Chinese
另外不作名称安立。此处名为牛角，此处的智慧是什么呢？也是角之外的支分等，以及角相互关联而处所不间断，就称为角，以及那些产生角，相互之间利益扶持的，或者，一个对一个利益 扶持的，那才是此处的智慧的理由，不是适合聚集。完全断绝不可见。鼻孔和喉咙等在下面存在，以及关联上面的角完全断绝是不可见的，不断绝才是名为可见的意义。完全断绝可见，那是此处的智慧所依，不是适合聚集，因为那是承认为超离根识的缘故，已经多次说了。那样转变也可以，如果对于此处名为其他意义的理由，因此在有些时候不是真实的时候，近取也不转变，因为近取是真实的所依的缘故，如果这样说，其他意义的所依的名称的行境的事物不是事物，然而事物，无错乱有知的事物，语词的行境是什么就是真实。无错乱进入的智慧的处所，以前的语词的处所是什么就是真实，其他是次要的，例如牛的智慧无错乱进入的处所，具有鼻孔和喉咙等的集合体，世间上极为出名是真实的，错乱的智慧进入的处所，稍微近取小牛犊等。如果是那样，种姓等以及具有种姓等，分别之后没有现量执着，那样就是没有。那样转变也可以，智慧哪个和哪个随着差别而行，那个和那个就是从差别之外的其他意义的理由而进入，例如天蓝色上具有木杖的智慧，从不同的木杖的差别的理由而进入一样。那样，总的来说，不同差别的成立就会出现吗？对此，此处，从事物是他性，种姓等是事物。
English
Furthermore, names are not assigned or established. Here, what is the wisdom of what is called a "cow horn"? It is also the parts that are different from the horn, and the fact that the place is not interrupted by the mutual connection of the horns is called a "horn," and those that generate them mutually benefit and support each other, or, one benefits the other. That which supports is the reason for the wisdom here, not the suitability of gathering. Complete severance is invisible. The nostrils and throat, etc., exist below, and the connection of the upper horns is completely severed and invisible, and the non-severance is the meaning of being called visible. Complete severance is visible, that is the basis of wisdom here, not the suitability of gathering, because it is admitted to be beyond the senses, which has been said many times. It can be transformed in that way, but if the term "here" is the reason for another meaning, then when it is not real in some cases, the proximate does not change either, because the proximate is the basis of reality. If you say that, the object of the usage of the term that is the basis of another meaning is not a thing, but that thing, the unerring knowing thing, whatever is the object of the word is real. Whatever is the place of the wisdom that enters without error, whatever is the place of the previous word is real, and the other is secondary. For example, the place where the wisdom of a cow enters without error, the aggregate with nostrils and throat, etc., which is extremely famous in the world, is real, and the place where the erroneous wisdom enters is like a calf that is slightly taken nearby. If that is the case, then for genus etc. and those with it, there is no manifest grasping after distinguishing, so it is non-existent. It can be transformed in that way, but whichever consciousness follows the difference, that and that enter by reason of another meaning different from the difference. For example, the consciousness of having a staff on the azure enters by reason of the difference of the different staffs. In that way, will the establishment of different differences in general occur? To that, here, from the object is otherness, genus etc. are objects.
Chinese
对于与自性相异的总相等等成为对境，没有能成立其存在的比量。例如，对于一切木杖等，认为仅仅是差别等等，对于天授等施设为持杖者的名称，那不是与意义相异的独立的木杖，因为即使没有其所有者，也会有施设名称的过失。那么是什么呢？是从世俗上来说，持杖者们互相帮助，以及施加帮助的事物，是近取施设的处所的差别，而不是成为意义相异的，因为那是被分别念的虚妄增益之故。这是所要表达的意义。因此，由于没有成立例子，所以显示了没有比量。事物宫殿连等，声音等也不依赖于他者。事物、实事，具有随行之义的声音或意识，是具有表达一切词义的性质。宫殿的连，是具有差别的。差别之识和具有随行之义的声音，凡是这个以及等等所说的，如城市等等的名称，以前已经分析完毕。对此，声音这一切不依赖于他者，这显示了不决定。这样一来，事物事物这样的随行之名称，或者宫殿的连的声音的施设，不是具有随行一切事物之性质的相异差别的所依。在此，暂且宫殿本身不是实物，因为木头等等不相同的种类不造作实物之故。具有等等，虽然没有丝毫成为意义相异的，然而，承诺之后应当说，如果房屋也是具有，变化即使是那样，那连，即具有自性的宫殿的连，词义的形态那将变成什么？即使不包含在某些词义之中，那样一来，连这个词也丝毫不存在。那样一来，种类那不是实物，因为宫殿本身不是实物之故。也不是功德，功德等
English
