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DTG175 0001.A Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Compendium on Valid Cognition by Lhawangpo A Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Compendium on Valid Cognition by Lhawangpo.g2.0f

Chinese

因此,产生的原因就是所取。无分之物也没有微细等。因为显现的支分是微细等相状的缘故,以及处在遥远地方的缘故,以及非常近的缘故,以及支分具有特殊差别的微细之所取本身并非是无分之物也没有微细等。因为是执着的近取之自性,所以具有非处在远处的知识自性,无支分就没有微细等,这样一来,从何所取的相不是吗?虽然是这样变化的,但是,所取的能力会衰退。此生之自性不是他者。那个知识的能力有两种,即所取本身的能力和产生知识的能力。因此,知识的所取能力衰退,而产生其他事物的自性,通过近取的自性来产生,这本身会衰退吗?因此,即使是近取的自性,也不是知识的所取相,因此会转移到其他境上吗?虽然是这样变化的,但是,如果成为所取相的形态,无论如何产生的事物,如果从所取本身转变为其他事物,那么如何如实地执持自性呢?谁会认为色识等是所取相呢?所取本身是生因。不是他者,因此,成为所取相的产生之智,会产生为所取本身,否则就不是产生。如果不是这样,色等就不会产生所取相。如果不是产生所取相,那么那时就不会通过间接的方式来利益,因为实际上对于眼等之智,色等不是利益者。不是所取。因此,从所取相来说,境等不是劫,此业的色等。那实际上到底是什么呢?即使确定是所取本身,又是什么原因导致不能产生具有如此自境之相的识呢?对于智来说,产生后来的智实际上是有利益的。那是存在的,如果是那样,仅仅是智

English

Therefore, the cause of arising is the object itself. Things without parts also have no fineness, etc. Because the appearing limbs are in the form of fineness, etc., and because they are located far away, and because they are very close, and because the limbs have special differences, the object itself, which is fine, is not something without parts and has no fineness, etc. Because it is the nature of grasping the near, it has the nature of knowledge that is not located far away. Without limbs, there is no fineness, etc. In that case, is it not the characteristic of what is taken? Although it changes like this, the power of the object will decline. The nature of this arising is not other. That knowledge has two powers, namely the power of the object itself and the power to generate knowledge. Therefore, the power of the object of knowledge declines, and the nature of generating other things, through the nature of grasping the near, will this itself decline? Therefore, even if it is the nature of grasping the near, it is not the characteristic of the object of knowledge, so will it transfer to other objects? Although it changes like this, if it becomes the form of the object, no matter what arises, if it changes from the object itself to other things, then how can one hold the self-nature as it is? Who would think that color consciousness, etc., are the characteristics of the object? The object itself is the cause of arising. It is not other, therefore, the wisdom that arises as the object will arise as the object itself, otherwise it is not arising. If it is not like this, color, etc., will not produce the object. If it does not produce the object, then at that time it will not benefit through indirect means, because in reality, for the wisdom of the eye, etc., color, etc., are not benefactors. It is not the object. Therefore, from the perspective of the object, the environment, etc., is not a kalpa, the color, etc., of this karma. What is that actually? Even if it is determined to be the object itself, what is the reason that it cannot generate consciousness with such a self-object aspect? For wisdom, generating later wisdom is actually beneficial. That exists, if that is the case, it is only wisdom.

Chinese

哦,而且它也确实是作为所取对境而存在的,就像色等一样,由于对境没有劫等,并且眼等靠近时具有的所取对境的特征,不是需要依赖其他的,因为不是有身,并且因为不住于对境,并且因为眼等靠近结合的缘故。然而心本身就是所取对境的特征。例如,仅仅是能取的近取和体验。也就是能执著我的识的近取和心的自性。因此,心不是所知的所取对境,因为其他的知识也会变成所取对境的特征。也不是仅仅是近取因的自性,因为根也会变成所取对境的事物。因此,这两者不是错乱。它也是存在于心的自性中,这样就是所取对境的特征。如果不是这样,如果它被其他心所取,为什么不体验其他的心呢?对于提出这个问题的人,无疑会回答说因为是其他的自性。会说因为不是它的近取自性等。如果是其他的自性,如果进行分析,也是安住于不是能取识的近取,而不是其他的。如果说是由于自性的法等,那么自性也包含在近取中。因此,这确实是所取对境。如果说,如果是微细等的色等不是所取对境,并且不是变成近取,因此其他的心也不是,那时,瑜伽士们的这两个都不会变成所取,如果变成所取,因此所取对境是错乱的,那么,这没有那个过失,例如:色等和心也是这样,对于不清净心者是这样。这样说的意思是,这是依赖于此岸的见解来分析所取对境的,而不是对于瑜伽士,因为那些瑜伽士的分别念是不可思议的,微细等的见解是不可思议的。

