Chinese
是这样的。因为自己没有体验过，所以别人正确地体验，也不会对我产生追随和接近的损害。如果自己不能现量地认识自己的心，那么人又怎么能自己认识自己呢？愚蠢的人是应该嘲笑的，所以诸神会高兴。如果不迷惑于根和境，认为有心，那么这本身就是一种标志。不迷惑就是没有的意思。如果说这本身就是心的标志，那么也提到了“那也是”等等。如果分别部派认为，不是仅仅有分别识，而是有分别识的因，因为它的力量，分别识才不执着于其他境，那么为了阐明这一点，就说了它的作用。如果说，意识以能生起其他境的分别识的能力而变得非常空虚，因为不生起其他境的分别识，那么这样的分别识也是心的自性，所以不成立。如果说境的显现是心的标志，那么境的显现的差别对你来说也是不成立的。如果境的显现是境的自性，那么境的自性也是自和他人的共同之处，所以也会推论出他人的心。对于这一点，也会推论出一切事物都能被认识，因为通过对遥远事物的分析，就能认识，所以要知道这里没有说。如果承认显现是境的自性，即使标志成立，因为心从来没有成立，也没有抓住联系，所以不能推论。因此，心不是现量，这是不合理的，所以现量本身通过自证而成立，对于这一点，通过无分别的现量，通过不显现的不见而成立，所以说一切现量都是通过不与言语混合而认识事物的。此外，没有根的作用，如果没有根的意识，仅仅通过声音就能认识事物，那么根的意识使事物显现，以及事物的作用，就像声音的事物在声音的意识中不分别显现一样。根的意识的境是不可言说的认识。
English
It is like that. Because one has not experienced it oneself, another person correctly experiences it, and it will not cause harm to me in terms of following and approaching. If one cannot directly realize one's own mind, then how can a person realize himself? Foolish people are to be laughed at, so the gods will be happy. If one is not confused about the senses and objects, thinking that there is mind, then that itself is a sign. Not being confused means there is not. If it is said that this itself is a sign of mind, then "that also" etc. are mentioned. If the Vaibhashikas think that it is not just that there is discriminating consciousness, but that there is a cause of discriminating consciousness, because of its power, discriminating consciousness does not cling to other objects, then in order to clarify this, its function is spoken of. If it is said that consciousness becomes very empty because of the ability to generate discriminating consciousness of other objects, because it does not generate discriminating consciousness of other objects, then such discriminating consciousness is also the nature of mind, so it is not established. If it is said that the appearance of an object is a sign of mind, then the difference of the appearance of the object is also not established for you. If the appearance of an object is the nature of the object, then the nature of the object is also a commonality of self and others, so it will also be inferred that the mind of others. For this, it will also be inferred that all things can be known, because by analyzing distant things, one can know, so know that it is not said here. If one admits that appearance is the nature of the object, even if the sign is established, because mind has never been established, and there is no grasping of connection, so it cannot be inferred. Therefore, it is unreasonable that mind is not direct perception, so direct perception itself is established through self-awareness, for this, through non-conceptual direct perception, it is established through the non-appearance of non-seeing, so it is said that all direct perceptions know things only through not being mixed with speech. Furthermore, there is no function of the senses, if there is no consciousness of the senses, one can know things only through sound, then the consciousness of the senses makes things appear, and the function of things, just as the things of sound do not appear separately in the consciousness of sound. The object of the consciousness of the senses is unspeakable knowledge.
