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[1] Which are the states that are good 9^ When a good thought concerning the sensuous uni- verse^ has arisen, which is accompanied by happiness and associated with knowledge/ and has as its object a ^ The brackets enclosing this and all other headings indicate that the latter have been transposed from the position they occupy in the text. There each heading stands at the end of its section. ■^ See Introduction. ^ Ibid. * Nana-sampayuttani. According to the Cy., a good thought deserves to be thus distinguished on three grounds : from the karma it produces, from the maturity of the faculties it involves, and from the remoteness of mental and moral infirmity which it implies (Asl. 76). Sam- payuttam — lit., con -yoked — is, in the Kathavatthu, quoted by the Cy. (p. 42), described as including the following relations (between one ' state ' and another) : concomitant (s ah a gat a), connate (sahajata), contiguous 1 sigtt,^' a '^btirid, a smell, a taste, a touch,- a [mental] state,^ or what not,* then there is (i) contact (§ 2), (ii) feeling (§ 3), (sarnsattha), having a common origin (ekuppada), a common cessation (ekanirodha), a common basis or embodiment (ekavatthuka),a common object of attention (ekarammana). In the present work the term is sub- sequently rendered by 'connected,' e.g., in § 1007, etc. The preceding adjectival phrase, somanassa-sahagatam, which I have rendered * accompanied by happiness,' is virtually declared by the Cy. to be here equivalent to somanassa-sampayuttam, inasmuch as it is to be interpreted in its fullest intension. Of its five distinguish- able shades of meaning, the one here selected is that of 'conjoined' (samsattham). And of the four distinguish- able connotations of 'conjoined,' the one here selected is that of 'connate.' Hence 'accompanied by' means here 'connate.' And further, inasmuch as the concomitance is not between two corporeal phenomena, or between a corporeal and an incorporeal phenomenon, it is of that persistent and thoroughgoing kind — persisting beyond the common origin — which is described under the word * associated.' Thus far the intricate Buddhaghosa. But I have yet to discover any attempt to analyze the laws governing the process of association between mental states, such as we first find in Aristotle. On ' happiness,' see §§ 10, 18. ^ Ruparammanam, saddarammanarn, etc., i.e,, either as a present sensation or as a representative image relating to the past or future ; in the language of Hume, as an impression or as an idea ; in the more comprehensive German term, as Vorstellung (Asl. 71). See Introduc- tion. ^ Literally, an object that is tangible — the standard Pali term. ^ Dhammarammanam — the 'object,' that is, of re- presentative imagination or ideation (ma no, cittam, Asl., 71), just as a thing seen is the object of sight. Buddhaghosa rejects the opinion that a dhammaram- manam is something outside the range of the senses, and cites M. i. 295, where Sariputta declares that, whereas (iii) perception (§4), (iv) thinking (§ 5), (V) thought (§ 6), (vi) conception (§ 7), (vii) discursive thought (§8), (viii) joy (§ 9), (ix) ease (§ 10), (x) self-collectedness (§11), (xi) the faculty of faith (§ 12), (xii) the faculty of energy (§ 13), (xiii) the faculty of mindfulness (§ 14), (xiv) the faculty of concentration (§ 15), (xv) the faculty of wisdom (^ 16), each sense has its specific field, the mano has all these five fields as its scope. At the moment when an object enters ' the door of the eye ' or other sense, it enters also the door of the ideating faculty causing the consciousness, or one's being, to vibrate (bhavangacalanassa paccayo hoti), just as the alighting bird, at the same moment, strikes the bough and casts a shadow {ibid. 72). — As we might say, presentative cognition is invariably accompanied by representative cognition. — Then, in the course of the mental undulations arising through this disturbance by way of sense impact, one of these eight psychoses termed Mahacittani may emerge. * But in pure representative cognition (suddha-manodvare) there is no process of sensory stimulation,' as when we recall past sense-experi- ence.