Chinese
确立意义之理的第十四品开始撰写。此处说：你们说蕴等诸法是无自性的，这与薄伽梵的教言相违背，因为经中说，色、识和眼三者相遇就是触，因此你们所承诺的会受到损害。从胜义谛上来说，应当了知诸法是有自性的，因为是依靠它们来显示触的缘故。依靠它们，对于此处不存在的事物，导师没有显示依靠它而有触，例如像乌龟的毛一样。薄伽梵的教言中有贪欲、嗔恚和无明的随缚，因此凭借如上所说的理由，诸法唯有是具有自性的。此处说：所见、能见、见者三者，两两以及全部，都不可能互相接触。所见、能见和见者，这两两以及全部，都不可能互相接触，这是总结语。同样，贪欲、染着和将染着，以及其余烦恼和十二处中未说明的剩余部分，也应以三种方式观察。同样，对于贪欲和染着以及将染着，以及除了所说的贪欲之外的其余烦恼，如嗔恨等，也应安立嗔恨、有嗔恨者和应嗔恨等，以两两以及全部的三种方式，说明不可能互相接触，应作此破斥。其中，贪欲是特别染着的自性。烦恼是使众生相续烦恼的。相对于已说明的十二处，未说明的剩余部分，如听、嗅、舌、身、意等，对于应听、听和听者，以及同样对于应嗅、嗅和嗅者等，也应以两两以及全部的三种方式，说明不可能互相接触，也应作此破斥。其中，十二处的意思是心和心所生
English
The fourteenth chapter, which establishes the meaning of reason, begins to be written. Here it is said: Your assertion that the aggregates and other phenomena are without inherent existence contradicts the words of the Blessed One, because it is said in the scriptures that the meeting of form, consciousness, and the eye is contact, therefore your commitment will be harmed. From the ultimate truth, it should be understood that all phenomena have inherent existence, because it is by relying on them that contact is shown. By relying on them, the teacher did not show that contact exists by relying on what does not exist here, just like the hair of a tortoise. The Blessed One's teachings contain attachment, anger, and ignorance as bonds, therefore, by the strength of the reasons stated above, all phenomena are only inherently existent. Here it is said: The seen, the seeing, and the seer, these three, two by two, and all, cannot possibly touch each other. The seen, the seeing, and the seer, these two by two, and all, cannot possibly touch each other, this is the concluding statement. Similarly, desire, attachment, and becoming attached, as well as the remaining afflictions and the remaining parts not explained in the twelve sources, should also be viewed in three ways. Similarly, for desire and attachment and becoming attached, and the remaining afflictions other than the stated desire, such as hatred, etc., one should also establish hatred, the one with hatred, and the one to be hated, etc., in the three ways of two by two and all, stating that it is impossible to touch each other, this refutation should be made. Among them, desire is the nature of special attachment. Afflictions are what afflict the minds of sentient beings. Relative to the explained twelve sources, the remaining parts not explained, such as hearing, smelling, tongue, body, and mind, etc., for what should be heard, hearing, and the hearer, and similarly for what should be smelled, smelling, and the smeller, etc., one should also state in the three ways of two by two and all that it is impossible to touch each other, this refutation should also be made. Among them, the meaning of the twelve sources is mind and what arises from mind.