Chinese
哦！明晰和作用，是现量，是不可言说的境。因为没有根识的作用，声音不像根识所见那样在心中清晰显现。因此，声音和根识的境，其体性已确立为不同。因此说了“凡不是声音的意义”等等。用味觉的意识比喻嗅觉，这是相似的例子。用眼识比喻色法，这是不相似的例子。因为随行和不随行，所以说了“能够安立”等等。此外，为了理解意义而结合声音，是为了施设名称。根识的意义，是通过符号的因缘，声音所关联的意义，在后来见到的时侯，与符号相符而施设名称，不是随伺于分别念，因为根识本身和境同时灭亡。为了详细阐述这一点，所以说了“这就像这样”。根识的意义，其自相与一切同类和异类相异。与境同时见到的事物的刹那，任何时候也不会在其他地方见到。因为现量的事物不随行，所以没有从明晰中分离出来的东西，或者没有其他无差别的总相，因为没有如此执着的意识差别。声音所指的总相，与明晰是不同的。这否定了不显现的现象。不能近似表示，就是不能确定。牛啊牛啊，这样执为一体的意识，以及声音进入总相后作为符号的意识和声音，如果进入其他的明晰，那么如果不理解总相，明晰就不能用总相的意识和声音来表示。按照你们的观点，总相不能表示明晰。总相的意识和声音不随行，因为没有总相的差别明晰，凭借见到总相的力量，明晰在符号时期和名称时期都存在，因此总相以明晰为意识和声音的对境，怎么能说不能表示呢？因此说了“从何处到何处”。
English
O! Clarity and function are direct perception, an inexpressible realm. Because without the function of the senses, sounds do not appear clearly in the mind as seen by sense consciousness. Therefore, the nature of sound and the realm of sense consciousness are established as different. Therefore, it is said, "Whatever is not the meaning of sound," and so on. Using taste consciousness to exemplify smell is a similar example. Using eye consciousness to exemplify form is a dissimilar example. Because of following and not following, it is said, "Able to establish," and so on. Furthermore, combining sounds to understand meaning is for the purpose of applying names. The meaning of sense objects is that, through the cause of symbols, the meaning associated with sound, when seen later, is named in accordance with the symbol, and does not follow after conceptual thought, because sense consciousness itself and the object cease simultaneously. To explain this in detail, it is said, "It is like this." The intrinsic nature of the meaning of sense objects is different from all similar and dissimilar things. The moment of a thing seen simultaneously with the object is never seen elsewhere. Because phenomena of direct perception do not follow, there is nothing separated from clarity, or no other undifferentiated generality, because there is no difference in the consciousness that grasps it in this way. The generality to which sound applies is different from clarity. This negates the non-appearing phenomenon. Not being able to approximate means not being able to ascertain. The consciousness that grasps "cow, cow" as one, and the consciousness and sound that enter into generality as a symbol, if they enter into other clarity, then if the generality is not understood, clarity cannot be represented by the consciousness and sound of generality. According to your view, generality cannot represent clarity. The consciousness and sound of generality do not follow, because this distinction of clarity without generality, by the power of seeing generality, clarity also exists at the time of the symbol and at the time of the name, therefore generality makes clarity the object of consciousness and sound, how can it be said that it cannot represent it? Therefore, it is said, "From where to where."
Chinese
以及其他的例子就不说了。总的来说，虽然各自显现，但不明显，因为有差别，所以没有随之而行。或者说，虽然各自显现，是指总的来说，在感官上各自显现，但在感官上，显现的主体没有混杂，所以没有随之而行。以前，瓶子能盛水，看到那个能产生结果的瓶子，后来看到的所有瓶子，先前的见解留下了记忆的种子，后来的见解唤醒了那个习气，因此，由体验的力量产生的记忆，会让人觉得“这个能盛水”，由此产生对那个事物产生贪执的显现，从而广泛地使用名称。 虽然仅仅是直接观察事物，但由于体验事物而产生的习气的力量，以及由习气产生的记忆，后来体验到与先前的事物相似的其他事物，会说“这就是以前的那个”，体验将这些连接起来，当看到先前见过的无用之物，以及与它相似的事物时，会将它们归为一类，从而产生贪执和不贪执。由此，就会使用获取和舍弃的名称。 此处的“能力”指的是记忆。从记忆中，也能获得贪执和不贪执的能力，因此这些也会产生。由此，就会进行取舍。所谓的“相似的紧随因”，指的是通过一个相续，感官的意识和意意识是相互关联的。否则，瑜伽士以意根对与另一个相续相关的感官意识进行观察，也作为观察的条件，也是由感官意识产生的。感官意识是其自身对境的紧随，也就是与其之间没有间隔的对境的刹那。它与感官意识一同运作。因为陈述意识的人认为事物和对事物的认识是同时的，所以感官意识的对境与其自身是同时存在的，而紧随其后的对境是其自身之后的时间，所以意根与其自身的意识是同时存在的，但那个对境与感官意识运作的时间不同步。感官意识和它的对境的紧随对境两者也是同时的，感官
