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The three cardinal sources of misery are positive in form. And the five ' Path-factors ' go to constitute what might have been called the Base Eightfold Path. We come, finally, to the third ethical category of a-vyakatam, the Inexplicit or Indeterminate. The subject is difficult if interesting, bringing us as it does within closer range of the Buddhist view of moral causa- tion. The hall-mark of Indeterminate thought is said to be * absence of result'^ — that is, of pleasant or painful result. And there are said to be four species of such ^ Viz, : Anannat'anfiassamitindriyani, aiinin- driyam, aiinatavindriyam. Pp. 86, 96, 97, 150. Cf, Dh. K. *53. '^ Contra, cf, M. i., 184. ^ ^sl. 39. XCll thought: (1) Vipako, or thought which is a result; (2) K i r i y a , or consciousness leading to no result ; (3) form, as outside moral causation ; (4) uncompounded element (or, in later records. Nirvana), as above or beyond the further efficacy of moral causation. Of these four, the third has been dealt with already ; the fourth I cannot discuss here and now.^ It is conceivable that the earlier Buddhists considered their summun honum a subject too ineffably sublime and mysterious for logical and analytical discussion. Two instances, at least, occur to me in the Nikayas,^ where the talk was cut short, in the one case by Gotama himself, in the other by the woman- apostle Dhammadinna, when the interlocutor brought up Nirvana for discussion of this sort. This is possibly the reason why, in a work like our Manual, the concept is pre- sented— in all but the commentarial appendixes — under the quasi-metaphysical term * uncompounded element.' It is classed here as a species of Indeterminate, because, although it was the outcome of the utmost carrying power of good karma, it could, as a state of mind and character, itself work no good effect for that individual mind and character. These represented pure effect. The Arahat could afford to live wholly on withdrawn capital and to use it up. His conduct, speech and thought are, of course, necessarily ' good,' but good with no ' heaping - up ' potency. Of the other two Indeterminates, it is not easy to say whether they represent aspects only of states considered with respect to moral efficacy, or whether they represent divisions in a more rigid and artificial view of moral causa- tion than we should, at the present day, be prepared to maintain. To explain : every thought, word and deed (morally considered) is for us at once the effect of certain antecedents, and the cause, or part of the cause, of sub- sequent manifestations of character. It is a link, both held and holding. But in vipako we have dhammas 1 See Appendix II. ^ g^ ^^ 2I8 ; M. i. 304. XClll considered, with respect to cause, merely as effects; in kiriya^ we have dhammas considered, with respect to effect, as having none. And the fact that both are divided off from Good and Bad — that is to say, from conduct or consciousness considered as causally effective — and are called Indeterminate, seems to point, not to aspects only, but to that artificial view alluded to. Yet in this matter I confess to the greater wisdom of imitating the angels, rather than rushing in with the fools. Life presented itself to the Buddhist much as the Surrey heath appeared to the watchful eyes of a Darwin — as a teeming soil, a khettam,^ where swarmed the seeds of previous karmas waiting for * room,' for opportunity to come to effect. And in considering the seed as potential effect, they were not, to that extent, concerned with that seed as capable of producing, not only its own flower and fruit, but other seed in its turn. However that may have been, one thing is clear, and for us suggestive. Moral experience as result pure and simple was not in itself uninteresting to the Buddhists. In dealing with good and bad dhammas, they show us a field of the struggle for moral life, the sowing of potential well-being or of ill. But in the Avyakatas we are either outside the struggle and concerned with the unmoral E u p a m , or we walk among the sheaves of harvest. From the Western standpoint the struggle covers the whole field of temporal life. Good and bad * war in the members ' even of its Arahats. The ideal of the Buddhist, held as realizable under temporal conditions, was to walk ^ I am indebted to the Eev. Suriyagoda Sumangala, of Eatmalane, Ceylon, for information very kindly given con- cerning the term kiriya or kriya. He defines it as 'action ineffective as to result,' and kiriya-cittam as 'mind in relation to action ineffective as to result.' He adds a full analysis of the various modes of kiriya taught by Buddhists at the present day. 2 ' Origin of Species,' p. 56. A. i. 223, 224. Cf. Asl. 360. XCIV among his sheaves 'beyond the Good and the Bad.'i The Good consisted in giving hostages to the future. His ideal was to be releasing them, and, in a span of final, but glorious existence, to be tasting of the finest fruit of living — the peace of insight, the joy of emancipation. This was life supremely worth living, for ' leben heisst In Freiheit leben und mit freiem Geist !'- The Good, to take his own metaphor, was as a raft bearing him across the stream of danger. After that he was to leave it and go on. *And ye, brethren, learn by the parable of the raft that ye must put away good conditions, let alone bad.'^ It is not easy for us, who have learnt from Plato to call our Absolute the Good and our Ideal a siunmun honum, to sympathize really with this moral standpoint. Critics see in it an aspiration towards moral stultification and self- complacent egoism. Yes, there is little fear but that in the long-run fuller knowledge will bring deeper insight into what in Buddhism is really worthy of admiration for all time. If it is now accused of weakening the concept of individuality by reject- ing soul, and, at the same time, of fostering egoistic morality, it is just possible that criticism is here at fault. On the ruins of the animistic view. Buddhism had to reconstruct a new personality, wholly phenomenal, impermanent, law- determined, yet none the less able, and alone able, by indomitable faith and will, to work out a personal salva- tion, a personal perfection. Bearing this in mind and surveying the history of its altruistic missionary labours, we cannot rashly cast egoistic morality at it to much effect. Nor has it much to fear from charges of stultification, quietism, pessimism and the like. We are misled to a ^ Nietzsche on Buddhism in *Der Antichrist.' 2 A. Pfungst, ' An Giordano Bruno.' ^ See the third quotation, p. vii. xcv certain extent herein by the very thoroughness of its methods of getting at the moral life by way of psychical training. We see, as in our Manual, and other canonical records, elaborate systems for analyzing and cultivating the intellectual faculties, the will and feeling, and we take these as substitutes for overt moral activity, as ends when they are but means. And if the Dhamma-Sangani seems to some calculated to foster introspective thought to a morbid extent, it must not be forgotten that it is not Buddhist philosophy alone which teaches that, for all the natural tendency to spend and be spent in efforts to cope, by thought and achievement, with the world without, * it is in this little fathom-long mortal frame with its thinkings and its notions that the world '^ itself and the whole problem of its misery and of the victory over it lies hid. If I have succeeded to any extent in connecting the contents of this Manual with the rest of the Buddhist Pitakas, it is because I had at my disposal the mass of material accumulated in my husband's MS. Pali dictionary. Besides this, the selection of material for Sections II. and III. of my Introduction is his work. Besides this I owe him a debt of gratitude indefinitely great for advice and criticism generally. ^ See second quotation, p. vii. [BOOK I. THE GENESIS OF THOUGHTS (C i 1 1 u p p a d a - k a n cl a m). I PABT I.—GOOD STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS, Chapter I. The Eight Main Types of Thought relating to the Sensuous Universe (Kamavacara-attha-mahacit- tani).p I.