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DTG175 0002.A Treatise Called The Reasoning of Debate, by Dharmakirti..A Treatise Called The Reasoning of Debate, by Dharmakirti..A Treatise Called The Reasoning of Debate, by Dharmakirti..g2.0f

English

If you say that there is no fault because there is no error, alas! It is difficult to have no fault without concealment, and because you are attached to narrow views, you cannot truly recognize your own nature. The so-called "no difference" is the same, and the dependence on difference referred to by "those" is the name of existence. For things like regression and arising, and the existence and non-existence of things like no regression and no arising, how can various natures be said to be reasonable? Because those are the differences between things, and being free from those is no difference. For example, happiness and the state of ability are like the same nature. Otherwise, since there is no characteristic of difference and no non-difference, the establishment of difference and no difference would become meaningless. If the arising of its own nature is said to be non-different, and the opposite of this is different. For example, a pot arises from the nature of clay, so it is not different, and the opposite is different. If this, like happiness and suffering, is the nature of difference and no difference, then there is no contradiction, is it? The arising of a pot is not the nature of clay, but some nature of clay is the nature of the pot. The nature of clay is not unique in the three realms, because it appears as different consciousnesses, and the nature of matter is also different through different states and different functions of each meaning. In this way, happiness and sentient beings will also be admitted to be different, and if so, how can they be different? If it is true, but because some nature is compliant, it is another unique one, is it? Happiness and sentient beings will also have faults here, because pots and so on are not compliant with becoming the nature of everything, because it will become a fault of not being multiple natures and arising together. The difference between the nature of the pot and the clay is not clearly expressed by the world, who would arise here like this?

Chinese

亦将成为“变为”之义。如果不能确定所依和能依的差别,就不会那样转变,因为从能力中不可能产生能力的自性,因此不会不异于其自身的自性。这些就是对完全转变的回答。如果说,任何被普遍认为转变的事物都不异于它所转变的事物,那么,如果能力的自性不是完全转变的,那么“完全转变”这个词又将指示什么呢?如果说,物质的状态的其他法类的退却和其它法类的增长就是完全转变,那么,那个其它的法类退却和增长的,是那个物质本身的状态吗?还是与它不同的事物?因为没有其它的分别。如果它是那个本身,那么应当说,那个安住而没有退却或增长的就是那些,而且“状态的其它法类”这个说法也不会成立。那个本身无所依赖,它就不会成为它的依赖的不同的其它法类。或者,如果法与物质是不同的事物,那么那个法的退却和增长就不是物质的完全转变。如果转变成为不同的事物,那么退却和增长就不是不同事物的完全转变,因为这也将导致与有情相违背。物质的法这个关联词的术语不会成立,因为没有关联。除了因果的关联之外,没有其它的事物的关联,因为这其中也没有因果本身,因为自己不是它的自性,因此不是它的因,而且法与物质也不是不同的事物。即使假定是不同的事物,如果是法的因,如果其它法类的果产生,那么“物质完全转变”这个说法也将被接受,那么对于其它事物也没有矛盾,因为因果的相续是,从作为因的泥土团的先前物质中,产生作为果的瓶子的后来物质时,会承认“泥土的物质完全转变”这个术语。对于法来说,不可能分别物质是那个本身还是其它的事物。然而,

English

it will also become the meaning of "becoming." If the difference between the dependent and the depended cannot be ascertained, it will not change in that way, because the nature of ability cannot be fully born from ability, therefore it will not be non-different from its own nature. These are the answers to complete transformation. If it is said that whatever is universally considered to be transformed is not different from what it is transformed from, then if the nature of ability is not completely transformed, then what will the word "completely transformed" indicate? If it is said that the retreat of other dharmas of the state of matter and the increase of other dharmas is complete transformation, then is that other dharma that retreats and increases the state of that matter itself? Or is it a different thing from it? Because there is no other distinction. If it is that itself, then it should be said that what abides without retreating or increasing is those, and the saying "other dharmas of the state" will not be established either. That itself is independent, it will not become its dependent different other dharmas. Or, if dharma and matter are different things, then the retreat and increase of that dharma is not the complete transformation of matter. If it transforms into different things, then retreat and increase is not the complete transformation of different things, because this will also lead to contradiction with sentient beings. The term of the relational word of the dharma of matter will not be established, because there is no relation. Apart from the relation of cause and effect, there is no other relation of things, because there is no cause and effect itself in this, because oneself is not its nature, therefore it is not its cause, and dharma and matter are not different things either. Even if it is assumed to be different things, if it is the cause of dharma, if the fruit of other dharmas arises, then the saying "matter is completely transformed" will also be accepted, then there is no contradiction for other things either, because the continuity of cause and effect is that when the later matter of the pot as the fruit arises from the previous matter of the lump of clay as the cause, the term "the matter of clay is completely transformed" will be admitted. For dharma, it is impossible to distinguish whether matter is that itself or other things. However,

