Chinese
认为唯一是其他宗派的观点。因此，想要表达蓝色之物，也就是黄色等等。因此，想要表达一切事物，结合起来就变成了须弥山一切意义的表达者，这表明所谓的“表达意愿的确定性”对于常法来说是不合理的。因此，从那个词中确定地理解意义是不确定的。按照我们的观点，承认刹那的各个意义是不同的，没有过失。然而，想要表达的仍然只是各个意义的差异。如果说成立的宗派被损害，那也不是损害，因为衡量标准所损害的才被认为是损害。如果是这样，那么想要表达的“不是由人所造”对于常法来说是不合理的，因为它们已经变成了自己的本质。如果是这样，就像看到的那样，它也没有完全接受或抛弃某些意义，因此没有安排就结束了。然而，我们不认为它是人的自性， 因为它是其他的功德。如果是这样，那么它是它的结果还是不是结果呢？如果是结果，那么想要表达的“这是这个而不是其他的”对于常法来说是不合理的。这样做，所有的表达意愿结合起来，就变成了蓝色声音一切意义的表达者。如果它不是结果，那么它是常法，如果是这样，那么自在天只是常法的表达意愿，而不是其他的表达意愿，所谓的“表达意愿的确定性”对于常法来说是不合理的。因为两者都是常法，所以没有能利益和被利益的事物，这是最后的结论。其他的反驳是表达那些表达意愿等等。如果因为是功德，所以想要表达的是不同的，但不是人的自性，同样，看到也是不同的，那么，想要表达者和观看者如何能同时变成一个呢？如果是一个，那么因为是同一意义的自性，所以看到本身就是观看者和意愿
English
The assertion that it is only one is the view of others. Therefore, whatever is intended to express blue is also yellow and so on. Therefore, wanting to express all meanings, combining them becomes the expression of all the meanings of Mount Meru, which shows that the so-called "certainty of expressive intention" is not reasonable for permanence. Therefore, understanding the definite meaning from that word is not definite. According to our view, there is no fault in admitting that the individual meanings of momentary phenomena are different. However, what is intended to be expressed is only the difference in individual meanings. If the established tenet is harmed, it is not a harm, because only what is harmed by valid cognition is considered a harm. If that is the case, then the intention to express "not made by a person" is not reasonable for permanence, because they have become their own essence. If that is so, just as it is seen, it has neither completely accepted nor abandoned some meanings, therefore the arrangement is exhausted. However, we do not consider it to be the nature of a person, because it is another quality. If so, is it its result or not its result? If it is a result, then the intention to express "this is this and not another" is not reasonable for permanence. By doing so, all expressive intentions combined become the expression of all the meanings of the blue sound. If it is not a result, then it is permanent, and if that is the case, then Ishvara is only the expressive intention of permanence, and not of another, the so-called "certainty of expressive intention" is not reasonable for permanence. Because both are permanent, there is no object of benefit and benefactor, that is the final conclusion. Other refutations are expressing those expressive intentions and so on. If because it is a quality, the intention to express is different, but it is not the nature of a person, and likewise, seeing is also different, then how can the expresser and the seer become one together? If it is one, then because it is the nature of the same meaning, seeing itself is the seer and the intention
Chinese
因为是自性，所以想说本身就是想说。但自在天无法触及它们的自性，因为性质不同。它们也不是自在天的自性，因此自在天也不会因此成为观看者和想说者。因此，因为观看者本身不是想说者，你们的那个怎么会是量呢？是从看到后想说而显示的吗？还是看到的自性会成为量呢？这二者都不存在。别人的疑问是“如果”的这个意思，如果执持想说之义的见也执持应观之义，那么这时如果出现这个过失，自在天本身就是想说者，并且是执持应观之义者，那么从看到后想说而显示的怎么会不是量呢？回答是“想说”等。想说和没有看到其他，它们的体性就是想说和其他。因为显明和不显明，是相违的自性，怎么会被一个自在天执持呢？因为所取不同，所以能取也理应是不同的意思。如果又在这里，即使所取不同，也不承认能取不同，那么现量和比量也不会不同，这是通过“如果是那样”来显示过失。亲属会变成不相似，有些人以“其他是那样”的方式，依靠其他数论的观点来怀疑，就是“如果那个也”。“真实地”的意思是自性的体性。“真实地”指的是现量和比量。如果看到烟等之后立即推断出火，那么现量和比量是依次出现的。在推断的时候，也因为看到烟等而不会同时出现吗？那么怎么会认为出现者和出现者是同一个呢？因此说了“那怎么”。对此的回答是“自性是同一个”，也是为了同时近似地表示。
English
