ones who speak perversely about worldly conventions, because if that were the case, the limbs and so on would also become non-existent. Considering that, it is said in the Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds: "Do not destroy the worldly conventions." Therefore, in the ultimate sense, just as there are no things with parts and so on, there are also no parts and so on. In the conventional sense, just as there are parts and so on, it is also said that there are things with parts and so on, and this does not deviate from the principle of the two truths. Fourth, the benefit of quickly attaining the view by relying on this is stated in the commentary on Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds: 'Because this worldly convention is not established as existent when analyzed in this way, and it exists by reputation without analysis, therefore, the yogi, by analyzing this in this order, will very quickly fathom the depths of that reality. How is it? How can a yogi find this existence with the sevenfold non-existence? Therefore, it will also be easy to enter that reality, so the establishment of this here should be accepted as such.' It is said that such an analysis of the chariot quickly fathoms the profound meaning of the selflessness of that reality, so this seems to be very important. In this way, if a yogi who analyzes and examines in this way, if the thing called a chariot were established by its own nature, then without a doubt, when searching with the reasoning of searching for the existence or non-existence of its own nature in terms of the seven aspects such as one and different,