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A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics of the Fourth Century B.C - Caroline A. F. Rhys Davids, 1900 - Complete Book

English

They show the close connection between the Buddhist pair of terms, instead of obscuring it ; they are equally popular and vague in form and extension; the import of cetana has much in common with a psychological account of thinking ; no term misfits cittam less than * thought,' unless it be * heart,' on which see Introduction. It is unfortunate that Buddha- ghosa does not give a comparative analysis of the two, as he does in the case of vitakka-vicara and piti-sukham. Under cetana he expatiates in forcible similes, describing it as a process of activity and toil, and as a co-ordinating, order- ing function. He likens it to an energetic farmer, bustling about his fifty-five labourers (the fifty-five co-constituents in the thought-complex) to get in the harvest ; to a senior apprentice at the carpenter's, working himself and supervis- ing the tasks of the others ; to the leader of a warrior band, fighting and inciting. To these notions the definition of Nagasena (Mil. 61) only adds that of preparing (abhisan- kharanam), the other qualifying term being merely a denominative form (as if we should say ' thinkifying ') . In so far, then, as ' thinking ' connotes representative, co-ordinative intellection, it coincides with cetana. In its narrower, technical sense of intellection by way of general notions, it does not (see Introduction). Any way, to call it * thinking ' is sufficiently indefinite, and does not preclude the rendering of it elsewhere by such terms as ' reflecting,' * cogitating,' ' considering,' etc. But the problem has still 10 [7] What on that occasion is conception (vitakko)?^ The ratiocination, the conception, which on that occasion is the disposition,^ the fixation, the focussing,^ the applica- to be solved of how it is related to such terms as sarin a, c it tarn, and vinnanam. With regard to skandha, it is classed, not with cittam, but under the sankhara- skandha, § 62. Cittam, together with the terms in which it is de- scribed, is discussed in my Introduction. ^ Vitakko and vicaro is another pair of terms which it is hard to fit with any one pair of English words. It is very possible that academic teaching came to attach a more preg- nant and specialized import to them than was conveyed in popular and purely ethical usage. Cf, M. i., Suttas xix. and XX., where vitakka would be adequately rendered by ideas, notions, or thoughts. In Asl. 114, 115, on the other hand [cf. Mil. 62, 63), the relation of the two to cittam and to each other is set out with much metaphor, if with too little psychological grasp. Vitakko is distinctively mental procedure at the inception of a train of thought, the deliberate movement of voluntary attention. As a king ascends to his palace leaning on the arm of favourite or relative, so thought ascends to its object depending upon the conceptive act (vitakko; Asl. 114). Other metaphorical attributes are its impingeing upon, circum-impingeing upon (paryahanam), the object, and, again, bringing it near. Hence in selecting ' conception ' in preference to 'reasoning,' by which vitakko has often been translated, I wished to bring out this grasping, constructive, reaching-out act of the mind, this incipient fetch of the imagination, elaborated in the Buddhist scholastic analysis of the term ; but I had no wish to read our own logical or psychological import of con- ception as intellection by way of general notions, or the like, into the Eastern tradition. Yet just as conception may be so used as to include 'reasoning' or 'ratiocination,' so vitakko is, in the reply, described by takko, the term used for ratiocinative procedure, argument, or logic {cf. D. i. 12, 21). 'What,' asks the Cy., 'does one reason about (takkesi) ? About a pot, a cart, the distance of anything. Well, vitakko is a stronger reasoning.' 2 On * disposition,' ' right intention,' see § 21. '■^Appana vyappana, the latter an intensive form of the former (Asl. 142, 143). In the ' Yogavacara's Manual ' (p. xi and passim) appana denotes the dawn of the desired 11 tion of the mind,^ right intention — this is the conception that there then is. [8] What on that occasion is discursive thought (vicaro) ?