Chinese

然则,物质的排列是一种暂时的状态,因为不能认为它是不同的。如果这样说,那是不对的,因为拳头是手指的特殊形式。只有一些手指是拳头,但不是全部。拳头不是与伸展的手指没有区别的自性,因为在拳头和手指的两种状态下,会陷入两者都属于的过失。任何不同的东西,变成它自身自性的东西,就是事物不同的特征,例如快乐和痛苦。 即使改变后的差异很明显,也只能识别出伸展的手指。如果产生了自性不改变的其他事物,那么就会陷入无法识别其他形式的过失。如果说物质本身不是没有差异的状态,也不是物质之外的其他事物,那不是已经说过了吗?即使说过了,这个道理也是不成立的,因为存在本身的那个事物,不可能存在与他性分离的其他形式。因为它们是事物相互排斥而存在的特征。如果排斥了一个,另一个就不存在。每一刹那都在消逝的手指的伸展也是不同的,拳头也是不同的。其中,拳头等词是具有特殊对象的,手指的词是具有一般对象的,就像种子和幼苗等词,以及谷物等词一样。因此,伸展的手指不是拳头。如果先前的不存在变成了因,那么为什么不是一切都从一切中产生呢?因为在某种程度上,不存在是没有差别的。即使一切中都存在一切,这个过失不也是一样的吗?在某种程度上,存在是没有差别的。即使存在差别,这个差别也会变成与三种功德不同的部分,即使它存在,差别也不会随之而来。即使因为存在本身,又有什么会像一切都已成就的状态那样产生呢?能成立的是没有结果的,因为没有什么需要成立的。某种差别的

English

However, the arrangement of matter is a temporary state, because it cannot be considered different. If you say so, that is not correct, because a fist is a special form of fingers. Only some fingers are a fist, but not all. A fist is not a nature that is no different from outstretched fingers, because in the two states of fist and fingers, it would fall into the fault of belonging to both. Anything that is different, that becomes its own nature, is the characteristic of the difference of things, such as pleasure and pain. Even if the difference after the change is obvious, only the outstretched fingers can be identified. If other things are produced that do not change their nature, then one would fall into the fault of not being able to identify other forms. If it is said that matter itself is not a state without difference, nor is it other things besides matter, hasn't it already been said? Even if it has been said, this reasoning is not valid, because that thing of existence itself cannot have other forms separate from otherness. Because they are the characteristics of things existing by mutually excluding each other. If one is excluded, the other does not exist. The extension of the fingers, which are disappearing in each moment, is also different, and the fist is also different. Among them, the words fist, etc., have special objects, and the word finger has general objects, like the words seed and sprout, etc., and the words grain, etc. Therefore, the outstretched finger is not a fist. If the previous non-existence becomes the cause, then why doesn't everything arise from everything? Because in some ways, non-existence is without difference. Even if everything exists in everything, isn't this fault the same? In some ways, existence is without difference. Even if there is a difference, this difference will become a part different from the three qualities, even if it exists, the difference will not follow. Even because of existence itself, what will arise like the state where everything has been accomplished? That which can be established is without result, because there is nothing to be established. Some difference of

Chinese

如果像什么都没有一样产生,那么这里没有的差别怎么会产生呢?如果产生,那么一切都从一切产生,因此,驳斥和考察是相同的。如果说那种差别不是在一切方面都存在,而是仅仅在某些方面存在,那么,像这样没有的方面,因为它在那里面没有,怎么会产生方面呢? 如果是在一切方面都存在,那么就表明产生是毫无意义的。从因产生没有的果,又是哪一个产生哪一个的自性呢?就是从那一个产生那一个,而不是从其他的产生,这是确定的。那又是在没有自性的那里,说是自己的因,这是从无始以来由事物的自性所决定的。另外,就像蜂巢里有蜜蜂一样,在那样的状态下,为什么没有像后来一样的显现或作用呢?如果说是由于没有明显地产生,那么,正因为有能做那件事的瓶子,又因为它的形状以前没有,怎么会有瓶子呢?事物的自性不是在其他事物中存在,如果存在自性的不同显现,事物没有不同是不合理的,因为会变成这样的过失。因此,凡是在哪里作为所缘的认识对象而存在的自性不可得,那不是存在。那不在它的自性中存在,没有不可得,不在那里存在就不是它,因为自性不是互相存在,就像快乐和痛苦一样,这是由不可得的差别没有差别之名称所周遍的。因此,由于某些不可得能成立遣除,如前所说作为所缘的认识对象,显示应当接近显示,从而成立了显示自性不可得。周遍的不可得,也是在周遍所作和周遍能作本身中,对法进行善加成立之后,才能成立差别法遣除。因不可得,也是在对因和果本身进行善加成立之后,才能成立因遣除的成立。与此相违背的不可得

English

If something arises as if it doesn't exist, how can the difference of non-existence here arise? If it arises, then everything arises from everything, therefore, refutation and examination are the same. If it is said that the difference does not exist in all aspects, but only in some aspects, then, like this, the aspect of non-existence, because it does not exist in that, how can it produce aspects? If it exists in all aspects, then it is shown that arising is meaningless. From the cause arises the non-existent effect, and what is the nature of which produces which? It is from that one that that one arises, and not from others, this is certain. That is also in the absence of self-nature, saying that it is its own cause, this is determined by the nature of things from beginningless time. Furthermore, just as there are bees in a honeycomb, why is there no manifestation or function like later in that state? If it is said that it is because it is not clearly produced, then, precisely because there is a pot that can do that thing, and because its shape did not exist before, how can there be a pot? The nature of things does not exist in other things, if there are different manifestations of self-nature, it is unreasonable for things not to be different, because it will become such a fault. Therefore, wherever the self-nature that exists as an object of cognition of what is perceived is not found, that is not existence. That does not exist in its self-nature, there is no non-perception, and not existing there is not it, because self-natures do not exist mutually, like happiness and suffering, this is pervaded by the certainty of the name of the absence of difference of non-perception. Therefore, since some non-perceptions can establish elimination, as previously said, the object of cognition of what is perceived, showing that it should be approached, thereby establishing the showing of the non-perception of self-nature. The pervasive non-perception is also in the pervasive object and the pervasive agent itself, after the dharmas have been well established, the elimination of the difference dharma can be established. The non-perception of the cause is also after the cause and effect themselves have been well established, the establishment of the elimination of the cause can be established. The non-perception that contradicts this