— The process of representation is illustrated in detail, and completes an interesting essay in ancient psychology. In the case of seeing, hearing, and smell, past pleasant sensations are described as being simply revived during a subsequent state of repose. In the case of taste and touch, it is present disagreeable sensations which suggest certain contrasted experience in the past. But the commentator is not here interested in ' association by contrast ' as such. * Lit., ' or whatever [object the thought] is about.' The gist of the somewhat obscure comment is that, while no new class of objects is here to be understood over and above those of present or past sensations, there is no serial or numerical order in which these " become material for thought. 1—2 (xvi) the faculty of ideation (§ 17), (xvii) the faculty of happiness (§ 18), (xviii) the faculty of vitality (§ 19) ; (xix) right views (§ 20), (xx) right intention (§21), (xxi) right endeavour (§ 22), (xxii) right mindfulness (§ 23), (xxiii) right concentration (§ 24) ; (xxiv) the power of faith (§ 25), (xxv) the power of energy (§ 26), (xxvi) the power of mindfulness (§ 27), (xxvii) the power of concentration (§ 28), (xxviii) the power of wisdom (§ 29), (xxix) the power of conscientiousness (§ 30), (xxx) the power of the fear of blame (§ 31) ; (xxxi) absence of lust (§ 32), (xxxii) absence of hate (§ 33), (xxxiii) absence of dulness (§ 34) ; (xxxiv) absence of covetousness (§ 35), (xxxv) absence of malice (§ 36), (xxxvi) right views^ (§ 37) ; (xxxvii) conscientiousness (§ 38), (xxxviii) fear of blame (§ 39) ; (xxxix, xl) serenity in sense and thought (§§ 40, 41), (xli, xlii) lightness in sense and thought (§§ 42, 43), (xliii, xliv) plasticity in sense and thought (§§ 44, 45), (xlv, xlvi) facility in sense and thought (§§ 46, 47), (xlvii, xlviii) fitness in sense and thought (§§ 48, 49), (xlix, 1) directness in sense and thought (§§ 50, 51) ; (li) mindfulness (§ 52), (Hi) intelligence (§53) (liii) quiet (§ 54) 1 According to Buddhaghosa the ' states ' numbered xxxiv-vi are considered as equivalents of those numbered xxxi-iii respectively, but as taken under another aspect. In the prior enumeration the threefold ' root of good ' is set out ; in the latter, reference to the * path of karma ' is understood (Asl. 129). (liv) insight (§ 55), (Iv) grasp (§ 56), (Ivi) balance (§ 57). Now these — or whatever other incorporeal, causally in- duced states^ there are on that occasion — these are states that are good. [2] What on that occasion is contact (p h a s s o) ?^ ^ Nine other states, according to the Cy., are here im- plied as factors in this psychosis, viz., desire (or conation, or volition, chando), resolve (adhimokkho), attention (manasikaro), equanimity (tatramaj jhattata), pity (karuna), sympathy (mudita), abstinence from evil con- duct in act, speech, and mode of livelihood. And the opening words of this and similar supplementary clauses in the text are coined into a technical term — ye-va- panaka, 'the or- whatever ' [states], — to signify such groups. The Cy. then ' defines ' the nine : desire, qualified as orthodox desire (dhammachando), to distinguish it from ethically undesirable desire {cf. § 1097, etc.), is the wish to act, the stretching forth the hand of the mind {cf. ope^is:) to grasp the object in idea. Kesolve is steadfastness, decision, the being unshaken as a pillar. Attention is movement, direction of the mind, confronting the object. Equanimity — lit., the mean (medium) state — is the being borne along evenly, without defect or excess, without partiality. Pity and sympathy are described in § 258 et seq. The last three give those three factors of the Eight- fold Path unrepresented in the analysis of the thought (Asl. 132, 133). It is not without interest to note that in this supple- mentary category all the purely psychological states are wholly, or at least mainly, volitional or emotional. ^ Touch or contact must be understood in a very general sense, as the outcome of three conditions : an impingeing sentient organ, an impingeing agency conceived as external to the sentient organ, and impact or collision. The similes in Mil. 60 of the rams and the cymbals are quoted in the Cy.