Because it is self-nature, the desire to speak itself is the desire to speak. But the self-existent one cannot touch their self-nature because their characteristics are different. They are also not the self-nature of the self-existent one, so the self-existent one will not become the viewer and the speaker through it. Therefore, because the viewer himself is not the speaker, how can yours be a valid means of knowledge? Is it shown by wanting to speak after seeing? Or will the self-nature of seeing become a valid means of knowledge? Neither of these exists. The doubt of others is the meaning of "if," if the seeing that holds the meaning of wanting to speak also holds the meaning of what should be seen, then if this fault occurs at this time, the self-existent one himself is the speaker and the one who holds the meaning of what should be seen, then how can what is shown by wanting to speak after seeing not be a valid means of knowledge? The answer is "wanting to speak," etc. Wanting to speak and not seeing others, their nature is wanting to speak and others. Because of being clear and unclear, it is a contradictory nature, how can it be held by one self-existent one? Because what is to be taken is different, so what can take should also be different, that is the meaning. If again here, even if what is to be taken is different, it is not admitted that what can take is different, then direct perception and inference will also not be different, this is to show the fault through "if it is like that." Relatives will become dissimilar, some people doubt by relying on the views of other Samkhyas in the way of "other is like that," that is "if that also." "Truly" means the nature of self-nature. "Truly" refers to direct perception and inference. If fire is inferred immediately after seeing smoke, etc., then direct perception and inference appear sequentially. At the time of inference, will they also not appear simultaneously because of seeing smoke, etc.? Then how can it be thought that the one who appears and the one who appears are the same? Therefore, it is said, "How is that?" The answer to this is "Self-nature is the same," which is also to indicate approximately at the same time.
Tibetan
།ཚ་དམ་ཡིས་ནི་རྟོགས་པ་མིན། །ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་གཅིག་ཉིད་སྒྲུབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་མངོན་སུམ་དང་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་མེད་པ་སྟེ་ཇི་སྐད་བཤད་པའི་རང་བཞིན་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང༌། ཆོས་རྗེས་སུ་འགྲོ་བ་ཡང་བཀག་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཡང་ན་ཚད་མས་གནོད་པ་ཉིད་དེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་དོན་ཏེ། སོ་སོར་ངེས་པའི་གཟུང་བའི་རང་བཞིན་ངེས་པར་རྟོགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང༌། རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་དང་གཞན་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་འགལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ན་བཟུང་བ་ཐ་དད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན་མངོན་སུམ་དང་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་གཉིས་དག་བཞིན་དུ་ཐ་དད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དབང་ཕྱུག་བརྗོད་པར་འདོད་པ་དང་ཅིག་ཤོས་དག་གི་འཛིན་བྱེད་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེས་ན་སྔར་གྱི་ཉེས་པ་ལས་མི་གྲོལ་ལོ། །དེས་ན་ཤེས་པའམ་བརྗོད་པར་འདོད་པ་ཐ་དད་པས་ནི་དབང་ཕྱུག་ཐམས་ ཅད་མཁྱེན་པ་ཉིད་དམ་ཉེ་བར་སྟོན་པ་ཉིད་དུ་འཐད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་སྙམ་དུ་བསྟན་ནས། འདི་རྟག་པ་ཉིད་ལ་ཚད་མ་ཡང་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་སྟོན་པ་ནི། རྟོགས་པ་དེའམ་གཞན་གྱིས་ནི་ཞེས་བྱ་བའོ། །རྟོགས་པར་བྱེད་པ་དེའམ་གཞན་གྱི་དུས་ཐ་དད་པར་ཉེ་བར་མཚོན་པའི་དངོས་པོ་གང་ཞིག་ཅིག་གིས་བྱ་བར་རྟོགས་པ་དེ་གཅིག་ཁོ་ནའོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་བདེན་ནམ་ཅི་མི་བདེན་པ་ཉིད་སྟོན་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ངོ་ཤེས་པ་སུན་ཕྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །བདེན་པ་མིན་ནོ་ཞེན་ནི་དེའི་ཚེ་རྟག་པ་ཉིད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཚིག་དོན་མེད་དོ། །དེའམ་གཞན་གྱིས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཕལ་མོ་ཆེས་རྟོགས་པ་ཡིན་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚིག་གོ །འོན་ཏེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་གཞན་གྱི་དོགས་པ་སྟེ། དེ་གཞན་གྱིས་མ་ཞེས་མོད། རྟོགས་པ་པོ་དེ་རབ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ནི་བདག །དེ་རྣམ་ཀུན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་རྟག་པ་དང་ཐམས་ཅད་ཤེས་པ་ཉིད་ལ་སོགས་པའི་རང་བཞིན་དུ་ཤེས་པར་བྱེད་དེ་ཡང་དག་པར་ངེས་པར་བྱེད་དོ་ཞི་ན། སུན་འབྱིན་པ་ནི། དེ་ནི་དེ་ལྟ་ཞེས་བྱ་སྟེ། འདི་ལ་ཚད་མ་ཅི་ཡང་མེད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་དོན་ཏོ། །གཞན་ཡང་དེ་ཁོ་ནའམ་ཀུན་བརྗོད་པར་ཐམས་ཅད་རིག་པར་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་སྟོན་པ་ནི། རང་རིག་ཉིད་ལས་གཞན་པ་ནི་ཞེས་བྱ་བའོ། །རང་རིག་པ་ཙམ་ལ་རྟག་པའམ་ཐམས་ཅད་རིག་པ་ཉིད་གལ་ཡོད་དེ། སྔ་མ་དང་ཕྱི་མ་ཡང་གཞན་རིག་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་དོན་དམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཀུན་རྫོབ་པ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྟག་པ་ཉིད་དང་ཐམས་ཅད་རིག་པ་ཉིད་ནི་ད་མ་པའི་ལྟོས་ནས་ནོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ནི་ཞུགས་པ་ཟིན་བའི་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་གྱི་ཆ་ཉིད་བཤད་པའི་ཕྱིར་སྐབས་རྩོམ་པ་ནི་ཅི་སྟེ་ཡང་ཞེས་བྱ་བའོ། །ཤེས་བྱ་མི་རྟག་པ་ཉིད་ཅེས་
Chinese
“由量不能证成”之意，即是说，没有现量和比量来成立唯一性，因为如前所说，自性没有成立的缘故，并且法随行也被遮止的缘故。或者说，就是量所损害的意思，因为对各自决定的所取之自性必定了知的缘故，并且与分别和异体性相违的缘故。这样一来，因为所取各异的缘故，如同现量和比量二者一样，因为各异的缘故，就不是自在天所说的和另一方的执持者，因此不能从先前的过失中解脱。因此，显示出因为知识或想要表达的各异，自在天就不是一切遍知或者不是近似显示，然后显示说，对于这个常性，也没有量，这就是“由彼或他证”的意思。能证成者，由彼或他的不同时间中近似显示的任何事物，以一者所作而了知，那个就是唯一，这样说是真实的吗？还是不真实呢？仅仅显示不真实性，就已驳倒了能立的自相。如果认为不真实，那么“彼时是常性”这句话就没有意义了。“由彼或他”的意思，就是大多数人所了知的意思。然而，这是他人的疑惑，即使说不是由他人，但了知者以极度的方式就是我，那个一切种类，就是了知常性和一切遍知等等的自性，从而如实决定。驳斥说：那就是那样，意思是说，对此没有任何量。另外，显示说，仅仅由那个或者由一切所说，就是一切遍知。这就是“自知之外者”的意思。仅仅自知就有常性或一切遍知的重要性吗？因为先前和后来也没有他知。因此不是胜义谛。也不是世俗谛，因为常性和一切遍知是从现在的依赖而获得的缘故。因此，因为已经讲述了进入的释量论的支分，所以造论的开端就是“何故复”的意思。所知是无常性，
English
The meaning of "cannot be proven by valid means" is that there is no direct perception or inference to establish oneness, because, as previously stated, self-nature is not established, and the following of Dharma is also prevented. Or, it means that it is harmed by valid means, because the nature of what is grasped, which is determined separately, is necessarily known, and because it contradicts discrimination and otherness. In this way, because what is grasped is different, just like the two, direct perception and inference, because of the difference, it is not the speaker of Ishvara and the holder of the other side, so it cannot be liberated from the previous faults. Therefore, it shows that because knowledge or what is intended to be expressed is different, Ishvara is not omniscient or not approximately shown, and then it shows that for this permanence, there is no valid means, which is the meaning of "by that or another is proven." The one who can prove, by that or another, any object that is approximately shown in different times, is known to be done by one, that is the only one, is it true to say that? Or is it not true? Merely showing untruthfulness has already refuted the self-nature of the establisher. If it is considered untrue, then the sentence "at that time it is permanence" has no meaning. The meaning of "by that or another" is what most people know. However, this is the doubt of others, even if it is said not by others, but the knower is me in an extreme way, that all kinds, is to know the nature of permanence and omniscience, etc., and thus truly decide. The refutation says: that is so, which means that there is no valid means for this. In addition, it shows that only by that or by all that is said, is omniscience. This is the meaning of "other than self-knowledge." Is there importance of permanence or omniscience only in self-knowledge? Because there is no other knowledge before and after. Therefore, it is not the ultimate truth. It is also not the conventional truth, because permanence and omniscience are obtained from the present dependence. Therefore, because the branch of the Commentary on Valid Cognition that has entered has been explained, the beginning of making the treatise is the meaning of "why again." What is to be known is impermanence,