Chinese
因此，有为法，若非自性有，如幻如梦一般，由自因缘力，获得自体差别是合理的。如是说。对于那些认为有为法是自性有的，由于先前分析的理证，系缚和解脱是不合理的。有为法若非自性有，如幻术和阳焰一般，由自因缘力，刹那与刹那间获得与先前体性不同的自体差别，那么系缚和解脱是合理的。如何理解呢？在此，有为法的集合，从无始时起，就被我与我所执著的执取所控制，被贪欲等烦恼的铁链所束缚，由此生起真实的正见，解脱一切束缚，从轮回的监狱中彻底解脱，所谓的解脱，以世俗谛的智慧安立名言是合理的。但胜义谛并非如此。如是，如经中所说：如来使轮回止息，但其中没有任何轮回；如来示现涅槃，但其中没有任何涅槃。如同此例。自宗的一些人说：从一个因缘传递到另一个因缘的相续，名色、贪欲等，以及与之俱生的与解脱相违的方面，称为系缚。对于系缚，听闻正法和如理作意所产生的正见之灯，生起远离无明的黑暗，从贪欲等束缚中解脱，称为解脱。对于那些这样说的人，以下偈颂是为他们而说的：名与色，胜义中，流转不应理，有为故如外，地等不许然。所谓的名，是指非色蕴的四蕴。色，是指身体和感官的集合。这在胜义中，生起、流转和周遍是不合理的，因为是由因缘聚合而成的。例如，外在的土地等，因为是有为法，所以不承认它们在轮回中流转。
English
Therefore, conditioned phenomena, if not inherently existent, are like illusions and dreams. It is reasonable to obtain individual distinctions through the power of one's own causes and conditions. Thus it is said. For those who believe that conditioned phenomena are inherently existent, bondage and liberation are unreasonable due to the previously analyzed reasons. If conditioned phenomena are not inherently existent, like illusions and mirages, and through the power of their own causes and conditions, they obtain individual distinctions that differ in nature from the previous moment, then bondage and liberation are reasonable. How so? Here, the collection of conditioned phenomena, which has been involved since beginningless time, is controlled by the grasping of self and what belongs to self, and bound by the iron chains of afflictions such as desire. By generating correct knowledge, all bonds are loosened, and liberation, which is the complete passing beyond the prison of samsara, is appropriately designated by the wisdom that belongs to conventional truth. But this is not the case in ultimate truth. As it is said: Although the Tathagata causes samsara to cease, there is no samsara there. Although the Tathagata shows nirvana, there is no nirvana there. Like this example. Some of our own schools say: The continuum that passes from one cause and condition to another, name and form, desire, etc., and the aspects that arise simultaneously and are contrary to liberation, are called bondage. For bondage, the lamp of correct knowledge arising from hearing the Dharma and proper attention, which is free from the darkness of ignorance, is born, and liberation from the bonds of desire, etc., is called liberation. For those who say this, the following verse is spoken: Name and form, in ultimate truth, it is not reasonable to transmigrate, because they are conditioned, like external, earth, etc., which are not admitted. What is called name refers to the four non-form aggregates. Form refers to the collection of body and senses. It is not reasonable for these to arise, transmigrate, and pervade in ultimate truth, because they are manifestly conditioned by causes and conditions. For example, external earth, etc., are conditioned, so it is not admitted that they transmigrate in samsara.
Chinese
而且解脱也是不合理的。为什么呢？如果名色在胜义中，无论如何也不会解脱。因为具有生和灭，就像外面的水等一样。这是说，应该认为它的相续是解脱，还是刹那是解脱呢？对此，暂且相续不是实有，就像水的波浪生起和熄灭一样，而且刹那也是，束缚在束缚的时候就坏灭了，而且在后来的时间里生起，也只是像束缚一样生起，怎么会解脱呢？这样一来，暂且名和色上的束缚和解脱都是不合理的。住子部的宗派认为，有异于蕴、处、界的补特伽罗流转和解脱，为了驳斥这一点而宣说：补特伽罗在真实中，不会流转和解脱。因为是假立的，就像房屋一样。因为是能说的，就像气味一样。这是说，譬如用草、木、土、竹、石头和砖等假立为房屋一样，仅仅是依靠蕴、界、处而假立为补特伽罗，没有它们就难以指示它。因此，补特伽罗就像房屋等一样，因为是应该假立的，而且像气味一样，因为是应该说的，所以没有束缚和解脱。或者，那个补特伽罗不是实有的，因为没有异于色、受、想、行、识的自相可以指出的缘故，就像虚空中的花一样。因此宣说：或者补特伽罗不是补特伽罗，因为具有因，就像瓶子一样。因为具有生和灭，因为是所知，就像来一样。这是说，这个补特伽罗是异于蕴等的吗？还是不是异于蕴等的呢？如果如果是异于蕴等的，那么就会变成没有自性。如果不是异于蕴等的，那么在蕴等坏灭的时候，补特伽罗也会坏灭的过失。如果说那个补特伽罗既不是可以说的同一，也不是可以说的他异，而且也认为是实有，那么这样也是不合理的。因为补特伽罗是不可说的，所以没有成立是实有，就像气味和
English
