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DTG187 0002.《A Commentary on Determining Valid Cognition, by Yeshe Pelzangpo.》.A Commentary on Determining Valid Cognition, by Yeshe Pelzangpo..g2.0f

English

The reason for the occurrence of faults is none other than one's own lack of understanding; what else could it be other than ignorance? The elucidator himself has mistaken the meaning, saying that names cannot be applied to non-existent things, and that non-existent things cannot be the object of refutation. Preventing the use of names for things that do not exist for others, saying that refutation from non-existent things is not allowed, because it prevents the name of refutation itself, so this itself is using a negative name for non-existent things. Because it is said that there is no reason to prevent others, it is clearly stated that this is the king's decree. Because the reason cannot be refuted from non-existent things, refutation is without a sign. Its refutation is that there is a sign on the inconsistent side; how can one accept non-existent things as existent things? Error is without reason. If it does not exist, then the existent object will be proven. What it says itself is that because the non-existent thing does not exist, it will also become an existent object. Behavior like that of a vague person is seen in the abdomen. Some people here read "blind livestock" as "completely inflated"; if that is the case, then the word "blind livestock" indicates extreme ignorance. The word "completely inflated" refers to false arrogance. If one does not agree that the reason is not refuted from the non-existent side, then why not agree that the reason enters that side? Apart from entering or refuting, there can be no other aggregates. If even entering is not agreed upon, then how can your refutation prevent my refutation? It will become a refutation. Why? Because proof or negation, etc., have been mentioned. Because here, negation and proof, these two non-existent things, are impossible, so one can only remain silent. Furthermore, using existence to negate existence, and non-existent things also have no object, so negation is not applicable; therefore, in your way of saying there is no place to go, the meaning of non-existence is lost, and names become impossible. If the thing itself cannot be negated, and it is not non-existent, then is it said that it does not exist in that place, or is non-existence negated at that time? No matter in which place or at which time it exists, it exists as it is, so it should not be negated; no matter in which place it does not exist, in that case, the non-existent thing cannot be the object of negation, so it cannot be negated. Therefore, negation

Chinese

因为遍及存在和不存在,并且对于那两者,都不允许作为否定的词语,所以,所有否定的词语都将断绝。如果按照您的观点,那会怎样呢?因为在其他地方,词语将会断绝。依赖于声音的意义,即非事物。因为事物本身无法表达,所以如前所述。事物和非事物的所依,即是境。所有否定和肯定的词语的所依,不是外境,而是被认为是心的显现。因此,通过它与有法相关联,从而认识到它的存在。也通过它来观察认识到不存在是空性的。为什么在心的认识中,唯有显现被认为是否定和肯定的词语的对境呢?因为声音的运用是存在的,即声音只显示那个。声音所显示的那个,即被认为是声音的词语。如果除了心的显现之外,词语的意义是事物,那么,对一个法的否定,即对声音的常法一个否定,即对声音的常法一个否定,那么,对眼境等等的所有否定都将成立。肯定,即肯定一个无常,那么,所有由努力产生的或者未把握的等等都将被肯定,因为它们与它的自性无有差别。如果它们与所依的声音是不同的,那么也是众多,就像对不同的事物进行否定或肯定一样,就像对蓝色进行否定或肯定,对黄色则不然一样,对有法进行肯定和否定,也不会被结合。那么,应该如何进行否定或肯定呢?多种法,即相异的差别。它的基础所变成的一个有法,即心所显现的,多种法如同一个基础的体性一样显现所依赖的。在那上面,当肯定想要肯定的一个相异的法时,因为没有其他法的否定和肯定,所以通过舍弃而保持中立。肯定一个法是这样做的。否定也是,通过舍弃其他而想要否定的那个是空性的,从那以外的都是中立的。如果事物没有部分,那么如何区分不同的法呢?词语的意义不是事物,而是由分别心所安立的。没有分别的显现不是。