Chinese
幼者乃是出生的门之义。当看之物等等和贪欲等等，二二者，以及一切也互相不相遇，那是誓言之近安置。现在为了显示不相遇，将要解说正理。若他者与他者相遇，因为当看之物等等，彼他者是不存在的，因此不会相遇。相遇是结合的异名，那也是若有他者，则会与他者相遇。因为当看之物和看、能看者和贪欲、贪着和将贪着等等，彼他者也是不存在的，因此不会相遇，这是结尾之词。此乃从不相符之方所退还，显示方之法，譬如常恒和非所作性相关联，那在声上是没有的，而所作性是有的那样。此处结合之词是，就胜义谛而言，能看者与当看之物或者看是不相遇的，因为不是从那之外的他者之故。任何从任何之外不是他者，那与那不相遇，譬如自己的自性一般。若他者与他者相遇，此句中，其他的人说，贪欲等等没有相遇，因为随顺境和相续各异之故。相遇乃是境各异和因各异者之间，供养而进入。他们这样说。对此，此处有些人说，当看之物等等，因为不是境各异之故，以及贪 欲等等，也因为不住于境之故，随顺境和相续各异之故。说是这样的理由之义未成立，以及没有随行之故，那似乎是不好的。从下面将要出现的方式，仅仅当看之物等等，不仅没有他者，任何与任何一起，成为他者也是不合理的。当听之物和听者和能听者等等，以及嗔恨和有嗔者和当嗔恨等等，这是总括之词，因此对那些没有相遇。此处说，当看之物和看和能看者等等不是他者。
English
The young ones are the meaning of the door of birth. Objects to be seen, etc., and desire, etc., two by two, and all do not meet each other, that is the close placement of the vow. Now, in order to show the absence of meeting, the reason will be explained. If another meets another, because of objects to be seen, etc., that other does not exist, therefore it will not meet. Meeting is a synonym for combination, and that is also if there is another, it will meet another. Because of objects to be seen, and seeing, and the seer, and desire, and attachment, and becoming attached, etc., that other also does not exist, therefore it will not meet, this is the concluding word. This shows the dharma of the side by reversing from the inconsistent side, for example, permanence and uncreatedness are related, that is not present in sound, but createdness is present. Here, the word of combination is, in the ultimate sense, the seer does not meet the object to be seen or seeing, because it is not other than that. Whatever is not other than whatever, that does not meet that, like one's own self. If another meets another, in this sentence, others say that desire, etc., do not meet, because they follow different objects and continuums. Meeting is the offering and entering between those who are not different objects and not different causes. They say so. To this, here some say that objects to be seen, etc., are not different objects, and desire etc., also do not abide in objects, therefore they follow different objects and continuums. Saying that the meaning of the reason is not established, and there is no following, that seems not good. In the manner that will appear below, only objects to be seen, etc., not only is there no other, but it is also unreasonable for anything to be other together with anything. Objects to be heard and hearers and listeners, etc., and hatred and haters and objects to be hated, etc., this is a summary word, therefore there is no meeting for those. Here it is said, objects to be seen and seeing and seers, etc., are not other.
Chinese
如果不是成立的缘故，难道不会变成理由的意义不成立的过失吗？不是这样说的。怎么样呢？他者依赖于他者而为他者，无他者则他者不会转变，他者依赖于他者而为他者。如果这样说，因为无他者，所以依赖于他者而为他者也是不合理的。那么是什么呢？他者依赖于他者而为他者，这只是施设名称的言词而已。这表明了所要成立的法，即特殊的陈述，是具有依赖性的。所依赖的那个是什么，它不应与那个相异。这是对承诺的近似安立。在此，比量在胜义谛中观察，与所观察的无异，因为特殊的陈述是具有依赖性的。由于所观察的自性，因此成立者成立的理由也是理由，所以不是意义不成立。并且，所要陈述的特殊陈述，即具有依赖性的理由的意义，也不是不成立的，因为无依赖性是不成立的。怎么样呢？如果他者是他者之外的他者，那么无他者也可能成立。如果名为他者的事物，本质上是他者之外的他者，那么即使没有他者，也可能成为他者，因为那是它的本质。例如，在世俗谛中被称为火的事物，即使不依赖于其他事物，也会成为热的本质。从他者之外的他者，如果不存在，那么因为不存在，所以它不存在。所谓他者本身就是如此。这不是所期望的，因为观者和听者等不依赖于所观和所听等而成为他者，贪欲等也不依赖于欲贪等而成为他者。例如，在世俗中，火不依赖于寒冷，而以其自性不存在热一样。如果观者不依赖于观看等也是他者，因为体相各异，就像牛和马一样。像这样的体相各异也是存在的，观者是境
English
If it is not established, wouldn't it become the fault of the reason's meaning not being established? It is not said like that. How is it? The other depends on the other to be the other. Without the other, the other will not change. The other depends on the other to be the other. If it is said like that, because there is no other, therefore, depending on the other to be the other is also unreasonable. Then what is it? The other depends on the other to be the other, it is just a term for applying names. This shows that the dharma to be established, the special statement, is indeed with dependence. What is depended on, it should not be different from that. This is the approximate establishment of the commitment. Here, inference, in the ultimate truth, is not different from what is to be observed, because the special statement is with dependence. Because of the