English

Oh, and it is indeed certain to exist as the object to be grasped, just like form and so on, because the object does not have kalpas and so on, and the characteristic of the object to be grasped that exists when the eye and so on are near, does not need to rely on others, because it is not embodied, and because it does not dwell in the object, and because the eye and so on are closely connected. However, the mind itself is the characteristic of the object to be grasped. For example, it is only the grasping of the near and the experience. That is, the near of the consciousness that grasps me and the nature of the mind. Therefore, the mind is not the object to be grasped of the knowable, because other knowledge will also become the characteristic of the object to be grasped. It is also not just the nature of the near cause, because the senses will also become the object of the object to be grasped. Therefore, these two are not confused. It is also present in the nature of the mind, so it is the characteristic of the object to be grasped. If it is not so, if it is grasped by another mind, why not experience the other mind? To the person who raises this question, it will undoubtedly be answered that because it is the nature of the other. It will be said that because it is not its near nature and so on. If it is the nature of the other, if analyzed, it also abides in the near that is not the grasping consciousness, but not the other. If it is said that it is due to the dharma of self-nature and so on, then self-nature is also included in the near. Therefore, this is indeed the object to be grasped. If it is said that if it is subtle and so on, form and so on are not the characteristics of the object to be grasped, and it is not becoming near, therefore the other mind is not, then, these two of the yogis will not become the object to be grasped, if it becomes the object to be grasped, therefore the object to be grasped is confused, then, there is no that fault, for example: form and so on and the mind are also like this, it is like this for those with impure minds. What is said is that this is based on the view of this shore to analyze the object to be grasped, but not for the yogis, because the discriminations of those yogis are inconceivable, and the views of the subtle and so on are inconceivable.

Tibetan

དེ་དག་གི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་ལ་གཟུང་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ནི་ཡོད་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ལྟར་ན་དེ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་གཟུང་བའམ་འཛིན་པར་རྣམ་པར་གཞག་པ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །གཞན་ཡང༌། ཕྲ་རབ་ལ་སོགས་ངོ་བོ་ཡིས། །གཟུང་བ་སྟེ་གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་འགའ་ཞིག་གི་ཚེ། གཟུང་མེད་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་རོ། །གཟུགས་སོགས་བློ་ལ་དེ་དག་ཐམས་ཅད་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ལུས་ཅན་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་བས་ན་འདིའི་སྣང་བའི་གནས་སྐབས་ན། གཟུང་བ་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རྒྱུ་སྔར་མེད་གང་དེ་འདྲ་དེ་ཕྱིས་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡང་ཅི་ཞིག་ཡིན། གང་གིས་ན་གཟུང་བ་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། མ་ཡིན་ བ་ཉིད་དོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་དགོངས་སོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་སེམས་གཞན་གྱིས་རང་བློ་འཛིན་ཡོད་ན། རང་གི་བློ་ལ་འཛིན་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ན་ཡང་འདི་ལྟར་ཁས་བླངས་ནས། དེ་མ་ཐག་པའི་སེམས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་ཉིད་སེམས་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ཉིད་གཟུང་བ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པས་ན་གཟུང་བ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་གཟུང་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དུ་གྱུར་པ་ཉེ་བར་མ་གཏོགས་པ་དོན་གཞན་དང་གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་མིན་ཏེ། མཐོང་བ་མེད་པ་དེ་ལྟར་ན་ཡུལ་གཞན་ལ་འཕོ་བ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་མཇུག་བསྡུ་བའོ། །གལ་ཏེ་གཟུང་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཉེ་བར་ལེན་པའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེས་བཤད་པ་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ཐ་དད་པའི་ནུས་པ་སྟེ། ཉེ་བར་ལེན་པའི་ནུས་པ་གཞན་ཡིན་ཞིང་གཞན་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ནུས་པ་ཡང་གཞན་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ལྟར་ན། ཇི་ལྟར་ན་ཉེ་བར་ལེན་པའི་ནུས་པ་གཅིག་གིས་ཉེ་བར་སྦྱོར་བར་བྱེད་ན་གཟུང་བའི་ནུས་པའི་ཉེ་བར་སྦྱོར་བ་མེད་པར་གཟུང་བ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྱུར་ཞེ་ན། ནུས་པ་གཅིག་དང་ལྡན་པའམ། །ནུས་པ་དུ་མ་དད་ལྡན་པ་ལས་འགའ་ཞིག་འབྲས་བུ་གཅིག་དང་དུ་མ་མེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །འོ་ན་ཅི་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། ནུས་བ་དུ་མ་གཅིག་མེད་པ་ན་ཡང་ནུས་པ་དུ་མ་མེད་ན། ངོ་བོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ནི་འབྲས་བུ་དུ་མ་བྱེད། ཅི་ནུས་པ་དུ་མ་གཅིག་མེད་ན་ཡང༌། དངོས་པོ་ཐ་དད་བ། འབྲས་བུ་གཅིག་བྱེད་ཅེས་སྔར་བསྟན་ཞིང་བརྗོད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ནི་འགྱུར་མོད་ཀྱི། གལ་ཏེ་གཅིག་ལས་དུ་མ་མི་འགྱུར། །དངོས་པོ་གཅིག་ལས་འབྲས་བུ་དུ་མ་འབྱུང་བར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། །འོ་ན་ཅི་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། དུ་མ་ནི་རྒྱུ་དུ་མ་ལས་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་རང་གི་སྡེ་པའི་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་དེ་ལྟར་ནི་ཡིན་ན། གཅིག་ལས་གཅིག་ནི་ཅིར་མི་རུང༌། །འོན་ཀྱང༌། ཚོགས་པ་དག་ལས་ཐམས་ཅད་འབྱུང༌། །ཚོགས་པ་གཅིག་ལས་ཚོགས་པ