English

Because it pervades existence and non-existence, and for those two, it is not allowed to be used as a term of negation, therefore, all terms of negation will be cut off. According to your view, what would happen? Because in other places, terms will be cut off. Relying on the meaning of sound, that is, non-things. Because things themselves cannot be expressed, so it is as before. The basis of things and non-things is the object. The basis of all terms of negation and affirmation is not the external object, but is considered to be the appearance of the mind. Therefore, through its connection with the subject, it is recognized that it exists. It is also observed through it that non-existence is emptiness. Why is it that in the cognition of the mind, only appearance is considered to be the object of terms of negation and affirmation? Because the application of sound exists, that is, sound only shows that. That which is shown by sound is considered to be the term of sound. If, apart from the appearance of the mind, the meaning of the word is a thing, then the negation of one dharma, that is, the negation of one permanent dharma of sound, that is, the negation of one permanent dharma of sound, then the negation of all objects of the eye, etc., will be established. Affirmation, that is, affirming one impermanence, then all that arises from effort or is not grasped, etc., will be affirmed, because they are not different from its nature. If they are different from the sound of the basis, then there are also many, just like negating or affirming different things, just like negating or affirming blue, but not yellow, affirming and negating the subject will not be combined. Then, how should negation or affirmation be done? Various dharmas, that is, different differences. One subject that has become its basis, that is, the appearance of the mind, relies on the appearance of many dharmas as the nature of one basis. On that, when affirming one different dharma that one wants to affirm, because there is no negation and affirmation of other dharmas, it is done by abandoning and remaining neutral. Affirming one dharma is done in this way. Negation is also, by abandoning others, that which one wants to negate is emptiness, and everything other than that is neutral. If things have no parts, then how can different dharmas be distinguished? The meaning of the word is not a thing, but is established by the discriminating mind. The appearance without discrimination is not.

Chinese

也是如此。因为是分别念的意识所添加的,因此没有考察真实性,依靠由认识所作的法的差别,而认识到法是各异的。如果诸法没有自体各异,那么认识是如何执持的呢?无始以来的习气,即从错乱的种子中产生的意识,对于世间人所共知的义,智者们不应舍弃,不应对其造成损害。如果对其造成损害,那么一切名言都将断绝。外在的种子稍微存在,那是具有果实的,即火所焚烧的具有果实者。除了火之外,一切事物都没有它的果实。因此,从一个火中产生的非火之物,它们在意义上是各异的。依靠那个各异的事物,而进行扰乱。对于那个火,也通过成立许多与非火之物各异的性质,以及遮止一些与它们各异的性质,使得那个火看起来好像失去了一些各异的性质。许多各异的事物虽然与意义不相符,但由于它们以那个意义的自性而相互关联,因此无论以何种法进行遮破或成立,都是以意义为对境。那些各异的事物与所依相关联,并且对于看起来像是各异的差别,所依赖的那个,由于在其自性中不存在,因此是不了解的扰乱。不聪明的人认为许多法,本身就与所依各异。聪明的人则仅仅认识到那是语词的意义,因此不是扰乱。具有三种特征的不可得,具有三种特征的自性,具有三种特征的果,这样结合起来,后来也分别称它们为“相”。这样一来,每一个相也都是具有三种特征的,但三种特征和三个相并不是按照顺序排列的。少于三者是不可能的,因为二者是成立事物,而且那也是通过成立自己的自性和成立非自性的差别来区分的。一者仅仅是通过成立遮破。其中,前二者既是事物也是成立,因此是成立事物,事物本身就是理由,而不是仅仅在教证中出名,也不是考察自己的同类。或者以事物的方式成立事物。

English

It is just like that. Because it is added by the discriminating mind, therefore, without examining the suchness, relying on the distinctions of phenomena made by cognition, one cognizes phenomena as being different. If things do not have different self-natures, then how does cognition grasp them? The beginningless habit, that is, the mind born from the seed of delusion, the meaning known to worldly people should not be abandoned by the wise; one should not harm it. If one harms it, then all conventions will be cut off. There is a slight external seed; it has fruit, that is, the one with fruit that is burned by fire. Since all things other than fire do not have its fruit, therefore, those non-fires arising from one fire are different in meaning. Based on that difference, one is confused. For that fire, too, by establishing many differences from those non-fires, and by preventing some differences from them, it seems as if that fire has lost some differences. Although many differences are not consistent with the meaning, because they are connected as one by the self-nature of that meaning, therefore, no matter what phenomenon is refuted or established, it takes meaning as its object. Those differences are related to the basis, and for the distinctions that appear to be different, that which is relied upon, because it does not exist in its self-nature, is an ignorant disturbance. Unintelligent people think that many phenomena are different from the basis itself. Wise people, however, only realize that it is just the meaning of the word, so it is not a disturbance. Non-apprehension with three characteristics, nature with three characteristics, and result with three characteristics are combined, and later they are also separately called "signs." In this way, each sign also has three characteristics, but the three characteristics and the three signs are not in order. It is impossible to have fewer than three, because two are to establish things, and that is also distinguished by establishing one's own self-nature and establishing non-self-nature. One is simply to establish negation. Among them, the former two are both things and establishment, so it is the establishment of things, the thing itself is the reason, not just famous in the scriptures, nor is it an examination of one's own kind. Or, to establish a thing in the manner of a thing.

