English
The eye and its object are the usual illustration, but the representative imagination (mano or cittam) and its object are included as proceeding by way of contact, only without impact (sanghattanam). The real causal con- nexion in every case — so I understand the, to me, obscurely 6 The contact which on that occasion is touching, the being brought into contact, the state of having been brought into touch with — this is the contact that there then is. [3J What on that occasion is feeling (v e d a n a) ?^ The mental pleasure, the mental ease, which, on that occasion, is born of contact with the appropriate element of representative intellection f the pleasurable, easeful sensa- worded comment to say (Asl. 109) — is mental, even though we speak of an external agency, just as when lac melts with heat we speak of hot coals as the cause, though the heat is in the lac's own tissue. * Contact ' is given priority of place, as standing for the inception of the thought, and as being the sine qua non of all the allied states, conditioning them much as the roof- tree of a storied house supports all the other combinations of material {iUd, 107). •^ Vedana is a term of very general import, meaning sentience or reaction, bodily or mental, on contact or im- pression. Sensation is scarcely so loyal a rendering as feeling, for though vedana is often qualified as 'born of the contact ' in sense-activity, it is always defined generally as consisting of the three species — pleasure (happiness), pain (ill), and neutral feeling — a hedonistic aspect to which the term 'feeling' is alone adequate. Moreover, it covers representative feeling. This general psychical aspect of vedana, as distinct from sensations localized bodily — e.g., toothache — is probably emphasized by the term 'mental' (cetasikam) in the answer. The Cy. points out that by this expression ( = cittanissitattam) 'bodily pleasure is eliminated' (Asl. 139). It also illustrates the general scope of vedana by the simile of a cook who, after preparing a number of dishes for his lord, tastes each critically to test them, the lord partaking of whichever he pleases. The cook represents all the associated states in the thought- complex, each functioning in one specific way. Vedana, the master, ' enjoys the essence (taste) of the object ' as a whole. 2 Tajja-manovifinanadhatu. Tajj a is paraphrased by anucchavikfi, sarupa. Cf. A. i. 207; S. iv. 215; M. i. 190, 191 ; Mil. 53. On the remainder of the com- tion which is born of contact with thought ; ^ the pleasurable, easeful feeling which is born of contact with thought — this is the feeling that there then is. [4] What on that occasion is perception (s a ii n a) ?2 The perception, the perceiving, the state of having per- ceived which on that occasion is born of contact with the pound term, see § 6. And on the hedonistic expressions in the answer, see § 10. ^ Ceto-samphassajam . . . vedayitam. The latter term (experience) is, more literally, that which is felt, das Empfundene. Ceto, cittam are used interchangeably in the Cy. on these terms (see § 6). The * contact ' is that between idea or object and thought, or the ideating agency, conceived as analogous to the impact between sense-organ and sense-object. In consequence of this contact or pre- sentation, emotional affection arises in consciousness. '^ The apparently capricious way in which the intension of the term sanna is varied in the Pitakas makes it difficult to assign any one adequate English rendering. In the Mahavedalla Sutta (M. i. 293) and elsewhere (c/. Mil. 61) it is explained as the relatively simple form of intellection or cognition which consists in the discernment, recognition, assimilation of sensations — e.g., of colours, as 'blue,' etc. — the process termed in modern English psychology sense- perception, except that it is not quite clear that, in Buddhist psychology, as in English, the perception is made only on occasion of sense-stiimdation. The answer, indeed, in our § 4 alludes to representative activity only. In the Maha- parinibbana Sutta, however {cf. A. v. 105), sanna stands for the intellectual realization of a number of highly complex concepts, such as impermanence, non-substan- tiality, etc. In the Potthapada Sutta (D. i. 180-187), again, the sanna discussed is clearly what we should call con- sciousness, whether as opposed to the unconsciousness of trance, or as the raw material of nanam, or as conceivably distinct from the soul or Ego. Lastly, in a more popular sense the term is used (notably in the Jatakas and in commentators' similes) for sign, mark, or token. Here, if we follow the Cy. (Asl. 110), sail ii a means simply that sense-perception which discerns, recognises and gives class-reference to (upatthita-visaya), the impressions of sense. Its procedure is likened to the carpenter's recog- nition of certain woods by the mark he had made on each ; 8 appropriate element of representative intellection — this is the perception that there then is. [5] What on that occasion is thinking (c e t a n a) ?^ The thinking, the cogitating, the reflection, which is born of contact with the appropriate element of representative intellection — this is the thinking that there then is. [6] What on that occasion is thought (cittam) ? to the treasurer's specifying certain articles of jewelry by the ticket on each ; to the wild animal's discernment in the scarecrow of the work of man. The essence of saiina is said to be recognition by way of a mark. In this notion of mark and marking lies such continuity of thought as may be claimed for the various uses of the term. The bare fact of consciousness means ability to discriminate — that is, to mark. To mark is to perceive. And the ideas or concepts of ' impermanence,' ' impurity,' and the like, were so many acts of marking, though of a highly ' re-representative ' character. Sanna, no less than cittam (see Intro- duction), and 'thought,' stands for both faculty and any act or product of that faculty. And it is even objectified so far as to signify further the result of any such act — that is, in its connotation of mark or sign. It is, I believe, when connoting the more specific sense of faculty, or of skandha, that it may safely be rendered by ' perception ' or ' marking,' and may be taken to mean the relatively ' superficial,' ' transient ' (Asl. 110, 111) play of cognition when concerned with objects of sense. In ch. xiv. of the Visuddhi Magga — in a passage the late Henry C. Warren was good enough to transcribe for me — sanna is in this way, and this way only, distinguished from viiina- nam and panna. The latter terms stand for cognition at (as we might say) a relatively higher and a still higher power, in virtue of the greater depth and complexity of the concepts they were exercised about (see §§6, 16). 1 There is no more difficult problem in interpreting the Dhamma Sangani than to get at the grounds on which its compilers, and subsequently its commentator, saw fit to set out mutually independent descriptions of terms etymologi- cally so identical as cetana and cittam. The only parallel that suggests itself to me is the distinction drawn, during a long period in British philosophy, between * reason- ing ' and ' reason ' — that is, between deductive inference and the nous, or noetic function. Both pairs of terms are quite The thought which on that occasion is ideation, mind, heart, that which is clear, ideation as the sphere of mind, the faculty of mind, intellection, the skandha of intellec- tion, the appropriate element of representative intellection — this is the thought that there then is. popular in form. Compare, e.g., in the Nidana-katha (Jat. i. 74), Buddha's reply to Mara : ' I have here no con- scious (or intelligent) witness. . . . Let this . . . earth, un- conscious though it be, be witness. . . . Sacetano koci sakkhi, etc. . . . ayam acetanapi . . . pathavi sak- khlti.' Again, in A. i., p. 224, the import seems simple and quite untechnical : * Their thoughts (cetana) and hopes (lit., thinking and hoping) are fixed on lower things.' Hence I have kept to terms popular in form. This does not justify the use of terms so undifferentiated as 'thinking' and ' thought ' ; yet I have returned to them, after essaying half a dozen substitutes, for various reasons.