^ The process, the sustained procedure (vicaro), the progress and access [of the mind] which on that occasion is the [continuous] adjusting and focussing of thought^ — this is the discursive thought that there then is. [9] What on that occasion is joy (pit i) ?* concept during the practice of regulated meditation. Bud- dhaghosa defines it thus: — ekaggam cittam arammane appenti. ^ Cetaso abhiniropana = arammane cittam . . . patitthapeti (ibid.) ^Vicaro, as compared with vitakko, was used to express the movement and maintenance of the voluntary thought- continuum, as distinguished from the initiative grappling with the subject of reflection. Examining in detail, as com- pared with grasping the whole, is also read into it by com- mentators (Asl. 114). It is a pounding up (anumajja- nam), as well as a linking together. Metaphors are multiplied, to show its relation to vitakko. It is as the reverberation of the beaten drum or bell is to the beating; as the planing movement of the bird's wings after the initial upsoaring ; as the buzzing of the bee when it has alighted on the lotus; as the scouring of the dirty bowl when clutched; as the manipulating hand of the potter, vitakko being represented by the hand which holds the clay to the wheel, and so on. * Investigation ' would well represent the sustained activity ; ' analysis,' the cogitation in details ; ' discursive thought ' gives some of the import of both, without introducing modern and Western implications. ^ Like the adjusting of bow and arrow. ' Focussing ' is anupekkhamano. ^ Piti, as distinguished from sukham, is explicitly ex- cluded from the skandha of feeling, considered as the irreducible hedonic constituent, and referred to the composite psychoses of the sankhara skandha. It con- notes emotion, as distinct from bare feeling ; that is to say, piti is a complex psychical phenomenon, implying a ' central psycho-physical origin ' and a widely diffused ' somatic resonance ' (ef. Sully, ' The Human Mind,' ii. 56). 12 The joy which on that occasion is gladness, rejoicing at, rejoicing over, mirth and merriment, feHcity,^ exultation, transport of mind^ — this is the joy that there then is. [10] What on that occasion is ease (s u k h a m) ?^ It arises out of a present idea, and suffuses the whole being. By Buddhaghosa's day it was divided into five species : the thrill of joy, just causing * the flesh to creep ' ; the flash of joy, like lightning ; the flood of joy, like the breakers on a sea-shore ; ecstasy or transport, in which the subject could float in the air ; and overwhelming suffusing joy (Asl. 115, 116). Instances are related of the fourth species (ubbega-piti), the inspiring idea being 'Buddharammanam^ (see also Visuddhi Magga, ch. iv. ; *Yogavacara's Manual,' vii.). The same word (ubbego) is used to describe the anguish or trembling over guilt discovered. See below, § 31 n. ^ Vitti, meaning literally, as the Cy. points out, prosperity, wealth, and used here by analogy as a state conditioned by a source of pleasure. ' Happiness arises to him who is joyful through his joy, as it arises to the wealthy through his rice-possessions.' (Asl. 143.) ^ Attamanata cittassa. Buddhaghosa, who did not know the true etymology of this term, is ready as ever with a guess : attano manata, or mentality of one's self, not of another, subjective experience. If I am pained or pleased, that is peculiarly my aft'air (ibid.). Psychologically it is interesting to note that he is prepared to find this intimate, subjective reference in a state of intense feeling. * Feeling is subjective experience jjar excellence . . . our feelings . . . are all our own.' (Sully, ' The Human Mind,' ii. 2 ; G. C. Eobertson, ' Elements of Psychology,' 185-188.) ^ To contrast piti with sukham, Buddhaghosa draws a charming picture of the traveller who, fordone with journeying through a desert, hears with joy of a pool in a grove, and with joy comes upon it, and who, on drinking, bathing, and resting in the shade is filled with ease. Sukham, it is true, is not bare quiescence ; it is positive, pleasurable feeling, and may have active concomitants; its * essence ' is expansion or increase ( u p a b r u h a n a m ) . But just as dukkham means, not so much pain as ill-being or misery, so does sukham mean well-being or sane and sound csenaesthesis.