Chinese

如果那些事物的对境的体性是存在的差别,那么依赖于它,安立为对境或执持是不存在的。另外,极微等自性,作为对境,即色等某些时候,会变成无对境的。色等在心识中,所有这些是不存在的,因为不是有身者。因此,在此显现的阶段,作为对境的因,先前没有的,像那样后来产生的又是什么呢?因为什么而变成非对境呢?应该理解为不是的自性。因此,如果他心能执持自己的心识,那么自己的心识上执持是不存在的。即使那样,像这样承诺后,紧接着的心识的因,即任何心识,那本身就是对境,因此是对境的自性。因此,成为对境的体性,除了接近之外,不依赖于其他事物和色等,因为是不可见的,那样就没有转移到其他境上的情况,这是总结。如果说对境的体性会变成接近的自性,那是不对的,因为这样,不同的识的能量,即接近的能量是其他的,其他的能量也是其他的,这样,如果一个接近的能量进行接近,那么在没有对境的能量的接近时,怎么会变成对境呢?或者具有一个能量,或者从具有多个不同能量中,有些不是一个或多个果。那么是什么呢?即使没有多个能量,如果没有多个能量,自性上就产生多个果。即使没有多个能量,不同的事物,也产生一个果,这是先前已经显示和说过的。那样变化是可以的,如果一个不会变成多个,一个事物不会产生多个果。那么是什么呢?多个是从多个因产生的,这是自己宗派的观点。如果那样,一个为什么不能变成一个呢?然而,一切都从集合产生。一个集合产生集合

English

If the nature of the objects of those things is the difference of existence, then depending on that, it is not possible to establish them as objects or holders. Moreover, the nature of atoms, etc., as objects, i.e., in some cases such as form, etc., it will become without objects. Form, etc., are not all present in the mind, because they are not embodied. Therefore, in this state of appearance, what is the cause of being an object, which did not exist before, and what is it that arises later? Because of what does it become non-object? It should be understood as the nature of not being. Therefore, if another mind can hold one's own mind, then there is no holding on one's own mind. Even so, after making such a commitment, the cause of the immediately following mind, i.e., any mind, is itself the object, therefore it is the nature of the object. Therefore, being the nature of the object, it does not depend on other things and form, etc., except for being close, because it is invisible, so there is no situation of transferring to other objects, this is the conclusion. If it is said that the nature of the object will become the nature of approaching, that is not correct, because in this way, the power of different consciousnesses, i.e., the power of approaching is different, and the power of otherness is also different, so if one approaching power performs approaching, then how can it become an object without the approaching of the object's power? Either having one power, or from having multiple different powers, some are not one or multiple fruits. Then what is it? Even if there are no multiple powers, if there are no multiple powers, then by nature multiple fruits are produced. Even if there are no multiple powers, different things also produce one fruit, this has been previously shown and said. Such a change is possible, but if one does not become multiple, one thing does not produce multiple fruits. Then what is it? Multiple are produced from multiple causes, this is the view of one's own sect. If that is the case, why can't one become one? However, everything arises from aggregates. One aggregate produces aggregates.