Moreover, liberation is also unreasonable. Why? If name and form are in ultimate reality, they will not be liberated in any way. Because they have birth and death, like external water, etc. This means, should its continuum be considered liberation, or the moment? In this regard, for the time being, the continuum is not substantially existent, just as the waves of water arise and cease, and the moment is also, because bondage ceases at the time of bondage, and arising in the later time also arises only as bondage, how can it be liberation? In this way, for the time being, bondage and liberation on name and form are unreasonable. The Sthavira Nikāya sect believes that there is a person who is different from the aggregates, sense bases, and elements, who transmigrates and is liberated, and in order to refute this, it is said: A person in reality will not transmigrate or be liberated. Because it is imputed, like a house. Because it is expressible, like a smell. This means that just as a house is imputed with grass, wood, earth, bamboo, stones, and bricks, etc., it is only imputed as a person based on the aggregates, elements, and sense bases, and without them it is difficult to indicate it. Therefore, a person is like a house, etc., because it is to be imputed, and like a smell, because it is to be expressed, there is no bondage and liberation. Or, that person is not substantially existent, because there is no self-characteristic that can be pointed out other than form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness, like a flower in the sky. Therefore, it is said: Or a person is not a person, because it has a cause, like a pot. Because it has birth and death, because it is knowable, like coming. This means, is this person different from the aggregates, etc.? Or is it not different from the aggregates, etc.? If it is different, then it will become without self-nature. If it is not different, then when the aggregates, etc., are destroyed, the person will also have the fault of being destroyed. If it is said that that person is neither the same nor different that can be spoken of, and is also considered to be substantially existent, then this is also unreasonable. Because a person is inexpressible, therefore it is not established as substantially existent, like smell and
Tibetan
་དཀར་སྔོར་བརྗོད་མེད་པའི། །མོ་གཤམ་བུས་ནི་མ་ངེས་འགྱུར། །ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་བརྗོད་དུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་འདིས་ནི་ཕ་རོལ་པོའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་དོན་མ་ངེས་པ་ཉིད་དུ་སྟོན་ཏེ། །བརྗོད་དུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱིས་གང་ཟག་དེ་རྫས་སུ་ཡོད་པར་མི་འགྲུབ་སྟེ། ཅི་རེ་ཞིག་དྲི་བརྗོད་དུ་མེད་ཀྱང་རྫས་སུ་ཡོད་པ་བཞིན་དུ་གང་ཟག་ཀྱང་བརྗོད་དུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རྫས་སུ་ཡོད་པར་འགྱུར་རམ། །འོན་ཏེ་མོ་གཤམ་གྱི་བུ་དཀར་པོ་དང་སྔོན་པོར་བརྗོད་དུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རྫས་སུ་མེད་པ་བཞིན་དུ་གང་ཟག་ཀྱང་བརྗོད་དུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྫས་སུ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་བ་མ་ངེས་པས་དེ་རྫས་སུ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་ཉམས་སོ། །དེ་ལྟར་ཕུང་པོ་བདག་ མེད་ཅིང༌། །སྲོག་མེད་སེམས་ཅན་ཡོད་མིན་པ། །མཁས་པས་གཟུ་བོའི་བློ་དག་གིས། །ཅི་རིགས་པར་ནི་ཤེས་པར་བྱ། །ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་གང་ཟག་དགག་པ་དང་འདྲ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་བྱ་བར་བསམས་སོ། །དེ་ལ་བདག་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་གྲངས་ཅན་དང་བྱེ་བྲག་པ་དག་གི་གཞུང་ལས་རྒྱུན་དུ་འགྲོ་བའམ། འབྱུང་པོ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱིས་བརྟག་པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་བདག་ཅེས་བྱའོ། །སྲོག་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་གཅེར་བུ་བདག་གི་གཞུང་ལས་འཚོ་བའི་དོན་གྱིས་སྲོག་ཅེའོ། །སེམས་ཅན་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་རྒོལ་བ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་གཞུང་ལས་ཡོད་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ནི་སེམས་ཅན་ནོ་ཞེ་འམ། །འགྲོ་བ་རྣམས་སུ་སྦྱོར་བ་ནི་སེམས་ཅན་ནོ་ཞེའོ། །གང་ཟག་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་གནས་མ་བུའི་སྡེ་པ་དག་གི་གཞུང་ལས་ཡང་འགྲོ་བ་ལེན་པའི་ཕྱིར་གང་ཟག་ཅེའོ། །བདག་བཀག་པ་བཞིན་དུ་སྲོག་དང་གང་ཟག་དགག་པ་ཡང་འདྲ་བར་མཐོང་ནས། ལུས་དང་དབང་པོའི་ཚོགས་རྣམས་ལ། །དེ་ཉིད་དུ་ན་བདག་མེད་འདོད། །རྒྱུ་དང་ལྡན་ཕྱིར་ཀ་བ་བཞིན། །ཡང་ན་བསགས་ཕྱིར་གྲོག་མཁར་བཞིན། །ཞེས་བྱ་བ་སྨྲས་ཏེ། བདག་མེད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དེ་དག་ལས་བདག་བྲལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་བདག་མེད་དོ། །གྲོག་མཁར་བཞིན་ཞེས་བྱ་ནི་གྲོག་མའི་བྲུན་བཞིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་ཐ་ཚིག་གོ །མུ་སྟེགས་ཅན་དག་ན་རེ་བ་དག་ནི་ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་ཏེ། དྲན་པ་དང་ངོ་ཤེས་པ་དང༌། ཤེས་པ་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དག་གིས་ལུས་དང་དབང་པོའི་ཚོགས་དག་ནི་བདག་དང་བཅས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །བུམ་པ་དང་སྣམ་བུ་ལ་སོགས་པ་བདག་མེད་པ་དག་ལ་ནི་དྲན་པ་དང་ངོ་ཤེས་པ་སྐྱེ་བ་མ་མཐོང་བས་དེའི་ཕྱིར་དྲན་པ་ལ་སོགས་པ་དག་ནི་དག་ནི་བདག་གི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེས་ན་བདག་ཡོད་པ་ཁོ་ནར་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་གོ་ཞེས་ཟེར་རོ། །འདིར་བཤད་པ
Chinese
“说成白色或蓝色都不可说，因此母骡所生之子是不确定的。” 叫做不可说的缘故，这表明对方的理由是不确定的。因为不可说的缘故，这个理由不能证明那个人是实有。例如，即使气味不可说，但它仍然是实有的。那么，人也会因为不可说而变成实有吗？或者，就像母骡的儿子不能被说成白色或蓝色一样，因为人也是不可说的，所以不能确定他是否是实有的，因此他作为实有的存在就消失了。因此，五蕴无我，没有生命，众生也不存在。智者以公正的智慧，应如理了知。这与否定人是相似的。我认为是这样。所谓“我”，在数论派和胜论派的论典中，是指常存的，或者是指一切要素所考察的对象，因此称为“我”。所谓“命”，在耆那教的论典中，是指具有活力的意义。所谓“众生”，在所有论敌的论典中，是指存在的有事物，或者是指与轮回相连结的事物。所谓“人”，在住子部的论典中，是指再次受生的主体，因此称为“人”。就像否定“我”一样，否定“命”和“人”也被认为是相似的。他们说：“对于身体和感官的集合，我们认为其中没有我。就像柱子有原因一样，或者像蚁丘是积累而成的一样。” 所谓“无我”，是指从这些事物中脱离了“我”，因此是无我的。所谓“像蚁丘一样”，是指像蚂蚁的粪便一样。外道们说，存在是绝对存在的，因为有记忆、识别和知识产生等理由，所以身体和感官的集合是有我的。因为在瓶子和布匹等无我的事物上，没有看到记忆和识别的产生，所以记忆等是我的属性。因此，可以推断出我是绝对存在的。这里所说的
English
“It is unspeakable to say white or blue, therefore the offspring of a mule is uncertain.” This, called the reason of being unspeakable, shows that the opponent's reason is uncertain. Because of the reason of being unspeakable, this reason cannot prove that the person is real. For example, even if the smell is unspeakable, it is still real. So, will a person also become real because he is unspeakable? Or, just as the son of a mule cannot be said to be white or blue, because a person is also unspeakable, it is uncertain whether he is real, so his existence as real disappears. Therefore, the five aggregates are without self, there is no life, and sentient beings do not exist. The wise should know this appropriately with impartial wisdom. This is similar to denying the person. I think so. The so-called "self" in the treatises of the Samkhya and Vaisheshika schools refers to what is permanent or what is to be examined by all elements, therefore it is called "self." The so-called "life" in the treatises of the Jains refers to the meaning of vitality. The so-called "sentient being" in the treatises of all opponents refers to existing things, or to things that are connected to samsara. The so-called "person" in the treatises of the Vatsiputriya school refers to the subject who takes rebirth again, therefore it is called "person." Just as denying the "self," denying "life" and "person" is also considered similar. They say, “For the collection of body and senses, we think that there is no self in them. Just as a pillar has a cause, or like an anthill is accumulated.” The so-called "no-self" means that the "self" is separated from these things, therefore it is no-self. The so-called "like an anthill" means like the dung of ants. The heretics say that existence is absolutely existent, because there are reasons such as memory, recognition, and the arising of knowledge, so the collection of body and senses is with self. Because the arising of memory and recognition is not seen in things without self such as pots and cloths, memory and so on are the attributes of the self. Therefore, it can be inferred that the self is absolutely existent. What is said here