Chinese

由于是成立的缘故,是成立事物,以存在之义,是成立存在之义的所成立,是成立之因。后者之一是否定之理,与非有之否定所成立者相应。那也是仅仅是否定的理,所以是否定之理,但并非仅仅是否定,因为以自性否定等成立也是可能的缘故。仅仅是否定并非如此,如果成立存在,则会变成自性之相的缘故。同样,如果前两者也成立否定,则会变成非显现之故,仅仅成立事物。如果问为什么没有超过三种呢?说了“如果存在自性关联”等,因为自性关联仅仅确定在这三种上的缘故。法与有法仅以异体区分,是分别念所完全测度的,无常性与所作性之义也不是分别念所测度的,如果那些也是分别念所测度的,则因为对义一无所依,心识会变成自以为是,由于那不能获得义,所以说了心识差别自以为是等。以“诸物皆自性”之语,是指以自己的体性,或从自己的因。自物是同类。他物的种类是不同类。因此,以声音之义而安住于差别,而且正因也因为以遣除他者而进入,所以成立某些相违的差别,但不成立自己的体性,因为是从所成立之外的相违之故。如果先前在非显现之境的譬喻中,以无有之名遍布而成立,之后在存在如此之境上,以先前成立名称的次第,不会错乱无有之名。如果辩论者等想要成立无有之事物,因为所谓的非显现,在那之上没有显现的知识,否定之自性变成了相,那么,为什么仅仅是无有之名是所成立,而不是无有呢?说了以非显现之相,没有显现,也就是在那之上也没有显现的知识。如果那样,知识

English

Because it is established, it establishes things; by the meaning of existence, it establishes what is to be established by the meaning of existence, and is the cause of establishment. The latter is the reason for negation, corresponding to what is to be established by the negation of non-existence. That is also solely the reason for negation, so it is the reason for negation, but not solely negation, because it is also possible to establish by self-nature negation, etc. It is not solely negation, because if existence is established, it will become the nature of self-nature. Similarly, if the former two also establish negation, it will become non-manifestation, and only establish things. If asked why there are no more than three? It is said, "If there is a self-nature connection," etc., because the self-nature connection is only determined on these three. The difference between dharma and the possessor of dharma is only distinguished by different entities, which is completely measured by discrimination, and the meaning of impermanence and being made is not measured by discrimination. If those are also measured by discrimination, then because there is no reliance on meaning at all, consciousness will become self-righteous, and because that cannot obtain meaning, it is said that the difference of consciousness is self-righteous, etc. The phrase "all things are self-nature" refers to one's own nature, or from one's own cause. Self-things are of the same kind. The kinds of other things are of different kinds. Therefore, it abides in difference by the meaning of sound, and because the valid reason also enters by eliminating others, it establishes some contradictory differences, but does not establish its own nature, because it is contradictory from what is established. If previously, in the metaphor of the non-manifest realm, it is established by being pervaded by the name of non-existence, then later, in the existence of such a realm, by the order of previously established names, the name of non-existence will not be confused. If debaters, etc., want to establish non-existent things, because the so-called non-manifestation, there is no knowledge of manifestation on it, and the nature of negation becomes a characteristic, then why is only the name of non-existence what is to be established, and not non-existence? It is said by the characteristic of non-manifestation, there is no manifestation, that is, there is also no knowledge of manifestation on it. If so, knowledge