English
And other examples are not mentioned. In general, although they appear separately, they are not obvious, because they are different, so there is no following. Or, although they appear separately, it means that in general, they appear separately in the senses, but in the senses, the subject of appearance is not mixed, so there is no following. Previously, the vase could hold water, seeing that vase that produced the result, all the vases seen later, the previous view left the seed of memory, and the later view awakened that habit, therefore, the memory produced by the power of experience, will make people feel "this can hold water", thereby producing a manifestation of attachment to that thing, thereby widely using the name. Although it is only directly observing things, the power of habits arising from experiencing things, and the memory arising from habits, later experiencing other things similar to the previous things, will say "this is the previous one", experience connects these, when seeing the previously seen useless things, and things similar to it, they will be classified into one category, thereby producing attachment and non-attachment. From this, the names of acquisition and abandonment will be used. The "ability" here refers to memory. From memory, the ability of attachment and non-attachment can also be obtained, so these will also arise. From this, one will engage in taking and discarding. The so-called "similar immediate cause" refers to the fact that through one continuum, the consciousness of the senses and the consciousness of the mind are interconnected. Otherwise, the yogi observes the sensory consciousness related to another continuum with the mind root, also as a condition of observation, which is also produced by the sensory consciousness. Sensory consciousness is the immediate of its own object, that is, the moment of the object with no interval between them. It works together with sensory consciousness. Because those who state consciousness believe that things and the knowledge of things are simultaneous, the object of sensory consciousness exists simultaneously with itself, and the object that immediately follows is the time after itself, so the mind root exists simultaneously with its own consciousness, but that object does not synchronize with the time of sensory consciousness operation. Both the sensory consciousness and the immediate object of its object are also simultaneous, sensory
Chinese
感官的意识产生时，它没有自己的对境，因为它是一个原因，所以是过去的。因此，与感官意识同时产生的，是第二刹那的意识的对境。因此，它是同时产生的。否则，如果原因对境和结果意识同时产生，那么原因和结果本身就不存在了，所以就说了“先前没有能力”等等。如果感官意识的对境是紧接着被抓住的，那么就会变成抓住已经被抓住的东西了。对此，就说了“这是先前的量”等等。如果是已决定的对境的量，那么记忆也会变成量，那就太过分了。那是什么样的呢？“不忘所见之行”，这样说了，因为记忆与此没有区别。为了显示即使与记忆相似，也不能成为量，所以说了“从已经完成的行为”等等，因为对于已经被意识所理解的东西，不需要其他的意识来证明。因此，后者是证明者，是使未理解的被理解。如果事物是常恒的，因此先前的感官意识所抓住的，意识也能抓住，那么意识就不是量了。为了阐明这一点，就说了“那个事物变成原因的智慧”等等，因为原因没有差别，所以感官和意识的意识依次产生也是相违的。如果通过同时产生的差别而依次产生，那么对于已经理解的事物，因为没有改变，所以也不应该依赖于其他。如果通过行为意识的差别而依次产生，那么即使行为是不同的，它的作者也会变成其他的，常恒本身就会消失。因此，由于常恒不合理，所以事物不是刹那的，因为没有过去，所以意识不是依赖于接近的事物而被抓住的。这样，对于一个行为的完成，以及一个快乐的意识，如果也各自通过刹那的差别而变成量，那么这是不希望的。这是通过名称的力量来确立的量，因为做同一件事，所以是一个量。如果那样，那么意识也会变成与感官意识做同一件事的对境吗？这是