self-nature of what is to be observed, therefore, the reason for the establisher to establish is also the reason, so it is not that the meaning is not established. And, the special statement to be stated, the meaning of the reason with dependence, is also not not established, because the absence of dependence is not established. How is it? If the other is the other outside the other, then the absence of the other may also be established. If the thing called the other is essentially the other outside the other, then even without the other, it may become the other, because that is its essence. For example, the thing called fire in conventional truth, even if it does not depend on other things, it will become the essence of heat. The other from the other, if it does not exist, then because it does not exist, therefore it does not exist. The so-called other itself is like that. This is not what is expected, because the viewer and the listener etc. do not depend on what is to be viewed and what is to be heard etc. to become the other, and greed etc. also do not depend on desire etc. to become the other. For example, in the world, fire does not depend on cold, and by its own nature, there is no heat. If the viewer is also the other without depending on viewing etc., because the characteristics are different, like a cow and a horse. Such different characteristics also exist, the viewer is the object
Chinese
显现的识之相，如同与之相应的行蕴。见是境，即颜色、形色与眼识之所依处。色是可显现之相，是颜色和形状的自性。因此，以如上所说之理，能见者异于所见等，以后的分别念和自主的推断会造成损害，如果这样说，那是不合理的。因为牛和马等本身并没有成立为异体。这也就回答了因为名称不同，以及因和果不同等等的理由。胜论派说：在所见中，异体必定存在，因此，异体成立，因为所说是特殊的，依赖于所依。这种理由是不成立的。即使如此，所谓异体，是具有可说之法的，因为依赖于异体，并且普遍陈述了方分之法，所以理由并非不成立。此外，如果因为具有异体而被认为是异体，那么无可避免地 也会从自身变成异体，因为它是自身的自性，例如火不依赖于寒冷等，也会因为自身的自性而变成热。如果将无二之事物，即不依赖于他物的法，视为异体，那也只是分别念而已。因为依赖于他物本身不是异体之识的因，而异体是该识的因。如果将异体和非异体视为具有异体，那也是没有意义的，并且会变成不相容的否定。如果将不可言说之事物在以后视为具有异体，那么事物并非具有异体，因为它是事物。例如，如同不可言说之事物本身的刹那，会损害自己的推断。其他胜论派说：究竟而言，见与所见无异，那么这个誓言的意义是什么？如果异体不包含在其中，那么理由是不确定的。
English
The characteristic of manifest consciousness is like the aggregate of formations that correspond to it. Seeing is the object, the basis of color, form, and eye consciousness. Form is the characteristic of being able to manifest, the nature of color and shape. Therefore, according to the reason stated above, the seer is different from the seen, etc., and subsequent conceptualizations and autonomous inferences will cause harm. If you say so, it is unreasonable. Because cows and horses, etc., have not themselves been established as different entities. This also answers the reasons such as different names and different causes and effects. The Vaiseṣika school says: In what is to be seen, otherness must exist, therefore, otherness is established, because what is said is special and depends on the basis. This reason is not established. Even so, the so-called otherness is something that has the characteristic of being speakable, because it depends on otherness and universally states the dharma of the parts, so the reason is not unestablished. Furthermore, if it is considered otherness because it possesses otherness, then inevitably it will also become otherness from itself, because it is its own nature, for example, fire does not depend on coldness, etc., and will also become hot because of its own nature. If one considers a non-dual thing, that is, a dharma that does not depend on other things, as otherness, then it is only a conceptualization. Because depending on other things itself is not the cause of the consciousness of otherness, and otherness is the cause of that consciousness. If one considers otherness and non-otherness as possessing otherness, then it is meaningless and will become an incompatible negation. If one considers something that is not speakable as possessing otherness in the future, then the thing is not possessing otherness, because it is a thing. For example, like the moment of the unspeakable itself, it will harm its own inference. Other Vaiseṣikas say: Ultimately, seeing is not different from what is to be seen, then what is the meaning of this vow? If otherness is not included in it, then the reason is uncertain.