For the general characteristics that are different from the own-being and become objects, there is no inference that can establish their existence. For example, for all sticks and so on, it is considered to be merely differences and so on, and the name of "stick-holder" is applied to Devadatta and so on, that is not an independent stick that has become different in meaning, because even without its owner, there would be the fault of applying the name. So what is it? It is from the conventional point of view that stick-holders help each other, and the things that give help, are the differences in the place of proximate imputation, and not that they have become different in meaning, because that is due to the false imputation of conceptual thought. This is the meaning to be expressed. Therefore, since the example is not established, it shows that there is no inference. Things like palace rows, sounds, etc., do not depend on others. Things, actual things, sounds or consciousness that have the meaning of following, have the nature of expressing all word meanings. The row of palaces is distinctive. The knowledge of distinction and the sound that has the meaning of following, whatever this and so on are mentioned, such as the name of a city and so on, have already been analyzed before. In this regard, the statement that all these sounds do not depend on others shows the uncertainty. In this way, the name of following such as "thing thing," or the application of the sound of a row of palaces, is not the basis of different distinctions that have the nature of following all things. Here, for the time being, the palace itself is not a substance, because different kinds of wood and so on do not create substances. Having and so on, although there is not the slightest bit of becoming different in meaning, nevertheless, after promising, it should be said, if the house is also having, even if the change is like that, then the row, that is, the row of palaces that has the nature of having, what will the form of the word meaning become? Even if it is not included in some word meanings, then there is not the slightest bit of the word "row." In that case, the genus is not a substance, because the palace itself is not a substance. It is also not a quality, qualities etc.
Tibetan
ས་ལ་ཡོན་ཏན་མེད་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ནི་འགྱུར་མོད་ཀྱི། གལ་ཏེ་རིགས་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཁང་བཟངས་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ལྡན་པའི་རིགས་ཕྲེང་བ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེ་ན། དེའི་ཚེ་ཁང་གཅིག་ཀྱང་སྟེ། ཁང་བཟངས་ལ་ཕྲེང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་ཕྲེང་བའི་སྒྲ་ནི་རིགས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་ མཚན་ཅན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཅི་དང་འདྲ་བར་ཞེ་ན། ཤིང་བཞིན་དུ། དཔེར་ན་ཤིང་གི་སྒྲ་རིགས་བརྗོད་པའི་ངང་ཚུལ་ཅན་གྱི་པ་ལ་ཤ་ལ་སོགས་པ་མང་པོ་བརྗོད་ཅིང་གཅིག་ཀྱང་བརྗོད་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ། །དེ་བཞིན་དུ་ཁང་བཟངས་གཅིག་ལ་ཡང་ཁང་བཟངས་ཀྱི་ཕྲེང་བའི་སྒྲས་བརྗོད་པར་འགྱུར་ན། བརྗོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་བས་ན་ཕྲེང་བའི་སྒྲ་ནི་རིགས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཅན་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །སྦྱོར་བ་ནི་གང་ཞིག་གང་ཡོད་ན་ཡང་མི་འགྱུར་བ་དེ་ནི་དེ་ཙམ་གྱི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཅན་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན་ངང་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལ་རྟ་ཡོད་དུ་ཟིན་ཀྱང་བ་ལང་གི་སྒྲ་མེད་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ། །ཁང་བཟངས་གཅིག་ལ་ཡང་ལྡན་པའི་རིགས་ཡོད་ན་ཡང་ཕྲེང་བའི་སྒྲར་མི་འགྱུར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཁྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་འགལ་བ་དམིགས་པའོ། །ཕྲེང་མང་པོ་ཉིད་དེ་སྒྲ་ནི། །ཇི་ལྟར་གང་གི་ཚེ། རིགས་ཉིད་ཕྲེང་བ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ་དེའི་ཚེ་ཁང་བཟངས་ཀྱི་ཕྲེང་བ་མང་པོ་དག་ལ་ཁང་བཟངས་ཀྱི་ཕྲེང་བ་མངས་པོ་དག་ལ་ཁང་བཟངས་ཀྱི་ཕྲེང་བ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཁྱད་པར་གྱི་རྗེས་སུ་འགྲོ་བའི་ཤེས་པར་མི་འགྱུར་རོ། །རིགས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་ཕྲེང་བ་དག་ལ་སྤྱི་གཞན་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རིགས་ནི་རིགས་མིན་ཕྱིར་སྤྱི་ལ་ཡང་སྤྱི་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གཞན་ཡང་ཁང་བཟངས་ཀྱི་ཕྲེང་བ་ཆེན་པོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་སྙད་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་དག་གང་གང་གིས་བྱས་ཚད་ནི་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཕྲེང་སོགས་ལྡན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཅན་གྱི་ཁང་བཟངས་སམ། རིགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཅན་གྱི་ཕྲེང་བ་ལ་ཆེན་པོ་ཉིད་སོགས་ཡོན་ཏན་གྱི་ཚད་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །གང་ཉེ་བར་བཏགས་ལས་ཁང་བཟངས་ཀྱི་ཕྲེང་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལ་ཆེན་པོ་ཉིད་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་འདོད་ན་ཡང་ཐ་དད་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ཡང་རིགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་དཔེར་ན་མེ་ཏོག་རྒྱས་པ་ཅན་གྱི་ནགས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདི་ལ་གྲངས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཅན་གྱི་ནགས་ལ་མེ་ཏོག་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དེ་དག་ནི་རྫས་ལ་ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ན་ཡང་རྫས་གཅིག་ལ་གྲངས་དང་མེ་ཏོག་གི་འཕྲོད་པ་འདུ་བ་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ལྟར་ན། ཁྱེད་ཀྱིས་ཀུན་དུ་བརྟགས་པར་ཉེ་བར་བཏགས་པའི་ས་བོན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་མེ་ཏོག་རྒྱས་པ་ཅན་གྱི་ནགས་ཞེས་ཉེ་བར་བཏགས་པ་ལས
Chinese
因为土地本身没有功德。虽然可以这样转变，但如果说是种姓，是具有叫做“房屋”的种姓的连贯，那么，即使只有一个房屋，也称为“房屋的连贯”，因为“连贯”这个词具有种姓的理由。比如什么呢？就像树一样。例如，树这个词具有表达种姓的方式，可以表达许多巴拉夏等，也可以表达一个。同样，即使只有一个房屋，也可以用“房屋的连贯”这个词来表达，但不能表达。因此，“连贯”这个词不具有种姓的理由。推理是，如果某物存在于某处也不会改变，那么它就不具有那样的理由。例如，即使天鹅等有马，也没有牛的称谓。即使一个房屋也具有连贯的种姓，也不会变成“连贯”这个词，这是指遍及性相违。连贯是许多，那么词语呢？就像什么时候，种姓本身就是连贯的时候，对于许多房屋的连贯，不会变成跟随差别的知识，即称其为房屋的连贯。对于种姓自性的连贯，没有其他的共相，因为种姓不是种姓，所以对于共相也没有共相本身。此外，所谓“巨大的房屋的连贯”的名称，那些用什么来衡量呢？不具有连贯等特征的房屋，或者不具有种姓特征的连贯，不具有巨大等功德的衡量。如果从假立的角度，想要对房屋的连贯等使用巨大等名称，也没有不同的差别。这也不合道理，比如“鲜花盛开的森林”，对于具有数量特征的森林来说，因为没有鲜花，所以那些存在于事物上。即使如此，在一个事物上存在数量和鲜花的相合，那样的话，因为你们普遍考察了假立的种子，所以从假立的角度称其为“鲜花盛开的森林”。
English
Because the land itself has no merit. Although it can be transformed in this way, if it is said to be a lineage, a continuous lineage of the "house" kind, then even if there is only one house, it is called "a continuous lineage of houses," because the word "continuous" has the reason of lineage. What is it like? It's like a tree. For example, the word "tree" has a way of expressing lineage, and can express many palasha and so on, and can also express one. Similarly, even if there is only one house, it can be expressed by the word "continuous lineage of houses," but it cannot be expressed. Therefore, the word "continuous" does not have the reason of lineage. The reasoning is that if something exists somewhere and does not change, then it does not have that kind of reason. For example, even if swans and so on have horses, they do not have the name of cattle. Even if one house has the lineage of continuity, it will not become the word "continuous," which refers to the contradiction of pervasiveness. Continuity is many, so what about the word? Just like when the lineage itself is continuity, for many continuous lineages of houses, it will not become the knowledge that follows the difference, that is, calling it a continuous lineage of houses. For the continuity of the nature of lineage, there is no other generality, because lineage is not lineage, so for generality, there is no generality itself. In addition, what is the measure of those so-called "huge continuous lineages of houses"? Houses that do not have the characteristics of continuity, etc., or continuous lineages that do not have the characteristics of lineage, do not have the measure of merits such as hugeness. If, from the perspective of imputation, one wants to use names such as hugeness for the continuous lineages of houses, etc., there is no different difference. This is also unreasonable, such as "a forest with blooming flowers," for a forest with numerical characteristics, because there are no flowers, so those exist on things. Even so, if there is a combination of number and flowers on one thing, then, because you have universally examined the seed of imputation, it is called "a forest with blooming flowers" from the perspective of imputation.